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
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MERCHANT'S MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY

WILLIAM B. DANA!

VOLUME SIXTY-ONE,

FROM JULY TO DECEMBER, INCLUSIVE, 1869.

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VOLUME LXI.

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T H E
MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE
AND
COMMERCIAL REVIEW

J U L Y , 1 8 6 9.

THE COMMERCIAL CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY.

The general condition of the industrial and commercial affairs, though not what could be desired, is yet far from affording justification of those gloomy ratiocinations in which our prophets of evil periodically indulge. For the last five years, we have often heard that we were on the eve of an unprecedented panic, which as a severe but effectual remedy, was to rectify our money derangements, explode the prevailing inflation, and place affairs generally upon a sound basis. These anticipations have kept capitalists in a state of constant fear, checking the employment of their money in industrial pursuits and inducing large investments in securities and real estate, with a consequent inflation of their value. It is, however, to be noted that the predicted catastrophe has not yet arrived. We have had several more or less severe spasms, partly the result of

these apprehensions, partly of irregularities in our deranged finances, and partly of extremes in the inflation of securities; but, after each crisis affairs have lapsed back into their former position. We have even withstood the effect of excessive importation and of European panics which, in former times, would have resulted in disturbing our entire commercial system.

There evil forebodings have been based upon an imperfect comprehension of the situation of the country, and the agencies by which its derangements are to be adjusted. The really effective correctives of an unsound condition of a nations commerce are natural. The evils themselves have a self corrective tendency; and though the remedy may come slowly, yet, where there is a reasonable degree of freedom from extraneous restrictions, they come with all the certainty of natural results. The violent convulsions are the consequence of conventional restrictions; and panics are to be expected when and where those restrictions check the national operations of affairs. These views receive confirmation from the fact that, for the last four years, the business of the country, so far from working toward the culmination of a panic, has been fundamentally improving. By this we do not mean to imply that some interests, especially the strictly commercial, have not sustained losses, and that depression and complaint have not been more or less general; but that, in spite of all this, there has been a steady return of our labor and industries to the employments called for by a condition of peace; that more attention has been paid to those branches of industry which lay at the basis of national prosperity and abundance; that there has been an increased production of those commodities which were relatively scarce and therefore dear; and that, in this way, we have made rapid progress toward a normal relation between the several branches of industry. The prosperity of the agricultural interest, in a certain sense at the expense of the manufacturing and trading interests, has, with favorable seasons, induced such an increased production of breadstuffs that we now have low prices of grain, to the general advantage of the whole community. The same process has been in operation in the cotton trade; and although the result cannot, for evident reasons, come so rapidly, yet it is easy to see that the period is not far distant when the price of the great staple of clothing will range upon a level with the reduced value of breadstuffs. These are most encouraging symptoms of recovery, for the cheapness of food and clothing lays at the basis of moderate values for all other products, and of necessity must be followed by lower wages and lower prices, which, in a free community, are always accompanied with abundance and prosperity.

Very fortunately also the seasons favor a continuance of this recuperative tendency. The abundant harvest of last year is likely to be followed

by another year of plenty. A large area of land has been placed under grain, and the condition of the crops is everywhere reported to be highly satisfactory; so that favorable weather is the only remaining condition requisite to an abundant supply of grain. Reports from Europe also are satisfactory as to the prospects of the next harvest. We are evidently, therefore, in a position to recover at an early day the old position in respect to stocks of breadstuffs, the main essential to a permanently lower scale of prices for grain. The prospects of the cotton crop are, on the whole, encouraging. Reports from the South do not indicate the probability of any extraordinary yield; but a considerable acreage has been planted, and the condition of the crop, as a whole, is promising; so that a moderate increase upon the crop of 1868-9 may be reasonably anticipated. This prospect perhaps would not justify the expectation of a decided fall in the price of the staple; for stocks of cotton throughout the world are low, and only a succession of abundant crops could place the stocks of raw material and of goods in the condition which would necessitate a settling to permanently lower prices. It may, however, be safely calculated that, with ordinary seasons, the South will henceforth steadily augment its crop; the cultivation of cotton being highly profitable, while the means of the planters are steadily accumulating, and their labor resources, though too limited, have proved to be reliable.

The condition of the public finances also affords ground for congratulation and confidence. The public debt has assumed a more consolidated form, and there is no longer the occasion of an unsettling of monetary affairs by the retiring of the short obligations of the Government. The necessary financial operations of the Treasury are now conducted, apparently as far as possible, upon a settled and known policy, enabling the public to calculate definitely upon the movements of the Department, and thereby obviating the surprises and frequent derangements to which the money market has been subject from this source. In the public departments a process of moderation of expenditures has been inaugurated which are likely to be kept in force, and from which we may anticipate an extended reduction of the public debt or a diminution of the burthens of taxation.

Putting together all these facts, there is really substantial ground for the moderation of the chilling apprehensions so long entertained and for increased confidence among capitalists in the employment of their means in production and commercial enterprises. All the natural forces at our command are working together to effect a more rapid recuperation than has followed any of the great wars of the Old World; and nothing can more effectually promote their beneficial issue than the ready co-operation of those who control the accumulated resources of the country.

There remains much to be done in the adjustment of our financial derangements; but nothing can so effectively promote that work as the growth of activity and confidence in the employment of capital, and especially in production.

THE SOUTH.

BY W. L. TRENHOLM, ESQ*

It is no new thing in modern history for a people to live out more than one phase of civilization. The genius of Egyptian labor, the grace of Grecian art, the power of Roman law, the honor of Mediæval chivalry—had, indeed, each in turn, flowered and passed away, but England, France and Germany have perpetually renewed, in changed institutions, the vigor of their national life, and it is to modern, and not to ancient instances, that we must look for the true type of our own civilization.

Death is the consummation, not the condemnation of life, and the institutions of a people, like the bodies of men, must die in order that the souls which animate them may live. Hence it is no reproach to our past to say that it had accomplished its allotted days, and that its dissolution was the natural process by which we have emerged into a new and larger life. Looking back now upon the dead past of the South, we need not blush for it, for its life was vigorous and fruitful. It is true that long ago the world condemned slavery, but the world has never known it as we have known it, and history will yet do us justice, for it must record how difficult its duties were and how faithfully and successfully we discharged them. Half a century before the war when the slave trade ceased, the South contained less than a million souls of the African race; when the war occurred they had increased to upwards of four millions. These four million descendants of savages were more orderly and moral than the same class in any other civilized country, and they remain so up to the present moment, notwithstanding the temptations and privations of the war, the license of sudden freedom and the bad advice of political agitators. They were deeply imbued with the principles of Christianity, insomuch that since emancipation they have cheerfully devoted their scanty earnings to the building and maintenance of churches and schools, and the establishment of charitable societies; their intellectual powers were stimulated and improved as far as they logically could be in a condition of slavery, and were sufficiently developed to furnish a stimulus for continued effort, and to constitute the basis of their future self improvement.

* Portions of an address delivered by W. L. Trenholm, Esq., on the third anniversary of the Charleston Board of Trade.

Slavery was something more than a contrivance for consolidating labor with capital; it was a discipline for both races, a school for the formation of character. As far as slavery and our administration of it are amenable to moral judgment, it must be judged by its influence upon the maturity, and not by its impression upon the pupillage of those whom God placed under its restraints. The masters as well as the slaves, the whites as well as the blacks, learned many noble lessons in life at this discontinued school. Providence and forecast for dependents, indulgence of the weak, and an habitual consciousness of responsibility upon the part of those invested with power—the obligations of honor, the force of character, the power of self reliance, the sanctity of individual rights, the elevation of dignity above gain, of worth above wealth, were all acquired there and are characteristics of which we had a right to be proud, and to which we should still tenaciously cling.

Outside our own limits we exercised an influence for good, the effect of which is conspicuous all over the United States. While New England was exploring communism and dissipating personal identity and responsibility, the South was perfecting the ideal of the individual. When the great flood of the Democracy at the North had obliterated all venerable landmarks and levelled all society, the South elevated still higher her ancient families and historic names to point a contrast which should abash the levellers. When the West was all one human river, rolling ever over new soils and territories, retaining nothing, preserving nothing, but pursuing all things, untill home meant a camp and companionship was an encumbrance, the South rested tranquilly within her ancient borders, inhabited still her ancestral mansions, and cultivated attachment to the soil, repose and contentment.

It is not necessary to weigh the value of the contributions to the now harmonising national character, which have been made by the different sections of our common country. Before the war we stood too widely opposed in all the relations of life for our various qualities to combine, but now the quick intellect and fertile invention of the East, the large aims and broad culture of the North, the restless spirit and boundless ambition of the West, the conservative tenacity and intrepid courage of the South, will all become interwoven and form one substantial and well defined American national character.

Planted at the opposite poles of human development, the North at the social and the South at the individual, our contrary systems strained the bond of union and would have rent it asunder. One-half century ago the separation would have been inevitable, but the characteristic of the present age is unification. We have seen the ancient principalities of Italy brought together into a single nationality; we have seen the great

Tuetonic Fatherland restored to unity and a common destiny ; we hear from afar the murmur of pan-Sclavonic aspirations ; we have seen the combined power of Europe invoked to keep down a little longer the unconquerable yearnings of Grecian consanguinity. Our late opposing sections, too, have felt the hand of Providence constraining us to draw closer together, and having in the past been severally spinning the web and the woof, we are to-day uniting them in the firm texture of a common and uniform nationality.

At the North government and society have been approximating the Southern type ; individuality has been emancipated from communism, the rank license of thought and speech has been restrained within the bounds of decorum, propriety has become more influential than extravagance, and distinction is no longer conferred by wealth alone.

At the South similar and correlative changes have turned the current of our future development towards the Northern ideal. Here authority has been deprived of its prerogative, personal distinction is being eclipsed by representative prominence, expediency shares the influence which used to belong to sentiment alone, reason is more consulted than usage, inducement is used rather than compulsion, public advantage prevails over private pretension.

All the elements of character and society which formerly were bent in one direction are now straining in that which is the opposite, and yet the one as much as the other will bear us onward to prosperity. When a ship, which seeks her port against an adverse wind with all her sails aslant, has won the utmost limit of her tack, and turning sharp athwart her former course hauls round her yards and spreads her canvas for a changed career, the seamen's science tell him that her progress is still onward ; and so may we, if we look to principles and not to appearances, be assured that the South is moving still onward to the haven of her hopes—whether her prow points northwardly or southwardly.

While we rejoice in the assurance of general progress, we are, nevertheless, not all free from apprehension as to the future of individual interests ; we look back upon the crude communism of the North as we remember it in the past, and cling still more fondly to the protection of our ancient safeguards. This is natural, but it is not altogether justified by reason, for we are approaching their civilization from the opposite side to that at which they entered it ; we are moving to meet them, we are not following in their steps. When once these currents shall have mingled, their united stream cannot flow upward to the source of either.

Apart from reason and interest, many of us are still held back by a sentiment which all must respect, but to which none ought to yield ; our destiny is not our own to make or mar as we like, but we must conform

to the requirements of our times and move to the cadence of the great march of the world. The feudal barons built lofty towers to shield their tenants and their herds in lawless times, but now those empty strongholds stand in picturesque decay upon the hills that look down on the peaceful Rhine, untenanted by man or beast, serving no purpose but to adorn the landscape, while on the level plains below a thousand humbler dwellings give the shelter and security of home to a more numerous and a happier people. So it is with us. Our castled crags of individualism have become obsolete. He who still abides there chooses solitude and proud penury; those who descend to the vineyards below will find liberty and prosperity, peace and companionship.

Let none imagine that they who join this movement are doing any wrong to their ancestors whose effigies stand in the niches of the ancient walls. The institutions, the laws, the manners of the past, subserved their purpose and fulfilled their destiny. God imposed them, God has changed them. "What is man that he should contend with the Almighty?" In the past we and those who, alas, are buried with it, did our duty according to the requirements of our circumstances, but now other duties wait upon us, and different circumstances encompass us. We must explore our new times, discover the resources and take possession of the opportunities that lie before us. To this task we must bring courage and patience, minds unfettered by prejudice, and eyes undazzled by authority; we must be intrepid enough to give offence to ignorance, we must forget to defer to senility, we must learn to respect energy and to make use of youth. Let the true and the wise direct our counsels; let the brave and the young march in the van; let the infirm and the timid follow safely in the rear. Thus and thus only can we advance, thus and thus only can we achieve.

With common ends in view, and common objects to attain, our energies should be united, and a common sentiment should pervade our minds. It is easy for men to be combined under the constraint of authority. The influence of position, the prestige of fame, place a sceptre in the hands of distinction by which unthinking minds are swayed, and indolent dispositions directed. Such union constitutes the power of empire, it consolidates energy, it represses independence of thought and action, it is strong for conquest but weak in defence, it may win renown but it drives off prosperity. This is not the combination we should seek—our new condition must be a republic or it will be nothing; no single mind can solve its varied problems, no single character can prevail against its difficulties. The solid front of voluntary combination, the irresistible movement of intelligence freely massed and understanding its aims, are the only forces that can avail against the obstacles in the way of that

kind of progress which is alone worthy of our efforts and our aspirations. Look abroad upon the world and contrast the two systems of combination—see Asia stagnating and Continental Europe heaving under the power of empire, while England has just renewed the glory of her history in the last great triumph she has given to public opinion. The vast globe itself is not too large to be filled with the reverberation of England's mighty shout as the statue of liberty is raised above the ancient seat of unjust privilege and oppressive prerogative.

Governments and all social establishments derive their sanction from their usefulness; under the common law of modern civilization each may be summoned to the bar of the public opinion of the world and put upon the vindication of its existence. We who have learned only lately what it is to have a government over us, in which, for the moment, we can take no part, should feel the utmost interest in the sovereignty of the great public opinion of civilized mankind. It is the only tribunal to which we can appeal, the only power strong enough to protect us. The disabilities under which the South once stood in that high court are now removed; the world is growing more just to our past; and is warmly drawn to us in sympathy for our present condition. To-day we stand among the other civilized communities of the world wearing the court dress of free labor which the age prescribes, no longer obliged to plead our rights to equality and respect.

The present age has brought all mankind very near together; through the rapidity of communication it has multiplied the reciprocal ties between distant communities, and has enlarged the interests which are in common among widely spreading populations. Humanity has become the prevailing passion of our time; the brotherhood of man, which Christ preached eighteen hundred years ago, is only now being practically accepted by the world which crucified Him. But now the world is heartily in earnest; Christian charity has become more universal than Christian faith, and labors of love are more abundant than prayers and penances. We who appreciate the past history of the Southern people know that in the office of humanity they were entitled to rank with any other community. We know that the Roman discipline of the plantation was tempered with patriarchal benevolence—that subordination went hand in hand with familiar intimacy, and that courtesy was shown to age, however humble, and respect accorded to merit, even in a slave. The time must come when the world will do us justice in these things, and we should boldly claim it of the world, and not stultify our past and embitter our future by suffering the freedmen of the South to be persuaded that they have heretofore suffered wrongs at our hands or are likely hereafter to be defrauded of their rights by the restoration to power of those who are entitled to control the State Governments at the South.

The obligations of honor and humanity in which our childhood was educated still bind us to the African race; they have still the claim upon us that weakness has upon strength, that ignorance has upon knowledge that want has upon wealth. Their new relations to us have enlarged the area of our common interests. Formerly we were materially interested in their physical and moral well-being only, now we have a still more important interest in their intellectual improvement. However premature and hazardous we may rightly think the enfranchisement of the negroes, we cannot fail to see that it is irrevocable, and since whatever danger there may be, comes from their ignorance and not from their malevolence, it is our interest as well as our duty to see that their ignorance is enlightened by education. Education is not dependent upon schools, nor does it necessarily rest upon reading or writing—these are best, but they are not essential; and, meanwhile, until these can be afforded, let us lose no opportunity of advising and encouraging these simple people in the difficulties and perplexities of their new responsibilities. We need not fear that the African race will ever impose its inferior culture upon the Caucasian—where we voluntarily abandon the field, they may walk in and occupy it, if we should unwisely exclude them from political association with us, and drive them back upon themselves, they will find leaders of their own blood or of ours, and will make their influence felt; but if we resume the personal intercourse of the past with them, retain their affection and continue to deserve their confidence, they will not be slow to learn that what is our good is theirs, what brings prosperity to us brings it to them, and that as we are able to think better than they so they will do well to listen to our counsel and support our measures. To gain their confidence we need not soil our hands with intrigue nor stoop to become sycophants; they have been studying us all their lives and know when we are in earnest; our kindly and sincere purposes towards them will be most appreciated when least demonstrative, and our own position is sufficiently assured to make us absolutely free to approach them frankly, unaffectedly and in the open light of day.

Such intercourse is not repugnant to our habits, it is not inconsistent with either the past or present relations of the two races, it is in harmony with the great law of Christian charity and is plainly pointed out by the most practical common sense. Once established it can never be again interrupted, because its benefits will be too much appreciated ever to be resigned. Let equal justice for all be once fairly established, let mistrust and suspicion be dispelled, let law be seated above politics, and truth and justice preferred before party, and the future of the South becomes assured. Then may we widen the basis of our prosperity enlarge the area of our enterprise, multiply the employments, the inter-

ests and the aspirations of our people. Nature has set no limit to our development; the genial soil of the South would nourish a very much larger population than that now inhabiting it; our facilities for manufacture are abundant, our mineral resources are almost untouched, our harbors and rivers are sufficient for all the commerce of the Atlantic.

We need population and capital—the one will come if we open our doors; the other will follow if we assure it of protection. The thirteen Southern States, excluding Maryland and Delaware, with an area of 830,000 square miles, contained in 1860 11,500,000 inhabitants, which is less than fourteen to the square mile. If all the South were as densely populated as South Carolina, it would contain nearly 24,000,000 inhabitants; if it were as densely peopled as New England, the number would be 40,000,000 and over. That the population of the South did not increase in the same ratio as that of other parts of the United States, is notorious. Our northern frontier, although washed by the living tide which has flowed even up to the base of the Rocky Mountains, was almost a barrier to immigration. Between 1850 and 1860, the foreign born population of the Northern States increased 2,550,000; that of the Southern States only 325,000, or as eight to one; yet according to the census of 1860, only one acre in every seven at the South was "improved," while at the North one in every five was "improved." In Illinois, farms were worth on an average twenty dollars an acre; in Alabama, nine dollars an acre; yet undoubtedly at the South the best lands only in each State were under cultivation.

It is trite to say that slavery was the cause of this difference, yet few who are ready with this explanation have considered in what way immigration was prevented by slavery. It has been customary to ascribe the hindrance to moral causes, to speak of the "instincts of freedom," and other supposed sentimental objections; but such explanations are unphilosophical and untrue. Immigrants had certainly been taught, by the experience of those who had tried it, that the South was not the place for them, but the causes that excluded them were physical and not moral; they were economic and not sentimental; they arose not from any obloquy attaching to labor at the South, but from the fact that here slavery mobilized the laboring population and enabled it to be massed together in large force, to be rapidly moved from place to place and to occupy new and rich soils just as soon as these became accessible to immigrants. Under ordinary circumstances, the native population of a country is permanently seated; attachment to the soil and the ties of family retain it until its density becomes excessive, and emigration is embraced as the alternative to hopeless poverty. If such conditions had obtained at the South, or if slavery here had not been contemporaneous with the extra-

ordinary facilities for transmigration which the present century has introduced, the original slave States would probably have contained to-day the eleven millions which constitute the Southern population, and European immigration would long since have filled up all the rest of our present territory. But when the whole intelligence of the South was intent upon discovering the best and richest soils, when its whole capital was available for their acquisition and its whole laboring population ready to occupy them, the immigrant found himself at a hopeless disadvantage. Without capital or credit, he came in competition with the master of many slaves, and found the best soils preoccupied; being alone he earned less and spent more in living than the slave, for combination augments production and economizes consumption.

The mobility of our laboring population not only excluded immigrants from our new territory and prematurely diminished the laboring population of the older States, but in these the slaves became massed together as the competition of the West came to be more and more felt. Thus profitable planting required large capital and small proprietors were at a disadvantage. Free labor was too expensive for both laborer and employer, hence many were forced to emigrate; and so extensive was this emigration that the census of 1860 showed that of the white persons then living in the United States, who had been born in South Carolina, 277,000 only remained at home, while 193,000 were permanently settled in other States. North Carolina retained 634,000 and had parted with 272,000. Virginia retained 1,000,000 and had sent off 400,000 of her native white population. The same cause practically prohibited manufactures, because manufactures even more than agriculture depend upon fixity of population. Cheapness of living, uniformity and regularity in the supply of the necessities of life, are conditions which must be in existence in every locality before manufacturing becomes possible there. These conditions cannot obtain where population is shifting, nor will capital consent to permanent investment where values fluctuate with the movements of nomadic labor.

With the extinction of slavery, the South presents to immigration an entirely different aspect. Our native population, no longer migratory, is already beginning to find the country too large, and to conjecture how immigration can be reconciled with conservatism. Our foreign-born citizens, few in number, but intelligent and prosperous, are earnestly and actively engaged in inviting their countrymen to try their fortunes here, while the attitude towards immigration assumed by our newly enfranchised classes, reflects infinite credit alike upon their good sense and their patriotism, and entitles them to participate throughout the future in the benefits of a broad and liberal public policy. Let us everywhere at the

South yield to this impulse of the times. The great popular mind has fastened upon immigration as the foremost measure of the day. Its ultimate triumph admits of no question, and yet, in many a private circle, in many an ancient coterie, doubts and apprehensions are still entertained. Many an empty privilege—many a useless custom—the lumbering rubbish which collects in old communities—may be borne away upon this vigorous flood. Some venerable and worthy relics, too, may be lost; but it is better to lose the relics of antiquity than to make no bequests to posterity. The past did its duty and is dead; but we live upon its works. Let us likewise do our duty, that our children may in turn live upon ours. Fling wide your doors to immigration and compel them to come in—not barbarians, to be beasts of burden, but intelligent, thrifty, liberty-loving men, and healthy, industrious and virtuous women. Welcome all alike, whether they be laborers or capitalists, artisans or merchants. Establish just laws, and watch jealously over their impartial administration; see that labor is assured of its earnings; that property is made sacred; that wealth is effectually guarded against public and private assault. Let the inviolability of the person and the sanctity of the human life receive the most impressive sanction of our courts; let the public peace be maintained with the truncheon of the policeman and not the bayonet of the soldier; let the public expenditures be directed to the ends of good government, and not to the nourishment of party.

Long before these things are all accomplished, before even we shall all be of the same mind as to their merit, the tide of immigration will be upon us. Our soil is too accessible and too fertile, and our climate too pleasant and healthful to be passed by for the distant and inhospitable regions where alone public lands are still offered to the immigrant. Agriculture in the South presents now greater inducements to the farmer than to the planter, science and mechanical invention are more effective than muscular force, varied production is more lucrative than the culture of a single staple. The immigrant will find his intelligence appreciated, his skill available, his thrift profitable; our population will become fixed, living will be cheaper, manufactures will be possible, trade will become more active and more ramified, our country towns will grow, our cities will be multiplied and will become more populous. Occupation and opportunity will be found for all; native talent and industry will have freer scope and larger reward than ever before, while new-comers will be no longer feared as rivals, but welcomed as allies.

The dense populations of the Eastern and Middle States can spare us a large number of immigrants, whose education, enterprise and capital will be of vast consequence to our early prosperity. The inducements the South holds out to this class are sufficient to bring them without

other invitation, but the people of the South owe it to themselves to meet the first-comers in a manly spirit. It would be unworthy of us to take a mercenary view of such a question, and hence I say nothing of expediency; but it is becoming in us, because it is manly and generous, to give a frank and honest welcome to those who are personally worthy of it, whether they were with us or against us in the past. After the Revolution, the fratricidal passion which had arrayed Whig against Tory, was banished from the heroic breasts of the victors and vanquished alike; and we who have so conspicuously imitated the courage of our ancestors, need not be ashamed of emulating their generosity. The advent of strangers, however welcome they may be, cannot fail to have the effect of drawing closer together all the classes of our native and old adopted population. There is something in old associations which cannot be entirely expelled from the human breast, and we shall all stand more firmly together when in the presence of those who do not share in our memories of the past. With ranks recruited, energies refreshed, hopes elated, we of the South may move forward to the occupation of our future with the assurance which reason gives to those who are provided with the means to command success. In that future the South will find a destiny which to us who must bear the burdens of the march, is not yet revealed in all its fullness—but we already see enough to incite us to advance with energy and intrepidity. Great effort and great sacrifice will be demanded of us; the sacrifice must be individual, but the effort must be in common. He who is conscious of being worthy to be a leader must be content to take a place in the ranks; he who is ambitious of being the first to scale the wall must abide by the wagons if need be; he who loves solitude must be ready to rush into the thickest of the fray. Thus will personal sacrifice minister to public advantage, and the common good will grow by common effort.

Let us array ourselves in panoply of enthusiasm—proof against the petty darts of prejudice and affectation—and, shoulder to shoulder, bear down the barriers of ignorance and obstruction; we need no leaders, but we will find representative men; we need no crowned authority, but we will stand under the free banners of public opinion—the ruler of the world, the arbiter of the destinies of nations. Public opinion is the Melchisidech of our age, receiving tribute from all mankind, allowing empire or conducting revolution, anointed of God, the King of Peace. Within the limits of its wide influence no wrong can stand uncondemned, no lie can remain unrebuked, but truth, however homely, is made honorable—rights, however humble, are exalted to power. There the human mind is free, no antique usage nor obsolete tradition fetters human speech, for public opinion can live only in the atmosphere of liberty; it is the spirit of truth, the interpreter of revelation—the only *vox populi vox dei*.

When thought and speech are not free from prejudice and fashion, from the domination of party or the dictation of caucus, that which calls itself public opinion is a usurper; for when the mind is not free truth is imprisoned in her own citadel and her standard still floating above the outer wall, becomes the emblem of successful falsehood.

To establish among us forever the true and the right, it is only necessary that every man should assert absolute independence of thought and speech, and accord the same to every other man. This is no easy task; it devolves especially upon the young and the brave, the honest hearted and the humble minded, for liberty does not come of pride, but of humility; not of strength, but of courage; not of experience, but of aspiration. Upon all sides there is work to be done, error to be exposed, truth to be illustrated. In our courthouses and workshops, upon the marts of commerce, in the fields of agriculture, wherever men are called to labor with the arm or the brain, we need clear heads, strong hearts, steady hands—not to dictate but to enlighten; not to lead, but to encourage; not to control, but to point out. Thus and thus only will our whole population advance in harmony and with unity of purpose. A people so moved and being in unison with the great prevailing principle of their times, acquire a momentum in the direction of greatness which is irresistible.

The greatness of a people is not measured in modern times by the altitude of one class above another, but by the common elevation of the whole. Rise high your highest, but leave not the lowly low; let merit be exalted, let intelligence soar among the clouds, but leave no human being to struggle alone with the degradation that drags him still downward, leave none in the darkness of ignorance, deny to none the warmth of sympathy, and above all heap no contumely on the head of the humblest aspirant for honor and position. Thus will all unite in building up a glorious future, where all may dwell in happiness and honor, and where our public greatness will be a perpetual *Te Deum*; for there is a grand harmony in the mingling emotions of a free community; when the solemn ground-tone of earnest masses, the vast swell of pervading enthusiasm, the whole diapason of human aspirations, pour their united torrent upward and fill the ear of Heaven with man's great *laborare est orare*, while pure and clear as the treble of a silver bugle the dominating idea of the epoch gives articulate language to the tumultuous concord.

THE BANK RESERVES.

We publish this month tables showing the reserves of the National Banks, and the aggregate returns of the banks in each State of the Union as reported on the 17th April under the new law requiring five reports a

year under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency. There are two points in regard to these tables which are worthy of attention. First, they are made up for some past day designated by Mr. Hulburt, and the abuse of preparing for their statements is at an end. To give such statistics their full value, they must offer faithful and impartial records of the average condition of the banks. Now it is notorious that under the old system this was not so. The banks everywhere were tempted to prepare for their quarterly reports. They were anxious to offer a strong statement, and they knew beforehand on what day it would be made up. Their credit with the department and their position before the public depended in part upon their success in showing a strong position in these reports, which are not only sent to Washington but are published by law in the newspapers. Hence the very mischievous practice grew up of calling in loans, of gathering greenbacks into their coffers, and of making other adroit disposition of their assets so as to show a large proportion of reserves to liabilities. Now the thing that is wanted is to make the banks always strong in reserve. The new law does this, at least, in part. For it requires the statement to be made up whenever the Comptroller may order it. The banks are therefore liable at any time to be called upon, and they cannot strengthen themselves so as to appear in their report stronger than they are on the average. Moreover, the report is always to be made up for some past day, as was formerly done under our New York State banking system. It is obvious that as the banks do not know beforehand for which day or even in what month their statements will be required, they are kept under a constant pressure to hold themselves in a sound, strong position at all times. At any rate, we shall be likely now to know more precisely what is the real condition of the banks, and the sworn figures of the reports will give more nearly than heretofore the actual averages. The new value thus conferred on our bank statistics it is impossible to overestimate.

The second point of interest in these tables is in regard to the adequacy of the reserve. In view of the monetary spasms of the past six months this question is assuming more and more prominence. Had the bank reserves been more ample, the stringency of March and April would perhaps not have occurred; certainly it would have been less severe, and less prolonged. The law requires that all banks situated outside of the financial centres shall protect their liabilities by a reserve of 15 per cent. The institutions to which this rule applies are 1,397. Their liabilities approach 394 millions, so that the reserve required is 59 millions. The banks actually hold 82 millions, so that they would seem to be amply fortified. If these 82 millions were greenbacks the situation would be strong indeed. But the reserve is really composed of no more than 37

millions of greenbacks in hand, the remainder being chiefly on deposit in the banks of the redeeming cities, except about 6 millions in gold and 8 per cent certificates. Still the reserves are considerably in excess of what the law demands, both in these country banks and in those of the fifteen chief cities which form the second group of banking centres. These banks, exclusive of those of New York, are 164 in number, having liabilities amounting to 213 millions. Their reserves by law must be 25 per cent, or 53 millions. The reserves actually held amount to 61 millions, or 29 per cent. Of this sum 26 millions are legal tenders, 15 millions are 3 per cent certificates, and 18½ millions represent the balances in the redeeming cities.

Turning now to our 56 New York banks, we find their liabilities are 187 millions which require by law 25 per cent reserve. The aggregate legal reserve should thus be \$46,750,121. The amount of actual reserve is \$53,801,622, or nearly 29 per cent. Of this reserve it is very important to note that the legal tenders are no more than \$17,229,007. This weakness in greenbacks is partly compensated for by 15 millions of Clearing House certificates and nearly 16 millions more of 3 per cent temporary loan certificates. The excess of interest bearing reserves and the deficiency of greenbacks is at present one of the weakest points in our National banking system.

The banks must always be weak and exposed to danger so long as they allow their greenback reserves to run down below a certain safe level. That they have sunk below that level of late the feverish state of our money market sufficiently proves. Several months since the *MAGAZINE* called attention to the danger of allowing the banks to hold reserves bearing interest. The evil we predicted has arrived. If new legislation is needed to correct it, that legislation should look to the imposing of restrictions on the interest bearing reserve and to an increase in the amount of greenbacks to be held by the banks as guarantee of their solvency.

ON THE TRADE WITH THE COLORED RACES OF AFRICA.*

BY ARCHIBALD HAMILTON, ESQ.

I propose to take a general survey of the commerce between the colored or Ethiopic races of Africa and the civilized world; and then briefly to consider the means by which that commerce, hitherto confined to the coast, can be extended to the interior.

The Ethiopic races inhabit that vast country south of the great desert,

* Read before the Statistical Society, February 18, 1866.

which may with tolerable accuracy be defined by a line drawn from the River Senegal to Cape Guardafui as its northern boundary; while its southern limit is the Cape Colony. It thus comprises about forty-five degrees of latitude, and is bounded, east and west, by the Indian and Atlantic oceans; its area being equal to one-fifth or one-sixth part of the habitable globe.

Apart from any question of inherent inferiority of race, it is obvious that the country occupied by the Ethiopians is not calculated to engender civilization. It lies in too compact a mass, unbroken by bays or inlets; nor do the rivers afford either defensive frontiers or the means of communication and transport equal to those which divide and traverse the other divisions of the globe. The great desert cuts it off from the ancient civilization of which the Mediterranean was the centre, while the intercourse subsequently established by the Arabs is limited and impeded by the same cause. The rivers are all subject to a dry season, which renders them during a part of the year unfit for inland navigation; and they are all more or less interrupted by rapids and cataracts—though it is true equal obstacles have not hindered the St. Lawrence from becoming the great means in the settlement of Canada.

There are two circumstances which give reason to hope, not only that our commerce with the races dwelling on the coast will be rapidly enlarged, but also be extended inwards. I mean the almost total stoppage of the Christian or transatlantic slave trade, and the rapid strides which have of late been made in the exploration of the continent.

In 1854 Livingstone penetrated from the Cape Colony to Loanda, and thence he crossed to Quillimane, tracing the course of the Zambesi on his way. Subsequently he explored Lake Nyanza, and it has recently been a public consolation to learn that he is now on his way home, most likely down the Nile, to complete our knowledge of Lake Tanganyika, first discovered by Burton. Barth has supplemented the labors of Denham and Clapperton in Central Africa, between the Niger and Lake Tchad, the most hopeful and important district of all. Speke and Grant advancing northwards from Zanzibar, have discovered Lake Victoria Nyanza; while Baker, coming in the opposite direction from Egypt, has terminated the long mystery as to the source of the Nile, having beheld it issuing from the great lake Albert Nyanza. Brilliant as have been the results of these explorations, and others of lesser note, the field of adventure is far from exhausted; much remains for discovery before the map of Africa can be filled up, and the future highways of commerce be traced out. Happily, however, the spirit and enterprise of our countrymen are more likely to be stimulated than diminished by the exploits of the celebrated travelers to whom I have alluded.

There is one subject which occupies a large space in every book of African travel—the slave trade. I do not intend to enter into any details of the horrors attending that traffic; but as human beings have for three centuries been one of the chief exports from Africa, this subject is inseparably mixed up with that of legitimate commerce; because of the anarchy which the slave trade everywhere creates, the ceaseless kidnapping—slave hunts—and wars undertaken expressly to obtain captives, to the destruction of settled industry. It is even the principal cause of the difficulties experienced in exploring the country; and has, moreover, brutalized the natives on the coast far below the condition of the people in the interior.

Within the last few years success seems at length to have crowned our efforts to suppress the transatlantic slave trade, but the Mahomedan traffic continues unchecked, or nearly so. Owing to their contraband nature, it is impossible to obtain accurate information of either at any period. The matter was carefully investigated by Sir Fowell Buxton, who estimated the number of slaves exported at 170,000 per annum so recently as 1839–40, on data which have never been impugned. To this must be added a loss of life from slaughter in wars undertaken for the capture of slaves and subsequent mortality, so that the figures are thus stated by Buxton:

	Deliver'd.	Lo's of Life.	Total.
Transatlantic slave trade.....	120,000	28,000	400,000
Mahomedan.....	50,000	50,000	100,000
Total.....	170,000	330,000	500,000

It would appear, however, from more recent information, that the loss of life from the Mahomedan trade is considerably under stated by Buxton.

Such was the most moderate estimate that could be formed of the transatlantic slave trade in 1840, and there is reason to believe it was stimulated for several years by the alteration of our sugar duties in 1846. The first effectual blow was in 1853 and 1854, when Brazil abolished the trade and importations ceased; so that Cuba thenceforward has continued the only importing country. A return of the slaves exported from the west coast between the years 1848 and 1864, will be found in Appendix, Table I; since the latter year the trade has almost ceased, a stray cargo now and then being all that has reached Cuba. The authorities there have of late been in earnest in preventing importations, and it is gratifying to observe that public feeling in Cuba is becoming adverse to their continuance.

I shall now briefly explain the progress which has been made in substituting legitimate commerce for the slave trade along the west coast; and may remark that this has nowhere been accomplished without com

pulsion of some kind in the first instance; and there is too much reason to fear that, in case of a renewed demand, the trade would once more break out where our vigilance relaxed. No export of slaves has taken place for many years from our settlements on the west coast, viz., the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Cape Coast Castle; nor from the adjacent territories under the influence of those settlements; nor from the republic of Liberia, nor the Dutch settlements on the Gold Coast; so that if we except the River Nunz, the coast between Gambia and Dahomey, say for 1,500 miles, has for many years been free from the slave trade. Relying on this immunity, it was resolved in February, 1864, to withdraw the squadron entirely from this part of the coast; the consequence was, that in September following, a cargo of slaves was shipped from the River Nunz (situated between the Gambia and Sierra Leone), but with which there has been little intercourse from either settlement.

It is worthy of note that for many years great pains have been taken by the missionary societies with the education of the liberated Africans at Sierra Leone, and the children born in the colony. During six years ending 1864, between seventy and eighty schools have been maintained, at a cost of £5,000 per annum, which have been attended by 57,000 scholars, or an average of 9,500 per annum. An important class of educated blacks has thus grown up, who, together with the Liberian blacks, are actively engaged in trade all down the coast; and ever since the mail steamers were established, in 1852, they have availed themselves freely of the facilities thereby offered, to trade at the various places on the coast at which the steamers call. As many as 150 per month of these native traders pass in the mail steamers between the stations. Besides Sierra Leone, they are numerous at the Gambia, Cape Coast, Acora and Fernando Po, while they swarm at Lagos. They are everywhere useful as middlemen, and have, in fact, driven all white traders on a small scale out of the field at Sierra Leone; and the more extensive European merchants employ them as agents and clerks in their operations on the neighboring rivers. Of late it has become the ambition of these traders to order goods direct from England, paying for them in produce. I shall presently point out how the educated blacks are capable of playing a most useful part in the opening trade with Central Africa.

Already, as often as the educated native traders have had opportunities, they have shown great eagerness to carry small adventures up the Niger, and have even endeavored to form among themselves a company, with a capital of £25,000, for steam navigation in that river.

Whilst on this subject, I may allude to the progress made by the republic of Liberia, which occupies a coast line of about 600 miles.

The first settlement of emancipated slaves from the United States

was in 1820, and in 1847 it was declared a free republic. It now contains about 30,000 civilized inhabitants, about 15,000 of whom, with their descendants, are from America. From 300,000 to 400,000 aborigines reside within the territory of Liberia, and are brought more or less directly under the influence of her institutions. There are about fifty churches in the republic, representing five different denominations. The educated blacks in Liberia and Sierra Leone are intensely religious, and the various sects, Episcopalians, Wesleyans, Baptists, Independents, &c., are represented among them just as in England and the United States. Differing from Sierra Leone, Liberia has been governed since 1847 by blacks alone. Their constitution resembles that of the United States, and if their proceedings are at times calculated to raise a smile as a parody upon their model, it is impossible to deny the good sense, frugality and success which have attended them so far. In 1861 the revenue was \$149,550, against an expenditure of \$142,831. The Presidential message for 1866 alludes, with just pride, to the foundation of the Liberian college, and lays down a plan for national education. There can be no doubt that this well ordered and well governed community will play a great part in the civilization of Africa. The present state of matters in America will lead to a considerable accession of strength, 600 emigrants having been dispatched in the course of 1866, and 942 in 1867. The American Colonization Society, which founded the settlement in 1820, now regularly employ a vessel in the conveyance of emigrants. The settlers have already been able to repel all attacks from the natives, and as they gain strength, will become aggressive and extend their influence inwards. For the year 1864 the imports amounted to \$162,930, the exports to \$172,308.

I come next to the British settlement of Lagos, which was for many years the headquarters of the slave trade in the Bight of Benin. Situated at the entrance to an extensive lagoon, affording boat navigation eastward as far as the River Benue, and westward to the notorious kingdom of Dahomey, it possesses unequalled facilities for the slave trade, enabling the slavers to dodge our cruisers. In 1851 a treaty was forced on the chiefs and king, and a consulate was established, which continued until 1861; but those measures being inadequate, we took possession of the island of Lagos and of one or two points on the adjacent coast, which, with a couple of gunboats on the lagoons, has answered our purpose effectually.

A considerable trade in palm oil had grown up under the Treaty of 1851. Since we took possession the trade has been seriously interrupted by a war between Abeokuto and Ibadan, caused by the latter desiring a direct road to the white man at Lagos, and so avoid paying toll to the

Abeokuta. The ground lost will soon, however, be recovered, and Lagos is rapidly becoming the seat of a flourishing trade.

Stopping the slave trade at Lagos had the effect of directing the current thence to Whydah, a port in Dahomey; but of late, owing to the cessation of the traffic, the king of that country has turned his attention to legitimate commerce. Some small trade had indeed been carried on chiefly by the French, concurrently with the slave traffic; and in 1864 a Liverpool company opened trade at Whydah, the king granting them his baragoon, or slave depot, as a store for goods. Two other English houses have sent agents there, and a healthy trade is rapidly in course of development. I may mention, however, that so recently as May or June, 1867, the king tendered slaves in payment of a debt which he had contracted. I am unable to give particulars of this trade which as yet is in its infancy.

I come next to the rivers, Benue, Brass, and Bonny (mouths of the Niger), also Old and New Calabar and Cameroons, generally classed together as the "oil rivers." These were at one time the noted haunts of slavers. In the years 1838 to 1840, treaties were forced upon the native kings and chiefs, by which they engaged to discontinue the slave trade. Courts of equity were afterwards established for the regulation of legitimate commerce, consisting of the captains, supercargoes, and agents of English houses, together with the kings and chiefs of the place. They take cognizance of all disputes between the English and the natives. A consul visits the rivers at intervals, and the system has been found to work successfully, with only an occasional resort to the squadron; in fact, the mere presence of a man-of-war has of late sufficed to restore order. I am enabled to show, from private statistics, the progress of the trade between the oil rivers and Liverpool. The average during the first fourteen years was 17,932 tons; and during the last fourteen years 24,734 tons; but during the first fourteen years the trade was chiefly with Liverpool; Bristol participated, and of late years the Clyde has also shared. There have been great fluctuations in the imports, which have been influenced by the prices at home, leading occasionally to suspension of trade when the natives were unwilling to submit to reduced prices; likewise to bad seasons.

The next point on the coast where there is a considerable trade, is the Gaboon River, which is under the control of the French Government, and has hitherto been thrown open to all nations. There are five English, two or three French, one German, and two Dutch houses engaged in the trade. The police regulations are good, and traders well protected; until recently the expense was borne by the Imperial Government, but within the last twelve months they have enforced a charge for a trading licence, and it is expected will levy a duty of 4 per cent on imports and exports.

so as to assist in defraying the expenses of government. At our colonies a revenue is collected by similar import duties. I have been unable to obtain returns of the imports and exports, but these will enter into the general tables of trade with the west coast.

Further south we came to the River Congo, notorious as the last seat of the slave trade on the west coast. Within the last five or six years, as many as twenty-three slavers have been counted at Ponta de Lena at one time. Legitimate trade made no progress, until at last an effectual check was given to the slave traffic by the adoption of a very obvious course—our Government entered into a contract to coal the preventive cruisers on the spot, instead of resorting to Fernando Po or Ascension for a supply, leaving the coast and rivers for the time unguarded.

To prove how effective has been the blockade since this arrangement was adopted, I may state that within the last twelve months 700 slaves were sent down for shipment, and two slavers appeared on the coast to embark them—one was captured and the other left the coast in despair. When my informant left the Congo, the slaves were still on hand, and have doubtless either been set free or put to some useful occupation ere this. Cut off from the slave trade, the natives are now eagerly engaged in raising produce, while the Portuguese slave dealers are rendering good service as middlemen in the up-country trade. One Dutch, one American, three French, and three British houses have established themselves in the Congo, with branches along the neighboring coast as far as the Portuguese settlements at Angola, and an active trade is now carried on in palm oil and kernels, ivory, coffee, india rubber, copper ore, gum copal, and ground nuts. This trade has probably increased tenfold within six years, and the exports for 1867 have been estimated at £250,000.

Besides the points on the west coast to which I have alluded, there is an active trade carried on by the French at their settlements at Senegal and Goree, as well as elsewhere; by the Dutch at their settlements on the Gold Coast; as also by the Hanse Towns and Americans at various points; while the Portuguese settlements of Angola and Benguela are little developed, though there are valuable copper mines within their territory.

The trade carried on by these countries figure in the general tables of African commerce. But to show the extent of the west coast trade there are tables in the Appendix (table II) showing the imports and exports to the United Kingdom for ten years ending 1866 as also the imports from thence of ivory and bullion. The growth of the trade with the United Kingdom will, however, be best shown by the table of palm oil imported since the year 1790—also in the Appendix, table III.

As regards the goods shipped to the west coast, I may state that the

demand has for the last ten years or so, been constantly for an improved quality. The consumption of British manufactures seems limited only by the possibility of supplying produce or value in exchange; thus at the time when returns were unhappily obtained chiefly in slaves, the exports from the United Kingdom were, in—

1805.....	£1,150,000	1808.....	£807,000
1806.....	1,650,000	1811.....	400,000
1807 (slave trade abolished)..	1, 30,000	1827.....	156,000

This was the lowest point to which they dwindled. About 1830 the palm oil trade became important, so that the exports of British manufactures rose in—

1830 to.....	£250,000	1850.....	£640,000
1835.....	300,000	1855.....	1,100,000
1840.....	4 00,000	1860.....	1, 00,000
1845.....	580, 000	18 5.....	1,100,000

As it has been often stated that considerable supplies of cotton may be derived from Central and Western Africa, I subjoin the quantities imported, viz.:

1876	Cwts. 308	1862	Cwts. 3,438
1857.....	1,024	1863*.....
1858.....	2, 16	1864*.....
1859.....	1,316	1865.....	7,126
1860.....	2,069	1866.....	9,512
1861.....	1,389		

It is true the cotton plant is indigenous, and the soil and climate over an enormous district are capable of supplying more than we even now consume; still the needful European superintendence for a large production cannot be supplied. The means of transport for so bulky an article do not exist; neither could the capital required for implements, gins, presses, &c., be prudently invested unless under British rule; so that many years must elapse, in my opinion, and many changes must occur, before we can look for any quantity of African cotton, such as would be sensibly felt in our markets.

As regards the trade with the natives bordering on the Cape and Natal colonies, as well as the Dutch republics beyond the frontiers, it is impossible to arrive at exact data. Speaking generally, we may assume that the greater part of the ivory and ostrich feathers from the colonies is obtained from the natives, or through their agency and assistance, as well as a quantity of hides and skins. Commerce is gradually extending northwards; for example, it is not many years since Livingstone discovered Lake Ngami, and now it is within the ordinary range of the traders in

* Importation cease', owing to Abeokutan war above mentioned.

quest of ivory and ostrich feathers. The Caffres and Fungoes settled within the colony are making marked progress; they now participate in the carrying trade of the colony, conveying merchandise in well appointed waggons from the coast to the up-country, and bringing down the returns of produce. Their consumption of European goods is increasing, and they now require these to be of better quality; a remark which applies likewise to the natives beyond the limits of the colony.

As a rough guess merely, I am inclined to set down the trade between the colonists and the natives beyond the borders, as follows:

Ivory, one-half exports from Cape and Natal.....	£20,000
Ostrich feathers, three-fourths ditto	47,500
Hides and skins.....	10,000
Cattle, sheep, goats, and sundries.....	110,000
Total	£177,500

The eastern coast of Africa, northward of the colony of Natal was the seat of a flourishing commerce of great antiquity, carried on by the Arabs, who occupied the coast nine hundred years ago, and founded numerous cities as far South as Sofala; some of which remain to this day, while the ruins of others have lately been discovered. They traded to India, Persia, Arabia and Egypt. It was at Melinda that Vasco de Gama, in the year 1498, procured a pilot to conduct him to India.

The Portuguese speedily possessed themselves of the principal positions on the coast for a range of about 2,400 miles. Their power did not, however, extend far inland, though they made efforts to advance into the country, chiefly with a view to reach the gold mines, the produce of which was brought down the Zambesi to Sofala (supposed by some to have been the Ophir of the Bible). But instead of the abundance they expected, they found the gold, as in other parts of Africa, had to be laboriously washed from the extraneous substances in which it is deposited.

As the power of the Portuguese nation declined, the Arabs re-established their independence over a portion of their former possessions, so that the coast from Delagoa Bay to Cape Delgado, 1,300 miles, is all that remains to the Portuguese, while the coast from Delgado to Magadoxo is claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, a range of 1,100 miles. Though in fact the sovereignty thus claimed by the Portuguese and Arabs is merely nominal, except here and there where forts are maintained. The natives beyond the range of these of these forts pay no taxes, and are in fact a source of terror to the Portuguese, who subsidize them at times, and have difficulty in holding their ground; indeed, Mr. Young has just brought word that they have been driven out of Sena and all places south of the Zambesi by the Zulus.

The blight of slavery has fallen upon their settlements, and of the prosperity for which they were at one time famous, scarce a shadow remains. Their trade consists in gold, ivory, and slaves. The slave trade, though contrary to Portuguese law, has unceasingly been carried on with the knowledge and connivance of the officials; happily it has been curtailed by the stoppage of the transatlantic traffic; but the Portuguese still supply the Arabs with slaves for the eastern markets. The only healthy symptoms is a trade which seems likely to spring up between our colony of Natal and the Portuguese settlements at Delagoa Bay, Quillimane, and Mozambique. It is to be regretted the sovereignty over 1,300 miles of coast should be in the hands of a jealous and indolent people like the Portuguese, who by their commercial restrictions have, in fact, left their own subjects and the native chiefs little else to engage in than the slave trade, while they play this dog-in-the-manger policy on the coast of a fertile country, possessed of fine harbors and rivers more or less navigable. The Zambesi, the chief river of all, Livingstone has proved to be navigable for 700 or 800 miles inland, interrupted, it is true, by cataracts, but but still offering facilities for commerce; while its tributary, the Shire, gives access from the sea to the great Lake Nyassa, with the exception of about 35 miles of rapids not navigable as has been recently proved by Mr. Young of the Livingstone search expedition.

In the returns of trade between Portugal and her African settlements, no distinction is made between those on the west and east coasts; indeed they are kept so imperfectly that I am compelled to estimate them as follows, viz.:

Imports to Africa	£300,000
Exports from Africa.....	409,000

In marked contrast with the Portuguese, the Sultan of Zanzibar encourages European commerce, both on the island so named and on the coast over which he claims sovereignty, though his influence does not extend over the heathen tribes beyond the range of his forts. The rapid development of the Zanzibar trade, is a striking proof of the resources of Eastern Africa, and confirms the accounts which have reached us of its ancient prosperity. The island is 48 miles long by 15 to 30 broad. In 1761 it contained about 250,000 inhabitants, and is supposed in the three following years, to have increased to 300,000, consisting of Arabs, half castes, and settlers from India, together with negro slaves from the mainland; the latter carry on the cultivation, while all trade is in the hands of the Hindoos. In 1834 the trade of Zanzibar was reported to consist of a few imports from Arabia, and exports of gum and ivory to Bombay. In the year ending April, 1866, it was visited by sixty-six square-rigged vessels of

all flags, amounting to 21,000 tons, besides of Indian, Persian, and Arab craft 8,000 tons; and, taking an average of five years ending 1865 the

Imports were.....	£349,562
Exports were.....	877,801

Of these the largest proportion is with British India; the Germans and Americans come next; the British trade is however on the increase.

These results will show what might be done on the coast with settled government; but the island of Zanzibar is an Arab settlement, and I have to do only with what portion of the trade which is derived from the Ethiopic races on the mainland. It is the chief mart for ivory, and Baker mentions that when he reached the neighborhood of the Nyanza Lakes, he found the natives wearing cloth and possessed of other goods which had been passed from Zanzibar. From the last consular report, I find the imports from the mainland to have been, on an average of five years, equal to £225,000, exclusive of slaves.

A considerable trade has been carried on between Zanzibar and Lagos in cowries, of which there is here a fishery.

The Zanzibar dominions are the only part of Africa where the slave trade is legal. There are recognized importations into the island during a certain portion of the year, under a system of passes; during the last five years the average number entered at the customs has been 14,000 per annum, on which a duty of \$2 per head is levied. Adults are worth £2 to £7, boys and girls 25s to 50s. The slaves in Zanzibar are well treated, but, contrary to experience in America, they do not increase. General Rigby states that only 5 out of every 100 female slaves bear children; this he ascribes not to disparity of the sexes, but to their unwillingness to rear children, which will be sold as soon as they grow into sufficient value. It is uncertain how many of the slaves annually imported are exported from the island to the eastern markets, but it is thought not less than 6,000. The regulations alluded to are indeed but a mere cloak for a traffic carried on by the Arabs from places on the coast as far south as Mozambique, to ports in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. These jointly with what are brought from the White Nile country and across the Great Desert from Central Africa, furnish slaves for Arabia, Syria, and Asia Minor, as far as Constantinople; while those carried to the Persian Gulf supply Mesopotamia, Persia, and the countries eastward as far as the Indus. The unhappy negroes are to be found sprinkled over the country, from the confines of Russia to Cashmere, and from the Indus to the Mediterranean.

The great difficulty we have experienced in our efforts to put down the Mahomedan slave trade, is due to its sanction by their religion. Slavery

has existed among eastern races from the remotest ages and is in some respects necessary to their society as constituted. They do not, therefore, understand our views; hence the chiefs and rulers, even though willing, might be unable to suppress it; but in fact they not unfrequently derive much profit from the traffic. We have hitherto been restrained from putting it down with a high hand, because our policy in the East is considered involved, lest we should excite the hostility of the countries concerned. But our proceedings on the east coast, as yet, are calculated to irritate, rather than seriously interrupt the traffic. It has been suggested that the coast should be scourged by steam gunboats, capable of following the dhows into shoal water, which would be less expensive than the cruisers at present on the station; while some of these latter could be employed with advantage on the Red Sea, so as to intercept the traffic brought from the White Nile as it crosses to Arabia. The Egyptian Government has been induced to place a steamer on the White Nile to check the evil; and I trust before we have done with Abyssinia, that something may be arranged to hinder the transit through that country.

I come now to the caravan trade by camels from Morocco and Tripoli across the desert, which the Arabs and Moors carry on with Central Africa. We know but little of that between Morocco and Timbuctoo, except that the returns are chiefly in slaves. From Tripoli the caravans pass by way of Mourzuk to Bornou and Soudan—Kuka and Kano being the chief centres from whence branch caravans pass to other places. We are indebted to Denham and Clapperton, Richardson and Barth, for our knowledge of this commerce; and fuller details are expected in a work by Dr. Rohlfs, now in the press in Germany. The cost of transport is about £30 per ton, independently of duties and exactions on every pretext, except where the caravan is strong enough to bear down opposition; it takes four months to cross the desert, so that the cost of goods at Tripoli is quadrupled by the time they reach Kuka and Kano. The returns are therefore chiefly in slaves, with the addition of a small amount in valuables, such as gold, ivory, ostrich skins, and a little antimony. Ordinary articles of produce would not bear the cost of transport.

The return caravans frequently include over 5,000 slaves; large numbers of whom die of hunger, thirst, and fever on the way—the routes being actually marked by the whitening bones of the wretched beings who have sunk under the fatigues of the journey. A whole caravan has been known to perish for want of water.

At Mourzuk the slaves are sold, at from £20 to £25 per head and from thence smuggled into Tripoli, Egypt, and the East. It is in vain that we have treaties with the Turkish and Egyptian Governments—the officials connive at the traffic; we have no means of enforcing the

treaties in the case of this inland slave trade, such as we have at sea; but it happens we have a more effectual means of extinguishing it by the readier access to Central Africa afforded by the River Niger, so that we can under-ell by that channel those engaged in the caravan trade, and bring down returns in produce such as can be raised in abundance. As an example of how this will work, I may mention that a gentleman having ascended the Niger in a steamer direct from England, in a point within a few days journey of Bada, saw a caravan arrive there with European goods from Tripoli, part of the goods being loaf sugar made at Whitechapel! There can, in fact, be no doubt that as soon as the Niger trade has been developed, the caravan trade from Tripoli and Morocco will be extinguished and with it will end the necessity of carrying back returns in the shape of human beings.

Having thus made the circuit of Ethiopia, I summarise its commerce with the civilized world in the following table: Table IV.

It is to be observed, that with the exception of ivory and gold, no legitimate commerce has yet been established with Central Africa. Europeans have in fact as yet traded with the natives dwelling on the mere outskirts of this vast territory, and though the trade on the west coast has reached respectable dimensions, it is still capable of being largely increased; and as I have shown, is rapidly increasing. That of the east coast is well nigh neglected.

The Arabs are the only people who have established a regular communication with Central Africa; by introducing the camel from Arabia, they were enabled to open paths through the desert, which had previously defied all efforts. By successive migrations they became in time the ruling power, introducing the Mahomedan religion and Arab civilization, the traces of which latter can be discovered to this day. They founded kingdoms, ample accounts of which have been transmitted to us by the Arab writers of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries; while modern travelers have ascertained that these countries in Central Africa are now inhabited by a variety of races, some of them red or chocolate color, and differing in shades of black. The black tribes again range from those with high features, approaching the Caucasian, to the common Negro. Of all these races the Felatahs are the most warlike, and they are supposed to have emerged from the condition of a mere pastoral tribe, and to have founded their powerful empire of Sokatu, within a century from this time. They are still encroaching on their neighbors.

With the exception of some few nomadic tribes, the people for security live chiefly in large towns fortified by mud walls, sufficiently strong to resist ordinary attacks, and round these towns cluster agricultural villages.

The space within the walls is usually extensive, the houses are interspersed with cultivated fields, and this renders it difficult to estimate the population with accuracy; but it is certain that many of the towns contain as many as 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants, though some travelers rate them as high as 100,000.

In all the towns markets are held every two or three days; large numbers from the neighboring villages attend them; and although their dealings would appear to us trifling, still there is everywhere shown a strong love of trade.

Cotton and indigo are cultivated, and in many towns there is a considerable manufacture of cotton cloth, noted for its excellent quality and the durability of its dye, which latter equals, if it does not excel, in quality anything done in Manchester. Besides cloth, there are manufacturers of leather, as saddlery, bags, crubions, &c. The art of smelting is understood, and in some places gold chains and ornaments are manufactured with creditable taste and skill. The trade of the blacksmith is everywhere plied. At the Exhibition of 1851, the late Mr. Robert Jamieson exhibited some specimens of native copper ware, tinned inside, rudely done no doubt, but proving they possess that as well as several other useful arts.

Salt is a prime article of commerce; it is brought by caravan from certain points in the great desert, and likewise from the coast.

Some of the canoes on the Niger, approaching the sea, are large enough to convey upwards of one hundred people; and Park saw one as high up the river as Sogo, carry four horses and six or eight men.

The medium of exchange differs in various places. In Kano it is cowries; in Bornou cloth; in Loggun iron, where indeed, in Denham's time, a kind of iron coinage was in use, and Baikie saw the same thing in 1854, when he ascended the Tchadda. In general, in all important transactions, the value is expressed in the price of a slave.

The religion of the dominant races is Mahomedan. The only written character is the Arabic, and the Koran is, of course, read in all mosques—though sometimes the reader does not understand a word, and the hearers very seldom, if ever.

Disputes are adjusted by palaver, when professed advocates, who can expound the Koran, conduct the cause of the litigants, often with much ingenuity. These palavers are, indeed, everywhere a marked feature of the native races, as they are, one and all, noted for loquacity.

The proportion of slaves to free population differs in various countries. At Kano, Clapperton says the free population was in the proportion of one to thirty slaves; other travelers estimate in other places the proportion of slaves to vary from two-thirds to four-fifths. There is, however, a

wide difference between the domestic, or born slaves, who form the bulk, and slaves who have been purchased or captured. The domestic slaves have certain well established rights, only give up a portion of their time to their masters, and cannot be sold out of their districts except for crime, adjudged in due form by pulaver. In short, it is rather a mild form of serfdom than slavery.

All these facts bespeak a certain security of property and industry protected, as well as the elements of civilization. There are, however, no traces of antiquity—no works of art—and it is wonderful that so much of the Arab civilization should have survived, amid the constant slave hunts and wars which for three centuries have prevailed to supply the demand for slaves for America. That demand has only now ceased, so that slaves are no longer sent down from these countries to the coast, and they are, therefore, ripe for legitimate commerce. To this rich and populous region there is ready access by the river Niger, next in size to the Nile, but destined to play a still more important part in the civilization of Africa, affording as it does, together with its equally important branch, the Tchadda, a noble highway to the very heart of the continent.

The history, too, of the Niger is not a little strange. The sources of other great rivers have frequently been the object of curiosity, but the Niger alone has been distinguished by the interest attaching to its junction with the sea. Its existence was successively known to the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and Arabs, the latter, indeed, having settled on its banks at Timbuctoo. An enormous body of water was known to flow eastward towards the great desert; it was supposed to be lost in the sands of Sahara, or to be a branch of the Nile; and other theories innumerable were from time to time put forth, until 1830, when the problem was solved by Richard Lander, who, extending the previous achievements of Park, followed its lower course to the sea, and laid open the long-coveted channel for commerce with Central Africa.

The first attempt to render Lander's discovery available, was by a company formed in Liverpool, which sent out an expedition consisting of two steamers, accompanied by the late Mr. McGregor Laird, who published an interesting account of its proceedings and misfortunes. Having entered the river too late in the season, the steamers grounded at the confluence of the river Tchadda. Out of forty-eight men nine only survived, and the capital of the company was lost.

Mr. Robert Jamie & Co., a merchant of Glasgow, next fitted out a steamer in 1839. His operations were commercially unfavorable; but they added greatly to our knowledge of the Niger and its delta, besides exploring the rivers Benin and Old Calabar. The loss of life, though great, was not so deplorable as on the previous attempt.

In 1841 followed the well known government expedition, which cost the country upwards of £200,000, and accomplished absolutely nothing. The failure of the expedition was foreseen by Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Laird, while the late Mr. Thomas Stirling wrote to Lord John Russell predicting, with marvelous accuracy, the misfortunes which ensued. Though the sickness was general, the loss of life did not exceed fifty-three out of a complement of three hundred and three.

In marked contrast with this deplorable failure was the expedition fitted out by McGregor Laird in 1854, at his own risk, but partly assisted by government. Under charge of Dr. Baikie the steamer ascended the Tchadda three hundred miles beyond the point previously reached, and returned to Fernando Po, after having been in the river one hundred and eighteen days, without the loss of a man. This gratifying fact, so different from all previous experience, was due to better sanitary arrangements and the use of quinine as a preventive; also to the plan of manning the ship with blacks, and sending the smallest possible complement of Europeans to officer the ship and work the engines. By the observance of these rules the frightful mortality has been obviated, which previously was the sure attendant of a river expedition.

Notwithstanding that this expedition was mainly one of exploration, the produce picked up in exchange for outward cargo realized £2,000.

Encouraged by these results, Mr. Laird entered into a contract with her Majesty's government, binding himself for a small subsidy to maintain steam communication on the river and its tributaries, and to carry goods and passengers for all who might offer. He further embarked a considerable capital in trading stations at various points on the river.

In 1857 the returns realized about.....	£4,000
In 1858 owing to various drawbacks they were....	2,500
In 1859 they realized about.....	8,000

In 1860 there was no ascent, owing to the hostility of the natives in the delta and the absence of a promised convoy. This, however, led to the conclusion that the best way to remove the hostility of the people in the river and delta is to trade with them at proper intervals, since it was proved on this occasion that their hostility arose, not from the presence of white men in the river, but because the steamers gave them the go-by, whereas they have been in the habit of levying dues on all canoes passing up and down.

Unhappily, while maturing these plans, Mr. Laird died in 1861, and it became my duty as his executor to close up these most interesting operations. Accordingly the steamer made its final ascent in 1861, and the year's trading in the delta and river realized £10,000.

During the next four years a gunboat was sent up annually with a sp-

plies for Dr Baikie at the confluence, where he held the post of agent for Her Majesty's Government, a post which has since been raised into a consulate, and is now held by Mr. Lyons McLeod.

The Niger enterprise has since been taken up by a Manchester company, unsupported by a subsidy. In 1865 they sent a steamer up to the confluence with a well-assorted cargo and an experienced agent, which resulted, I understand, in the most successful year's trading yet attained. The operations of 1866 and 1867 have not transpired, but if not equally successful it has not been due to any inherent obstacles, but rather to the limited scale on which they have been conducted. Whatever may be the result of the spirited operations of this company, they have certainly made valuable additions to our stock of experience.

The truth is, that at present no steamer will pay her expenses on the river. The caravan trade has to be diverted gradually from the desert routes to Tripoli and Morocco towards points on the rivers Niger and Tchadda. New markets have to be established, and new industries have to be created, to supply returns in produce, before the traffic will suffice to cover the heavy expense of steam navigation. Returns will be obtained in ivory, shea butter, indigo, and other articles of produce, and already the native traders, availing themselves of the steamers, have brought down native cloths made in the interior, tobacs, fine mats, and other goods, which sell well on the coast. But to effect any good in the Niger steam navigation is indispensable; and to maintain this, a subsidy for five years I consider would suffice, as by that time it would become self-supporting. Whoever embarks in this enterprise without a subsidy, must be prepared to incur heavy loss for several years, merely if successful, to open the way to others who would be eager to reap the fruits of his outlay.

Impressed with these views, I urged on the Government the advantage of continuing the subsidy granted to the late Macgregor Laird, to whoever would carry out his plans, with such amendments as experience has since suggested. These were, to place suitable steamers on the river for a monthly service to the confluence during eight months of the year, while it is navigable for cargo vessels; to offer every inducement to the native traders (educated blacks from Sierra Leone and Liberia) to enter into the trade and become a useful class of middlemen; to employ them freely as clerks and agents under European superintendence; to form trading stations at proper intervals, and keep the same stocked with goods, so as to obviate the hostility of the natives, and thus make sure of the ground as far as the confluence; operations could subsequently have been pushed up the Tchadda in sea-going steamers 300 miles above the confluence, or 570 from the sea, and up the Niger 470 miles from the sea to the rapids near Boussa, beyond which the Niger is

again available for transport through a fertile country as far as Bammar-koo, a distance of nearly 1,000 miles.

An influential company offered to embark £30,000 in steamers and trading stations to carry out these operations, stipulating for a subsidy of £8,000 per annum for five years, which they considered would be equivalent to snaring the loss on the first two or three years equally between the Government and the company. I regret to say, that although this offer was approved by Lord Palmerston, and recommended for adoption by Lord Russell at the Foreign Office, in which department the matter originated—the scheme was vetoed at the Treasury.

I trust I may be excused for dwelling so long on the Niger enterprises, because it is impossible to overestimate the importance of that majestic river as the only available highway to the Mahomedan countries of the Soudan—populous, productive, and semi-civilized—the key to the regeneration of Africa.

In conclusion, I may be allowed to express a hope that the success which has at length crowned our efforts for the suppression of the slave trade on the west coast, may not lead to a premature withdrawal of the squadron and the relaxation of our vigilance—but rather that the same system may be extended to the east coast, so that a flourishing trade may be established there as it has been on the west—that we may press for more stringent treaties with Persia and Turkey, Egypt and Muscat, so that the sea-borne slave trade may be stamped out wheresoever it may be found—and that although we cannot directly reach the inland slave trade it may be as effectually extinguished by the encouragement of steam navigation on the Niger. By these means it may be that the gloom which has for long ages settled upon this great continent, will, in our time, be lifted up, and the dawn of commerce, civilization, and Christianity be hailed throughout the length and breadth of Africa.

APPENDIX.

I.—RETURN OF THE NUMBER OF SLAVES EXPORTED FROM THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA SINCE 1848.

Year.	Imported in o Br sil.	Imported into Cuba. No return	Imported into Portu- guese Col.	Captured by Her Majesty's cruise s.	Total exp'd
1848.....	60, 00	No return	6,973	66,973
1849.....	54,061	8,710	4,774	67,485
1850.....	22,856	8,103	6,650	32,606
1851.....	3,287	5,000	1,020	9,307
1852.....	810	7,924	237	8,961
1853.....	None	2,500	None	2,500
1854.....	None	11,490	None	11,490
1855.....	90	6,408	90	6,588
1856.....	No slaves imported since the year 1855	7,304	None	7,304
1857.....		11,436	1,408	11,844
1858.....		16,992	33	17,025
1859.....		30,473	983	31,451
1860.....		24,895	2,655	27,550
1861.....		23,964	907	3,233	28,102
1862.....		1,264	561	1,989	13,804
1863.....		7,07	16	1,425	8,947
1864.....		6,807	317	7,124
	141,094	184,864	1,477	30,696	367,930

II.—TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA.

Y. ar.	Real value of imports to United Kingdom.	Real value of exports from United Kingdom.	Ivory. Cwt.	Gold and silver imported to United King. om.	Gold and silver exported from United King. om. West coast
1857 ...	£,062,000	£1,492,000	2,000	{ Not given separately before 1858	not
1858 ...	1,776,000	1,189,000	2,000		given as, arately
1859 ...	1,890,000	1,244,000	1,000	114,000	before
1860 ...	1,920,000	1,558,000	1,000	101,000	1862
1861 ...	1,710,000	1,559,000	1,000	80,000	
1862 ...	1,950,000	1,626,000	1,000	106,000	54,000
1863 ...	1,608,000	1,275,000	1,000	78,000	5,000
1864 ...	1,860,000	1,104,000	1,000	120,000	57,000
1865 ...	1,750,000	1,824,000	2,000	132,000	4,000
1866 ...	1,971,000	1,876,000	3,000	139,000	60,000

Note.—Average of ivory for ten years, from 1850 to 1860, 2,154 cwt.
1857 to 1866, 1,672 cwt.

III.—PALM OIL IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA SINCE THE YEAR 1790.

[Tons in this table given in round numbers.]

Y. ar.	Tons.	Y. ar.	Tons.	Y. ar.	Tons.
1790....	100	1816....	1,200	1842....	21,000
1791....	200	1817....	1,500	1843....	20,400
1792....	200	1818....	1,500	1844....	20,700
1793....	200	1819....	3,700	1845....	25,000
1794....	100	1820....	800	1846....	18,300
1795....	100	1821....	5,100	1847....	23,800
1796....	Records burnt.	1822....	3,100	1848....	25,500
1797....	100	1823....	3,800	1849....	24,700
1798....	200	1824....	1,700	1850....	22,400
1799....	200	1825....	4,300	1851....	30,400
1800....	200	1826....	1,000	1852....	26,000
1801....	200	1827....	4,800	1853....	31,800
1802....	400	1828....	6,800	1854....	37,600
1803....	500	1829....	9,000	1855....	40,500
1804....	300	1830....	10,700	1856....	39,300
1805....	200	1831....	8,100	1857....	42,700
1806....	400	1832....	10,900	1858....	38,700
1807....	100	1833....	1,800	1859....	39,900
1808....	500	1834....	13,600	1860....	39,200
1809....	700	1835....	12,900	1861....	35,700
1810....	1,300	1836....	14,900	1862....	42,100
1811....	1,200	1837....	11,100	1863....	38,700
1812....	600	1838....	14,000	1864....	32,800
1813....	Records burnt.	1839....	17,200	1865....	39,700
1814....	1,100	1840....	16,800	1866....	39,200
1815....	2,000	1841....	19,900		

IV.—SUMMARY OF THE TRADE WITH THE COLORED RACES OF AFRICA, INCLUDING BUL-LION AND SPECIE.

[Sums in this table given in round numbers.]

	Imports into Africa	Exports from Africa.	Memoranda.
United Kingdom.....	£1,374,000	£1,957,000	Ave of 8 years end'd 1866
France.....	787,000	1,053,000	" 4 " 1864
Belgium.....	8,000	25,000	" 3 " 1866
Spain.....	4,000	2,000	" 4 " 1863
Portugal.....	300,000*	409,000	" 2 " 1864
Holland.....	81,000	93,000	" 3 " 1863
Germany.....	76,000*	79,000	" 3 " 1864

	Imports into Africa.	Exports from Africa.	Memoranda.
United States.....	379,001	488,000	Year 1861.
Brazil.....	58,000	80,000	Ave of 8 years end'd 1864
East Indies	156,000	227,000	" " " " 1864
Cape Good Hope and Natal	180,000	180,000*	Estimate.
Egypt.....	50,000*	75,000	} Ivory to U. Kingdom and France, ave. of 6 years.
Barbary States.....	150,000	71,000	
	<u>£8,580,070</u>	<u>£1,887,000</u>	
Miscellaneous (say).....	100,000*	100,000*	
	<u>£8,680,000</u>	<u>£1,987,000</u>	

THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK.

Two opposite opinions are held in regard to the prospects of the money market in the immediate future. The more hopeful view is, that the spasms we have had during March, April, and June have inspired the business community with so much caution, and have tended so strongly to prevent the inordinate inflation of credits, that there is more soundness and strength among the timbers and girders and buttresses of our financial edifice, and therefore less probability of any untoward catastrophe. The opposite opinion is, that the profits of business have for a long time been small and precarious, while the whole of our credit system is in a feverish, excitable condition, the money market, like a patient with depressed vitality, has suffered so much from recent shocks as to have less strength and elastic vigor to recuperate. The inference is that there cannot be much improvement for the present, and that we may have some great financial convulsive crash.

Probably the most notable aspect of these various phases of public opinion in regard to the money market is the uncertainty which every one feels as to his conclusions. Never since the close of the war has such an anomalous state of things prevailed. Very few persons can be found who can give any reasonable connected explanation of the reasons why, contrary to all precedent and in defiance of the usual laws which are supposed to govern monetary affairs, the very season of the year when we usually have the easiest money market has witnessed a spasm so severe as that of the last week. Failing to explain the past, it is obvious that our business men are at fault in regard to what is to come, and when they attempt to forecast the events of the future they show a restless anxiety and an uncomfortable want of confidence which are equally paralyzing to industrial enterprise and adverse to commercial activity.

* Items which have been estimated.

Between the two opposing views to which we have just referred there is a third and more prevalent opinion, which, though less gloomy than the one and less hopeful than the other, is, perhaps, more free from errors and more broad in its analysis of the phenomena of the financial outlook. This opinion rests on the fact that the trouble in the money market does not arise from any great catastrophe which has impoverished the nation or impaired any considerable part of its productive powers. It is impossible to traverse any part of the United States, in the North or in the South, without the conviction that in all the elements of material wealth there is a gratifying and rapid advance. Railroads are being extended, new manufactories, residences, and other buildings are rising up around us, and wherever we go in agricultural districts or in manufacturing centres there is offered to the eye the same evidence of investment of capital in productive enterprises. In fact it is this very conversion of floating capital into fixed capital, to which we have again and again pointed as one of the dangers of the financial situation. Months ago we predicted that trouble would come from this cause, and we appealed to history and to experience to show that, both in England and in this country, seasons of rapid conversion of floating capital into fixed forms never fail to disturb the loan market and to deplete that reservoir of loanable floating capital, from which the banks and lending institutions supply the wants of commercial borrowers.

The second point insisted on is connected, not with capital, but with the currency, by means of which the movements of capital between lender and borrower are kept lively and elastic. It is a law of finance that when too much currency is afloat the movements of capital are too active and lead to inflation and speculative mischiefs, and pave the way for subsequent depression, just as inordinate excitement and fever in the human organism brings on languor, depression and weakness. When, on the other hand, the volume of currency is too small, the active energies of business are paralysed, and spasms and convulsions of greater or less extent seldom fail to supervene. Now, it is for this reason that contraction of the currency produces so much harm, except it be done at the right time and in the right way. And there are three facts which in this connection should be steadily kept in view. The first is, that in consequence of the great number of small farmers who are producing the Southern crops, a more ample volume of currency is needed to move these crops. Sixty millions of currency went South during the early months of this year, one-half of which has not returned, and perhaps will never make its appearance here again, except as worn-out notes, to be replaced by new currency. Such a heavy depletion of the circulating current could not possibly take place without producing trouble. Secondly, we have had the further absorption

of currency into the Sub-Treasury, which was perhaps unavoidable for reasons to which we adverted last week; and thirdly, we find that the banks of this city are unusually poor in currency reserve. They hold no more than \$49,612,000 in greenbacks and greenback certificates, while the Treasury itself has but nineteen millions of currency in all its depositories throughout the country. Last June the Treasury held thirty millions and our city banks seventy-two millions. Thus we see the aggregate is now less than that of last year by the vast sum of thirty-four millions of dollars. We need offer no further evidence of the vast extent to which the circulating medium has been absorbed.

Now, what is the practical inference from all this? The most important conclusion undoubtedly is, that our monetary troubles do not arise from our growing poorer. We are growing richer as a nation; and the present throes and spasms which convulse the money market now and then are premonitory, not of weakness and decadence, but, like the morbid troubles and temporary maladies incident to infancy and youth, they give the promise of a healthy growth and a more vigorous prosperity when they shall have passed away. They remind us that we are a vigorous young nation, and are suffering some of the troubles of youth. It is clear that the monetary derangement which troubles us is due rather to superficial defects in our financial machinery than to any fatal mischiefs which lurk deep in the vitals of the body politic and threaten its growth, its permanence or its progress. If, then, we scarcely dare to hope for quite as swift a recuperation as the more hopeful observers predict, we are quite sure that the croakers will now, as heretofore, turn out to be false prophets.

THE BANK CONVENTION.

On Wednesday the National Banks held a convention at the St. Nicholas Hotel, in this city, and delegates were present from almost every State in the Union. The object of this meeting was to organize a voluntary association comprehending all the National Banks in the United States for the purpose of enabling these institutions to act together as a unit in matters of common concern. The organization has been duly made and the association, for good or for evil, is now in full operation. Some of the leading bankers in New York and other financial centres have long been of the opinion that to promote the internal efficiency of the banks all over the country, there should be between them some closer bonds, some more intimate union, than is established by the National Currency law, and by the Banking Bureau at Washington. To carry out this purpose several meetings have been convened, and notwithstanding the

difficulties which arose from the opposition of a few of the banks, and from the apathy and indifference of others, these gentlemen persevered in their plans, and, as we see, the contemplated association has been at length consummated. To give due efficiency to a voluntary organization of this sort, it is of course indispensable that the banks generally should join it, and that its powers, duties and aims should be definitely known. It is also important that its executive officers should be men of enlightened views, and that the public good, rather than the private interests of the banks, should be the paramount objects to which the efforts of the organized body should direct themselves. We are on the eve of great financial changes, and the anomalous condition of monetary affairs indicates coming trouble. Never before at this season of the year has the money market been so stringent, spasmodic, and feverish as now. The public mind is busying itself more and more with financial questions. There is a strong probability that in the next session of Congress there will be a stormy discussion of some of the leading financial topics. Under the pressure of public distress there will be a rigid scrutiny of the monetary machinery of the country, and if it should appear that the banks are to blame for any part of the trouble, the privileges and franchises of these institutions may be assailed, and the banking system itself may be in jeopardy. We have no desire to play the part of alarmists, but it must be obvious to every dispassionate observer that, under the circumstances to which we have adverted, great advantages to the banks themselves, to the monetary condition of the country, and to Congress which will have to legislate regarding both, will be secured if there is some central organization among the banks themselves which is actively at work to correct evils, to give full efficiency to the banking system, and to bring it into harmony with the general interests of the country. That the foremost men among our banking leaders are alive to the perils of the financial situation, and anxious to apply a remedy for the evils of the National banking system, there is abundant evidence in the speeches which were delivered at the Convention. We are glad to hear that an official report of them is to be printed in pamphlet form for distribution among the banks. In the opening address of the Chairman, the Hon. E. G. Spaulding, of Buffalo, we find the following remarks about the association, which are of general interest:

The first National Bank Convention was held in this city in October, 1861, for the purpose of organization and concert of action in regard to matters of common interest pertaining to all national banks organized under the National law. That Convention was held while the system was being put into operation and before the State banks had generally decided to become National banks. Many changes have taken place since that time. It was thought best to call a new Convention, have general notice given, and obtain if possible a full delegation from all parts of the country for consultation. What was then regarded by many as an experiment is now

an accomplished fact. The National Bank system is now in full operation under the law, and is a decided success. It has been tried, and is now generally conceded to be the best banking system that has ever been devised. It is of incalculable benefit to the commerce of the country. It has not yet been fully perfected in all its parts. There is no proper redemption of the national currency, and there cannot be until there is a general resumption of specie payments.

The banks are so interwoven with all the business interests of the country that their joint co-operation and good management is of great consequence to themselves as well as the government and business community. It is very apparent, also, that there is a community of interests between the banks, the government and people, and that all are interested in the prudent and successful working of the system and an ultimate return to specie payments.

The object of this Convention is to make a new organization, which will aid in perfecting the system and as far as possible accomplish the beneficial purposes intended by their organization, namely, sound and well-managed business banks, and a prompt redemption of their currency in gold and silver. It is very obvious that the country must pass through an important crisis before we reach specie payments, and that there must be mutual aid and co-operation by all parties in accomplishing that result.

Banking is eminently a practical business. It requires skill and good business capacity equal to that of any other business. It is the especial duty of the government to protect the billholders, who are not able to protect themselves, against loss in case of failure of the banks. The government has performed this duty well. The security is ample, and the government guarantees the billholders against all loss. The other operations of the banks should be managed by the officers and directors. In other matters of business. The business affairs of the banks can be much better managed by the officers of the banks themselves than by the government, or by any officer of the government. In the first draft of the National Bank bill the chief officer of the Bank Department was called "Bank Comptroller," which seemed to imply that he should have control over the business operations of the banks as well as the currency; but, upon mature consideration, the bill was changed so that in the law as passed he is called "Comptroller of the Currency" which implies a more limited control over the operations of the banks. The law has been amended from time to time, and as it now stands confers on this officer important powers and duties; but I do not propose to discuss them at this time. I only desire to say that the Free Bank law of New York worked remarkably well for twenty-five years, and was very popular, for the reason, mainly, that it was open to all. The currency was well secured, with strict rules for its prompt redemption in gold and silver, while the business of the banks was left to the management of its officers, without very much interference by the State or the Bank Superintendent. The Treasury Department and old banks were compelled by the exigencies of the war to suspend specie payments in December, 1861 more than two months prior to the issue of any legal-tender notes; and we did not return to the point of departure before the national finances were king can be played on a sound and reliable basis. As soon as specie payments are resumed it would no doubt be safe and better for the country to throw open the bank law and make it free to all. Banks would then be established where the business wants of the country would require them. Secure the billholder perfectly, require prompt redemption in coin, with ample resources for that purpose, and the requirements of business would take care of the rest. But when with specie payments be resumed? This is a difficult question to answer. If the Supreme Court should decide the legal-tender clause unconstitutional in rendering judgment upon the Kentucky case, which has been argued and submitted, it would compel a return to specie payments at an early day. But if no such decision is made, it is very uncertain when resumption will take place.

There is one point to which we regret that the Convention did not pay more attention. We refer to the inadequacy of the legal-tender reserve. Too much of the reserve is locked up by our banks in the form of interest-bearing certificates, and too little in the available greenbacks. It is not improbable that if the banks had held more greenbacks, and had been fortified by a more available reserve, the drain of sixty millions of currency

to the South would not have produced the monetary troubles of March and April, nor would the locking up of thirty millions of currency in the month of May have brought on the stringency under which the loan market is still tremulous and suffering. Instead of reproaching Mr. Boutwell for the recent financial spasms, not a few persons are already pointing to this condition of the bank reserves as sufficient cause for these monetary disturbances.

IMMIGRATION.

A Liverpool despatch of the 15th inst., says there seems to be no diminution of the tide of emigration to America, over six thousand men, women and children having left that port alone for New York during the week. It appears from the returns of the emigration agents at Liverpool, that, in the month of May, there sailed from that port 37 ships with 26,312 passengers, of whom 7,706 were English, 679 Scotch, 4,237 Irish, and 13,600 of other nationalities, chiefly Germans; of the whole number, 21,195 passengers were for the United States and the remainder for Canada; the total emigration for the month was 27,080 against 19,748 in May, 1868. Turning to the statistics of Castle Garden, we find that the whole number of immigrant passengers landed here from January 1 to June 1, was 101,329, against 76,116 for the same months of last year, showing an increase for that period of about 30 per cent. For the first seven days of the present month, the number landed at Castle Garden was 10,978. The returns at this port are not made up in such a way as to indicate the nationality of the immigrants, any further than may be inferred from the ports from which they sailed, as given in the following statement showing the number sailing for the United States from the principal foreign ports from January 1 to May 31:

From—	Vessels.	Emigrants.
Liverpool	11	63,739
London	21	3,894
Glasgow	25	7,556
Hamburg	28	13,306
Bremen	50	11,216
Amwerp	8	773
Copenhagen	2	2,671
To a	240	101,329

One notable feature in the arrivals is the increase in the number of English emigrants and the falling off in the Irish, the number of the latter leaving Liverpool in the month of May being little more than half that of the former. The German element preponderates very largely. Of the total arrivals, about one-third sail direct from German ports; while of the departures from Liverpool nearly one-half are Germans. Taking the month of May as a basis of comparison, we find that the Germans constitute about 60 per cent of the whole. The present influx differs from that of former years in that it is not a drain of the pauper population of

Europe. The arrivals consist very largely of the better class of emigrants, including well trained mechanics and operatives, and agriculturists possessed of moderate means. The latter class generally proceed directly to the West to settle upon lands and cultivate them with their own thrift and labor, while the former seek employment in our workshops and factories.

It is not improbable that this extraordinary immigration has been stimulated by the naturalization treaties lately concluded between the United States and European Governments. The main cause, however, is to be found in the superior inducements to labor offered by this country. The recent wars in Europe have produced a protracted depression of industry, while they have increased the burthens of the people. The military system of Germany has been felt to be a severe tax upon the services and lives even of the working classes, from which they are naturally desirous to escape. And, although we too have had a devastating war, yet the absence of subsequent suffering and the rapid recuperation from its effects, have been a wonder to foreign nations improving our credit and exhibiting us before the world as a people who better than any other can endure the greatest of national disasters. With all the evils of the war, it has yet served to show in a striking light our strength, our cohesion, and our recuperative force; and in this aspect, our Government commands greater confidence than the masses of Europe are disposed to award to their own systems.

These accessions of foreign population are what the country peculiarly needs. The great economic requisite of the times is an enlarged production, with a moderate consumption. The immigrant is eminently a worker. For a time, at least, he produces more cheaply than our old hands, and in accordance with his thrifty training, he consumes less than he produces; and in this way a freer influx of foreign population contributes to the recuperation of our stocks of products and the cheapening of prices. It may be safely estimated that the accessions of Europeans, from the beginning of the war to this time, far more than compensate for the loss of laborers in the North attendant upon the war. In this fact we may find an explanation of the circumstance that the after-suffering of the great struggle has been so much less than we have been led to expect from the experience of other countries. The movement is a national effort at the equalization of the labor markets of the Old World and the New. Its effect in Europe will be to relieve the ranks of labor of the surplus, which produces little and depresses the masses; while, here, it will supply a deficiency of labor which is injuring the community at large and not even benefiting the operative classes themselves.

THE GOLD MOVEMENT.

The specie movement at New York, since January 1st, presents some irregularities which require to be understood by those interested in the course of the gold premium. It was very generally expected that, owing to the wide disparity between the imports and the exports of the country, we should have to ship during the spring and summer months a large amount of gold to Europe. This expected result, however, has not been realized. The passage of the Public Credit bill and the subsequent enforcement of the Sinking Fund provisions gave an impetus to the European demand for our bonds, which resulted in our sending out during March, April and May a very unusually large amount of securities, thereby saving the remittance of a corresponding value in the precious metals. Had it not been for these large exports of bonds, there can be little doubt that we should have shipped fully as much specie as last year, when, for the first five months, the total reached \$37,279,000. But instead of this we have exported, during those months, this season only \$13,116,000, or \$24,163,000 less than in 1868, and \$4,755,000 less than in 1867, as will appear from the following comparison:

EXPORTS OF SPECIE AT NEW YORK FROM JAN. 1 TO MAY 31.

1869	\$13,116,000
1868	37,279,000
1867	17,871,000

The export of bonds even went so far as to actually turn the flow of gold at one period in this direction; so that while our shipments of specie were unusually light, we received, for a time, heavy remittances of coin from Europe. During the first five months of the year \$9,997,000 of gold and silver arrived here, against \$3,200,000 for the same time in 1868 and \$1,057,000 in 1867, as the following figures will show:

IMPORTS OF SPECIE AT NEW YORK FROM JAN. 1 TO MAY 31.

1869	\$9,997,000
1868	3,200,000
1867	1,057,000

Under this exceptional movement, however, it is to be remarked that we had no extra supply of gold upon the market, and the premium has ranged little, if at all, below the usual average for this season during late years. On the 1st of June, the specie in the banks was only \$10,000 above the amount at the same period of last year, and was nearly \$3,000,000 less than on January 1st; while the amount of coin held on deposit in the Treasury was \$3,696,000 less on June 1st than on January 1st. The following statements show respectively the coin in the banks and on deposit in the Treasury on January 1st and June 1st:

SPECIE IN NEW YORK BANKS JANUARY 1 AND JUNE 1.

	1869.	1868	1867
January 1.....	\$20,711,000	\$12,724,000	\$17,188,000
June 1.....	17,971,000	17,881,000	14,617,000

COIN CERTIFICATES OUTSTANDING JANUARY 1 AND JUNE 1.

	1869.	1868.	1867.
January 1.....	\$27,000 00	\$20,104 00	\$6,441,000
June 1.....	23,810 00	20,285 00	17,844,000

The fact of the supply of gold on the market not having been augmented, under the exceptional course of the exports and imports of the precious metals, above noted, appears to be susceptible of easy explanation.

(1). The receipts of treasure from California have been unusually light. During the five months under review we have received, via Aspinwall, \$7,406,000 less than in 1868 and \$2,651,000 less than in 1867, which was a period of very light receipts. To whatever cause this falling off in the supply of new gold is to be attributed, it must be accepted as an important fact in the current movement, modifying the effect which must otherwise have resulted from the unusual course of the foreign shipments and arrivals. The following figures show the arrivals of California gold, by steamer, for the first five months of the year:

RECEIPTS OF CALIFORNIA TREASURE AT NEW YORK FROM JAN. 1 TO MAY 31.

1869.....	\$7,789,000
1868.....	15,100,000
1867.....	10,444,000

(2). The unusually heavy payments on account of customs have tended to keep down the market supply. The receipts from duties at this port, for the five months, were \$7,285,000 in excess of last year and \$3,427,000 over those of 1867, as will be seen from the following comparison:

CUSTOMS DUTIES PAID AT NEW YORK FROM JAN. 1 TO MAY 31.

1869.....	\$5,057,000
1868.....	47,724,000
1867.....	5,150,000

(3). A still more important explanation is found in the circumstance that Treasury sales of coin, up to June 1st, fell materially short of those of previous years. Through the courtesy of the Assistant Treasurer we have been enabled to ascertain the precise amount of the sales at the Sub Treasury, from which it appears that the amount coming on the market from this source, from January 1 to May 31, was less this year than last by \$18,248,000, and less than in 1867 by \$22,399,000. The following figures, compiled from Treasury documents, show the Government sales of gold at New York for the first five months of the years 1869, 1868 and 1867:

SALES OF GOVERNMENT GOLD AT NEW YORK FROM JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 1.

1869.....	\$7,000,000
1868.....	5,210,000
1867.....	21,990,000

While, however, the Treasury has sold \$18,248,000 less than last year, it has paid out in coin interest, at this point, \$8,523,000 more than then; so that really the supply coming out of the Treasury is only \$9,725,000

*There were no receipts of gold over and by railroad from San Francisco before June.

less than in 1868. The interest payments of the Treasury, for the five months, compare as follows :

PAYMENTS OF COIN INTEREST AT THE NEW YORK SUB-TREASURY FROM JAN 1 TO MAY 31.		
	1868.	1867.
1868.....	\$12,471,000	
1869.....	\$12,471,000	
1867.....		\$12,471,000

With increased receipts from customs and reduced sales of coin, and with this gain only partly counterbalanced by the enlarged payments of interest, the Treasury has, of course, augmented its stock of gold. On the 1st of June, the amount of gold owned by the Government was \$12,110,000 greater than at the same date of 1868 and \$1,394,000 more than in 1867, as will be seen from the subjoined statement, in which we give also the amount owned on January 1st :

GOLD OWNED BY GOVERNMENT ON JANUARY 1 AND JUNE 1.		
	1868.	1867.
January 1.....	\$71,727,000	\$71,898,000
June 1.....	\$73,121,000	\$73,292,000

From the foregoing details, we are able to draw a comparison of the course of supply and withdrawals at this city for the five months, of necessity omitting certain minor items of which there is no available record. The supply coming upon the market from various sources, compares thus :

SUPPLY OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK FROM JAN 1 TO MAY 31.		
	1868.	1867.
Imports.....	\$9,079,000	\$11,571,000
From Cal for Jan.....	7,100,000	10,410,000
Treasury issue.....	42,511,000	27,100,000
Treasury sales.....	7,000,000	19,580,000
Total supply.....	\$66,690,000	\$68,661,000

It thus appears that the supply received from January 1 to May 31 is \$11,152,000 less than in 1868 and \$1,697,000 less than in 1867. On the other hand, the withdrawals, through exportation and payment of duties, have been \$16,878,000 below 1868, and \$1,328,000 below 1867, as will be seen from the following statement :

WITHDRAWALS OF SPECIE FROM NEW YORK MARKET FROM JAN. 1 TO MAY 31.		
	1868.	1867.
Exports.....	\$18,116,000	\$17,811,000
Pay for Customs.....	55,657,000	51,000,000
Total.....	\$73,773,000	\$68,811,000

With \$11,152,000 decrease in the supply and \$16,878,000 less withdrawn, there should be on the 1st of June \$5,726,000 more gold on the market than at the same period of last year; and, consequently, we find an increase of \$3,042,000 in the amount of Coin Certificates outstanding on June 1st.

What may be the course of our exports of specie for the next few weeks, we do not at present propose to consider. It will be seen however, from a survey of the foregoing statistics, that the supply, both in the Treasury and on the market, to meet the export requirements does not vary materially from that of the last two years.

MR. BOUTWELL AND THE MONEY MARKET

There can be no question that Mr. Boutwell's policy of absorbing currency into the Treasury during the dull summer season, with a view to restore that currency to the channels of business when the active fall trade begins, is founded on a sound basis of experience and of enlightened principle. It is well known that at this time of the year less currency is needed to do the business of the Country than in the spring and fall. Under the old State banking system the banks issued new notes to meet the increased demand for currency in active seasons of the year, and these notes, when they had done their work and were no longer wanted, returned to the issuers for redemption. Thus a return-current was kept up, which gave elasticity to the currency and made it expansive to the wants of our internal trade, expanding and contracting as the necessity for currency became less or more. Under the National banking system no such beneficial elasticity prevails. The banks are allowed to issue just so much currency, and no more. It is for the gain of each of these institutions to keep out as large an amount of notes as it is permitted to issue. The government endorsement of these bank notes, and their availability for payments into the Treasury all over the country, gives them a credit far beyond that of the old bank notes, and prevents their coming home for redemption at the issuing banks. The consequence is obvious. The bank note circulation is kept at its maximum throughout every part of the year. Whether more or less currency is wanted for the purposes of business, it makes no difference to the banks. They issue as much currency as the law allows; and what notes they issue are easily kept afloat. They either do not come home at all, or if so they are easily put out again to take their place in the channels of the circulation. We have repeatedly discussed this defect in the National banking system, and, with a view to give the proper elasticity to our currency, has urged on Congress the indispensable need of a rigid system of redemption in New York. These warnings have not been heeded; and until the remedy is applied by Congress our currency will be deficient in elasticity, and the money market in consequence cannot work smoothly, but will be jerky and unsettled, and will be liable to severe and frequent spasms, especially at certain critical seasons of the year. Failing this proper, and wholesome means of giving elasticity to the currency, the next best course is for the government to buy it up and lock it safely in the Treasury vaults in the summer months, when it is not required, with a view to set it free again when the proper time of liberation arrives in the more active season of the fall trade. In view of these facts, we repeat that Mr. Boutwell's policy of hoarding up and imprisoning the superfluous currency in the Treasury is founded in wisdom, and is approved by an enlightened regard to the exigencies of the financial situation.

Still, admitting and defending as we do the general wisdom of Mr. Boutwell's method for giving some measure of elasticity to the currency, we have expressed our doubts whether he has not been going rather too fast. Owing to the defective, imperfect way in which the daily balances in the Sub-Treasury are reported we cannot tell exactly how much currency has been absorbed and locked up in the government vaults since the beginning of May, but it is estimated at twenty-six to thirty millions. Considering the unprecedented severity of the spasm which invaded the money market last March and April, the rapidity of this contraction of the circulation, after so short an interval for recovery, is attended by unusual peril.

It is said that as we require fifty millions less of currency in the summer than in the spring and fall of the year, no harm but much good will result from the process of depletion and the withdrawal of thirty millions of currency is really less of contraction than is required, and the other twenty millions must also be withdrawn from the current of the circulation before the level will be brought low enough for the summer season. To this argument there are two answers. First, all hasty, sudden changes in the volume of the circulation are mischievous. But the contraction of the circulation is by far the most mischievous if it be done suddenly, too swiftly or at the wrong time. Ill-timed contraction of the currency imposes a tax on the people which is of the most intolerable, mischievous and useless character. It brings nothing into the Treasury, but it impoverishes the people, paralyses the productive powers of the nation, and, like the exploded medical theory of blood letting, it weakens and drains off the life of the body politic under pretence of relieving it of the inconvenience of plethora. To contract the currency without injuring business is one of the most delicate and difficult of financial problems. We cannot wonder, therefore, if the existing stringency is attributed in part to Mr. Boutwell's recent locking up of currency in the Treasury.

But, moreover there is a second point to be considered. The cotton and tobacco crops of the Southern States are raised under new conditions, and the business requires more currency than ever before. It is believed that of the currency which has gone South during the last nine months, thirty millions at least have not and will not come back. If this be so, it is equivalent to a contraction of thirty millions in the currency of our Northern States, and should make Mr. Boutwell watchful and wary how he goes on too far or too fast with his present policy. We presume it is from some such reason that the purchases of bonds this week have been increased and adjusted to the sales of gold, so that there will be for the rest of this month very little further accumulation of currency in the vaults of the Treasury. From this relaxation we may anticipate a measure of timely relief to the money market.

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR MAY AND FOR THE FIVE MONTHS SINCE JANUARY 1.

The returns of monthly earnings for May on the principal railroads, we are now able to give complete, and it is gratifying to notice the very satisfactory condition of business they exhibit, every road showing a considerable increase over the same month of 1868, with the single exception of Western Union, which is slightly below last year.

The grain traffic of the West during the latter part of May was greatly in excess of last year, and contributed largely to the increase in freight earnings. The results of the same movement are also observable in the earnings reported for the first two weeks of the present month, which largely exceed the totals for the corresponding weeks of 1868, on several of the Western roads. We regret to notice that the Fort Wayne company has altered its usual form for reporting the monthly earnings, by omitting the statement of expenses and net earnings heretofore given. This company has hitherto been an illustrious exception in furnishing the statement referred to, and thus giving the only complete and reliable information as to traffic that was published by any road.

The earnings for May are as follows:

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR MAY.				
	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
*Chicago & Alton.....	\$345,756	\$305,812	\$12,214
Chicago & North-western.....	1,269,934	1,206,776	63,158
†Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	419,077	382,979	130,109
Illinois Central.....	675,446	572,551	82,895
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	111,036	96,476	15,620
Michigan Central.....	408,676	389,635	39,041
Michigan Southern.....	415,791	389,399	4,392
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	400,347	439,414	29,067
Ohio & Mississippi.....	215,639	204,619	14,30
Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago.....	659,384	65,600	40,684
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	167,977	180,545	26,552
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	312,529	210,329	52,000
Western Union.....	68,473	70,68	\$1,690
Total.....	\$3,523,618	\$4,972,798	\$536,520	\$1,660

The total earnings for the first five months of the present and previous years have been as follows:

EARNINGS FROM JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 1.				
	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago & Alton.....	\$1,711,911	\$1,305,812	\$514,129
Chicago & North-western.....	5,211,042	4,688,953	526,089
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	1,832,109	1,480,073	342,036
Illinois Central.....	3,999,569	2,659,401	410,163
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	514,803	478,351	37,221
Michigan Central.....	1,911,743	1,760,263	151,474
Michigan Southern.....	2,116,136	1,987,819	128,317
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	2,296,303	2,076,677	219,626
Ohio & Mississippi.....	1,060,953	1,155,997	\$115,044
Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago.....	3,312,383	3,154,936	157,447
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	765,654	69,004	696,570
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	1,536,394	1,319,011	177,383
Western Union.....	242,512	25,710	3,102
Total.....	\$25,620,194	\$22,959,502	\$2,875,736	\$115,044

* 431 miles in '69, against 290 in 1868.

† Number of miles open continuously increasing. Over 100 miles more were worked in May, 1869, than in the same month of 1868.

‡ Including leased lines.

We are indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for the following tables, showing the state of the lawful money reserve of the National Banks on the 17th day of April, 1860. Next week we shall give in detail the returns of the Banks of each State.

Table of the state of the lawful money reserve (required by sections 81 and 82 of the National Currency Act) of the National Banking Associations of the United States and Territories, as shown by the reports of their condition at the close of business on the 17th day of April 1860.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.				Items of res-erve.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	
				Notes & b.p. in cir- culation.		A-t in re emp.		Amount		Per cent of	

Nebraska.....	4	1,972,559	205,884	257,458	11,619	160	860,523	680,090	23 9-10
Nevada (no reports).....									
Oregon (no reports).....									
Colorado.....	3	949,006	142,351	110,854	9,099		112,506	332,269	24 5-10
Minnesota (no reports).....									
Utah (no banks in Utah).....									
Idaho.....	1	119,050	17,709	23,013	2,646			35,659	31 7-10
Total.....	1,397	\$393,871,593	\$59,080,789	\$37,010,949	\$1,616,110	\$4,630,880	\$38,940,688	\$52,367,577	20 88-100

Table of the state of the lawful money reserve (required by sections 31 and 32 of the National Currency Act) of the National Banking Associations located in the cities named in section 31, except in New York, as shown by their reports of their condition at the close of business on the 17th day of April, 1869.

REDEMPTION CITIES.

Boston.....	46	\$65,845,973	\$10,711,476	\$6,641,540	\$938,971	\$5,065,000	\$6,638,990	\$18,999,004	28 4-10
Albany.....	7	12,261,874	3,090,963	1,921,800	10,637	680,070	2,191,638	6,731,905	41 5-10
Philadelphia.....	30	45,476,387	11,069,684	6,588,456	164,833	6,795,100	1,279,949	13,726,645	29 2-10
Pittsburg.....	16	14,645,313	3,661,813	1,872,672	64,875	645,000	1,163,673	3,675,669	25 1-10
Baltimore.....	13	17,049,196	4,263,299	2,040,480	251,240	1,390,000	1,316,168	4,897,922	28 4-10
Washington.....	3	2,029,971	723,943	388,63	17,768	190,000	259,081	805,007	27 8-10
New Orleans.....	2	2,302,773	575,693	455,709	44,776	10,000	289,068	839,563	26 6-10
Louisville.....	4	1,466,707	364,177	455,709	17,45	16,890	16,890	49,237	29 7-10
Cincinnati.....	6	9,437,933	2,371,07	1,432,574	36,083	900,000	290,100	2,260,767	33 5-10
Cleveland.....	6	4,970,674	1,232,664	476,000	2,069	275,100	1,232,641	1,232,641	25
Chicago.....	13	19,598,436	4,649,609	3,010,187	58,090	645,071	1,737,593	5,610,845	30 2-10
Detroit.....	3	4,271,145	1,067,786	438,784	497	180,000	572,085	1,178,386	27 6-10
Milwaukee.....	5	2,444,814	611,101	369,846	6,342	35,000	591,615	701,803	29 8-10
St. Louis.....	8	9,320,067	2,305,017	821,868	101,850	635,000	651,117	2,079,35	27 8-10
Leavenworth.....	2	1,019,379	254,845	165,742	122	70,000	75,117	250,980	24 6-10
Total.....	164	\$213,045,797	\$53,261,450	\$26,432,763	\$1,596,211	\$15,385,000	\$15,645,27	\$61,769,220	29

Table of the state of the lawful money reserve (required by sections 31 and 32 of the National Currency Act) of the National Banking Associations located in the City of New York, as shown by their reports of their condition at the close of business on the 17th day of April, 1869.

City of New York	Number of banks reporting.	Liabilities to be protected by a reserve of 25 p. c. amount.	Amount required as reserve.	Items of reserve				Per cent of available resources to reserve liabilities.
				Total	Specie	Treasury notes.	3 p. c. temp. loan cert. stamp as clearing house 3 p. c. temporary cert. at a loan cert. dates.	
City of New York	56	\$167,000,351	\$46,760,121	\$17,289,007	\$1,831,555	\$3,407,60	\$15,360,000	\$53,501,623
								28 77-100

* Liabilities of banks in cities to be protected by a reserve of twenty-five per cent of the amount + Amount in New York City available for the redemption of circulation.

NATIONAL BANKS OF EACH STATE—THEIR CONDITION APRIL 17, 1869.

We are indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for the following reports of the National Banks of each State and redemption city at the close of business on the 17th day of April, 1869.

RESOURCES.

	Maline.	New Hampshire.	Vermont.	Massa- chusetts.*	City of Boston.	Rhode Island.	Connecticut.	New York State.*
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,419,452 72	\$4,151,991 73	\$5,745,709 94	\$423,784,011 08	\$66,292,817 66	\$21,345,539 16	\$88,639,618 41	\$59,410,692 12
Overdrafts.....	9,409 61	31,670 43	62,191 44	78,198 39	89,647 17	3,112 91	81,507 25	492,015 18
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	8,440,750 00	4,897,000 00	6,685,500 00	35,382,450 00	20,750,650 00	14,711,600 00	19,756,010 00	383,113,450 00
U. S. bonds to secure depositions.....	795,000 00	811,000 00	658,000 00	2,329,000 00	850,000 00	410,000 00	1,176,000 00	2,846,150 00
U. S. bonds & securities on hand.....	703,791 00	261,500 00	259,500 00	9,289,000 00	3,300,500 00	271,410 00	1,960,500 00	2,901,300 00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	56,556 13	91,000 00	77,000 00	1,001,854 17	427,190 60	381,430 00	692,738 86	2,693,882 50
Due from redeeming agents.....	1,119,581 73	783,404 46	74,846 97	6,191,570 97	6,413,390 84	1,777,388 65	3,196,373 54	7,694,588 09
Due from national banks.....	71,929 43	385,848 47	87,131 17	116,097 03	2,613,523 72	39,406 13	1,133,572 38	1,695,089 16
Due from banks and bankers.....	3,388 38	13,481 46	27,701 62	116,097 03	46,376 63	5,416 13	77,059 80	7,955,615 65
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	241,246 61	115,469 41	146,944 01	8,018,554 14	1,301,392 63	577,553 99	2,551,713 78	1,720,556 67
Prepaid rent expenses.....	43,165 41	41,177 76	36,723 91	115,595 31	69,844 78	1,249,449 49	20,704 93	614,434 71
Prepaid premiums.....	10,124 89	490 13	41,557 96	14,278 48	206 01	15,953 69	3,418 61	153,796 88
Checks and other cash items.....	190,913 11	67,440 35	93,892 54	410,789 13	6,383,206 00	673,773 73	549,297 61	1,499,276 80
Bills of national banks.....	199,175 10	136,348 00	88,347 00	691,932 00	984,411 00	217,731 00	331,897 01	71,246 00
Bills of other banks.....	699 00	799 00	4 00	373 00	361 00	3,57 00	242 01	8,097 01
Fractional currency.....	29,752 04	11,353 93	22,690 47	162,383 10	125,779 21	40,388 37	56,733 35	185,098 13
Specie.....	3,579 51	2,468 43	21,534 43	135,365 05	6,074,171 39	86,653 51	142,076 47	2,963,753 53
Legal tender notes.....	1,086,932 00	468,665 10	6,8593 10	4,116,105 00	6,461,510 00	1,401,491 00	2,170,980 00	5,679,751 00
Compound interest on notes.....	10,000 00	57,000 00	15,900 00	15,900 00	5,076 00 00	14,000 01	285 00 00	12,340 00
Three per cent certificates.....	10,000 00	57,000 00	15,900 00	15,900 00	5,076 00 00	14,000 01	285 00 00	12,340 00
Total	\$32,751,468 53	\$12,003,453 42	\$12,003,453 42	\$99,802,096 18	\$131,318,873 60	\$48,125,595 50	\$61,889,815 01	\$121,805,536 98
Capital stock.....	\$9,185,000 00	\$4,875,000 00	\$6,610,112 50	\$37,182,000 00	\$14,850,000 00	\$20,854,500 00	\$34,976,880 00	\$38,672,211 00
Surplus fund.....	1,577,10 20	568,132 81	735,083 41	8,092,81 13	9,041,517 35	1,430,709 15	4,212,647 43	5,511,674 40
Undivided profits.....	73,894 48	41,628 87	593,086 45	2,527,03 21	1,044,391 85	1,141,416 16	1,755,53 19	4,593,115 34
National Bank notes outstanding.....	7,463,734 00	4,264,283 01	5,992,076 00	30,971,439 01	26,790,410 00	12,752,831 00	17,244,706 00	2,972,431 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	64,872 00	31,033 00	29,098 00	256,419 01	155,170 40	178,251 00	27,767 00	432,811 00
Individual deposits.....	4,973,87 07	1,513,01 81	1,942,770 73	18,923,323 33	37,558 46	5,455,891 53	11,591,817 35	41,983,470 54
U. S. deposits.....	2,048 31	387,479 14	173,761 81	951,410 01	37,656 46	113,619 31	498,441 76	1,238,470 11
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	180,241 19	31,455 14	74,970 03	62,317 93	131 19 33	131 19 33	1,809 19	1,809 19
Deposits of National Banks.....	109,113 36	1,700 13	36,093 99	552 2 10	11,535,891 31	531,219 91	1,081,188 89	2,678,188 89
Due to other banks and bankers.....	43,442 64	117,900 74	36,093 99	69,081 98	1,061,668 54	350,124 53	1,013,320 36	2,072,410 81
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	124,471 03	383,89 46
Bills payable.....	2,968 09	10,581 01	41,673 00	142,940 73
Total	\$22,751,468 53	\$12,003,453 42	\$12,003,453 42	\$99,802,096 18	\$131,318,873 60	\$48,125,595 50	\$61,889,815 01	\$121,805,536 98

* Exclusive of Boston.

* Exclusive of the cities of New York and Albany.

MEMORANDA.

	City of New York	Albany	New Jersey	Penn.	City of Philadelphia	Pittsburg	City of	Delaware	Maryland
Loans and discounts	\$162,683,110 97	\$6,600,121 00	\$19,431,701 84	\$23,432,913 05	\$16,319,216 29	\$13,450,719 61		\$1,044,435 06	\$2,341,968 17
Overdrafts	210,745 36	2,145,000 00	10,635 00	23,330,300 00	1,060 57	40,000 43		2,251 84	310,011 65
U. S. bonds to secure circulation	42,060,450 00	200,000 00	680 50	2,330,300 00	13,005 00	7,704,500 00		1,818,370 00	2,748 50 00
U. S. bonds and securities on hand	7,627,300 00	869,750 00	412,030 00	2,613,300 00	1,210 00	2,704,500 00		60,011 00	2,040 00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages	5,614,776 13	885,110 97	376,912 32	818,788 90	1,771,500 00	183,350 00		850 00	87,700 00
Due from redeeming agents	10,529,574 03	3,191,468 21	3,365,493 64	3,713,710 28	1,229,802 33	1,163,591 72		81,985 76	346,177 00
Due from National Banks	1,361,477 74	100,335 25	278,660 44	7,248,631 85	693,003 35	93 10		256 33 43	96 532 40
Due from other banks and bankers	7,021,105 39	180,365 82	732,311 19	1,143,480 79	1,654,529 32	618,462 91		\$1,494 87	41,119 60
Real estate, furniture & fixtures	1,271,971 23	3,614 50	131,438 37	431 60	498,429 50	116,071 59		1,177 37	110,511 95
Current expenses	13,898 13	13,914 70	114,978 74	68,600 92	8,551 46	3,511 46		19,057 81	23,14 84
Prepays	574,916 98	628,125 49	534,973 35	7,012,431 01	722,315 08	66,011 4		108,561 4	80,812 81
Check and other cash items	127,421,404 18	3,463,823 00	304,229 00	6,011 00	599,876 00	140,473 00		96,507 00	2,476 00
Bills of National Banks	5,392 10	3,903 10	10,894 00	8,968 00	1,207 00	1,770 00		2,476 00	16,07 90
Bills of other banks	389,561 25	25,314 50	67,911 13	135,851 40	132,495 62	60,901 26		7,321 96	6,023 65
Fractional currency	6,842 41 85	10,694 50	62,103 09	64,729 79	193,288 19	63,975 15		236,033 00	469 658 17
Specie	17,229 007 00	1,392,809 01	2,011,452 00	4,824,746 00	6,598,156 00	1,302,662 00		76,000 00	1,990 00
Legal tender notes			80 00	1,450 00					
Compound interest notes									
Three per cent certificates	31,200,000 00	530,000 00	3,500,000 00	865,000 00	5,960,000 00	645,000 00			
Total	\$436,107,943 55	\$17,702,961 80	\$40,537,181 81	\$77,590,037 96	\$30,253,005 61	\$37,573,909 28		\$1,442,968 98	\$7,128,109 05

L'AN LITRES.

Capital stock	\$78,982,700 00	\$2,650,000 00	\$11,475,350 00	\$24,055,240 00	\$16,492,150 00	\$9,000,000 00		\$1,498,155 00	\$2,398,317 00
Surplus fund	18,181,094 95	975,000 00	2,380,253 85	4,541,091 85	4,112,119 83	2,101,740 25		818,147 00	359,789 16
Undivid d profits	9,187,618 77	332,246 35	1,162,745 89	1,975,269 08	2,010,077 84	707,445 15		85,536 37	2,584 94
National bank notes outstanding	24,583,837 00	1,882,125 00	9,238,075 00	20,474,436 00	10,406,141 00	6,677,401 00		1,146,481 00	1,792,313 00
State bank notes outstanding	953,948 00	25,464 00	137,710 00	195,210 00	91,158 00	50,949 00		18,395 00	21,049 00
Individual deposits	223,826,164 97	9,282,976 10	13,720,446 63	23,681,533 83	87,950,505 83	8,081,460 46		1,144,193 13	2,051,087 61
U. S. deposits	59,103 06	60,389 91	2,235 12	364,744 01	173,406 45	13,264 36		24,940 14	27,000 40
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers		27,537 80	52,675 74	388,223 29					
Due to National Banks	53,357,876 11	1,983,971 02	1,863,941 75	1,771,922 06	8,347,438 60	689,590 70		194,490 81	120,854 08
Due to other banks and bankers	12,630,801 37	463,462 59	239,451 12	2,342,418 23	1,081,420 18	269,069 55		14,129 68	61,363 71
Notes and bills rediscounted			3,623 71	178,525 61					
Bills payable			45,000 00	53,000 00					
Total	\$436,107,943 55	\$17,702,961 80	\$40,537,181 81	\$77,590,037 96	\$30,253,005 61	\$37,573,909 28		\$1,442,968 98	\$7,128,109 05

* Exclusive of the cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburg.

† Exclusive of the City of Baltimore.

RESOURCES.

	Washington.	Virginia.	W. Virginia.	N. Carolina.	S. Carolina.	Georgia.	Alabama.
Loans and discounts.....	\$1,438,870.71	\$2,725,240.57	\$2,592,111.44	\$1,015,973.28	\$1,411,957.41	\$2,877,988.83	\$483,022.70
Overdrafts.....	21,042.73	31,921.93	24,569.79	10,578.58	4,566.63	75,901.73	441.73
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,013,000.00	2,036,500.00	2,143,250.01	200,000.00	245,000.00	1,889,500.00	810,441.73
U. S. bonds and securities on hand.....	420,000.00	253,000.00	810,000.00	107,000.00	160,000.00
U. S. bonds and securities on hand.....	237,303.00	296,000.00	531,550.00	107,000.00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	40,650.00	55,577.82	69,080.00	155,190.78	1,010.00	22,729.57	580.00
Due from Federal Reserve Bank.....	724,217.50	10,589.00	215,406.67	153,748.56	955,103.41	985,949.67	69,316.31
Due from National Banks.....	1,316,192.99	259,061.19	102,050.74	32,460.27	94,102.19	915,551.56	37,127.27
Due from other banks and bankers.....	233,101.80	103,835.41	180,330.06	69,327.33	71,210.70	275,034.15	73,850.81
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	88,661.24	47,813.40	52,790.74	68,156.08	25,831.23	100,925.03	14,281.08
Cash on hand.....	555,950.30	270,058.32	211,490.44	90,235.06	19,984.70	39,392.64	10,044.10
Checks and other cash items.....	194,013.18	61,475.51	35,497.44	17,556.28	2,000.00	1,496.62	5.00
U. S. currency.....	1,658,351.25	57,421.90	33,889.33	17,023.88	9,408.80	76,570.57	50,843.04
Notes of National Banks.....	8,056.00	89,713.00	21,455.40	67,415.00	62,415.00	114,483.60	20,911.00
Notes of other banks.....	750.00	8.90
Practical currency.....	2,065.67	16,015.35	21,264.87	7,786.10	1,250.85	30,560.45	5,150.99
Legal tender notes.....	17,763.03	109,000.04	28,555.07	92,789.44	20,170.13	40,835.41	55,558.47
Compound interest notes.....	388,163.03	313,393.00	388,191.00	271,369.00	245,181.00	763,864.00	91,809.00
Three per cent certificates.....	19,070.00	370.00	55,000.00	116.00
Total.....	\$31,821,532.03	\$5,026,921.01	\$6,787,456.49	\$2,675,913.63	\$2,630,833.26	\$5,780,816.00	\$1,239,205.62

LIABILITIES.

	Washington.	Virginia.	W. Virginia.	N. Carolina.	S. Carolina.	Georgia.	Alabama.
Capital stock.....	\$1,050,000.00	\$2,921,430.00	\$2,118,400.00	\$883,400.00	\$922,500.00	\$1,600,000.00	\$400,000.00
Surplus fund.....	235,000.00	163,640.30	346,900.90	54,592.10	44,303.24	168,100.00	13,873.15
Undivided profits.....	1,070,432.63	161,813.53	102,789.31	90,701.07	94,141.65	573,920.41	71,021.93
Notes and bills outstanding.....	7,071,593.00	1,971,430.00	1,857,088.00	844,510.00	176,060.00	1,231,685.00	264,303.00
Due to banks and other institutions.....	1,700,150.92	2,301,357.93	2,018,831.90	1,975,968.03	1,297,610.34	2,111,714.84	479,259.49
U. S. deposits.....	353,007.25	21,710.63	9,168.73	0.15	22,068.16
Due to National Banks.....	205,527.60	138,791.91	108,319.73	9,717.87	98,396.53	263,781.16	1,391.69
Due to other banks and bankers.....	10,044.56	91,841.01	61,443.43	8,467.81	58,346.13	84,165.20	3,325.43
Notes and bills redeemable.....	16,000.00	13,400.00
Notes and bills re-depositable.....	73,906.79	47,819.23	13,500.00
Total.....	\$31,821,532.03	\$5,026,921.01	\$6,787,456.49	\$2,675,913.63	\$2,630,833.26	\$5,780,816.00	\$1,239,205.62

RESOURCES.

	Baltimore.	Washington.	Virginia.	W. Virginia.	N. Carolina.	S. Carolina.	Georgia.	Alabama.
Loans and discounts.....	\$14,371,403 56	\$1,438,000 00	\$3,735,349 57	\$2,592,114 48	\$1,015,973 56	\$1,441,557 41	\$2,307,683 38	\$483,012 50
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	31,042 73	1,321 25	61,377 81	84,589 78	10,573 56	4,760 83	15,201 75	441 73
U. S. bonds to secure deposits.....	8,007,500 00	1,038,000 00	2,036,800 00	2,432,350 00	412,000 00	245,000 00	1,885,800 00	810,000 00
U. S. bonds and securities on hand.....	8,000 00	420 00	252,000 00	510,000 00	240,000 00	110,000 00	160,000 00	560 00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	40,669 00	237,861 10	206,000 00	581,650 00	107,000 00	110,000 00	22,732 51	10,000 00
Due from National Banks.....	736,217 80	259,081 19	65,577 52	215,406 67	153,748 56	363,103 41	985,949 67	69,316 81
Due from other National Banks.....	1,316,162 99	270,584 19	192,050 74	189,319 16	32,469 27	24,102 19	215,201 56	8,711 37
Due from other banks and bankers.....	252,104 80	105,885 41	221,735 85	189,319 16	68,873 34	31,210 70	275,044 15	72,870 81
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	85,861 34	249,863 61	47,813 40	172,780 74	68,873 34	25,831 23	100,925 03	14,787 08
Current expenses.....	555,250 30	88,464 74	27,068 32	211,480 94	17,356 28	18,865 70	38,332 64	10,000 40
Prepaid taxes.....	124,012 18	61,475 51	67,423 90	85,497 44	37,033 88	2,100 00	1,436 62	5 00
Patents and other cash items.....	40,518 75	6,763 67	51,421 90	85,497 44	17,356 28	2,100 00	1,436 62	5 00
Bills of National Banks.....	1,538,251 25	81,791 82	186,094 40	98,137 15	4,093 88	10,468 30	46,370 87	30,848 06
Bills of other banks.....	3,039,808 00	28,504 00	89,312 00	21,432 00	57,435 00	62,415 00	114,458 00	80,971 00
Practical currency.....	4,539 00	730 00	730 00	24,265 00	2,900 00	2,900 00	30,661 45	5,169 99
Specie.....	17,763 08	2,088 87	16,013 33	21,864 87	7,768 10	1,250 66	60,835 41	63,856 47
Legal tender notes.....	251,240 30	17,763 08	109,490 04	85,650 07	37,684 44	40,110 13	763,454 00	91,809 00
Compound interest on notes.....	2,041,490 00	898,168 00	343,252 00	388,794 00	271,569 00	345,181 00	110 00
Three per cent certificates.....	1,290,000 00	19,000 00	5,000 00	55,000 00	25,000 00
Total.....	\$31,821,532 05	\$4,545,982 22	\$8,020,921 01	\$6,737,456 49	\$2,675,913 62	\$2,630,833 36	\$5,190,816 06	\$1,239,205 63

LIABILITIES.

	Baltimore.	Washington.	Virginia.	W. Virginia.	N. Carolina.	S. Carolina.	Georgia.	Alabama.
Capital stock.....	\$10,891,985 00	\$1,050,000 00	\$3,221,430 00	\$2,116,400 00	\$633,400 00	\$923,500 00	\$1,600,000 00	\$400,000 00
Surplus fund.....	1,516,791 37	335,000 00	103,649 20	249,800 36	4,456 10	64,393 36	168,140 00	13,874 15
Undivided profits.....	80,133 63	1,074 82	161,815 63	102,781 24	99,701 07	94,141 95	232,920 41	77,602 98
Natl. bank notes outstanding.....	7,057,593 00	811,729 00	1,977,430 00	1,887,896 00	844,510 00	175,090 00	1,330,695 00	264,205 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	161,000 00	1,709,180 92	2,894,357 34	1,095 00	1,275,965 09	1,297,610 34	2,111,714 84	479,259 48
Individual deposits.....	9,662,544 12	833,707 35	1,010,000 00	2,018,311 90	6,058 71	6,058 71	23,668 16	99,017 66
U. S. deposits.....	120,000 81	833,707 35	1,010,000 00	2,018,311 90	6,058 71	6,058 71	23,668 16	99,017 66
Deposits of U. S. district officers.....	1,891,687 96	205,520 60	111,671 41	37,181 80	99,477 87	89,376 63	265,910 80	1,790 64
Due to National Banks.....	28,116 81	10,046 68	16,000 00	51,442 43	8,497 81	52,340 13	82,165 20	3,325 43
Due to other banks and bankers.....	47,819 33	15,460 00
Payable.....	13,500 00
Notes and bills redeemable.....
Total.....	\$31,821,532 05	\$4,545,982 22	\$8,020,921 01	\$6,737,456 49	\$2,675,913 62	\$2,630,833 36	\$5,190,816 06	\$1,239,205 63

RESOURCES.		Kentucky.*		Louisville.		Tennessee.		Ohio.†		Cincinnati.	
Arkansas.		\$2,181,126 46	\$1,041,410 00	\$2,074,185 22	\$2,090,004 16						
California.		46,322 8	2,455 66	27,150 00	153,281 01						
Colorado.		1,777,400 00	945,000 00	1,446,300 00	1,191,800 00						
Connecticut.		188,000 00	150,000 00	150,000 00	1,961,800 00						
Delaware.		11,200 00	7,450 00	232,900 00	1,180,200 00						
Florida.		7,000 00	300 00	1,651 53	70,460 84						
Georgia.		408,517 26	94,300 68	428,265 76	1,768,476 87						
Idaho.		75,672 64	53,912 48	188,947 07	761,156 11						
Illinois.		11,922 51	89,921 81	156,301 51	457,049 76						
Indiana.		2,948 45	104,522 17	24,266 83	779,273 03						
Iowa.		2,524 43	17,116 88	52,181 06	41,416 66						
Kansas.		997 70	3,47 18	4,711 01	47,574 61						
Kentucky.*		8,904 84	4,711 01	58,092 85	29,455 58						
Louisiana.		682 10	29,102 00	191,068 00	477,883 16						
Maine.		8,4 10	3,471 97	17,399 94	15,031 00						
Maryland.		49 41	17,415 81	19,071 46	91,705 00						
Massachusetts.		15,037 00	808,674 00	605,688 10	29,294 88						
Michigan.		230 10	3,09 18	3,09 18	3,09 18						
Minnesota.		15,000 00	10,001 06	30,000 00	415,101 00						
Mississippi.		\$31,833 03	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
Missouri.		\$5,406,413 97	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
Montana.		8,4 10	3,471 97	17,399 94	15,031 00						
Nebraska.		49 41	17,415 81	19,071 46	91,705 00						
Nevada.		15,037 00	808,674 00	605,688 10	29,294 88						
New Hampshire.		230 10	3,09 18	3,09 18	3,09 18						
New Jersey.		15,000 00	10,001 06	30,000 00	415,101 00						
New Mexico.		\$31,833 03	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
New York.		\$5,406,413 97	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
North Carolina.		8,4 10	3,471 97	17,399 94	15,031 00						
North Dakota.		49 41	17,415 81	19,071 46	91,705 00						
Ohio.†		15,037 00	808,674 00	605,688 10	29,294 88						
Oklahoma.		230 10	3,09 18	3,09 18	3,09 18						
Oregon.		15,000 00	10,001 06	30,000 00	415,101 00						
Pennsylvania.		\$31,833 03	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
Rhode Island.		8,4 10	3,471 97	17,399 94	15,031 00						
South Carolina.		49 41	17,415 81	19,071 46	91,705 00						
South Dakota.		15,037 00	808,674 00	605,688 10	29,294 88						
Tennessee.		230 10	3,09 18	3,09 18	3,09 18						
Texas.		15,000 00	10,001 06	30,000 00	415,101 00						
Utah.		\$31,833 03	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
Vermont.		8,4 10	3,471 97	17,399 94	15,031 00						
Virginia.		49 41	17,415 81	19,071 46	91,705 00						
Washington.		15,037 00	808,674 00	605,688 10	29,294 88						
West Virginia.		230 10	3,09 18	3,09 18	3,09 18						
Wisconsin.		15,000 00	10,001 06	30,000 00	415,101 00						
Wyoming.		\$31,833 03	\$2,703,560 51	\$2,005,310 20	\$47,341,731 07						
Total.		\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83						
LIABILITIES.		\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83						
Capital stock.		\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83	\$1,946,135 83						
Surplus fund.		72,000 00	72,000 00	72,000 00	72,000 00						
Undivided profits.		18,308 82	18,308 82	18,308 82	18,308 82						
National Bank notes outstanding.		1,053,766 00	1,053,766 00	1,053,766 00	1,053,766 00						
State bank notes outstanding.		1,480,812 61	1,480,812 61	1,480,812 61	1,480,812 61						
Individual deposits.		86,293 83	86,293 83	86,293 83	86,293 83						
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.		167,011 16	167,011 16	167,011 16	167,011 16						
Due to National Banks.		63,854 51	63,854 51	63,854 51	63,854 51						
Due to other banks and banks.		143,910 33	143,910 33	143,910 33	143,910 33						
Bills payable.							
Notes and bills rediscounted.							
Total.		\$4,198,868 76	\$4,198,868 76	\$4,198,868 76	\$4,198,868 76						
* Exclusive of the City of Louisville.							
† Exclusive of the cities of Cleveland and Cincinnati.							

	Cleveland.	Indiana.	Illinois.*	Michigan.	Detroit.	Wisconsin.	Illinois.	Iowa.
Cash and discounts.....	\$38,350.55	\$15,279.79	\$10,845.56	\$14,278.20	\$3,754.98	\$4,652.83	\$1,624.79	\$6,901.20
Overdrafts.....	48,221.73	61,511.05	223,953.15	4,580.74	5,547.16	8,415.51	0.11	13,408.35
U. S. bonds to secure circula- tion.....	2,244,000.00	12,383.50	6,116.00	4,580.74	8,551.17	1,846,850.00	700.00	3,528.70
U. S. bonds to secure deposits.....	65,000.00	1,140.00	78.00	1,100.00	50,000.00	50,000.00	300.00	370,000.00
U. S. bonds to secure other deposits.....	63,000.00	4,000.00	401,750.00	53,000.00	25,000.00	164,300.00	0.00	570,000.00
U. S. bonds to secure other deposits.....	9,512.27	224,700.75	335,882.29	84,311.17	1,450.88	31,280.31	10,049.31	177,011.09
Due from clearing agent.....	479,571.66	1,370,110.81	1,415,882.68	1,737,598.45	670,775.48	591,153.94	90.00	686,198.21
Due from National banks.....	227,495.43	1,043,327.77	674,587.40	1,500,119.13	271,153.97	243,875.42	17,913.25	572,694.57
Due from other banks & bank- ers.....	18,757.06	785,949.71	507,527.63	1,075,849.72	94,481.04	43,875.11	17,894.12	172,401.57
Current estate, furniture & other assets.....	202,461.61	193,275.00	435,925.57	4,011,127.77	104,447.33	119,637.94	124,316.14	333,910.50
Real estate.....	55,101.84	108,770.00	145,515.57	201,854.43	6,394.76	4,774.76	15,292.03	100,481.98
Prepaid expenses.....	14,140.00	10,029.82	210,778.19	12,009.46	116,317.62	56,319.10	10,532.01	16,853.77
Checks and other cash items.....	163,256.85	1,232,824.04	210,778.19	1,450,350.61	151,009.46	86,319.10	10,532.01	50,000.00
Notes of National banks.....	130,841.00	107,401.00	329,969.10	582,245.10	84,840.00	64,168.00	14,684.00	298,004.00
Notes of other banks.....	2,300.00	10,091.00	69,290.30	30,247.04	2,654.19	27,619.00	11,332.00	53,880.73
State and local currency.....	16,788.40	60,952.25	73,499.74	84,153.15	467.45	2,753.95	1,319.01	50,879.50
Legal tender notes.....	2,168.76	2,944.32	1,606,446.00	3,210,137.00	425,784.00	480,963.00	869,846.00	1,939,057.00
Unpaid interest on notes.....	478,046.00	2,317,721.00	1,606,446.00	3,210,137.00	425,784.00	480,963.00	869,846.00	1,939,057.00
Three per cent. certificates.....	275,000.00	150,000.00	110,000.00	600,000.00	150,000.00	55,000.00	35,000.00	20,000.00
Total	\$9,015,553.60	\$38,305,020.20	\$24,410,985.51	\$38,752,033.76	\$5,512,400.51	\$6,606,360.99	\$3,583,681.57	\$14,457,578.68

LIABILITIES.

	Cleveland.	Indiana.	Illinois.*	Michigan.	Detroit.	Wisconsin.	Illinois.	Iowa.
Capital stock.....	\$2,500,000.00	\$12,093,000.00	\$6,870,000.00	\$5,400,000.00	\$1,450,000.00	\$1,840,000.00	\$580,000.00	\$2,717,000.00
Surplus fund.....	695,847.91	2,511,429.69	1,496,775.84	1,771,500.07	765,323.30	391,011.13	119,704.77	677,585.71
Undivided profits.....	268,131.46	708,065.94	1,692,848.96	410,738.83	8,340.86	2,833.85	59,017.88	480,440.55
Notes to a bank not outstanding.....	1,840,000.00	10,849,017.00	5,457,165.00	4,367,996.00	944,639.00	1,686,902.00	692,175.00	3,019,900.00
State bank notes outstanding.....	0.33	7,919.00	1,727.00	1,074.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Individual deposits.....	2,920,340.95	8,636,686.83	9,272,140.19	11,454,871.62	2,993,938.50	2,387,575.00	1,362,411.11	6,097,731.23
U. S. deposits.....	271,831.95	638,084.94	442,529.43	6,734.41	1,212.39	64,258.61	127,170.01	1,451.98
Deposits of U. S. district officers.....	61,496.61	105,045.50	50,471.17	26,319.17	30,331.00	16,000.00	16,000.00	14,916.33
Deposits of National banks.....	97,437.23	182,646.83	103,458.17	2,964,169.31	192,049.21	17,438.86	16,000.00	94,879.50
Deposits of other banks & bankers.....	94,918.70	104,938.94	82,477.76	1,92,395.64	75,725.53	112,166.15	112,166.15	16,166.36
Notes and bills redem- ptible.....	99,000.00	8,000.00	4,000.00	4,000.00	141,676.87	3,000.00	141,676.87	2,500.00
Liabilities payable.....	11,472.35	11,472.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	\$9,015,553.60	\$38,305,020.20	\$24,410,985.51	\$38,752,033.76	\$5,512,400.51	\$6,606,360.99	\$3,583,681.57	\$14,457,578.68

* Exclusive of the City of Chicago.

† Exclusive of the City of Detroit.

‡ Exclusive of the City of Milwaukee.

RESOURCES.

	Montana.	Nevada.
Loans and discounts.....	\$19,929 20	\$140,000 79
Overdraft.....	10,841 41	8,065 00
United States bonds to secure circulation.....	40,000 00	155,000 00
United States bonds to secure deposits.....	20,000 00
United States bonds in circulation on hand.....
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	1,074 88
Due from approved redeeming agents.....	1,951 56	19,827 15
Due from national banks.....	451 01	263 84
Due from other banks and bankers.....	187,484 69	23,440 16
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	17,673 7	24,137 77
Current expenses.....	12,843 59	189 85
Premiums.....	58,698 57
Check and other cash items.....	15,851 07	227 02
Bills of national banks.....	381 00	5,040 00
Bills of other banks.....
Fractional currency.....	538 45
Specie.....	454 35	107,216 98
Legal tender notes.....	24,260 00	13,399 00
Compound interest notes.....
Three per cent certificates.....
Total.....	\$436,669 23	\$601,936 10

LIABILITIES.

Stock capital.....	\$ 00,000 00	\$250,000 00
Surplus fund.....	10,000 00	6,545 60
Undivided profits.....	11,081 08	12,561 07
National bank notes outstanding.....	13,445 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	85,935 00
Individual deposits.....	82,768 62	14,586 03
United States deposits.....
Deposits of United States disbursing officers.....	39,659 84
Due to national banks.....
Due to other banks and bankers.....	187,201 74
Total.....	\$436,669 23	\$601,936 10

TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

(From the London Correspondent of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.)

The Board of Trade returns for March and for the first three months of the year have been published this week. They are more favorable than those for February, and they also show satisfactory results, as compared with the corresponding months last year. As regards our exports, the following are the totals:

DECLARED VALUE OF EXPORTS OF BRITISH AND IRISH PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURES.

	1867.	1868	1869.
January.....	£12,738,842	£12,252,658	£12,621,114
February.....	11,106,072	11,349,779	12,485,026
March.....	1,148,767	14,892,249	15,697,465
Total.....	42,993,681	41,492,916	42,803,605

The total, therefore, for March in the current year is heavier than in the corresponding month in the two previous years, and is also the heaviest total in the above statement. Looking at the official returns more attentively, it is noticed that the export of coals show an increase of about 57,000 tons; linen piece goods 4,000,000 yards; iron 92,000 tons; seed oil 1,000,000 gallons; woolen cloth 250,000 yards; flannels 227,000 yards; blankets 928,000 yards; carpets and druggets 615,000 yards; and worsted stuffs 10,000,000 yards. On the other hand there is a diminution of 2,800,000 yards in the exports of woolen yarn, of 700,000 lbs. in those of linen thread, of 245,000 lbs in cotton thread, of 10,800,000 lbs. in cotton yarn, and of 61,400,000 yards in cotton piece goods.

Our imports this year have been on a large scale, and considerably in excess of previous years. The return published this week relating to the computed real value of the goods imported, embraces a period of only two months. The following figures show, however, that the value of the imports in February was £2,600,000 more than in the corresponding month last year, while in the two months it shows an increase of £4,640,000 :

COMPUTED REAL VALUE OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTS.

	1867.	1868.	1869.
January	£10,169,755	£9,481,192	£11,493,405
February	15,871,175	15,414,140	18,148,799
To all	25,940,930	24,895,332	29,642,204

As regards cotton, the computed real value in the two months was £4,703,255 against £4,685,843 and £6,264,889 ; of wheat, £2,844,818, against £3,866,818, and £2,520,085 ; of Indian corn, £1,029,837, against £496,724, and £356,547 ; and of flour £186,432, against £538,955 in 1868, and £306,631 in 1867.

The following are the leading particulars with regard to cotton :

IMPORTS IN THREE MONTHS.

From—	1867.	1868.	1869.
United States	998,402 cwt.	1,631,837	1,117,812
Brazil	111,778	261,178	171,984
Turkey	89,325	4,217	17,40
Egypt	454,005	297,841	310,316
East Indies	147,090	238,032	223,795
China	2,011		
Other countries	64,747	82,668	42,695
Total	1,815,319	2,430,866	2,013,322

EXPORTS IN THREE MONTHS.

To—	1867.	1868.	1869.
Prussia	50,319 cwt.	87,219	66,045
Hanse Towns	197,113	223,335	186,378
Holland	9,687	147,250	121,407
Other countries	201,275	24,954	189,367
Total	542,392	742,766	613,197

Of cotton manufactures the following are the exports :

IN MARCH.

Yarn	12,864,590 lbs.	16,477,378	13,632,543
Piece goods	210,094,411 yards.	249,309,459	223,352,963
Thread	559,684 lbs.	42,053	611,971

IN THREE MONTHS.

Yarn	38,871,670 lbs.	50,571,093	39,784,339
Piece goods	621,476,799 yards.	73,424,40	671,012,984
Thread	1,598,363 lbs.	1,227,141	1,622,045

As regards our exports of cotton piece goods in the first three months of the present year, there is a diminution, as compared with 1868, of 2,610,000 yards in those to Holland ; 2,890,000 yards to Portugal 750,000 yards to Illyria, Croatia and Dalmatia, 5,800,000 yards to Turkey, 5,880,000 yards to Syria and Palestine, 2,300,000 yards to Egypt, 7,500,000 yards to the foreign West Indies, 5,100,000 yards to Mexico, 3,800,000 yards to New Grenada, 1,700,000 yards to the Argentine Confederation, 14,200,000 yards to China and Hong Kong, 760,000 yards to Japan, 1,330,000 yards to Java, 1,700,000 yards to the Philippine Islands, 1,400,000 yards to the British West Indies, and of 50,400,000 yards to British India. On the other hand there is an increase of 1,200,000 yards in the shipments to Australia, 1,200,000 yards to the Hanse Towns, 3,400,000 yards to France, 2,400,000 yards to Italy, 11,000,000

yards to the United States, and 9,200,000 yards to Brazil. The following statement shows the extent of our exports to the United States in the first three months of the present and last two years:

	1867.	1878.	1899.
Alkali, cwt.	\$79,001	\$26,443	435,438
Beer & ale gals.	5,839	6,071	5,693
Coals, tons	23,064	24,130	17,425
COTTON MANUFACTURES:			
Piece goods, yds.	44,144,819	33,750,078	44,714,345
Thread, lbs.	423,446	434,731	455,703
Earth-ware and Porcelain pkgs.	90,301	21,663	24,304
Haberdashery and Millinery value.	\$2514,586	\$34,507	\$97,138
HAND-WARE AND CUTLERY:			
Knives, forks, &c., value	\$76,180	\$47,539	\$46,390
Anvils, files, &c. value.	\$2,443	16,130	\$2,403
Manufactures of German silver, value.	145,914	92,290	125,639
LINEN MANUFACTURES—			
Piece goods, yds.	22,449,010	20,771,444	31,236,943
Thread, lbs.	400,901	240,334	212,745
METALS—			
Iron—Pig, &c., tons	22,153	5,877	25,771
Bar, &c., tons.	13,107	6,761	15,399
Railroad, tons	83,901	150,047	143,308
Castings, tons	122	61	41
Hoops, sheets and boiler plates tons.	4,491	2,540	9,098
Wrought, tons.	2,369	953	2,465
Steel Unwrought, tons.	5,840	2,703	4,405
Copper, wrought, cwt.	2,517	651	1,039
Lead, pig, tons	1,346	2,332	1,339
Tin plates, cwt.	216,643	241,901	420,025
Oilseed, galls.	310,824	57,14	38,554
Salt, tons	39,245	44,440	43,536
SILK MANUFACTURES—			
Broad piece goods, &c., yards	196,905	150,369	157,617
Handkerchiefs, scarfs, &c., dozens.	403	54	532
Ribbons of silk only, lbs.	12,180	9,353	4,776
Other articles of silk only, value.	\$218,063	\$21,141	\$40,636
Silk manuf's mixed with other materials.	\$24,704	19,798	\$2,749
Spirits, British, gals.	7,977	11,740	16,650
Wool, lbs.	8,314	33,751	943,371
WOOLEN AND WORSTED MANUFACTURES—			
Cloth, yards	\$955,665	1,518,653	1,756,656
Carpets and druggets, yards.	1,523 2-1	556,44	1,537,901
Shawls, rugs, &c. number.	58,046	31,951	23,473
Worsted stuffs, yards.	16,763,185	19,957,440	24,799,560

The following return shows the prices of cereal produce at three periods in the current season, viz: when new produce commenced to arrive freely at market, when Spring corn was at its highest point, and, lastly during the present week. The downward movement in wheat has been uninterrupted, and it is believed that, as it was fully anticipated, no losses have been incurred, so much caution having been exercised throughout the season. Barley and oats, however, advanced to a high point by the commencement of November, but from that period a somewhat rapid downward movement set in, and the result has been that prices have declined (as in the case of foreign feeding barley) as much as 13s. per quarter, or about 80 per cent. Beans have declined from 1s. to 15s.; peas, 3s. to 6s.; and Indian corn 8s. to 9s. per quarter:

	Aug. 3, 1898. Per quarter.	Nov. 2, 1898. Per quarter.	May 3, 1899. Per quarter.
Wheat:			
English red.	54s. 8d.	52s. 6d.	52s. 4d.
English white.	54s. 1s.	52s. 5s.	52s. 4s.
Foreign red.	54s. 2s.	52s. 4s.	52s. 4s.
Foreign white.	54s. 6s.	52s. 6s.	52s. 5s.
Barley:			
English malting.	34s. 14s.	37s. 14s.	37s. 47s.
English feeding.	32s. 1s.	32s. 3s.	32s. 3s.
Foreign, grinding.	32s. 3s.	32s. 3s.	32s. 3s.
Oats:			
English feed.	37s. 6s.	37s. 5s.	37s. 3s.
Foreign feed.	37s. 3s.	37s. 3s.	37s. 3s.

Bees:			
English	44@50s.	45@50s.	37@43s.
Foreign	41@48s.	41@48s.	37@38s.
Peas:			
English	48@48s.	44@48s.	37@45s.
Foreign	41@46s.	42@46s.	36@39s.
Indian Corn:			
White	58@42s.	55@38s.	50@30s.
Yellow	30@42s.	30@37s.	27@28s.
Flour:	Per 280 lb	Per 270 lb	Per 280 lb
Town made	50@54s.	48@47s.	38@42s.
Country	48@52s.	3 6@48s.	24@35s.
French	50@52s.	45@44s.	3 6@35s.
American	Per barrel. 29@25s.	Per barrel. 26@30s.	Per barrel. 23@27s.

During the past three months of the current year our imports of wheat into the United Kingdom were 1,400,000 cwt. less than they were in the corresponding period in 1868. The more important feature in the return is the diminution of about 1,000,000 cwt. in our receipts from Egypt. The following are the chief particulars of our imports of wheat and flour in the first three months of the present and last two years:

WHEAT.

	1866.	1867.	1868.
Russia	2,789,345	2,725,473	2,665,536
Prussia	901,117	611,111	915,876
France	234,073	11,123	94,300
Illyria, Croatia and Dalmatia Turkey, Moldavia & Wallachia	577,918	1,353,146	571,466
Egypt	10,954	1,74,283	200,135
United States	508,944	1,808,119	1,971,265
Total, including other countries	6,031,539	8,405,521	7,036,018

FLOUR.

	1866.	1867.	1868.
France	120,059	152,895	173,579
United States	315,183	136,739	479,005
Other countries	59,500	20,709	197,601
Total, including other countries	865,183	773,367	1,114,383

Annexed is a statement showing the imports and exports of wheat and flour, into and from the United Kingdom, from September 1 to the close of last week:

WHEAT.

From—	Imports.	Exports.
Sept. 1 to May 1.....cwt.	1867-8. 18 8-9.	1867-8. 1868-9.
Sept. 1 to May 1.....cwt.	24,816,560	19,373,281

FLOUR.

Sept. 1 to May 27.....	2,366,113	2,738,738	38,265	22,148
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Annexed is an approximate statement of the imports of cereal produce into the United Kingdom in April and in four months. This year's April statement embraces a period of 28 days; but that of the previous three years, 30 days:

IMPORTS IN APRIL.

	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Wheat	1,514,400	3,231,018	2,091,669	1,846,741
Barley	262,874	539,174	508,233	480,537
Oat	543,609	78,534	74,117	419,157
Peas	94,713	72,411	33,009	84,416
Beans	52,391	134,464	145,953	15,953
Indian corn	75,703	973,014	89,370	986,086
Flour	483,808	216,280	218,365	304,878

IMPORTS IN FOUR MONTHS.

	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Wheat	7,183,508	9,211,870	11,560,890	8,892,753
Barley	1,644,455	2,746,840	1,793,481	4,129,194
Oat	1,775,511	2,113,308	1,999,995	1,694,438
Peas	200,867	885,423	252,310	293,919
Beans	119,035	650,911	621,259	783,386
Indian corn	4,074,576	2,284,404	3,191,557	4,638,886
Flour	2,344,408	1,134,463	1,021,735	1,444,152

Business during the present week in the manufacturing districts has been extremely quiet. There has, however, been a fair amount of buying on the part of the United States; but, with few exceptions, the greatest caution has been observed, and but few purchases have been made in excess of actual requirements. Cotton is lower in price, owing to the augmented shipments from American and Indian ports; but it is stated that the shipments during May and June will be very small. The trade demand is very quiet, and at Manchester, although there has been no pressure to sell, buyers have refrained from operating largely, except at some concession in prices on the part of producers.

The following return shows the extent of our exports of the principal cotton, linen, silk, and woolen goods to the United States and France during the first three months of the present and last two years:

TO THE UNITED STATES.			
	1877.	1868.	1869.
Cotton piece goods.....	yds. 44,144,813	33,780,098	41,714,342
Cotton yarn.....	lbs. 402,946	487,724	453,708
Linen piece goods.....	yds. 29,449,010	20,773,444	31,336,942
Linen thread.....	lbs. 400,401	240,374	213,745
Silk piece goods.....	yds. 196,935	10,669	17,617
Woolen cloth.....	yds. 2,638,656	1,822,662	1,856,668
Carpets and druggets.....	yds. 1,638,291	885,344	1,517,601
Worsted stuffs.....	yds. 16,718,185	19,562,440	21,799,660
Total.....	91,946,222	77,681,563	101,522,446
TO FRANCE.			
Cotton yarn.....	lbs. 931,198	1,070,747	244,384
Cotton piece goods.....	yds. 13,193,797	8,107,488	1,541,506
Cotton thread.....	lbs. 24,979	51,073	24,717
Linen yarn.....	lbs. 1,618,729	644,099	942,073
Linen piece goods.....	yds. 1,459,539	9,0915	1,085,817
Silk piece goods.....	yds. 611	3,496	5,569
Woolen yarn.....	lbs. 491,639	1,931,787	923,319
Woolen cloth.....	yds. 2,041,578	691,774	469,505
Carpets and druggets.....	yds. 71,923	91,913	115,393
Worsted stuffs.....	yds. 6,575,546	4,422,407	4,360,561
Total.....	26,355,219	17,977,579	19,831,158

The public sales of Colonial wool were commenced this evening. The arrivals comprise 41,368 bales from New South Wales; 12,207, Victoria; 8,075, Van Dieman's Land; 20,358, Adelaide; 21,933, New Zealand; 3,820, Swan River, and 32,090 bales from the Cape of Good Hope. The biddings have ruled heavy. Australian wool has, in some instances, declined $\frac{1}{4}$ d. and Cape $\frac{1}{4}$ @1d. per lb. as compared with March last. The foreign demand is only moderate.

Our imports of wool this year have been very large, more especially from Australia. They were as follows during the first three months of the present and last two years.

	1877.	1878.	1869.
From Continent.....	lbs. 2,422,353	1,410,705	5,073,677
Cape.....	5,471,560	5,047,928	6,744,192
British India.....	1,528,743	8,281,13	1,60,068
Australia.....	1,857,581	11,517,93	34,516,516
Other countries.....	1,931,858	2,512,42	3,481,236
Total.....	32,616,130	23,620,506	51,575,684

—while the exports have been as under:

O. LONIAL.			
	1877.	1878.	1869.
To Hanse Towns.....	lbs. 895,743	2,615,474	2,711,400
Belgium.....	1,97,891	4,79,884	3,093,194
France.....	6,731,563	9,971,671	11,539,306
United States.....	80,373	29,411	5,136
Other countries.....	41,953	63,683	1,77,197
Total.....	10,132,327	18,017,635	19,721,933

FOREIGN.			
	1867.	1868.	1869.
To Hanse Towns.....lbs.	216,443	114,635
Batavia.....	829,108	759,090	254,128
France.....	539,461	75,279	46,037
United States.....	718,675	321,566	1,966,981
Other countries.....	189,370	20,043	107,768
Total.....	2,493,357	1,469,931	2,374,924
HOME GROWN.			
	1867.	1868.	1869.
To Hanse Towns.....lbs.	615,063	451,321	346,501
Belgium.....	265,431	37,597	239,111
France.....	276,391	1,37,927	864,277
United States.....	8,814	31,781	943,371
Other countries.....	£81,751	843,145	255,940
Total.....	1,446,945	2,651,271	2,208,100

As regards the exports of woolen goods, the following are the particulars for the three months :

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Yarns, lbs.....	8,185,365	11,438,629	9,037,320
Cloth, yds.....	8,400,929	6,101,674	6,430,852
Flannel, yds.....	1,330,097	1,240,601	1,467,719
Blankets, yds.....	750,588	714,246	1,637,693
Blanketing and balises, yds.....	437,766	28,296	239,242
Carpets and druggets.....	2,019,403	1,549,319	2,194,383
Shawls, rugs, &c., num.....	111,333	116,945	179,888
Woolsted stuffs, yds.....	54,778,453	51,463,314	63,422,822

THE ANNUAL SAVINGS OF ENGLAND.

A correspondent of the London *Economist* writes as follows on this subject :

We have all seen statements of the annual savings of the United Kingdom, which have been variously estimated at from 150 to 200 millions £ down to nil, as I have lately seen estimated as the result of the year 1868 ; but I do not remember any concise statement of figures showing how such estimates are made out. I submit you such a statement herewith. I know that all calculations of this nature must be extremely vague, and cannot be relied on for any approximation to accuracy. I should be very glad if you or any of your correspondents, however, would point out any material errors which they may think I have made, or give me any better mode of forming an estimate from time to time of the general well-doing of the country as exhibited by such assumed facts.

The income on which income tax is raised is about	£370,000,000
“ “ “ “ not raised is assumed to be about the same	370,000,000
Total income of the United Kingdom.....	£740,000,000

EXPENDITURE.

On food, at an average of 4s for each person per week—the cost of feeding in unions is about an average of 3s 6d per head per week—30,000,000 at 4s per head per week, or £10 16s per year, is Government and local direct taxes, all indirect taxes being paid in the price of the goods.....	£312,000,000
Fuel and light at £3 per family per annum. I assume that there are 5,500,000 families.....	40,000,000
Locomotion, per railway.....	18,500,000
And in other ways.....	£17,000,000
Beer, spirits, and wine.....	22,000,000
Tobacco.....	50,000,000
House rent at £10 per house.....	8,000,000
Clothing at £2 per head.....	5,000,000
Sundry expenditure not enumerated in any of the above items, say £1 per head per annum.....	60,000,000
	30,000,000—
Surplus of income over expenditure.....	593,500,000
	£66,500,000

RAILROAD ITEMS.

MARIETTA AND CINCINNATI RAILROAD.—The earnings of this road for the year ending December 31, 1888, were as follows:

From passengers	\$769,373 46
" freight	814,539 35
" mail	23,737 44
" express	42,711 49
" telegraph	7,728 48
	<hr/>
Expenditures	\$1,225,187 12
Net earnings	<hr/> \$1,117,617 35
	<hr/>
Net earnings	<hr/> \$1,049,77

Compared with the previous year the gross earnings show an increase of \$7,572 45; with an increase in expenses of \$135,911 76—making a decrease in net earnings of \$128,839 81. The report says:

The route from St. Louis via the Ohio and Mississippi and Marietta and Cincinnati and Baltimore and his roads is the shortest to the seaboard, and the only one able to a large and remunerative traffic is the break of bulk now required at Cincinnati.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The difficulties caused by the embarrassed financial condition which has to a greater or less extent attended the company during its history, have to a considerable degree been overcome. The machinery and equipment are in excellent condition, and will probably compare favorably with those of any road in Ohio. The increase in rolling power, by rebuilding the four engines, heretofore referred to, will enable the company to transport promptly any amount of traffic which can be reasonably expected at present.

GENERAL BALANCE SHEET, December 31, 1888.

Dr.		Cr.	
Railroad and equipment	\$11,583,896 19	First pref. shares & scrip	\$810,719 44
Union at road purchase:		Second " "	4,460,683 33
" cash	\$126,944 19	Common shares & scrip	3,019,738 25
" in bond	\$0, 71 91—		<hr/>
Hillsboro' & Cincinnati Railroad	177,916 50		\$14,608,939 22
purchase:		First mortgage (sterling) bonds	
" cash	\$19,294 12	issued	1,050,000 00
" in shares 1	\$69 50 81—	First mortgage (currency) bonds	
Portsmouth Branch purchase (\$.	1,835,796 93	issued	2,449,500 00
and H. V. H. K.)	\$09,000 00	First mortgage (currency) scrip	
Construction—Main line	2,740,313 55	issued	4,843 51
" Cincinnati	1,351,110 30	Second mortgage bonds	2,500,000 00
" Cincinnati bonds	1,134,861 20	and H. V. H. K. bonds	300,000 00
Suspense account	155,000 00	Baltimore loan on Union R. R.	20,000 00
Real estate	550,366 77	Pay roll	\$ 31,408 67
Stocks and bonds	52,965 92	" payable & cash	
Fuel and materials on hand	103,529 89	borrowed	341,363 13
Buildings	7,999 34	Divid'g. due on pre	
Uncollected revenues	49,950 55	" preference	7,468 50
Col. and Hickory Valley R. R.		Individual accounts	99,630 87—
subscription	\$0,000 00		<hr/>
Profit and loss	574,376 65		\$21,424,949 80
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	\$21,424,949 80		

REPORT OF THE GEORGIA RAILROAD AND BANKING COMPANY for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1889:

EARNINGS.		OPERATING EXPENSES.	
From passenger receipts	\$321,789 78	For conducting transportation	\$144,341 59
From freight receipts	781,684 26	For motive power	223,068 04
From mail receipts	21,087 01	For maintenance of way	146,280 12
		For maintenance of cars	57,907 93
Gross earnings	1,104,521 01		<hr/>
			\$529,608 68
		Earn. over & above ord. ex	<hr/> \$579,608 36

EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES.

Renewing locomotive engines (not ordinary repairs).....	\$51,978 15
New cars and rebuilding cars (not ordinary repairs).....	53,645 83
New railroad iron, railroad spikes (over and above ordinary repairs).....	43,000 00
Ties used in laying new track, etc.....	5,741 81
Labor.....	2,849 54
Government tax on gross receipts.....	8,373 97—778,358 69

Net income..... \$352,903 67

Out of which has been paid :

For 4 new locomotive engines.....	49,008 23	For balance paid to stockholders in dividends.....	368,358 77
For new freight house and office at Atlanta.....	30,917 82		
For balance on new round house at Atlanta.....	4,408 26		352,903 67

These results compare with similar ones for the fiscal year ending March 31st 1868, as follows :

Receipts.....	\$1,008,733 66—\$1,104,521 04	Inc	\$100,797 38
Exp'n's and payments, ordinary and extraordinary.....	818,913 49—836,167 27	Inc.	17,254 78
Increase net income.....			\$33,542 60

It is somewhat remarkable that, while the last annual report made for every railroad connecting with, or in the neighborhood of the Georgia Railroad, shows a diminution in gross receipts, the gross receipts of your road have increased over one hundred thousand dollars.

Other roads have suffered in the falling off in their gross receipts as follows: Georgia Central Railroad, \$212,226 67; South Western Railroad, \$36,408 91; Western and Atlantic Railroad, \$329,584 11; Macon and Western Railroad, \$88,972 86; Atlanta and West Point Railroad, \$40,405 78, and the South Carolina Railroad, \$21,044 61.

The increase in travel amounts to \$33,424 50, in about equal proportion, the local, with the through, showing, I think, a more prosperous condition of our people.

The revenue from freight has increased \$67,572 87 over the earnings of that department for the last year. This increase is derived mostly from through business, resulting mainly from our improved connections and arrangements with the West, and the increased facilities for the transit of freight through the city of Augusta.

Condensed statement of the condition of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, on the 31st of March, 1869, the end of the financial year :

DEB.	CRED.
The road and its outfit.....	\$4,156,000 00
Real estate.....	114,838 66
Banking house and lot.....	25,000 00
Road expenses & expenditures for the road.....	887,090 16
Incidental expenses and salaries.....	13,113 28
Interest on bonds.....	29,638 58
U. S. tax on dividend No. 49 and 50.....	15,385 80
Tax paid State of Georgia.....	1,161 52
Materials on hand for road.....	77,516 44
Stock of various roads.....	1,067,397 20
Bonds of various roads.....	7,400 00
Discounted notes.....	2,519 11
Assessment on stock.....	269 50
Bills receivable.....	16,564 10
Due by other corporations.....	11,170 00
Notes of banks in Augusta.....	186,729 98
Cash.....	129,766 26
	\$6,855,988 61
Capital stock.....	\$4,156,000 00
Profit and loss.....	718,233 63
Income from Railroad.....	1,067,397 20
Transportation of the mails.....	31,319 51
Interest, discount and premium account.....	17,451 51
Dividends on stocks.....	81,043 58
Rent account.....	1,566 06
Bonds of this company.....	5,210 00
Dividends unpaid.....	43,682 87
Due to other corporations and agents.....	20,397 48
U. S. tax retained on coupons paid.....	1,326 69
Deposits.....	3,459 26
Circulation.....	110,985 08
	\$6,855,988 61

THE KANSAS PACIFIC ROAD.—The report for 1863 furnishes the following: The company has 440 25.100 miles in operation, with depot property, improvements and equipments thereon. At the beginning of the year the main line was in operation to old Coyote station, 385 miles from State line. June 14, the road was opened to Monument, 385 miles; and August 16 was opened to Sheridan, near the North Fork of the Smokey Hill, 405 miles.

In operation January 1, 1868:

State line to Coyote.....miles.	385
Leavenworth Branch.....	31.80
Wyandotte spur.....	1.75
State line to Kansas City.....	1.70
Total.....	370.25

Added during the year:

Coyote to Sheridan.....	70
Total.....	440.25

EARNINGS AND EXPENSES.

The following table gives an exhibit of business as compared with 1867:

	1867.	1868.
Average length of rode operated....	228 45.100	403 36.100

EARNINGS.

From Government business.....	\$511,369 04	\$487,930 18
Commercial ".....	1,071,888 44	1,284,165 63
Centr ctive freight.....	250,968 14	145,844 73
Miscellaneous sources.....	49,638 14	13,691 39
Total earnings.....	\$1,883,853 76	\$1,910,161 83
Operating exp uses.....	1,227,618 69	1,086,494 20
Net earnings.....	\$666,235 07	\$823,667 63
Per cent expenses to earnings.....	66 4.100	54 26.100
Earnings per mile.....		\$4.745 63
Operating exp uses per mile.....		2,569 65
Net earnings.....		\$2,166 98

The items of expenses were:

Contracting transportation.....	\$276,759 60
Motive power.....	416,307 20
Maintenance of cars.....	63,012 56
Maintenance of way.....	221,029 44
General expenses.....	59,468 23

TRAVEL AND TRAFFIC.

The total of passengers carried was 109,332—59,713 westward, and 40,619 eastward. Of the former 10,094 were immigrants settling in the State.

—The contract for putting down the iron on the Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Minnesota Railroad has been let. Track laying will commence at Burlington and Cedar Rapids about the 1st of June, and it is expected to have the whole line (160 miles) complete from Burlington to Waterloo by the 1st of January next. The company has already purchased 5,000 tons of iron, four locomotives, and a number of flat cars.

—The Dubuque and Sioux City Railway will be completed during the present season. On y one hundred and thirty-six miles are left between the East and West ends of the track, and of this, thirty miles from each end will be in operation before the 1st of July. Ten thousand tons of iron are coming forward from Scranton, Pa., via Oswego and the lakes, as rapidly as possible, and the entire work is progressing with all the energy that men and money can command.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC R.R.—The annual report for the year ending March 31st shows the following:

The gross earnings for the year amount to.....	\$5,231,979.75
The operating, legal expenses, taxes, &c., are.....	2,528,800.61

Leaving net earnings.....	\$2,703,179.14
Paid dividends, interest and Peoria route.....	2,267,520.29

Surplus earnings for the year.....	\$455,658.85
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The percentage of operating expenses to earnings, including local expenses and taxes, is 48.2-100 per cent.

The percentage of operating expenses to earnings, less local expenses and taxes, is 45.23-100 per cent.

The profit and loss account shows a credit balance for the year ending April 1.....	\$1,597,214.02
Deduct dividend paid April 10.....	731,000.00

Total.....	\$866,214.02
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Or a surplus of a little over 6 per cent.

The report estimates that the company will require the sum of \$3,448,120, to meet the payments falling due the next thirteen months, as follows:

Bonds of the Bridge Company due January, 1870, guaranteed by this Company.....	\$400,000
Bonds of the Chicago & Rock Island Railroad Company due July, 1870.....	1,297,000
One-half cost of building a new bridge over the Mississippi river at the city of Rock Island.....	800,000
New freight buildings and additional track in the city of Chicago.....	77,120
New equipment.....	581,000

Total.....	\$3,418,120
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The balance sheet shows the company had on hand, and available, the following items, April 1:

Cash in Assistant Treasurer's hands.....	\$1,177,045.09
Bills receivable.....	289,070.00

Total.....	\$1,466,115.09
From which should be deducted the dividend paid April 10.....	\$ 731,115.08

Since the date for which this report was made (April 1) the most of this balance, together with the current earnings, have been expended in paying the final estimates of the contractors and other expenses incidental to building and preparing for operating the new portion of the road between Des Moines and the Missouri river, so that the company, after providing for the payment of the July interest on their bonded indebtedness, will be virtually out of cash.

To raise these necessary funds, the company will either have to resort to an increase of its capital stock and the sale of the same, or a further issue of its mortgage bonds, either or both of which it is fully authorized to do.

THE INDIANA RAILROAD LAW.—At the recent session of the Indiana Legislature an important bill, authorizing counties and townships to aid in the construction of railroads, was passed, and is now the law of the State. Its most important provisions are as follows:

Whenever one hundred freeholders shall petition the County Commissioners for an appropriation to aid some organized railroad company to construct their road through or in the county to an amount named within the petition, a draft not exceeding two per cent of the taxables, as shown by the last duplicate, the Commissioners are to order the polls opened upon a day by them appointed, of which four weeks' notice is to be given by publication, for the voters of the county to vote upon the subject. If a majority of the votes cast are in favor of the appropriation, then the Commissioners are to levy a tax at their ensuing June session to raise the money; but the tax in one year cannot exceed one per cent of the taxables, nor can the aid voted to each road exceed two per cent thereon. When the money is collected the county can either take stock in the road and pay when it is subscribed, or a donation can be made by the Commissioners to aid in its construction. If the money is donated payments can be made only after the road is located and work upon it done and paid for to an amount equal to the donation, nor can more than fifty per

cent of the amount voted be donated until the cars run over the road through the county. A failure to commence work within one year after the tax is levied, or failure to complete the road within three years, forfeits all right to the money voted, unless, for good cause shown, a year additional is granted by the Commissioners; and all money forfeited goes into the general fund of the county. The provisions of the bill are also made applicable to townships whenever twenty-five freeholders shall present a petition from their township for aid to a road to be built through the same.

WEST WISCONSIN RAILWAY.—This road, formerly known as the Towah and Lake St. Croix Railroad, is progressing with the completion of its line, and has now in operation 82 miles of road from Tomah on the line of the Milwaukee & St. Paul Road to Black River Falls. The road, when completed, will extend from Tomah, through several towns already of considerable size, and a fine agricultural and lumbering district to Lake St. Croix, and thence to St. Paul, shortening very much the distance between that city and Milwaukee and Chicago. The company has a full land grant of 6,400 acres of land to the mile in alternate sections; and it is the opinion of parties well acquainted with the nature of the country through which the road passes, that the land will sell for enough to pay the entire amount of bonds issued for construction.

The portion of the road now open is operated by the Milwaukee & St. Paul Company under a contract, and it is stated by the officers that the earnings of the road were sufficient to pay the July interest on the debt the amount for that purpose being deposited in the London and County Bank, early in June.

The first mortgage 7 per cent gold bonds of the West Wisconsin Railway are quoted among the American securities on the London Exchange, and at the price for which they are negotiated, should be a very valuable security, and will undoubtedly advance to much higher prices upon the completion of the road to St. Paul.

The Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce recently adopted unanimously the following resolutions in regard to this road:

Resolved, That Milwaukee, represented by this body, feels the importance of the early completion of the road to St. Paul.

Resolved, That the energy exhibited by Mr. D. A. Baldwin and his associates in carrying to completion the first section of the road in a manner so creditable to them, challenges our respect and confidence.

Resolved, That the West Wisconsin Railroad has, in our opinion, a solid and substantial basis, sufficient to appeal with confidence to capitalists, at home and abroad, for assistance in the completion of the work.

Resolved, That this body extend to the West Wisconsin Railroad all the aid in its power, with the full confidence that, while the work is one of importance to our city and the country which it penetrates, it cannot fail, under such management as has thus far characterized it, to prove a profitable investment to capital.

—The State Treasurer of North Carolina has delivered to H. S. Cowan, Esq., President of the Wilmington, Charlotte and Rutherford Railroad Company \$1,000,000 of North Carolina State bonds for that road. Mr. Cowan will call a stockholders meeting on the 25th of July next, to elect officers of the road.

—Lancaster county, Neb., the second county west of the Missouri, has voted aid to secure the extension of the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad through it. The terms under which the bonds are issued are that the company are to have the line under contract from Plattsmouth to Lincoln before the 15th of June.

—The Western Union Railroad has been sold to Alexander Mitchell, President of the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, under whose management the road will hereafter be run.

—The Iron Mountain Railroad was opened to Fredericktown to-day, 105 miles from St. Louis, which leaves only a gap of 25 miles to be ironed between St. Louis and Belmont, and which will be finished in a few days. Mr. Allen, the President of the road, will visit New York in a few days, on business connected with the construction of the road from Worley, Mo., along the western bank of the Mississippi River to a point opposite Memphis. Large grants of land and of stock have been guaranteed to be taken by the counties through which the road will pass. The citizens generally are alive to the importance of the project.

—At a meeting of the Directors of the Iowa Falls and Sioux City Railroad, at Dubuque, on the 10th inst., a mortgage of the road was authorized to secure the bonds, at the rate of \$16,00 per mile, from Iowa Falls to Sioux City. President Blair, in conversation, stated that work upon the road will be pushed forward as fast as possible, and is sanguine that regular trains will be running into Sioux City by the 1st of June, 1870. Six miles of iron will be laid within the next thirty days, and rails are now landed in Chicago sufficient to lay the road for one hundred miles.

—The stock and bondholders of the St. Louis, Jacksonville and Chicago Railroad have authorized the Board of Directors to contract for the extension of the road, beginning at Hopedale, a point twenty-two miles south of Bloomington, and running through or near the towns of Tremont and Washington, in Tazewell county; Metamora, in Woodford county, and Wenona, in Marshall, and thence to Dwight, on the Chicago and Alton Railroad. It has also been determined to build a branch of the road to Licon, on the Illinois river.

—THE MEMPHIS EL PASO AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY give notice that sealed proposals will be received at their offices, 66 Exchange place, till September 1, 1869, for the clearing, grading, track laying, &c., on one hundred and sixty-five miles of their road.

—The authorities of the Columbia and Charlotte and Columbia and Augusta Railroads have agreed upon terms of consolidation, to be ratified or rejected by their respective stockholders in July. Under the terms agreed upon, the stock of the Columbia and Augusta Railroad is valued at \$22 a share, that of the Charlotte and South Carolina Railroad is valued at par, and four and a half shares of the former are to be received for one share of the latter.

PITTSBURG, FORT WAYNE AND CHICAGO RAILROAD LEASE.—In regard to the terms of this agreement the New York Times says: "A railway friend, who has closely examined the recent lease of the Fort Wayne road, writes as follows: The Board of Directors of the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company, under the resolution of the stockholders and bondholders adopted at their meeting on the 24th, have decided to issue a seven per cent guaranteed stock, the dividend on which will be payable quarterly on the first day of January, April, July and October in each year. These dividends will be free of the United States income tax, and special precautions have been made in the lease that they shall ever hereafter be free from deductions for any tax. It is understood that certificates are being prepared, and that when ready for exchange due notice will be given."

THE KANSAS PACIFIC RAILROAD (E. D.)

The following shows the exhibit of the General Account, March 31, 1869 :

DEBIT.

Cost of construction and equipment, 438 miles, including surveys to the Pacific, right of way, and real estate purchased	\$32,692,317 34
Interest on funded debt, and amount paid for discount and interest, since December 31, 1868	90,234 41
Due from Government for transportation	177,160 21
Bills receivable (chiefly Land Notes)	\$74,843 76
Due from other companies	14,835 01
Due from individuals, including amounts advanced on audited accounts	27,064 73
Agents' balances	68,430 96
Value of supplies on hand	\$327,908 30
Sundry investments	60,457 84
Cash and securities on hand	288,365 64
Profit and loss	55,774 65
	7,810 67
	\$23,692,518 08

CREDIT

Capital stock.....	\$5,172,500 00
Income bonds (essentially preferred stock).....	4,975,850 00
(First mortgage bonds).....	6,347,000 00
Funded debt—Leavenworth Branch bonds.....	600,000 00
Land Grant bonds.....	361,000 00
Government unbilled.....	\$6,803,000 00
Less amount credited by U. S. Treasurer for Trans.....	413,458 02
Bills and accounts payable, unclaimed coupons and wages, &c.....	5,880,541 93
Miscellaneous liabilities.....	711,599 16
Net earnings for January and February, 1869.....	40,974 47
Net receipts from sales of lands for January and February, 1869.....	4,925 69
Receipts from agents and conductors, for account of month of March, 1869.....	103,423 77
Receipts from agents and conductors, for account of month of March, 1869.....	103,423 77
Balance of income, December 31, 1868.....	75 01 78
	<u>\$23,663,638 08</u>

LAND DEPARTMENT.

The Company have over 6,000,000 acres of unsold land between Kansas City and Denver, lying in alternate sections within 20 miles of the road on each side. About one-half of this lies along the road thus far completed, and there is no encumbrance on any land of the Company, except on about 1,000 acres between the 140th and 24th mile posts, on which there are Land Grant Bonds outstanding to the amount of \$361,000, as above shown. The proceeds of sales during 1868 have equalled more than one-half the amount of these outstanding bonds, and by the close of 1869 will undoubtedly be sufficient to extinguish the lien. The entire lauded estate of the Company will then be practically clear of encumbrance.

The operations during the year were :

Acres sold.....	111,771
Cash received.....	\$77,778 36
Notes.....	201,084 06
Total.....	\$28,762 39
Expenses.....	24,477 95
Net proceeds.....	<u>\$24,284 37</u>

EXTENSIONS—TO DENVER.

The history of the Federal legislation upon this extension is given at length in the report. Suffice to say, on March 3, 1869—the Kansas Pacific and the Denver Pacific Companies having agreed thereto, Congress enacted that the latter should build and operate the line and enjoy its franchise—the line, via Denver and Cheyenne being placed on the same footing as that between Omaha and Cheyenne for the transportation of passengers and freight across the continent. The distance from Sheridan (end of track) to Denver is about 2.5 miles, an instrumental survey of which indicates that it may be built at a cost not to exceed that of the same length of the present road.

FOREIGN COMMERCE OF NEW YORK.

The foreign commerce of New York shows a large excess for the eleven months ending May 31. The following table indicates the imports from July 1, 1868, to May 31, 1869, compared with the corresponding period of 1868 and 1867, in gold :

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Six months.....	\$143,210,153	\$116,072,182	\$123,552,971
January.....	20,979,087	15,485,711	22,542,529
February.....	25,630,781	20,818,337	25,827,280
March.....	21,512,974	26,512,931	34,793,290
April.....	25,633,293	22,268,884	36,354,651
May.....	21,850,250	22,150,539	27,049,661
Total 11 months.....	\$258,816,538	\$223,441,447	\$270,120,382
Deduct specie.....	9,455,355	4,950,432	12,143,744
Total merchandise.....	<u>\$249,361,183</u>	<u>\$218,491,015</u>	<u>\$257,976,638</u>

The exports, exclusive of specie, for the corresponding eleven months of the fiscal year, in currency, are as follows:

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Six months.....	\$84,591,637	\$91,144,385	\$89,631,068
January.....	13,448,647	14,448,327	13,153,017
February.....	15,452,508	14,021,589	10,824,819
March.....	20,475,216	13,553,450	12,588,895
April.....	17,861,596	14,739,210	15,409,087
May.....	13,303,545	15,333,559	16,076,806
Produce and merchandise 11 months.....	\$165,134,157	\$163,249,520	\$148,703,485
Export of specie.....	34,642,660	64,486,258	34,854,361
Total exports 11 months.....	\$199,776,817	\$227,735,778	\$183,557,846

It will be seen from the tables above that the imports of merchandise for the eleven months ending May 31, were \$270,120,382 in gold, against produce exports of \$143,703,485 in currency, equal to about \$103,000,000 in gold, showing an excess of about \$167,000,000 gold in imports beyond exports at this port. The imports of merchandise for the corresponding period ending May 31, 1866, were \$281,239,651, the largest on record. The following is a statement of the foreign imports at New York for the five months from January 1 to May 31, in gold:

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Entered for consumption.....	\$56,125,236	\$50,138,370	\$70,145,030
Entered for warehousing.....	23,512,936	49,659,206	69,730,169
Free goods.....	4,932,651	4,170,940	6,594,957
Specie and bullion.....	1,057,519	3,200,789	9,097,255
Total entered at port.....	\$115,608,383	\$107,169,265	\$145,567,411
Withdrawn from warehouse.....	52,577,604	45,363,272	45,384,895

The figures below indicate the imports at the port of New York for the month of May, in gold:

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Entered for consumption.....	\$9,438,747	\$10,244,318	\$12,514,151
Entered for warehousing.....	10,896,675	10,541,079	12,876,131
Free goods.....	1,140,103	887,657	1,216,112
Specie and bullion.....	376,725	477,485	403,267
Total entered at port.....	\$21,852,250	\$22,150,519	\$27,049,661
Withdrawn from warehouse.....	9,245,943	2,045,351	8,379,916

The customs receipts in gold at the port of New York, for the eleven months ending May 31, are as follows:

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Six months.....	\$60,531,571 82	\$51,731,301 44	\$57,845,963 97
January.....	9,471,343 43	7,133,428 42	9,611,894 43
February.....	11,466,416 42	9,616,732 39	11,996,628 46
March.....	11,977,418 19	11,195,861 33	13,027,672 02
April.....	9,372,701 48	10,023,029 87	10,727,699 86
May.....	9,340,766 73	9,723,476 45	9,688,820 34
Total 11 months.....	\$12,161,125 12	\$102,543,849 40	\$112,902,79 02

The following is a statement of the exports of produce from New York, in currency for the five months from January 1 to May 31:

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Domestic produce.....	\$76,801,089	\$68,466,768	\$65,237,068
Foreign merchandise, free.....	244,024	371,313	17,869
Foreign merchandise, dutiable.....	3,418,407	3,218,664	2,717,486
Specie and bullion.....	17,271,390	37,279,972	13,111,363
Total exports.....	\$98,414,910	\$109,136,107	\$81,168,779
Exports ex. specie.....	20,543,520	72,106,135	68,652,417

The exports from New York for the month of May for three years have been as follows:

	1867.	1868.	1869.
Domestic produce.....	\$12,615,022	\$14,297,029	\$14,443,499
Foreign free goods.....	21,492	183,066	41,361
Foreign goods dutiable.....	665,031	832,544	583,848
Specie and bullion.....	9,043,151	15,936,231	2,512,336
Total exports.....	\$22,346,699	\$31,269,790	\$18,588,988
Exports ex. specie.....	13,313,545	15,333,559	16,076,806

**AMERICAN COMMERCE—REPORT OF THE DEPUTY SPECIAL COMMISSIONER
OF REVENUE—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR THREE MONTHS—
COASTWISE TRADE—IMMIGRATION.**

General Walker, the Deputy Special Commissioner of the Revenue, has just sent to press Monthly Report No. 25 of the Bureau of Statistics, from which we compile the following summary of our trade for the months of January, February and March, 1869, compared with the nine months ended March 31, 1868:

Months ended—	Imports.	Exports	Re-exp'ts.
January 31, 1869.....	\$30,112,634	\$35,244,132	\$1,522,610
February 28, 1869.....	35,173,726	38,755,480	2,227,540
March 31, 1869.....	50,195,384	31,594,197	1,738,024
Nine months ended March 31, 1869.....	3 3 528,503	265,724,156	15,919,463
Nine months ended March 31, 1868.....	269,936,006	332,075,153	15 520,114

Proportions of the foregoing shipped in American and foreign vessels during the nine months ending March 31, 1869:

American vessels.....	\$101,912,364	\$98,564,937	\$1,826,476
Foreign vessels.....	212,686,139	197,159,119	6,092,985

The warehouse transactions are given in detail by commodities and by custom districts for each of the three months ended March 31, 1869. The total value of foreign commodities remaining in warehouse March 31, was \$40,459,407.

The following table shows the number and tonnage of American and foreign vessels entered and cleared in the foreign trade during the quarters ended December 31, 1868, and March 31, 1869, and the nine months ended March 31, 1869, compared with the nine months ended March 31, 1868:

QUARTER ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1868.

	Entered		Cleared	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American vessels.....	2,297	774,516	2,396	813,697
Foreign vessels.....	4,594	1,226,507	4,592	1,212,366
Total.....	6,891	2,011,023	6,988	2,026,063

QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1869.

American vessels.....	1,504	702,921	1,596	734,665
Foreign vessels.....	1,704	971,045	1,594	938,693
Total.....	3,208	1,673,266	3,190	1,673,378

NINE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1869.

American vessels.....	6,972	2,433,311	6 878	2,420,332
Foreign vessels.....	13 158	3 828,288	13,071	3,961,839
Total.....	20,130	6,260,599	19,949	6,202,171

NINE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1868.

American vessels.....	6,868	2,873,739	6,976	3,067,945
Foreign vessels.....	11,334	2,978,378	11,731	3,294,598
Total.....	18,202	5,852,317	18,707	6,362,543

The following are the entrances and clearances of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade during the months ended January 31, February 28, and March 31, 1869, and the nine months ended March 31, 1869, compared with the nine months ended March 31, 1868:

	Entered		Cleared	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
January 31, 1869.....	1,941	1,010,713	1,953	917,819
February 28, 1869.....	1,903	978,464	1,901	913,327
March 31, 1869.....	2,160	1,155,601	2,151	1,016,137
Nine months ended March 31, 1869.....	51,835	18 863,779	51 649	18,118,047
March 31, 1868.....	49,234	17,797,141	48,777	16,966,965

The statistics of the indirect trade for the quarter ended March 31, 1869, are especially interesting.

The total indirect imports during the quarter amounted to \$14,422,267, of which sum \$1,883,694 came from the States comprising the German Zollverein through the ports of the following countries: Belgium, \$56,029; Bremen, \$525,291; England, \$1,491,332; France, \$23,984; Hamburg, \$117,519; Holland, \$68,536; through all other countries, \$1,003. Total indirect imports from France, \$6,782,423; through Belgium, \$7,045; Bremen, \$15,475; England, \$6,720,803; Hamburg, \$31,972; Holland, \$380; Canada, \$1,268. Indirect imports from England, \$275,449; through Belgium, \$52,251; Bremen, \$23,979; France, \$605,985; Hamburg, \$52,769; Canada and other British North American possessions,

\$12,928; through the ports of all other countries, \$13,185. Indirect imports from Cuba, \$49,528; through Hamburg, \$514; Canada, \$49,014.

The summary of the indirect trade is followed by elaborate comparative statements showing the total number of immigrants arrived in the United during each of the thirteen calendar years. The nationalities and occupation of immigrants are given in detail. These tables commence with the year 1856, being the point where "Brommell's History of Immigration" breaks off; and, taken in connection with the latter work, afford complete statistics of our immigration from 1819 to date.

Comparative tables are likewise given showing the imports, exports and re-exports of Great Britain and Ireland during the four months ended April 30, 1869, compared with the corresponding periods of 1867 and 1868. These tables are condensed from the British trade accounts. Comparative tables follow showing the exports by quarter of each class of merchandise shipped from Paris to the United States during the years 1866 to 1868, inclusive, the total value of exports from Paris to the United States from July 1, 1863, to December 31, 1869; exports sugar and molasses from Havana, Cardenas and Matanzas, 1867 to 1869, inclusive; exports from Havana of the principal articles of product from January 1 to June 10, in 1868 and 1869; and importations into Havana during the first five months of the ten years 1860 to 1869, inclusive; number and tonnage, by nationalities, of vessels which entered the port of Havana during the first five months of the years 1867 to 1869; exports from Calcutta to the United States during the first quarters of the years 1862 and 1869; exports of Sheffield to the United States from 1864 to 1868.

In addition to the foregoing, the report contains the usual miscellany of commercial transactions and consular reports, as well as tables showing the products of American fisheries, produce of Maine by way of New Brunswick, and shipments of domestic commodities between New York and San Francisco, by way of Panama.

CONSUMPTION AND STOCK OF COTTON.

The annual meeting of the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers and Planters was held in New York on the 30th June. We have received an advance copy of the report of the Statistical Committee, and give the following extracts from it, as it contains information relating to the supply and consumption of cotton which is of immediate interest and value:

We are thus limited to the present year, the facts of that portion past, and the apparent facts for the remainder, reaching to the 1st of September as the end of the regular cotton year, but to the 1st of October as the period up to which our mills must be supplied without help from the new crop. Accepting as correct the figures found in the weekly circular of the New York Board of Cotton Brokers, from which to state the crop movements since September 1, 1868, we find:

Stock in the ports Sept. 1, 1869.....	Bals.
Receipts at the ports to last mail dates (June 18).....	\$8,000
	2,067,000
Total supply, at ports, to June 18.....	2,100,000
Deduct foreign exports to June 18.....	1,402,000
Stocks in port.....	85,000
	— 1,497,000
Taken from the ports by Northern spinners.....	603,000
Add receipts overland to mills to April 2.....	141,000
Add receipts overland to mills, April 24 to June 18 (estimated).....	6,000
Total taken from this crop by Northern spinners since September 1, 1868.....	850,000

According to the returns made from the mills for 1867-8, the Northern consumption that year did not exceed about 900,000 bales. It is supposed, as before stated, that the consumption this year is less, owing to the reduced production of heavy goods. We do not venture to accept as fact, however, the inference from the above figures, that the Northern mills require to buy less than 50,000 bales to run up to 15th of October, 1869, which would complete the year for which supplies began to be received at mills about October 15, 1868, because it does

not satisfactorily appear that the supply in hand, supplemented by the 50,000 bales, will extend so far. The common impression is that the supply held by the mills on the 18th of June will extend (at present rate of use) only to about August 20 or 25, and that a further supply of 130,000 to 140,000 bales is required to run up to "new cotton," say 15th October.

Assume the want for home use up to 15th October to be the maximum, say.....	bales- 140,000
And that there shall be a further export of.....	26,000

Total..... 166,000

Whence is it to come? Can it be supplied?

The stock in all the ports, June 18, was.....	90,000
To come in before 1st September, including inland stock, (estimated)....	29,000
<i>In transitu</i> from South, June 18.....	21,000

Portion of receipts at ports to 1st October (estimated at 50,000 bales), available for mills before Oct. 15..... 37,000

Supply..... 178,000

If the stock in the ports 1st September, and in the mills 15th October, be assumed to be the same as last year, we find there is an apparent supply for the maximum want, and a surplus over, in *pro forma* statement, which bespeaks of the future only an ordinary minimum of supply, to cover a maximum of want.

While this indicates a full supply, it exhibits a surplus too small to afford that choice of qualities essential to the profitable working of a cotton mill. This small unappropriated supply could be easily controlled by speculation but for the hard fact that at the present price (32½@33c for middling cotton) there is an actual loss in producing nearly all the common and standard varieties of cotton goods. This will enforce further stopping of machinery. It would be well for manufacturers generally, if a large portion of the manufacturing power shall be stopped through most of the hot months of July and August.

The spindles and looms of Europe are further from the cotton fields, and a longer time is required for the transportation of their supplies. Looking to October 1, the period of the annual making up of the cotton statement for all Europe, the chief elements which enter into the supply for that period are now visible, and calculations can be made which will be approximately safe.

Let us consider Great Britain alone. From January 1 to June 10, 23 weeks.

The deliveries for home use were 1,178,000 bales, or 51,200 per week. The deliveries for export were 172,000 bales, or 7,500 per week. From Liverpool 1,155,000 bales. From London, &c., 195,000 bales. Total, 1,350,000 bales, or 58,700 per week. The total deliveries from Liverpool alone were 50,000 bales per week.

The following prospective statement for Liverpool is composed principally of ascertained or stated facts, such as "Stock on hand," "Cotton at Sea," with the exception of some minor quantities set down as probable, such as the imports from Brazil, Egypt, West Indies, &c., which, taken as last year for same time, are all understated if we may credit the recent advices of probable imports in excess of last year.

Stock of cotton in Liverpool, June 10.....	Bales. 435,400
Estimated imports:	
From the U. S., at sea, June 5.....	50,000
Cleared since June 5.....	20,000
To clear before Sept. 1.....	25,000
	127,000
From East India, at sea, May 15.....	456,000
Cleared before June 1.....	44,000—500,000
Brazil, same as last year.....	125,000
Egypt, same as last year.....	9,000
West Indies and others, same as last year.....	37,600—366,500
Total supply.....	1,302,000

The deliveries from Liverpool during the first 23 weeks of 1869 were 50,000 per week. That included a large trade demand for some weeks, and now the trade demand is much less. But there are indications of a large export demand in future. Assume, then, an increase of deliveries to 52,000 bales per week for the next 16 weeks..... 832,000

It would leave on hand, in Liverpool, October 1, 1869, 470,000 bales, against 424,000 October 1, 1868, whereas on the 10th June the stock was 217,000 less than at same date in 1868. This shows a large falling off in the deliveries for consumption and export. It is further shown in the trade statement* of exports of plain and colored cotton goods from London, Liverpool, and the Clyde, to the East Indies and China.

	Yards.
The quantity for the whole year 1866, was.....	825,431,005
" " " " 1867, "	1,036,14,613
" " " " 1868, "	1,27,532,283

an increase from 1866 to 1868 of nearly 50 per cent. Whereas, the exports of those goods from the same ports to the same countries were for the first five months of 1868, 497,955,000 yards and for the first five months of 1869 only 387,233,000 yards, a falling off equal to 22½ per cent, and we are assured both by trade circulars and by a comparison of the prices of raw cotton with the prices of cotton fabrics, that the business has left an average loss to spinners, manufacturers, and exporters during the last five or six months.

The consumption of cotton on the Continent of Europe has not varied materially from that of the previous year. Their direct importations have been larger, and they have taken less from England.

Up to October the manufacturing world has a visible and probable existing supply of cotton, larger than last year, with which to meet a smaller consumption. The result promised is a larger aggregate stock on the 1st of October next.

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

STATEMENT COMPARING THE RETURNS FOR JUNE 1 AND JULY 1, 1869.

DEBT BEARING COIN INTEREST.

Character of issues.	June 1.	July 1.	Increase.	Decrease.
50, Bonds of Jan 1, '59 (15 yrs).....	\$30,000,000	\$7,000,000	\$.....	\$.....
50, " " Jan. 1, '61 (10 yrs).....	7,022,000	7,022,000
50, B'ds of '61 (after Dec 31, '80).....	18,415,000	18,415,000
50, " " (Oregon war) '81.....	545,000	945,000
50, " " of June 30, '61 (20 yrs).....	189,317,400	189,317,500	100
50, " " May 1, '6 (5-20's).....	514,771,600	514,771,600
50, " " June '68 (5-1).....	75,000,000	75,000,000
50, " " Mar. 1, '64 (10-40's).....	194,547,300	194,547,300
50, " " Nov. 1, '61 (5-20's).....	139,433,000	121,443,800
50, " " July 1, '63 (5-20's).....	322,948,950	322,948,950
50, " " Nov. 1, '6 (5-20's).....	203,723,000	203,827,250
50, " " July 1, '67 (5-20's).....	879,531,000	879,532,850	48,400
50, " " July 1, '68 (5-20's).....	42,689,850	42,689,350

DEBT BEARING LAWFUL MONEY INTEREST.

2s, Certificates (demand).....	\$57,075,000	\$5,110,000	\$955,000
2s, Navy Pension Fund	14,000,000	14,000,000

DEBT ON WHICH INTEREST HAS CEASED SINCE MATURITY.

50, Bonds of 1862, '67, '68.....	\$182,700	\$102,000	\$30,100
50, Bonds (tax in rem) 1-64.....	242,000	241,000
Treasury notes prior to 1857.....	14,412	101,512
" " since 1857.....	381,192	379,152	2,040
50, Certificates of indebtedness.....	12,000	14,000
50, Comp'd int. notes '67 & '68.....	2,956,250	2,879,410	76,840
Temporary loan.....	186,610	186,310	300
7-30s, 3 year notes ('67 & '68).....	1,407,100	1,116,600	240,800

DEBT BEARING NO INTEREST.

Demand notes.....	\$122,813	\$121,639	\$1,175
U. S. Legal Tender notes.....	255,936,431	255,935,195	1,236
Postal & fractional currency.....	33,451,323	32,063,023	1,390,395
Gold Certificates.....	23,340,720	30,489,640	\$7,148,920

*George Fraser, Lion & Co., of Manchester.

RECAPITULATION.

Debt bearing coin interest.....	\$3,107,881.700	\$3,107,880,600	\$48,500
" b'ring lawful money int.....	67,078,000	66,120,000	\$958,000
" on which i t h s ceas'd.....	5,41,844	5,01,884	842,960
" bearing no interest.....	412,862,287	418,608,501	5,746,214
Aggregated principal debt.....	\$3,598,221,251	\$3,577,730,985	\$2,490,266
Col in circulation.....	83,476,62	45,300,000	38,176,62
Lawful money int. accrued.....	1,236,700	1,392,701	156,000
Int. accrued on matured debt.....	76,340	690,680	35,660
Aggregated bt & int. a c u'd.....	\$2,683,870,653	\$2,645,118,296	\$11,507,643
Deduct amount in Treasury:				
Coin belonging to Govern't.....	\$81,839,469	\$79,718,613	\$2,125,796
Col. for which certificates are outstanding..	28,307,20	2,489,40	7,148,90
Currency.....	19,94,55	17,037,89	17,113,264
Sink'g fund in coin, b'de & int.....	8,083,296	8,867,282	5,778,986
Total coin & cur'y in Treas'y.....	\$116,235,197	\$156,168,414	\$77,510,374
Debtless coin and currency.....	\$2,518,798,191	\$2,489,000,881	\$16,42,733

BONDS ISSUED TO UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD AND BRANCHES.

(Under acts of July 1, 1862, and July 1, 1866, principal payable in 30 years after date, and interest semi-annually, in January and July, both in lawful money.)				
62, Union Pacific Railroad.....	\$25,000,000	\$25,000,000
62, Union Pacific R.R. R.R.....	6,000,000	6,000,000
62, Sioux City & Pacific R.R.....	1,625,350	1,625,350
62, Central Pacific R.R.....	22,781,000	22,781,000
62, Central Branch (Kansas).....	1,600,000	1,600,000
62, Western Pacific R.R.....	320,000	320,000
Total amount issued.....	\$58,633,320	\$58,633,320

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW

Monetary Affairs—Rates of Loans and Discounts—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Price of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at New York—Opening, Highest, Lowest and Closing Prices at the New York Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

The condition of the money market during the month of June has been, in some respects, extraordinary. Usually, money at that period is abundant, the surplus means of the banks throughout the country resting here and causing low rates of interest. This year the resources of the city banks have been depleted to a point as low as during the periods of greatest commercial activity in the interior, and the rate of interest has ranged higher perhaps than at any former time, borrowers upon stocks having had to pay, upon money obtained outside the banks, rates ranging from 7 per cent in coin per annum to $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per day, i. e., from 10 per cent to 182 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum. The money market has had a formal embodiment in a regular gathering of lenders and borrowers in the open street, where money has been offered and bid for with as much excitement as attends the dealing in stocks or gold. In June of 1868 the rate of interest at bank was 4@5 per cent; in 1867, 6 per cent; and in 1866, 5@7 per cent. A comparison of the present condition of the banks with that at the corresponding period of last year will explain the cause of this remarkable departure from ordinary rates:

CONDITION OF ASSOCIATED BANKS JUNE 26, 1869, AND JUNE 27, 1868.

	June 26, 1869	June 27, 1868.
Loans and discounts.....	\$26,431,000	\$26,501,000
Specie.....	20,57,00	7,75,000
Circulation.....	84,214,00	84,08,000
Deposits.....	181,77,000	214,802,00
Legal tenders.....	43,163,000	73,853,000

With \$25,690,000 less legal tenders than a year ago, and \$17,073,000 in loans and discounts, it is easy to see how a condition of extreme stringency should exist. One predisposing cause to this condition of things has been the retention in the South of a large amount of the currency sent there for moving the cotton crop. Beyond this, however, there have been special causes tending to this result. The West has sent forward an unusually large quantity of grain for the season; which, together with the moving of the wool crop, has called for the remittance of a large amount of currency from New York. The operations of the Treasury also have tended to deplete the banks of their resources. Usually, in June, the receipts from internal revenue are heavy, and this year they appear to have been especially so. In addition to this circumstance, the Secretary of the Treasury has sold weekly \$2,000,000 of gold and purchased only \$1,000,000 of bonds, taking out of the banks, on these transactions about \$1,000,000 each week. As the result of these concurrent movements, we find that the currency balance in the Treasury has increased from \$19,984,000 on June 1st to \$37,497,000 on July 1; the increase of \$17,513,000 representing so much taken out of the banks of this and other cities. The condition of things thus induced has afforded a strong temptation to Wall street speculators to attempt an artificial manipulation of the market, which has not been overlooked. The most favorable opportunity for this extraneous pressure occurred near the close of the month, when the Treasury withdrawals were at their climax and there was a temporary withdrawal of funds from the market to provide for the payment of July interest upon bonds and stocks. Accordingly, the bank balances for the last three days of the month, clearly showed a "locking up" of about \$4,000,000 of money, generally understood to have been done in the interest of parties operating in stocks and gold.

This extraordinary condition of the money market has affected the markets generally less than might be expected. Monetary spasms have become so frequent that Wall street has learned to moderate its alarm at them, and coolly pays whatever may be demanded for the "carrying" of its securities or gold, instead of rushing in panic to realize upon them; and as an illustration of this feature, Government bonds were but $\frac{1}{4}$ @ $\frac{1}{2}$ lower at the close of the month than at the opening, although for several days $\frac{1}{4}$ @ $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent per day was charged for carrying them.

The effect of the condition of things we have described, upon the volume of business is apparent in the fact that the total sales of governments at the Stock Exchange were \$16,205,170 less for the month than in June, 1868, as will appear from the following statement:

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds	\$31,324,870	\$15,039,700	\$	\$16,285,170
U. S. notes	1,200,000	1,200,000
St'c & city b'ds	9,610,000	6,009,750	3,600,250
Company b'ds	1,050,200	1,707,500	657,300
Total—June	\$42,181,570	\$22,740,950	\$	\$20,380,720
Since January 1	16,045,120	174,821,259	9,276,139

The stock market, though feverish and subject to frequent fluctuations, has maintained a singular steadiness under the depressing influences connected with the money market. The average range of prices was higher, at the close of the

month, than at its commencement; there has been, however, a necessary curtailment of the operations of the smaller class of speculators, and hence the aggregate transactions for the month fall materially below those for the same month of last year, the total sale at the Stock Exchange having been 821,294 shares, against 1,183,114 shares in June, 1868. The business has been very much confined to a few stocks affected by schemes of consolidation, especially New York Central, Hudson River and Michigan Southern; while the general list has been remarkably quiet.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Increase.	[Dec.
Bank shares	1,659	1,556	...	108
Railroad "	973,064	694,093	...	279,068
Coal "	2,212	2,316	1,104	...
Mining "	8,554	26,895	...	4,359
Improvement "	16,775	7,650	...	9,225
Telegraph "	24,773	14,945	...	9,828
Steamship "	82,716	38,313	...	44,414
Exports &c "	51,321	35,288	...	16,033
Total—June	1,183,114	891,994	...	261,620
Since January 1	10,317,619	7,844,183	...	2,473,437

United States securities have naturally been heavy, under the condition of the money market, the only sustaining element having been the weekly purchases of the Government. Gold has been depressed, the price having declined about 2½ from the opening figures; and the prices of bonds abroad have not correspondingly advanced; on the contrary, Five-twenties were the same at London on the 30th as on the 1st. There has been little or no foreign demand for bonds, the changed position of the Alabama question having checked the demand from English investors. The stringency of money has prevented the active speculative buying which usually occurs in the latter half of June, in anticipation of the demand for the reinvestment of the July interest; while the fears of a money panic have naturally induced a certain amount of selling. Under these adverse conditions of the market, it is a remarkable evidence of the strength of our national securities, that prices should have been maintained with such steadiness as appears from the following daily quotations.

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of June as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of month.	6's, 1881.		6's, (5-20 yrs.) Coupon—				5's, 10-40		
	Coup.	Reg.	1862	1864	1866, new	'67.	'68.	C'n.	C'n.
1.....	122½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	120½	109½	109½
2.....	122	117½	122½	117½	118½	119½	119½	109½	109½
3.....	122	117½	122½	117½	118½	119½	119½	109½	109½
4.....	122	117½	122½	117½	118½	119½	119½	109½	109½
5.....	122	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
6.....	122	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
7.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
8.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
9.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
10.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
11.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
12.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
13.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
14.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
15.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
16.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
17.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
18.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
19.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
20.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
21.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
22.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
23.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
24.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
25.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
26.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
27.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
28.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
29.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
30.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½
31.....	121½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	119½	109½	109½

Day of month.	6's, 1881.		6's, (5-20 yrs.) Coupon						5's, 10-4.	
	Coup.	Reg.	1863.	1864.	1865.	new.	1867.	1868.	1869.	yr's.
25	121½	117	121½	117	118½	119	119½	119½	119½	108½
26	121½	117	121½	117	118½	120	119½	119½	119½	109½
27	121½	117	121½	117	118½	120	120	120	120	109½
28	121½	117	121½	117	118½	119	119½	119½	119½	108½
29	121½	117	121½	117	118½	119	119½	119½	119½	107½
30	121½	117	121½	117	118½	119	119½	119½	119½	107½
First	122½	117½	122½	117½	118½	120	120	120½	120½	109½
Highest	122½	117½	122½	117½	119	120½	121	121½	121½	109½
Lowest	121	116½	121	116½	117½	119	119½	119½	119½	107½
Last	121½	117	121½	116½	118½	119	119½	119½	119½	107½

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities U. S. Ill. C. 5-20s sh's.	Erie sh's.	Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. Ill. C. 5-20s sh's.	Erie sh's.		
Tu. day.....	1 92½	88½	96	19	Tuesday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Wednesday.....	2 92½	8 ¾	96	19½	Wednesday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Thursday.....	3 92½	8 ¾	95	18½	Thursday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Friday.....	4 92½	8 ¾	95½	18½	Friday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Saturday.....	5 92½	8 ¾	95	18½	Saturday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Monday.....	7 92½	8 ¾	94½	18½	Monday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Tuesday.....	8 92½	8 ¾	94	18½	Tuesday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Wednesday.....	9 92½	8 ¾	94½	18½	Wednesday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Thursday.....	10 92½	8 ¾	94	18½	Thursday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Friday.....	11 92½	8 ¾	93½	18½	Friday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Saturday.....	12 92½	8 ¾	94½	19½	Saturday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Monday.....	14 92½	8 ¾	94	19½	Monday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Tuesday.....	15 92½	8 ¾	95	19½	Tuesday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Wednesday.....	16 92½	8 ¾	95	19½	Wednesday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Thursday.....	17 92½	8 ¾	95½	20	Thursday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Friday.....	18 92½	8 ¾	95½	20½	Friday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Saturday.....	19 92½	8 ¾	95½	20½	Saturday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½
Monday.....	21 92½	8 ¾	94½	20	Monday.....	92½	8 ¾	91½	192½

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted the at New York Stock Exchange during the months of May and June, 1869 :

Railroad Stocks—	May				June			
	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.
Alton & Terre Haut	39	40	38	40	40	40	38	38
" " pref.	69	72½	64	63	63	68	59	60
Chicago & Alton	161	161	156	163	157	163	152½	160
do do pref.	160	161	159½	160	159	160	157	160
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	130	139	130	139	137	139	130	130
do & Northwest'n	86½	94	85	93	92½	93½	77½	81½
do do pref.	98½	10½	96½	104½	104½	106½	9½	95½
do & Rock Island	123	128½	125	125½	126½	129	115	118½
Columb. Chic. & Ind. C.	46	47	41½	43½	43½	43½	39	40
Clev. & Pittsburg	93½	99½	92	92½	103½	108½	91½	101
do Col. Cin. & Ind.	68½	75½	68½	75½	75½	75½	73	74
Del., Lack. & Western	116	119½	115	119	117	119	113	113
Dubuque & Sioux city	116½	116½	110	109	108	109	106	107
Har. & Ala.	151½	152	146½	151½	152	157	143	146½
do do pref.	145	150	145	150	145	150	143	146½
Hannibal & St. Joseph	115	120	114½	120	120	120	117½	120
do do pref.	114½	119½	112½	119½	123½	124	118	120
Hudson River	189	164½	153	157½	157½	166½	158½	165
Illinois Central	145	148	145	146½	146½	147	143	145
Joliet & Chicago	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96
Long Island	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Lake Shore	103½	117	108	117	116½	117	107½	107½
do & Mich. South	103	108½	102½	103	103	108½	102½	103
Mar. & Cincln., Ist.	21	23	21	22	23½	23½	21	22
do do pref.	8	9	8	8½	8½	8½	8½	8½
Michigan Central	126	129½	126	129½	121	126½	122	123½
do S. & N. Ind.	103½	113½	105	113½	118½	119	107½	107½
Milwaukee & St. Paul	78½	79½	75½	79½	79½	80	75½	75½
do do pref.	87½	91½	85	91	91	91½	81½	86½
Morris & Essex	91	91	90	91	90½	93½	89	89½
New Haven & Hartford	210	210	210	210	210	210	210	210
New Jersey	127	127	127	127	121	128	120	128
do Central	111	121	111	116½	117	122½	101	103
New York Central	171½	194½	171½	194½	191½	197½	188	195½
do & N. Haven	130	140	130	140	139	140	135	136
do do scrip	120	125	120	125	123	125	124½	124½

Norwich & Worcester.....	104	108	104	108	105	108	105	108
Ohio & Mississippi.....	83½	86½	83½	85½	85½	87	83	83½
do do pref.....	76½	79½	76½	79½	70	70	70	70
Panama.....	825	825	800	800	800	800	825	825
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica.....	140	169½	140	166½	156½	159	153½	155½
Reading.....	96½	101½	95	99½	100½	100½	96½	97½
Rme, W. & Ogden's.....	120	126	120	125	125	125	125	125
Toledo, Wab. & Western.....	78½	78½	73	77½	77½	77½	66½	73
do do do pref.....	79	83½	79	82½	82	82	80	84
Miscellaneous—								
Central.....	66	66	66	66	...	66	66½	64½
Cumberland Coal.....	30½	30	30	30	36	36	36½	34½
Del. & Hud. anal Coal.....	130	134	130	133½	133	134	130	131
Pennsylvania.....	225	225	225	225
Wilkes-Barre Coal.....	45	45	35	45	45	45	45	65
Pacific Mail.....	92	9½	80½	81½	81½	93½	80½	82½
Boston Water Power.....	16	17½	16	16½	16½	17	16½	16
Canton.....	62½	65½	62½	64	62½	68	62	63
Brunswick City.....	9	9	8	8½	8½	11	8½	11
Mariposa.....	21	24½	18½	24½	24	24½	7	8
do 1st pref.....	43½	55	42½	50½	60½	60½	14	16½
do pref.....	20	21½	14	14	16½	18½	14	16½
Quicksilver.....	43½	44½	42	43½	43½	48½	33	39
West. Union Telegraph.....	230	230	230	230	250	250	250	250
Ma. hattan Gas.....	106	108	106	107	109	110	108	110
Bankers & Brokers Ass.....
Express—								
American.....	41	41	38½	39	40½	40½	40½	40½
American M. Union.....	63	63	59	60	59½	63½	58	63
Adams.....	63	63	63	66½	67	75	66	72½
United States.....	15½	16	14½	14½	15	15½	14	16
Merchant's Union.....	36½	36½	31½	31½	30½	32½	29½	33
Wells, Fargo & Co.....

The gold premium has fluctuated between 139½ and 136½, opening at 138½ and closing at 137½; which is about 2 points below the range for the same month of last year, and about 1 point higher than in June, 1867. The predominant tone of speculation has perhaps been in favor of higher figures, based mainly upon the course of the foreign trade movement for the last few months. The condition of the money market, inducing very high charges for carrying gold has held in check speculative operations; and some who have long held heavy amounts for a rise, have become sellers, with the hope of buying back should the market become more buoyant. The supply coming upon the market has been about \$2,500,000 more than for the same period of last year, being, as will appear from the subjoined statement, \$11,614,000; while the withdrawals for export and customs duties has been \$1,419,000, or \$1,195,000 below the supply. Since the opening of the Pacific Railroad the record of arrivals of California treasure is necessarily incomplete, inasmuch as a considerable amount comes by rail, of which no accessible statement is kept.

The following formula will show the movement of coin and bullion at the port of New York during the month of June, 1868 and 1869, respectively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Decrease
Receipts from California.....	2,933,294	197,717	...	3,733,667
Imports of coin and bullion.....	640,903	183,567	...	455,356
Coin interest paid.....	1,779,749	3,131,615	1,351,926	...
Total reported supply.....	\$6,353,956	\$3,514,659	\$.....	\$2,838,997
Exports of coin and bullion.....	\$10,983,582	\$1,572,183	...	\$9,391,449
Customs duties.....	8,206,096	8,847,210	641,114	...
Total withdrawn.....	\$19,169,678	\$10,419,343	\$.....	\$8,750,335
Excess of withdrawals.....	12,815,722	6,894,684	...	5,921,338
Specie in banks increased.....	...	1,206,007	1,206,007	...
do do decreased.....	10,107,788	10,107,788
Derived from unreported sources.....	\$2,707,934	\$8,100,391	\$5,392,457

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
February 6.	266,641,733	27,989,304	84,246,486	196,601,899	53,441,133	670,829,470
February 13.	264,380,407	3,364,331	84,263,451	192,977,760	52,384,958	690,754,499
February 20.	263,429,406	28,111,911	84,247,321	187,612,546	50,997,197	70,991,049
February 27.	261,271,597	26,832,038	84,217,981	185,216,175	50,835,154	529,111,221
March 6.	262,039,883	19,416,684	84,273,825	182,601,487	49,111,609	737,118,131
March 13.	261,699,695	17,538,711	84,890,445	172,392,438	47,639,621	619,771,664
March 20.	263,088,262	15,213,806	84,741,810	183,501,919	51,744,874	730,711,003
March 27.	265,909,519	12,073,722	84,777,814	180,118,310	50,553,103	797,917,693
April 3.	261,933,675	10,777,889	81,816,916	175,325,769	48,496,359	837,278,629
April 10.	257110,227	8,791,543	81,601,360	171,455,510	48,644,712	810,116,453
April 17.	255,184,892	7,811,779	81,436,761	172,203,494	51,001,188	772,945,254
April 24.	257,158,074	8,830,600	81,010,511	177,310,080	51,677,896	752,906,766
May 1.	260,385,160	9,267,915	83,974,053	183,945,765	56,495,722	718,668,349
May 8.	262,436,372	16,181,419	83,916,150	191,813,817	57,103,573	911,274,577
May 15.	262,191,817	15,374,680	83,977,793	199,392,449	56,501,856	1,017,720,880
May 22.	270,275,552	15,429,404	83,927,316	199,414,869	57,818,183	788,747,212
May 29.	274,935,461	17,871,080	83,910,815	211,015,600	57,810,273	781,146,911
June 5.	275,919,609	19,051,113	83,912,995	199,124,402	57,289,429	786,281,036
June 12.	277,163,785	11,053,580	84,141,710	190,866,105	50,569,258	856,006,646
June 19.	265,841,908	19,025,444	84,198,829	189,214,110	49,812,433	1,136,224,021
June 26.	260,431,733	20,271,140	84,214,735	481,774,695	48,163,920	70,170,743

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.	\$31,716,999	\$352,483	\$132,039,7	\$28,210,223	\$10,593,719
January 11.	51,642,237	544,691	13,491,109	28,268,511	10,597,373
January 18.	52,122,723	478,463	13,729,493	29,625,158	10,596,760
January 25.	52,577,015	411,817	14,054,770	29,565,463	10,593,914
February 1.	52,628,313	327,813	14,216,570	29,677,435	10,599,351
February 8.	53,039,716	311,011	13,735,595	40,080,999	10,586,553
February 15.	52,922,391	204,681	13,573,043	35,711,575	10,587,426
February 22.	52,416,419	21,807	13,708,607	37,990,986	10,584,446
March 1.	52,251,211	266,923	13,010,608	37,735,05	10,585,646
March 8.	52,237,000	297,897	13,758,201	38,293,966	10,585,953
March 15.	51,911,513	277,517	13,028,207	37,577,582	10,581,811
March 22.	51,328,419	215,097	12,765,759	36,996,109	10,581,406
March 29.	50,597,010	210,644	13,021,215	36,293,344	10,572,420
April 5.	50,499,665	119,013	12,169,221	35,775,854	10,572,496
April 12.	50,770,193	181,246	12,643,857	36,023,183	10,582,166
April 19.	51,788,571	167,818	12,941,783	37,038,747	10,581,426
April 26.	51,294,323	164,361	13,610,063	37,477,225	10,624,407
May 3.	51,510,981	201,758	14,210,371	38,951,251	10,617,115
May 10.	51,639,530	270,525	14,621,863	39,178,803	10,617,934
May 17.	51,681,266	276,167	14,696,365	40,692,743	10,614,113
May 24.	52,317,754	174,115	15,087,008	41,116,110	10,618,846
May 31.	52,310,874	181,257	15,484,947	42,478,919	10,618,851
June 7.	52,296,57	169,316	15,371,368	42,310,830	10,610,590
June 14.	52,121,800	152,451	15,178,312	42,000,077	10,611,933
June 21.	53,810,065	148,795	14,972,133	42,168,901	10,617,864
June 28.	53,661,172	180,681	14,567,327	41,517,716	10,622,704

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.	\$98,423,144	\$1,203,401	\$12,918,333	\$31,358,767	\$25,151,345
January 11.	1,077,070	8,075,844	12,814,700	38,032,891	25,277,677
January 18.	102,205,009	2,617,688	12,912,327	39,717,193	25,243,223
January 25.	102,959,142	2,894,710	13,228,874	39,557,747	25,272,700
February 1.	103,699,153	2,161,284	12,164,225	40,218,463	25,312,917
February 8.	101,342,425	2,073,908	12,452,795	39,618,817	25,320,057
February 15.	103,215,014	1,845,524	11,642,856	37,759,712	25,352,123
February 22.	112,252,632	1,545,418	11,607,790	36,323,814	25,304,072
March 1.	101,209,519	1,238,936	11,200,149	35,819,668	25,201,557
March 8.	101,425,932	1,297,599	10,985,972	35,515,580	25,318,821
March 15.	100,830,363	1,278,815	10,869,188	34,011,715	25,317,154
March 22.	99,553,219	1,370,864	10,490,448	32,641,017	24,559,312
March 29.	99,670,945	937,769	11,646,222	32,989,010	24,254,167
April 5.	96,949,114	692,316	11,348,584	32,704,199	24,711,716
April 12.	99,625,472	750,160	11,391,519	34,927,777	25,338,783
April 19.	99,111,150	639,460	11,419,995	31,257,071	25,351,819
April 26.	98,971,711	617,435	12,361,827	31,312,103	25,319,775
May 3.	100,127,411	708,968	12,352,113	36,735,742	25,330,050
May 10.	110,515,542	1,174,749	12,514,772	37,467,897	25,321,532
May 17.	101,474,517	1,134,166	12,388,597	38,708,304	25,160,162
May 24.	102,042,181	934,160	11,191,542	39,847,891	25,220,282
May 31.	101,513,273	772,397	11,696,837	38,403,124	25,175,293
June 7.	101,613,849	640,512	13,454,611	38,491,46	25,292,187
June 14.	104,552,545	601,743	12,448,115	38,497,719	25,247,667
June 21.	103,611,618	959,796	12,087,205	30,243,945	25,113,661
June 28.	102,515,225	1,103,663	11,764,103	34,331,417	25,304,908

THE MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

AUGUST, 1869.

OUR IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.

We cannot sympathize with the disposition shown in some quarters to underrate the importance of our foreign trade returns, as an index of the balance of accounts between our own and foreign countries. The trade statistics of the country are now placed in charge of a special bureau, and appear to be compiled with the greatest attainable accuracy. It is true, the official returns necessarily omit some items of importance in our account with foreign nations; such, for instance, as the movement in bonds and other securities, the arrivals of gold by immigrants, and the amounts taken out by travelers to Europe, the interest payable upon foreign capital employed here and the ocean freights upon our importations. Our comparative ignorance of these items, however, affords no reason for rejecting information upon the more important movements which constitute four-fifths of our whole transactions with other nations.

Some weeks ago, we took occasion to indicate that, while our imports were gaining largely, there was an important decrease in our exports. This tendency toward an adverse trade balance was continued up to about the close of May; when our exports were enlarged by free shipments of breadstuffs and our imports began to exhibit a moderate decline. Returns just issued by Mr. Francis A. Walker, in charge of the Bureau of

Statistics, enable us now to form a close approximate estimate of the course of the foreign trade for the first nine months of the past fiscal year, i. e., from July 1, 1868, to March 31, 1869.

We present the following statements, compiled from the official returns, including specie in both the imports and exports, the exports being reduced to gold value in the Government statement so as to compare upon even terms with the imports, which are always entered in specie values :

(1.) IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES (SPECIE INCLUDED) FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1869.

		Imports.			Imports.
July, 1868.....		\$25,849,916	Dec., 1868.....		\$21,999,176
Aug., ".....		34,539,797	Jan., 1869.....		20,112,634
Sept., ".....		34,526,775	Feb., ".....		85,173,726
Oct., ".....		32,297,545	March, ".....		50,195,354
Nov., ".....		28,903,550			
Total imports—nine months.....					\$303,598,503
		—Exports—Gold value—			
		Dom. exports, produce and gold.	Re-exports, merchandise and gold.		
July, 1868.....		\$23,716,854		\$1,640,670	
Aug., ".....		19,749,787		1,755,695	
Sept., ".....		17,741,801		1,530,042	
Oct., ".....		22,454,419		1,758,878	
Nov., ".....		28,865,795		1,033,807	
Dec., ".....		33,701,950		1,642,707	
Jan., 1869.....		27,665,615		1,232,610	
Feb., ".....		29,840,223		2,227,540	
March, ".....		24,182,837		3,218,024	
Totals—nine months.....		\$227,933,991		\$15,919,463	
Add re-exports.....		15,919,463			
Total exports—gold value.....		\$243,853,454			

Later reports bring the movement down to the close of April. The imports for that month, are stated at \$52,176,828, and the exports at \$42,607,341 in mixed currency, while the re-exports are given at \$2,980,351, principally in gold value. Reducing the exports for this month to gold value we should have the following as the trade movement for the ten months ending April 30, 1869 :

(2.) IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF UNITED STATES FOR TEN MONTHS ENDING APRIL 30, 1869

<i>Imports, specie included.</i>		
For nine months ending March 31, 1869.....		\$303,598,503
For month of April, 1869.....		52,176,828
Total imports—ten months.....		\$355,775,331
<i>Exports and re-exports, specie included.</i>		
For nine months ending March 31, 1869.....		\$243,853,454
For month of April, 1869.....		85,900,000
Total exports—ten months.....		\$329,753,454

(3.) RECAPITULATION.

Total imports for the ten months.....	\$355,775,331
Total exports for the ten months.....	279,763,154
Excess of imports, gold value.....	\$77,012,177
4. <i>Import and Exports for ten months ending April 30, 1869.</i>	
Imports, specie included, gold value.....	\$304,306,000
Exports, specie included, gold value.....	304,995,609
Excess of exports, gold value.....	\$689,00

The statistical results here presented are not such as could have been desired; and but for the large increase in the imports at our own port and a proportionate decrease in the exports both of produce and specie, for some months past, we should have been disposed to question the accuracy of the official returns. It appears that while the imports for the ten months have reached \$356,700,000, the exports have been only \$279,700,000, showing an adverse balance, upon the trading account, of \$77,000,000 in gold.

This result is the more remarkable from the fact that the period covers the export of nearly our whole surplus of cotton, which this year realized very high prices, and the shipments of which, for nine months out of the ten, amounted to 497,500,000 pounds. In nearly every other article of export there has been a material decrease, the net result being that, for the ten months, the exports are \$25,232,000 in gold value less than for the same period of last year; while, on the other hand, the imports for the same period, are \$52,469,000 higher. The trade movement for the corresponding months of 1867-8 shows an almost even balance, the exports, as will be seen from table 4, being \$689,000 in excess of the imports.

There are, however, other items which require to be added to the debtor side of the account. Our interest account has now become a weighty one. It is very generally estimated that over \$900,000,000 of United States bonds are now held in Europe; on which the annual interest amounts to about \$55,000,000 in gold; while, upon other miscellaneous stocks and bonds held abroad, the interest and dividends cannot amount to less than \$10,000,000 in gold, making a total of interest payments to Europe of \$65,000,000 per annum. Adding the proportion of this item, say \$52,000,000 for the ten months, to the adverse commercial balance, we are found to stand debtor to other countries about \$129,000,000 on the ten months' transactions. The freight account upon our imports and exports is by no means unimportant, as two thirds of our trade is done in foreign bottoms; but this is an item too indefinite to admit of estimate.

The main contribution toward the liquidation of this balance consists of shipments of securities. As, however, there is no other record of these remittances than such as exists in the private accounts of the shippers, it is impossible to present any accurate statement of this movement. We have taken some pains to ascertain the views of prominent foreign bankers upon the amount of this item, and as those firms are accustomed to compare estimates, their opinions possess considerable weight, and may be regarded as very nearly correct. The average estimate of these parties does not exceed \$100,000,000, for, the ten months under review representing about \$72,500,000 in gold. This, too, probably is an extreme estimate; and it is proper to remark that it exceeds the figures suggested by firms who have sent out a large proportion of the whole exports of securities.

Some allowances should be made for the fact that a certain amount of our imports are consigned here on foreign account, and that the remittances against such consignments, after allowing for losses and charges are sometimes considerably below the value at which the goods were entered at the Custom House. But, on the other hand, it is to be considered that, in some cases, the amount realized upon this class of importations exceeds their invoiced value; and, indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that the consignments would not be continued from year to year were there not, upon the average, a profit to the consignors. Nor is it to be overlooked that there is a certain extent of under-invoicing importations, in order to reduce the aggregate duties upon them; in which cases, the remittances exceed the value entered at the Custom House. But again on the other hand, there is an average profit upon our consignments of products to other countries, which may be taken as setting off the profits upon foreign consignments to our own ports. Upon the whole, then, it would appear that the only items really necessary to be taken into the account are the imports and exports of produce and specie, the indebtedness accruing in the way of interest upon foreign capital invested here, and the shipments of securities. Above, we have presented the figure representing each of these items; and, if the estimate of the exports of securities can be accepted as approximating the truth, it would follow that, at the close of the ten months, there was a net balance against the country of about \$60,000,000 in gold. This may seem a very undesirable, not to say dangerous, condition of accounts. It is not, however, the first time, within the last four or five years, that we have found ourselves in such a position. For the first two years after the close of the war, our imports ran constantly very largely in excess of our exports; yet we then found it practicable to settle our balances by remittances of securities. Assuming that the European money markets are open to receive our bonds to as large an extent as during late years of over-trading, there would seem to be nothing in this adverse balance to cause immediate uneasiness. Under the circumstances, however, it is impossible not to feel some solicitude as to the present disposition of European capitalists to increase their investments in our securities. The latest advices from Frankfort represent a reaction as having set in upon the Continental Bourses from the late speculative excitement, and that the markets are well supplied with our bonds; how far this may prove to be temporary, remains to be seen. During the remaining two months of the fiscal year it is likely that this adverse balance will be decreased somewhat through increased exports of breadstuffs, as our imports are now on a reduced scale.



THE FUTURE PRODUCTION OF COTTON.

BY B. F. NOURSE.*

PAST ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH FROM THE PRODUCTION OF COTTON.

During the ten years 1851-1860, the crops produced in the cotton-growing States, (cotton, sugar, tobacco, rice, &c.,) not consumed at home, left a surplus of proceeds from sales amounting to about \$1,200,000,000, an average of \$120,000,000 per year, which, less the amount required to be expended beyond their borders for the comforts or luxuries of life, should have been so much added to the reproductive capital within those States. If one-half only was thus required, the other half, or \$60,000,000 per year, should have been put to profitable use.

Throughout the Southern States some internal improvement was in progress, chiefly in the form of railroads. In some States, as in Georgia, these works had been largely extended. Cheaply built and economically operated, they generally proved to be profitable investments, capable of rapidly repaying the loans incurred for their construction, which in many cases covered a great part of the cost.

A large amount of banking capital was well employed, but this, when not owned abroad, was chiefly the product of the commissions and other charges upon the produce of the country, and not to any considerable extent drawn from the accumulating capital of planters.

The capital which had built the few cotton and other factories and the machine shops had also accrued chiefly from charges upon the productions of the country. What, then, was done with the \$60,000,000 or whatever other sum represented the true annual gains of agriculture in these States? The statistics of population show pretty clearly that a great part of it was expended in importing slaves from other States.†

PRESENT AND FUTURE INCREASE OF WEALTH IN COTTON STATES.

When considering this subject in its economical aspect only, special effects bearing upon individuals or classes are to be disregarded for the general results affecting the whole community.

Population is wealth. Money sent from Alabama to Virginia to increase the laboring power of Alabama, even by importing slaves at \$2,000 each, added in some degree to the wealth of that State. But if laborers of equal productive power could have been introduced without expending any thing for them, the capital expended in the other case would have been saved, and the community would have gained its use in some other form of productive power, as in tools, machinery or ani-

* This is taken from advanced sheets of Mr. Nourse's report on cotton, as Commissioner to the Paris Universal Exposition.

† See Atkinson's "Cotton by Free Labor," page 80, and DeBow's Analysis of the Census of 1850 quoted in the former.

mal labor, with which to supplement and increase the value of manual labor. To the whole people, or the State, that is just the difference, in the *investment*, between importing a slave and importing a free laborer of equal capacity. There are other differences to the State, scarcely less important in an economical view, all in favor of the free laborer. Whatever the cotton-producing States expended for slaves above the cost of importing an equal amount of free-labor power was twice lost to the community.

Reckoning the slaves in the cotton States prior to 1861 at 3,000,000 in number, of the average nominal value of \$500, equal to 1,000,000 full hands, at \$1,500 each, we had an investment of \$1,500,000,000; and to replenish this force a large sum, much needed for other uses, was annually drawn from the gains of those States.

If, in 1860, the people, by unanimous consent, had declared emancipation of all those slaves, whether with or without compensation to those who had owned their service, there would have been neither loss nor gain to the community, except as the change might increase or diminish the efficiency of labor or the cost of its maintenance. There would have been no "annihilation of property," for the whole labor power would have remained as before, only it would have changed owners.

Precisely so stands the effect of the decree of emancipation, made as an act of war, with this difference, however, that the laborers of both races were sadly reduced and demoralized by the incidents of the war which wrought the change. The same laboring force still exists, with the exception mentioned, and except, also, that the sudden and violent change in relations between capital and labor render further time and experience necessary to make it fully effective.

While it is indisputably true that free labor is always cheaper than slave labor, when each is under its most favorable conditions, the demonstration of that truth needs more favorable circumstances than were found in the years 1866, 1867. The prejudices of those who must use it were arrayed against it. Scarcity of food and of other necessities of life followed an exhausting war. The sufferings of the very poor of both races were alleviated by government rations and by private beneficence; but planters were compelled to supply all the wants of themselves and their laborers, while breadstuffs were at very high prices, and implements, farming animals, and their subsistence were equally scarce and dear. At first the freedmen were not disposed to work for hire—demanded excessive wages, and after excepting them, too often rendered poor service. The crops of both cotton and grain failed, more or less, in both those years throughout the South. In some cases there was

failure to fulfill contracts on the part of the employer, from disability or other causes, while the "shares of the crop" which had been accepted by the freedmen as wholly or in part of lieu of wages, often resulted in "nothing but loss" leaving the freedmen destitute and the planter in a condition not much better.

It was not until 1868, the third season of the free labor experiment, that it became generally successful in its operation and results. Then improvement appeared, and the harvest, abundantly supplying the people with cheap food, leaves a surplus stored up for the future. The profit arising from the sale of the exportable productions of the same season will amount to \$250,000,000; and a reasonable forecast of the future sees a promise of equal gain in some of the succeeding years, the increase of quantity compensating for any reduction of price.

The annual gain, be it \$50,000,000, or \$250,000,000, is no longer to be wasted in the purchase of labor, when as good, or better, will be obtained without purchase; yet the capital must be employed, and will seek investment. For some years very little will be needed in opening fresh lands, of which there is already too much open for the labor applicable to it. After meeting the demands of agriculture it will seek other profitable uses, as in banking, railroads, manufactures, machine-shops, and the other active employments which capital finds for itself. Prominent among the improvements, that of reconstructing the levees and reclaiming the most fertile of cotton and cane lands should be one of the first, and, rightly conducted, one of the most profitable for the employment of money.

OPPORTUNITY FOR COTTON SPINNING.

Proximity to cotton fields abundance of water power and of building materials in healthy localities, as well as of fuel, both wood and coal, and cheap labor, not suitable for the field, begging employment, all indicate the advantages and certainty of rapidly extending works for the manufacture of cotton in the cotton-growing States, especially for the spinning and export of coarse yarns.

WANT OF LABORERS.

Now that capital is returning into the cotton States, the great want there will be labor, a better use of what they have and more of it, to extend their profitable agricultural business, yet carry forward the other works which will be required. So far, the prevailing conditions in the South have not been attractive to immigrants. Poor crops, dear food, destitution of the common laborer, and these evils too often aggravated by disorder and violence, were reported during the years 1866 and 1867.

The prosperity of 1868 stands in marked contrast to the adversities

of the two years preceeding. A similar prosperity repeated in succeeding years untill it shall be regarded as the rule and not the exception, supported by assurance of peace and safety, will turn the tide of emigration freely from the northern States and from Europe to the cotton-growing States. During the present year the Pacific railroad has been completed and opened, a highway by which the Chinese and other coolies or Asiatic laborers may reach the cotton fields of the United States. They are industrious, frugal, quiet, and numerous.

The people of the South, who are to be the immediate beneficiaries of rapidly increasing wealth, will become large consumers of the production of other States and other countries, and in that capacity will contribute scarcely less than as producers to the general welfare, the extension of trade and the payment of the national debt.

LARGE PLANTATIONS MUST GIVE PLACE TO SMALL COTTON FARMS.

It seems to be conceded in the South that the large plantation system must generally be abandoned, in the culture of cotton, for small holdings of land more thoroughly worked under the direction of the proprietors. This will favor a more general industry, more numerous proprietary interests requiring personal care, better economies, and a constantly improving agriculture, which will preserve the fresh lands in good fertility and restore those which have been over-cropped.

In cotton growing as in market gardening, or in any other tillage of the soil, it pays better to keep a small body of land (just enough for a full and fair use of the labor that can be applied to it) under high culture by thorough working and the use of fertilizers, than to half cultivate a larger area with the same or any inadequate force.

Since the war, experiments made to ascertain how much cotton can be produced upon a single acre, have exhibited remarkable and gratifying results. When made with "spade culture" stirring the soil deeply and often, after enriching it with guano and phosphates, the product has been very large. In one case, reported upon what seems to be good authority, the product of one acre was *four bales*, or over 1,600 pounds of clean cotton. In past times one bale to the acre has been regarded as a fair crop, and two bales a very large one on the very richest lands, while half a bale, or about 250 pounds, was for many years a satisfactory result in Georgia and the Carolinas, where the lands were badly worn. The story of 1,600 pounds seems almost incredible,* yet it is no more in excess of ordinary products than were some remarkable root crops,—ruta-bagas and mangle wurtzels—that have been obtained by the same process of

* "Mr. D—— has eyes to observe, and reports exactly what he sees. He tells me that he knows several instances where double the usual crops have been made on small patches, and one case where a man raised four bales of cotton on one acre of ground, the whole acre cultivated by hand, no mule needed, nor ass either."—*Extract from Letter.*

spade culture. Improvement by better farming, to get more cotton from less land, is practicable, and should be sought as the method of true economy, saving in labor, in manure, and all other outlay, yet increasing the income.

RESTORATION OF WORN SOILS—MINERAL AND ORGANIC MANURES.

The value of the calcareous and phosphatic marls, found in various parts of the country, for fertilizing and renovating impoverished soils, has long been known. They were freely used in the older portion of the cotton-growing States with beneficial effects. During the few years prior to 1861 some importations were made at the South of various commercial fertilizers, guanos, ground bones, and certain nitrates, phosphates, and super phosphates, some very good and some having very little value. The importation and use of these artificial manures had been greatly extended just before the war. The really valuable among them such as the true guanos and superphosphates, had a marked effect in the increase and better quality of the cotton produced, and this was as apparent on the light and much worn lands of the Carolinas and Georgia as upon the heavier and fresher lands further west.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA PHOSPHATES.

Since the war, a discovery of exceeding value to the agriculture of the whole country, and especially to the cotton culture, has been made in the "native bone phosphate," vast beds of which have been found lying all along the coast of South Carolina and on the Sea Islands; but cropping out and most easily accessible along the banks of the Ashley and Cooper rivers. Richer in these phosphates than any other natural deposits yet discovered, these beds lie just beneath the supersoil, at the very doorway into the cotton-growing country. A description of them and of the circumstances leading to their discovery will be found in the Appendix C, in a letter from Dr. N. A. Pratt, whose researches, aided by others, have opened up a treasure whose value cannot now be measured.

This store of phosphates, thus prepared in nature's laboratory and laid up until the day of special need, contains just the chemical properties wanted for the cotton plant, and which the cotton seed had been abstracting from the soil. So long as cotton seed was returned to the soil upon which it was grown the deterioration of the land was slow, for the fibre of cotton took but little from it.* But cotton seed had acquired a commercial

*S. L. Goodale, Esq., Secretary of the Board of Agriculture in Maine, a writer upon agricultural chemistry, writes thus: "I can conceive of no reason why cotton culture should not be less exhaustive than that of any other agricultural crop with which I am acquainted. Look at it; the product desired is merely cellulose or woody fibre. In this form it possesses a market value of, we will say, \$100 per acre, but to return to the soil it is of no more material value than so much sawdust or wood in any other form, consequently it may be exported with impunity. Be it as this there is a side product of seed which draws heavily upon the soil; but this may be utilized and all of value to the soil be returned to it. The seed may be decorticated, and the oil expressed and sold with no loss of ash constituents from the soil. The cake remaining possesses both feeding and manure value in a high degree. Ground to meal and fed in connection with corn fodder and annual grasses, (if no more permanent

value for the oil to be expressed from it, and for the rich food for cattle and sheep, which was found in the "cake" from which the oil had been expressed. It could no longer be carted back upon the land as a manure. The land, already worn by many years of improvident cropping, having this further loss, rapidly failed. Some portion of the needed restoring and fertilizing remedies could have been found in the artificial superphosphates and guanos of commerce, but these had become almost inaccessible. Often badly adulterated, and year by year advancing in price as the demand outran the supply of the good articles, while many of the planting people had become unable to buy them, except in very insufficient quantities, there was a great and urgent need of something to replace the cotton seed, and restore to the soil those chief ingredients indispensable to the production of a good cotton crop—phosphoric acid, or soluble phosphates. In this emergency came the discovery of those natural deposits.

Already too much space has been given to the effort to report faithfully the condition of the cotton culture of the United States, at the close of the year 1868; especially to exhibit the wonderful change from its condition one year previous, and from all the circumstances to draw a fair statement of the promise of the future for this great interest.

OTHER IMPROVEMENTS—SELECTIONS OF SEED, ETC.

It might be useful, did space permit, to notice in detail other movements in progress for the improvement of cotton culture, prominent among which would stand the valuable experiments in "improvement by selection of seed" from year to year, always guided by rules which define the object sought—in cotton, spinning qualities, such as length, strength, fineness, and the cohering together of the fibres; rapid growth and early maturity of the plant, and a habit of yielding well. Intelligent men are engaged in these efforts in various parts of the South, and of their results attained there are good reports from Georgia, Mississippi, and Arkansas. One new kind of cotton, the "Peeler," originating in Mississippi, is already in market, and bears a price 25 or 30 per cent higher than any other green seed, cotton of the same grade, because of its superior staple.

grasses can be grown with improved management, it can be converted into meat and manure, and thus fertility be maintained or even increased.

"Phosphoric and alkaline constituents exist in decorticated and cotton seed in large proportion. Its ash is abundant, being not less than 7½ or 8 parts in 100, and of this ash 29 per cent is phosphoric acid, chiefly in combination with potash, a little with magnesia, and a very little with lime. Thus a ton of cotton seed cake—that is, of seed with the hulls taken off and the oil pressed out contains about 60 pounds of phosphoric acid, which in a soluble form, as phosphate of potash, and with its combined alkali, cannot be deemed worth less than 10 cents per pound—I think it should be rated higher, but say \$6 00

"The same cake contains 6½ per cent of nitrogen, say 130 pounds to the ton, and this, rating it at what is paid for it in Peruvian guano, say 17 cents per pound, amounts to 22 10

"So we have as the manurial value of one ton of decorticated cotton seed cake, at least \$38 10

"It is well to bear in mind that the larger part of this (when the cake is fed to stock) would pass away in the liquid excreta, and unless the urine was absorbed or somehow saved, nothing like this value would be realized. In the light of these facts it is easy to see how wide a difference may be occasioned by the loss of the seed on the one hand and its use on the other."

MANUFACTURING AT THE SOUTH.

At the South Carolina State Agricultural Convention, held at Columbia, April 28th and 29th, 1869, Col. J. B. Palmer was requested to give some information to the Convention relative to manufacturing at the South. In response, Col. Palmer read the following very interesting paper, which he had prepared on the subject.

The advantages possessed by the South over the North in manufacturing cotton, may be stated briefly, to be:

1. An abundance of unoccupied water power in every Southern State.
2. A mild climate. Fire, for heating purposes, is only necessary for from one to three months in the year. Resinous heart-pine wood can be procured at very low rates. We pay for such wood delivered within one mile of our factory, only \$1 per cord, and our total expense for fuel for, say two and one-half months in the year, is but one-tenth of one cent per pound, when charged to the manufactures of those months, while in the North it is about one cent per pound on the manufactures of at least five months in the year.

3. Wages are, and must continue to be, comparatively low. The mildness of the climate, the abundance of lumber, and the cheapness of land, enables manufacturers to provide their operatives with inexpensive but comfortable houses and large garden plats. The country being an agricultural one, we must soon be able to produce our provisions, while the manufacturing districts of the North must always depend upon the distant West, and, to some extent, upon the South for theirs.

4. Operatives. Northern men, acting as superintendents of Southern mills, admit the superiority of our factory hands, who are remarkably frugal and industrious, and who are easily controlled.

5. Freights are lower on yarns and cloths than on lint cotton. There has been a time, within the last three years, when a bale of cotton of 450 pounds, worth, say \$90, paid a freight, from Charleston to New York or Philadelphia, of \$2 50 per bale, which would be 2.77 per cent on value; while that cotton, made into a bale of 400 pounds of No 20 yarn, worth, say, \$136, paid only 60 cents per bale, or 44-100 per cent on value—a difference in favor of yarns of 2½ per cent. The Southern manufacturer saves the freight on bagging, rope and other waste. This waste can be manufactured into paper at the South more cheaply than at the North, and is, consequently, more valuable here than there. Reclamation on false packed or damaged cotton is easy and direct, and we save the burdensome Northern charges for storage, brokerage, ect.

I support these positions by the following statement of actual cost of manufacturing at Saluda Cotton Mills, as shown by our books. It must be recollected that we have employed in the manufacture of No 20

yarn only 4,000 spindles (Jenke ring travelers.) Of course, a greater number of spindles, or the production of yarns of a lower number, would ensure a less cost per pound;

Labor—Superintendent .37; carding .56; spinning .76; reeling .75....	2 44 cts.
Repair—Labor and material (machinery nearly new)22 "
Packing, bundling, &c. labor and materials65 "
General Expenses—Watch .13; hauling .82; findings .20; oil .15; salaries .64; miscellaneous .56.....	2 00 "

Total per pound	5.24 "
Add—Loss by waste (450 lbs. cotton costing \$90 making but 400 lbs. of yarn)	2 50 "
10 per cent for wear and tear of machinery, charged to production, per pound.....	1.26 "

Total cost of manufacturing cotton, worth 20c. per pound	9 00 "
Freights to New York or Philadelphia 65; insurance .15.....	.80 "
Cost cotton per pound	20.00 "

Total cost per pound of Southern yarn (No. 20) delivered in New York..	29.80 "
The <i>very lowest</i> estimates I have seen of the cost of manufacturing at the North places cost of labor, repair, packing, and general expenses at, per pound.....	10 24 "
Loss by waste (cotton at 20c in Columbia would be 22½c. in New York; 450 lbs. cotton would cost \$101.25, and would make 400 lbs. yarn) ..	2 81 "
10 per cent. for wear and tear machinery.....	1 26 "
Total cost of manufacturing in the North.....	14 81 "
Add cost of cotton	22 50 "

Cost of No 20 yarns manufactured at the North.....	36 81 "
Showing a difference in favor of the South of, per pound	7 01 "
Both using the same quality of cotton.	
Deduct commissions, cartage, &c	2 01 "
And we have a net profit to the Southern manufacturer, provided he sells at the cost of Northern productions	5.00 "

A manufacturer of cotton yarns from Manchester, England, after looking at our books, told me that we manufactured cheaper than they did, by about the difference in value of currency and gold. That is to say, that the

Cost of labor, repairs, packing and general expenses was with them, gold.	5.24 cts.
Add for difference in value of gold and currency	1.75 "
And we have in currency	6.99 "
Estimating cotton in Liverpool at 24c. and the waste (450 lbs. cotton, worth \$11.8, making 400 lbs. yarn, would be	3 00 "

	9.99 "
Wear and tear of machinery	1.26 "

	11.25 "
Add cost of cotton	24 00 "

And we have, as cost of No 20 yarn manufactured in England.....	35.25 "
Costs of Southern yarns, as heretofore shown	29.00 cts.
Freight and insurance.....	1.50 "

Cost of Southern yarns delivered in England.....	30.50 "
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Difference in favor of Southern yarns	4 75 "
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But no estimate is made of the brokerage, &c., in Liverpool, or of the freights and charges on the cotton from Liverpool to Manchester. Southern yarns could be shipped to the continent of Europe at about the same rates as to Liverpool, while English yarns would have to pay freight from Manchester to the continent. These additional charges on the cost of English yarns being considered, I think it would be quite fair to infer from the foregoing that we could send our yarns to Europe, and, selling them at the cost of producing English yarns, derive a net profit of at least five cents per pound.

In support of the figures I have given, and the conclusions I have drawn from them, I mention the fact that at no time within the last three years would we have been unable to command from our Northern commission houses (had we chosen to ask for them) advances beyond the total cost of our yarns. Can any Northern or English manufacturer say this?

Estimating the average crop of cotton at 2,500,000 bales of 450 pounds each, and the price here at 20 cents, and we have as the amount received by the South, \$225,000,000. Manufacture this cotton into yarns, and sell at cost of Northern or English production, and we have, after deducting all foreign charges (net price per pound 34 cents), \$340,000,000; and for waste, which would be worth for paper stock, if manufactured at the South, \$2 per bale, \$5,000,000—\$345,000,000; showing a gain to the South of \$120,000,000; and if we estimate for a receipt of say 3 cents per pound over cost of foreign manufacture (and our experience would more than justify it), we have a further gain of \$30,000,000. In all \$150,000,000.

The average production of yarns last year throughout the United States was, per spindle, 62.17 pounds; the average number of yarn manufactured, $27\frac{3}{4}$; the total number of spindles was about 6,048,249; of these the Northern States had 5,848,477, and the Southern States only 199,772. The average number of yarn manufactured at the North was $27\frac{3}{4}$; production per spindle, 59.57. The average number of yarn manufactured at the South was $12\frac{1}{4}$; production per spindle, 140.37.

These figures are based upon the reports made to the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers and Planters. It is probable that many of the smaller mills in the South were not reported. My calculation is based upon an average production per spindle (ring traveler) of 87 pounds, and average number 20. To spin 2,500,000 bales would require 11,494,253 spindles. The calculation will vary, according to kind of spinning done and machines used. 11,494,253 spindles would give employment to 250,000 hands—principally females, from ten years of age up, and small boys. The average wages of operatives (big and

little) in our mill is \$142 82 each per annum, which would give as the gross amount paid for wages per annum, nearly \$36,000,000. And that, too, paid for labor that would nearly all of it not only be otherwise unemployed in adding to the wealth of the country, but be a positive burthen upon the country.

Where weaving is done, the number of operatives and amount of wages paid will of course be much more.

It must not be supposed that, because these figures show that it would require about twice the number of spindles now run in the North to spin up our entire cotton crop at home, that the amount of capital required would be double that invested in cotton manufactures in the North, and therefore beyond our reach; for but a comparatively small amount of Northern capital is invested in spinning. The most of it is in weaving, dyeing, printing, bleaching, &c. Spinning is comparatively simple, and complications commence where saving begins.

It must be evident to every business man, that all our cotton will, sooner or later, be manufactured here, at the place of its production. If done now, by association of planters and other Southern people, additional wealth is secured to ourselves and to our children: if deferred, Northern capital and energy will inevitably occupy the field.

It seems to me entirely practicable for the planters of the cotton-growing districts, all over the South to combine together, in joint stock associations, and erect cotton mills of sufficient capacity to spin up their crops. No doubt, if this suggestion were acted upon at once, and all our cotton made into yarn, and thrown upon the Northern market, the supply would exceed the demand, and loss, at first, would ensue. My proposition is to ship direct to the continent of Europe, as well as to the North. It would take us but little time to drive other yarns from the market. The process of approaching the spinning of our entire crop would be gradual, and would keep pace with the gradual withdrawal of our competitors.

The arguments in favor of spinning will apply with equal force in favor of weaving. I have, however, confined my suggestions and calculations to spinning, because it is more simple, and requires less capital; and is, therefore, more likely to be generally adopted at an early day.

To show the practicability of this plan, I submit an estimate for a cotton mill with 4,080 spindles, ring traveling frames;

Number of square feet of flooring, 10,200; amount of No 20 yarns manufactured for spindle, 87 pounds. Total amount of No 20 yarns manufactured in mill, 354,960 pounds. Cost of first class machinery, with all the latest improvements, viz.: One large cylinder cotton opener, English; one 3 cylinder opener, 1 beater, English; 1 double lap machine; 10 self-stripping 36 inch cards, with 2 R. W. heads, troughs and belts;

2 drawing frames and cans; 1 English slubber, 60 spindles; 2 English jack roving frames, 120 spindles each; 20 ring traveler spinning frames 204 spindles each; 14 reels, traverse grinder, slide rest, card clothing, governor, turbine wheel, cotton scales, bundle and bale presses, shafting, belting, bobbins, transportation, putting up machinery, findings to commence with, &c., &c., \$43,000; building, including houses for operatives (estimated by an experienced contractor,) \$7,000; total, \$50,000. Such a mill will give employment to 87 operatives, and will consume 887 bales cotton, weighing 450 pounds each. Estimated net profits on productions, if sold at cost of Northern production, \$17,748. No estimate is made of the cost of water power, as that would depend upon location, size and nature of stream.

Finally, with great diffidence, but with equal earnestness, I urge upon the Convention, and upon the Southern people generally, careful consideration of the facts and figures submitted; and close with the suggestion, that houses of correction for juvenile delinquents, who abound in our midst, and penitentiaries for females be established, and that their inmates, as well as those of orphan asylums, be employed in cotton manufacturing. I may state that, by the wise forethought of the projectors of our State Penitentiary, this was, though to a limited extent, provided for, and I believe I am correct in saying that the convicts now manufacture nearly, if not all their clothing and bedding.

THE RECENT BREADSTUFFS MOVEMENT.

Our readers will remember that, last fall, we expressed the opinion that a very heavy surplus of grain remained in the hands of Western farmers which they would have to realise upon, before next harvest, at lower prices than were then current. Upon this view, we urged the expediency of forwarding grain before the close of navigation, as best for the farmer and the country at large. The event has turned out as we anticipated, and proved the wisdom of our advice.

The abundant harvest of last year is succeeded by the prospect of another year of abundance, not only in the United States, but in many other grain-growing countries; and the farmers, under the prospect of this new supply, and fearing that the value of their grain may further depreciate, are pressing it forward to market. The amount of this surplus may be judged from the volume of the receipts at the Western grain centres. The following figures show the arrivals of flour, wheat, corn and oats, at the ports of Chicago, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Toledo, and

Detroit, from May 1 to June 12, for this and the two next preceding years :

	1869.	1868.	1867.
Flo. r, bbls.....	642,526	415,064	277,728
Wheat, bush.....	6,042,001	3,241,429	1,469,755
Corn, bush.....	4,167,979	3,372,918	5,021,241
Oats, bush.....	2,089,586	1,904,330	1,646,551
Total, bush.....	12,301,166	9,090,177	8,137,647

We thus find that the receipts of flour, at the Lake ports, for the week ending June 12, have been 227,762 bbls in excess of the same period of last year, and 365,038 bbls more than in 1867. The aggregate receipts of wheat, corn and oats, for the same weeks, were 3,280,989 bushels over those of 1868, and 4,163,519 more than in 1867. Since the prospects of the new crop became more apparent, the receipts have been especially heavy, those for the first two weeks of June being very close upon the arrivals of September last, when the forwarding movement was at its height. The arrivals of wheat and flour, at the five principal lake ports, for the four weeks ending June 19th, reducing the flour to wheat, were equal to nearly eight millions bushels of wheat. The following is a statement of the receipts at those points for the weeks named :

	1868.	1869.
Flour, barrels.....	230,768	458,268
Wheat, bushels.....	1,668,937	5,664,910

The *Buffalo Commercial Advertiser* gives the following estimate of the quantity of wheat afloat and in store at the close of last week :

	Bushels.
In store at Chicago and Milwaukee 21st.....	1,200,000
Afloat on Lakes for Buffalo and Oswego 21st.....	1,024,000
Afloat on Canal, destined for tide-water.....	1,800,000
In store in New York 21st.....	523,836
Total.....	5,552,836

not including stocks at Buffalo and Oswego.

The amount afloat on lakes and canals is about 2,800,000 bushels, mainly destined for the Hudson.

The natural effect of this movement would have been to further depress the prices of breadstuffs had it not been for the less favorable accounts with regard to the wheat plant which have lately been received from England and France. These reports, together with the small stocks now held in those countries, their light imports and the low prices current have within the past two weeks resulted in considerable activity in breadstuffs, with an upward movement both here and at Liverpool. This is furnishing a very convenient and satisfactory outlet for our present surplus. The immediate effect of this enlarged movement at the West and towards the East is quite apparent in its influence upon our money market; though perhaps not observed to the extent it really deserves. The Western banks, especially those of Chicago, have withdrawn large

amounts of currency from the banks of this city, the amount received there from the East, during June, being, according to the *Chicago Tribune*, \$6,000,000; and this depletion, occurring concurrently with a demand for moving the wool crop, with large withdrawals into the Treasury, and upon an unusually low condition of the legal tender resources of the banks, has contributed, in no small degree, to the extreme stringency in money which has recently prevailed.

The railroads have received their share of benefit from this movement. As appeared from our last issue, the gross earnings of thirteen principal Western roads, for the month of May, were \$5,528,000, against \$4,973,000 for the same month of last year; showing an increase of \$555,000, or about 12 per cent; and, for the current month, the receipts exhibit a still larger gain. This evidence of an increasing supply of food products is a gratifying indication of our agricultural growth, the main basis of our national prosperity. It is calculated to infuse a healthier feeling into our industries and to promote a sounder condition of general values; while it also affords a hope that we may ere long be able to assume a position of greater importance among the grain-producing countries of the world

REDEMPTION OF BANK NOTES.

We have often had occasion to defend the National Banking system against the attacks of persons who exaggerated its defects, and overlooked the vast benefits which it has conferred, or is capable of conferring in the financial, industrial and commercial progress of the country. In pleading the cause of the banks, however, we should carefully remember that the system is by no means perfect, and that much remains to be done for its improvement. Of this, we have, during the past month, had a striking proof in the spasms which have invaded the money market, and in the exorbitant rates of interest which have been paid in Wall street. That these troubles are caused, in part, by movements over which the banks can exert little direct control, we freely admit. But still neither the manoeuvres of speculators, the locking up of greenbacks, the absorption of currency in the South, the over-rapid conversion of floating capital into fixed capital, nor the hoarding of money in the Government vaults, would have produced so profound and convulsive a stringency had the banks kept themselves strong, and had our currency been elastic and responsive to the wants of business. It is very evident that the monetary troubles of the past three months have been due to defects in our financial machinery rather than to any lack of capital. Which ever way we look proofs multiply on every side that our people are growing in wealth and in all the chief conditions of material prosperity. What is wanting, however, is

a corresponding elasticity in the financial machinery of the country. Speculators and cliques of capitalists dam up the fertilizing streams of the national wealth and prevent their flowing equally and freely and gently over the whole field of the national industry. We are suffering not because we cannot produce wealth but because our machinery for distributing that wealth is out of order, inelastic, and not sufficiently responsive to the changing pressure upon it and to the varied demands of different seasons of the year.

These facts all point to the currency of the banks as the weakest part of the National system. When the cliques would make trouble in the loan market they always attack the currency and their ingenious devices for locking up currency, and so depleting the current of the active circulation have been often exposed. Why have no such plans ever been set in operation in Paris or in London? The speculators there are as keen, as bold and as shrewd, and wield larger masses of capital. Why do they never resort to the expedient of locking up currency. The reason is obvious. The currency of France and of Great Britain is elastic, and enlarges or contracts with the seasons with the activity of business and with the greater or less demand for money. Our currency, on the contrary, remains rigidly fixed in amount all the year round. It consists first of some four hundred millions of greenbacks and fractional currency, the amount of which was not intended to fluctuate, and secondly of national bank notes, the outstanding amount of which ought to vary from two hundred millions as the minimum, to three hundred millions as the extreme amount authorized by law. The issue of currency is so profitable to the banks that they try to keep afloat all the law allows. If the notes of a bank come back to it they are immediately reissued, and as there is no effective arrangement for redeeming the bank notes, the whole three hundred millions are kept constantly afloat, winter and summer, spring and fall, whether the amount is in excess of the requirements of the country or not.

In no other banking system ever established in Europe or in this country, have private corporations been invested with so much power over the volume of the currency. To say that they should not abuse this power, is nothing to the purpose. The banks are 1,600 independent institutions, spread over the various States, and anxious each to make large profits for its shareholders. The issue of currency is one of the most lucrative parts of the banking business, as it enables the bank to borrow money without interest. While human nature is as it is, every bank will put out and will keep out all the currency it can. And the only way to make sure that the volume of bank notes shall increase when they are needed for business and shall diminish when the want has passed away, is to make it

impossible for the banks to keep out their notes in excess. This is easily to be done. Banking experience has supplied an effective safeguard. It is the safeguard of metropolitan redemption. Let the banks be compelled to redeem their notes at the metropolis, where in time of plethora the notes are sure to accumulate, and we have the best remedy for inelasticity of the currency, which the nature of the case seems to admit.

An unreasonable opposition has been aroused among some of the banks, against any more effective means of redemption than one in use at present. We trust, however, this will pass away. The existing arrangements for redemption are notoriously imperfect and unsatisfactory. This circumstance offers a powerful weapon to the enemies of the banking system, which they are not slow to use. In Congress a large power is known to be arrayed against the banks. Surely it is the part of wisdom for these institutions to correct every abuse, and to strengthen and reform themselves as much as possible. The banks must show to the country that they are not a set of speculative institutions, intent on money-making and greedy of gain, but that they are depositories and trustees of important powers over the currency of the country, and that they do not receive the rich endowments of that trust without doing their best to fulfil its duties. One of the strongest arguments against the banks would be deprived of its force and one of the most threatening dangers which await them in Congress would be removed, if they would voluntarily combine together this summer and organize some effective scheme for central redemption. It is a matter for regret that the recent convention in this city did not give more attention to a reform which is infinitely more for the true interests of the banks than almost any other topic, which was prominently discussed.

A PART OF THE GREAT NORTHWEST.

There is a portion of this country which promises in a few years to yield to none other, in population, wealth and production. It is a region, however, now comparatively unknown, of vast extent, of healthful climate and of large resources. It has for its streams the upper waters of the Mississippi, those of the Red River of the North, of the Assiniboine and of the Saskatchewan. It touches the shores of Lake Winnipeg; extends far westward along the borders of the United States and of the New Dominion to and beyond the Rocky Mountains. It has Lake Superior for its Eastern limit. The State of Minnesota, part of Wisconsin, part of Dacotah and a broad section of the New Dominion lie within this region. At first thought one would say that this section was far to the

northward, but a glance at the map shows that while St. Paul is in the latitude of Venice, the Northern shore of Lake Superior is in the latitude of Paris, 200 miles further south than London and 700 miles further south than St. Petersburg. The summer isothermal line of 70 degrees, which passes through the wheat-growing regions of Russia and through Southern France, strikes this continent on Long Island, bends down into Pennsylvania, skirts the northern limits of Ohio and Indiana, passes from the foot of Lake Michigan to the Mississippi just north of St. Paul, and then sweeps up to latitude 52 three and a half degrees north of Paris. Some of our school misconceptions of geography are corrected by the practical knowledge we acquire in this day of enterprise and action. It is under and around this isothermal line that the richest wheat-growing regions of the United States lie, and it is near this line that the remarkable development of the last few years has been made. For instance, in 1857 Minnesota did not raise breadstuffs sufficient for her own consumption. Ten years after her export of wheat was 10,000,000 of bushels and her production was 14,000,000 bushels. In 1854 she had only 15,000 acres of land under cultivation. Ten years later it was over 1,000,000. In 1860 her population was 172,000. In 1865 it was 250,000. It is estimated now at 450,000. In 1860, Hon. Wm. H. Seward, standing in St. Paul, the centre of this great "continental wheat garden," speaking of the broad belt extending from Lake Superior to the Pacific, remarked, "Here is the place, the central place, where the agriculture of the richest regions of North America must pour out its tributes to the whole world."

The transportation facilities of this region are mostly as yet only "projected." There is first of all, however, the Mississippi river, which offers such cheap carriage to the sea. This route may, we think, be regarded as "finished." The agricultural wealth of Minnesota was one of the chief inducements for St. Louis to engage in the present system of grain carriage to New Orleans. Its effort was to secure a share of that traffic which by several lines of railroad passed across the States of Wisconsin and Illinois, and so sought an Eastern market, by way of the Lakes. But Minnesota has designs of its own, and hopes to do its own business. It has under way a railroad from St. Paul to Du Luth, the head of Lake Superior. This road will be 150 miles in length. A portion of it is done and the rest will be completed during the present year, placing Minnesota several hundred miles nearer tide water than it is now, for the western end of Lake Superior is 240 miles west of Chicago, and the distance of the centre of Minnesota production is much nearer Lake Superior than Lake Michigan. The navigation of the two lakes is practically limited to the same season, for one depends upon

the departure of the ice from the St. Marie, and the other upon the freedom of the Straits of Mackinaw. To New York the distance from the head of Lake Superior is just about the same as from the head of Lake Michigan. The Northern Pacific Railroad is another improvement, upon which work is beginning. But this is too indefinite yet to require further remark. Railroads, east and west lines, are started in the first, second, fourth and fifth tiers of counties in Minnesota, counting from the lower line of the State. St. Paul is a railroad centre, and from it diverge nine or ten roads, all of which are designed to feed the new road to Lake Superior. There is a road started to Pembina, of which 81 miles are completed. Another is from St. Paul to the head of Red River navigation, of which 60 miles are done and 100 more are contracted for by the first snow fall. Another runs towards Sioux City, and 90 miles are done. At Sioux City it will meet a branch of the Union Pacific road and contend for the traffic of that route. Another runs down the river to Hastings, and has Chicago for its objective; of this 20 miles are done. Another road towards Chicago has 50 miles completed. We omit mention of some minor routes and projections.

The question naturally arises how is the labor procured for all these enterprises? The regular emigrants to Minnesota and other Western States are farmers, agricultural laborers and artisans. They are not "navvies." So laborers for the railroads are sought abroad. They bring them over by the ship load, and set them to work on the railroads. They settle on the line, and so, when the road is done, it has a population to support it. The Minnesota State agent has been to Sweden for his emigrants, before whom he laid the wonders of climate, production, free homesteads, &c. He brought 900 over with him a few days since, and he promises that 75,000 Scandinavians will come over during the present year. So the State grows and develops. So civilization makes its powerful conquests of new regions. So the material prosperity of the whole country is increased and the national life derives fresh strength. The remote is brought near, the savage is tamed, and the kindly fruits of the earth are produced in greater and greater abundance. This little sketch of what one State is doing is but the repetition of what others have already done, and the prelude to even greater enterprises.

THE WESTERN GRANARY AND ITS OUTLET.

It is within the memory of many men now living that the centre of the wheat production of the United States was east of Lake Erie. In the earlier part of this century the counties on the Hudson River and along the Mohawk were large producers of wheat. Then the Genesee

Valley came into notice, and for many years was the granary of the East. The wheat and flour of this valley have not yet lost their celebrity, despite the competition of Ohio, St. Louis and California. For many years the insect destroyed the crop there, but its productiveness has been now partially restored, and at no time was there a complete failure. "Extra Genesee," though often merely a name, was still a brand in the market through all vicissitudes. The Erie Canal opened the way to the West and made the farther shores of the great lakes as accessible to market as Western New York had been. So the wheat-growing moved westward to Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Illinois. Another impulse was needed. Railroads were built from the Lakes to the Mississippi, from the Mississippi to the Missouri and farther West, and again the "granary" receded to the Westward, until to-day it is found beyond the Mississippi; and Iowa, Minnesota and California are, in proportion to population and in the yield to the acre, the greatest wheat-growing States of the Union. In 1848 and in 1859 the wheat product of several States was as follows:

	1848.	1859.
Pennsylvania.....bush	15,267,691	13,019,165
Ohio.....	14,487,351	15,119,047
New York.....	13,121,498	8,681,115
Illinois.....	8,414,573	23,837,023
Indiana.....	6,314,438	16,848,347
Michigan.....	4,925,889	8,336,364

Such were the figures for 1848 and 1859. But in 1866 a further change took place. For instance, Wisconsin, which reports 4,000,000 bushels in 1848 and 15,600,000 in 1859, reports in 1866 20,367,920 bushels, at a valuation of \$33,914,226—a five-fold increase in crop in 18 years and a nine-fold increase in value. Other States named above present the following aggregates:

	1866.	Value.
Pennsylvania.....bush.	10,519,660	\$28,007,492
Ohio.....	10,208,854	25,736,312
New York.....	12,526,466	35,525,604
Illinois.....	28,551,491	55,104,243
Indiana.....	9,114,562	21,466,024
Michigan.....	11,740,629	31,588,630

Pennsylvania, in the interval from 1859 to 1866, fell off; New York, recovering from the devastations of the weevil, gained; Ohio fell off largely, considering her increase in population; Indiana also produced less, while Illinois and Michigan increased. Iowa now enters the lists with a production of 8,000,000 bushels; California shows a production in 1866 of 14,000,000 bushels, having a currency value of some \$20,000,000; Minnesota, which in 1857 imported breadstuffs, had 10,000,000 bushels for export ten years later and kept 4,000,000 for home consumption. Twenty years ago the wheat product of New York and Pennsylvania was four or five bushels per head to the population; now it is but

two or three. Of course these States and their Eastern neighbors look to these great Western granaries for supplies; and their confidence will not be misplaced. Directly west of Iowa and Missouri, and within the limits of Kansas and Nebraska, the wheat region virtually ends; but it will expand into immense dimensions on the vast areas of the Northwest. There will be a granary never to be drawn down.

There is a lesson of importance to be derived from this statement we have given. These wheat areas of the East, and in this term we include all the regions east of the Mississippi, are by no means exhausted. They need but culture to reach the highest promise they ever gave. The wheat crop of New York fell from 13 millions in 1848 to 8 millions in 1859, and rose then to 12 millions in 1866. The prime cause of this was the renewal of wheat culture after years and years of disease. The farmers could not contend with the insect and they yielded. The insect disappeared, and again the fields returned productive crops. If land is higher in price in these Eastern States, the farmers are nearer a market and they can compete, to a certain extent, with the West. In Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Illinois, there has been a falling off in the average yield per acre, showing a careless cultivation, for these wild lands are yet unexhausted.

An examination of the breadstuffs trade of Chicago for a series of years, also indicates the growth of the West and the tendency of the centre of cereal production in that direction. In 1854 the receipts of flour at Chicago were 234,575 bbls., in 1868 they were 2,276,335 (a tenfold increase) and Chicago which, in 1860, manufactured but 282,000 bbls. manufactured last year 747,932. In 1854 the receipts of wheat were 3 millions of bushels, and in 1868 they were 15 millions. Corn grew from 7 millions in 1854 to 25 millions in 1868. Chicago shipped last year 24,800,000 bushels of wheat and flour reduced to wheat. The five lake ports together sent out 53,000,000 bushels, and it is estimated that 18,000,000 of bushels went on the railroads.

The promise of an increased crop this present year is very good. Illinois has recently suffered so severely from the rains that the corn crop is considered to be in danger, all other sections of the country report good progress and warrant the belief that the avenues of transportation will be crowded with the products of Agriculture. For the great granary beyond the Mississippi, of which we have spoken, the competition of transporting interests is lively. St. Louis has an agent in New York to engage a steamship to proceed to that city and bring a crop of grain directly to this port; Iowa and Minnesota are pushing railroads into the interior; Chicago reduces her charge for handling and storing grain. Freights by rail on competing roads go down and

the great battle between the rail and the water route assumes new and more interesting proportions. Some of the experiments induced by this rivalry between different routes are on an extensive scale. This steamship from New York to St. Louis and return, involves a long voyage. It is 3,000 miles of water against 1,000 by land. It is an ocean voyage, a gulf passage and a long and sinuous river with all its opposing currents and unknown obstructions. It passes by the Mississippi cities, whose hopes have been of "Direct Trade" with Europe, and it has for its St. Louis guarantors the enterprise, and capital and pluck of a strong and vigorous city. As one attempt to solve this problem of transportation it is interesting to all observers. The world at large which takes many million bushels of wheat, corn and flour from the United States, and the army of consumers in the non-producing States no less than producers are all directly interested, for to them it is a question of cheaper food.

TOLEDO, WABASH AND WESTERN RAILWAY.

Among western railways this line occupies a route which for directness between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts is not surpassed. This assertion applies to its present physical relations. When the Pike County Railroad, extending from Naples to Douglasville (opposite Hannibal, Mo.), now in process of construction, shall have been completed, the east and west line will have been materially improved both as to distance and general directness, insuring additional economical means of transacting the ever increasing business which the progress of events has brought within the company's grasp. The section of the line to be thrown out of use by this improvement as a through route (say between Van Gundy's and Palmyra) will be utilized as a local carrier for a rich and prosperous stretch of country. A further improvement of the direct westward line will be made by cutting off the triangle which, with Palmyra as its apex, has Hannibal as its latitudinal basis. In former times the constituents from which the whole route was formed were notoriously unproductive and expensive, but the vast development of the country through which the aggregate line passes, and the improved connections east and west already established or projected, together with the Union Pacific road now completed, have given to this line an increased importance which a very short period will more clearly develop. These facts, results and anticipations are in marked contrast with the troubles and disabilities through which the several roads comprising the company's present lines have been forced to pass. Even the titles of the bond issues, now part of the company's funded debt, speak of frequent disasters and

reorganization after reorganization in each of the principal roads, until common sense and experience brought the whole line occupied by the existing corporation under a single efficient and co-operative organization.

We have not space to recount the early history of the line. The Sangamon and Morgan Company began their experience the earliest—say some third of a century ago, and were succeeded by the Great Western Company, which built on the east and the west of the original route, so as to complete a line from the Indiana border to Meredosia, with a branch to Naples—both on the Illinois River. This company failing, was succeeded by the Great Western Company of 1859. The roads in Indiana and Ohio were built by separate companies, which under several titles, (now consolidated, again separate, and then again united,) had a very precarious existence. Then came the consolidation of July 1, 1865, which included two other lines and gave the original roads connection with Quincy and Warsaw, both on the Mississippi, and with the great lines of Missouri and Iowa. At the time of consolidation the lines were as follows :

	Miles.
Toledo and Wabash Railroad (Toledo, O., to the Indiana Line).....	242.4
Great Western Railroad of 1859 (Indiana Line to Meredosia, &c.)	152.4
Quincy and Toledo Railroad (Meredosia to Camp Point).....	84.0
Illinois and Southern Iowa Railroad (Clayton to Warsaw).....	41.2
Total consolidated line.....	500.0

About 22 miles of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad (leased) complete the company's operative lines, making the whole length of line operated 522 miles. Of this length of road 75.5 miles are in Ohio and 166.9 in Indiana, the remainder of the total length being in Illinois. The road is now ironed with rail averaging 60 pounds to the yard. The gauge of the track is 4 feet 8½ inches. The report does not state the length of second track, sidings, &c.

The amount of motive power and rolling stock operating on the roads of the company at the close of each of the three years 1866, 1867 and 1868, inclusive, was as follows :

	1866.	1867.	1868.
Locomotive engines.....	102	105	105
Passenger and smoking cars.....	47	49	52
Mail and baggage cars.....	27	24	29
Box freight cars.....	1,040	1,173	1,077
Live stock cars.....	275	405	401
Platform cars.....	200	243	243
Coal cars.....	150	154	148
Caboose cars.....	...	45	44
Dumping cars.....	...	30	30

Of the engines 47 are coal and 58 wood consumers. There are 104 stations on the roads and 11 engine houses. Upwards of 100 new cars were built in the company's shops in 1868, and nearly 400 cars were entirely rebuilt or received general repairs.

The results of operations in the same years and since the consolidation are shown in the following table:

	1865 (6 mos).	1866.	1867.	1868.
Passenger earnings.....	\$396,962 08	\$1,322,840 78	\$1,213,535 43	\$1,224,651 51
Passengers carried.....	364 525	634,378	534,855	
Freight earnings.....	\$1,020,258 38	\$2,302,427 35	\$2,361,925 40	\$2,542,749 91
Mail earnings.....	26,000 00	52,000 00	52,000 00	70,412 49
Express earnings.....	49,042 10	98,345 17	148,355 52	89,163 97
Miscellaneous earnings.....	40,846 59	84,766 92	21,517 23	86,207 10
Gross earnings.....	\$2,033,109 15	\$3,717,386 22	\$3,509,353 58	\$4,013,907 95

From which deduct expenditures :

Renewal of iron and superstructures.....	\$109,017 80	\$341,051 79	\$264,912 93	\$237,064 04
Maintenance of way and structures.....	338,024 46	624,066 25	673,491 20	634,979 41
Maintenance of cars, engines, &c.....	1276,837 12	1,566,005 78	1,449,469 34	1,489,389 66
Transportation expenses.....	763,568 93	1,289,463 63	1,439,008 85	1,438,566 68
Total operat'g expenses.....	\$1,487,438 26	\$2,811,156 50	\$2,768,883 32	\$2,899,619 79
Nett income.....	\$545,670 89	\$906,199 73	\$1,022,471 26	\$1,123,583 19
Nett earnings, per cent.....	26.84	24.39	28.97	28.00

In the following statement are shown the general financial transactions of the company as exhibited on the income account since the consolidation of July 1, 1865 :

	1865-66.	1867.	1868.
Nett earnings.....	\$1,451,870 61	\$1,022,471 26	\$1,123,533 19
Supplies from old companies.....	102,548 64		
Machinery and tools sold.....		1,840 00	
Sinking fund bonds sold.....	1,000,000 00		
Consolidated mortgage bonds sold.....		1,410,000 00	615,000 00
Ill. and South. Iowa R. Road.....		22,100 00	
Balance from year to year.....		273,599 00	491,512 82
Total.....	\$2,554,419 25	\$2,730,010 26	\$2,230,101 01

Against which amounts are charged as follows :

Construction, &c.....	\$603,974 00	\$443,536 53	\$303,481 71
Interest account.....	1,328,180 37	1,689,161 83	1,228,622 53
Discount and exchange.....	201,541 28	12,800 82	
Toledo and Wabash W.R. Company.....	17,106 63	1,454 98	
Ill. and South. Iowa RR. Company.....	129,807 97		
New York office.....		20,543 28	
Sinking fund bonds taken up.....		731,000 00	269,000 00
Balance from year to year.....	273,599 00	491,512 82	430,996 77

The financial status of the company at the close of 1866, '67 and '68, respectively, is shown in the Treasurer's general balance sheet, as follows :

	1866.	1867.	1868.
Balance of income account.....	\$273,599 00	\$491,512 82	\$430,996 77
General stock, 57,000 shares.....	5,700,000 00	5,700,000 00	5,700,000 00
Preferred stock, 10,000 shares.....	1,000,000 00	1,000,000 00	1,000,000 00
Funded debt.....	14,345,000 00	15,494,000 00	16,000,000 00
Coupons due and unpaid.....	42,234 75	63,256 00	127,512 50
Overdraft.....	71,790 53		
Equalization account.....	665,726 19		
Bills payable.....	15,500 00	15,420 00	1,008 00
Total.....	\$22,112,900 47	\$22,754,182 82	\$23,259,817 27

Per contra : the following charges, viz. :

Road and equipment.....	\$19,850,000 00	\$20,999,000 00	\$21,551,000 00
Trustees.....	1,195,000 00	1,195,000 00	1,195,000 00
Materials and fuel.....	303,014 07	269,737 88	237,262 66
Sundry accounts.....	6,540 43	103,678 88	131,803 10
Equalization account.....	700,300 28	31,574 08	31,574 08
Cash.....		167,171 98	1,807 43
Total.....	\$22,112,900 47	\$22,754,182 82	\$23,259,817 27

The funded debt of the company, as it stood on the books at the close of the fiscal year 1868, is described in the following statement:

	Classes of bonds	Interest		Principal	
		Rate	Payable.	Amount	Due.
1st mort.,	Tol. & Ill. RR (75.5 m.)	7	F. & A.	\$900,000	1890
"	L. Erie, Wa. & St. L. RR (166.9 m.)	7	F. & A.	2,500,000	1890
"	Gt. West'n RR, east of Decatur	10	A. & O.	1,000,000	1878
"	Gt. West'n RR, west of Decatur	7	F. & A.	45,000	1878
"	Gt. West'n RR of 1859 (183.4 m.)	7	F. & A.	1,465,000	1888
"	Quincy & Tol. RR (84 m.)	7	M. & N.	600,000	1890
"	Ill. & So. Iowa RR (41.2 m.)	7	F. & A.	800,000	1883
2d mort.,	Tol. & Wab. RR (75½ m.)	7	M. & N.	1,000,000	1878
"	Wabash & Western RR (166.9 m.)	7	M. & N.	1,500,000	1871
"	Gt. West'n RR of 1869 (183.4 m.)	7	M. & N.	2,500,000	1888
Equipment,	Toledo & Wabash RR	7	M. & N.	600,000	1883
8½g Fund,	Tol., W. & West'n RR (300 m.)	7	A. & O.	(called in)	1871
Consols,	Tol., W. & West'n RR (300 m.)	7	Quarterly	2,700,000	1907

All of these issues are payable principal and interest in New York at the dates above named. The interest on the new consolidated bonds is payable February, May, August and November.

Four years have nearly passed since the consolidation, during which the monthly range of the prices of the company's stocks at the New York Stock Exchange has been as follows:

RANGE OF THE GENERAL STOCK.

	1865-66.	1866-67.	1867-68.	1868-69.
July.....	38½ @ 40	46½ @ 53½	48½ @ 54½	
August.....	39 @ 47½	44½ @ 51	49 @ 53½	
September.....	40 @ 40	43½ @ 46½	39 @ 49	58½ @ 64
October.....	43 @ 48	41 @ 54½	39 @ 44½	56½ @ 67
November.....	39 @ 55	40 @ 55½	38 @ 39½	54 @ 63
December.....	40½ @ 48	41 @ 45½	28½ @ 13	58½ @ 59
January.....	42 @ 42	39 @ 45½	42½ @ 47	59½ @ 67
February.....	31 @ 40	38 @ 44½	45 @ 47½	63½ @ 68
March.....	31½ @ 33	34 @ 39	46½ @ 55½	65½ @ 68
April.....	31 @ 39	35 @ 39½	46 @ 52	61½ @ 73½
May.....	34 @ 39	38 @ 44½	49 @ 52	72 @ 78½
June.....	36 @ 36	41½ @ 47½	46 @ 51½	71 @ 76½
Year.....	31 @ 55	34 @ 55½	38½ @ 55½	48½ @ 78½

RANGE OF THE PREFERRED STOCK.

	1865-66.	1866-67.	1867-68.	1868-69.
July.....	61 @ 61	69½ @ 72½	69 @ 78½	
August.....	67½ @ 70	70½ @ 71	73 @ 78	
September.....	60 @ 64	70 @ 73½	69 @ 69	73½ @ 78
October.....	61 @ 65	72½ @ 75½	62½ @ 68	73½ @ 78
November.....	63 @ 68	72 @ 75½	62 @ 62½	70 @ 73½
December.....	61½ @ 61½	61½ @ 61½	60 @ 60	67 @ 70½
January.....	61½ @ 61½	64 @ 67	73 @ 74	
February.....	60 @ 68	68 @ 74½	77 @ 77½	
March.....	59 @ 65	70 @ 74	78 @ 79	
April.....	61½ @ 65	70½ @ 72	77½ @ 80	
May.....	62 @ 67	69 @ 69	79 @ 80½	
June.....	63½ @ 70	69 @ 69	82 @ 82	
Year.....	60 @ 68	59 @ 75½	61½ @ 74	74 @ 82½

We have made this analysis more extensive than ordinary, for the reason that "Poor's Manual" does not include the report for 1868, although we find that it was waited for as long as possible. A partial return obtained from the company is all that is given in the work referred to.

ON THE AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (SECOND PAPER.*)

BY JAMES CAIRD, ESQ.

(Read before the Statistical Society of London).

Having been invited by the Council to continue the subject of the Agricultural Statistics of the United Kingdom, on which I read a paper in March last year, I propose first to consider the result of the estimates then offered of the previous crop, the probable yield of the last crop (1868), and the great public advantage which followed the early announcement contained in the summary of the returns.

I.—*Estimate and Result of Crop, 1867.*

It will be remembered that I then offered an estimate of the result of the bad wheat crop of 1867, in which, after making deductions for the diminished consumption likely to be caused by high prices, I computed the foreign supply required within the harvest year at 9,600,000 quarters. The actual receipts have been 9,690,006 quarters, between August, 1867, and August, 1868, the date at which the new crop was ready.

But the harvest was a very early one, and the condition of the corn so good that it was available for immediate use. The harvest year, as generally and properly understood, and within which it is very desirable that the statistical tables should be framed, is from 1st September to 1st September. Between these dates last year the total imports of wheat and flour were 9,293,000 quarters.

On either basis it will appear that my estimate was not very wide of the mark, though it was severely handled at the time, and figures were put forth to show that considerably less than two million quarters was all we could possibly receive between that time and harvest. The price, which had begun to droop, was thus again strengthened and maintained during April, May and part of June, when the final fall began and steadily continued till the beginning of September, by which time the drop from the highest point had reached 20s. a quarter. But in the meantime the pressure on the poor, as was partly shown by the statistics of out-door relief, was unnecessarily prolonged, while it was found that the foreign supply, which had been represented to have been exhausted by the enormous imports of the first six months of the harvest year, continued with very little diminution to its close. Instead of the 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 quarters, which was the utmost we were led to expect from all sources, we actually received 4,500,000 quarters in the second half of the harvest year.

* The first paper was published in the June number of the *MAGAZINE* (vol. 60, page 431).

The economy in the use of bread caused by the high price of last year has proved very close to the estimate I ventured to put forth. It will perhaps be remembered that I assumed every 10 per cent of additional price on the crop would diminish the consumption by 1 per cent; and as bread had risen 50 per cent, I reckoned the saving at 5 per cent, or a little over 1,000,000 quarters on the total consumption. The actual saving is shown by the following figures:

	Quarters.
Average annual consumption since 1862, inclusive of seed.....	20,800,000
Seed, $2\frac{1}{2}$ bushels per acre.....	qrs. 1,100,000
Foreign wheat imported.....	9,800,000
Home crop, 9,700,000 quarters of 59 lb. quality, equal to 61 lb quality.....	9,880,000
	<hr/> 19,780,000
Saving by economy in the use of bread.....	<hr/> 1,020,000

This bears out the opinion of eminent statisticians, that the consumption of bread is very constant; that whatever the price may be, everything must be given up before bread, for the very severe pinch of an increase of price of fully one-half diminished the use of it by only one-twentieth.

II.—*Wheat Crop, 1868.*

The bountiful harvest of 1868, and the splendid condition in which it was saved rendering it fit for immediate consumption, was a great relief to the country after the pinching caused by two bad harvests and diminished trade. If there had been only the greater acreable produce to rely on much would have been gained; but a great deal more than that was revealed by the publication of a summary of the agricultural returns on 19th September. The beneficent season had added 2,000,000 qrs. to the produce of an average crop, while the increased acreage under wheat swelled that addition by 1,200,000 qrs. more. Nor was this all; for the fine and heavy sample will improve the yield and quality of the flour by 2 or 3 lbs. a bushel, or equal to one twenty-fifth part of the total produce.

The contrast between the yield of the two last harvests, 1867 and 1868 is shown in a very striking manner when all the figures are placed together.

Years.	Acres under Wheat.	Quality. Weight per bushel.	Total Produce at 488 lbs. per Quart. r. Qrs.
1867	3,640,000	59	9,880,000
'68	3,951,000	68	16,436,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Increase in 1868.....	7,056,000

Here is a difference in a single year, exceeding four months, or one-third of the total consumption. The home crop will give us within

5,100 000 qrs. of our average consumption, and if we add to that one month in consequence of the unusually early harvest, and reckon on 13, months' consumption before the next harvest may be available, we shall need 6,800,000 qrs. of foreign wheat and flour. In the six months since 1st September last we have imported about two-thirds of that quantity, so that, even if imports should for the current six months materially decrease, we are likely to receive quite enough to carry us on with moderate prices till next harvest.

III.—*Price and Supply.*

The price is a question of great delicacy, though of first importance. In the course of the year 1868 the highest average Gazette price was in May, 73s 8d, and the lowest in December, 50s 1d; the difference 23s 7d. There is thus a fall of one-third from the highest point, which corresponds in most remarkable exactness with the increased produce of 1868 over 1867. So far as our own crop is concerned, the consumer would thus appear to have got the full benefit of the good wheat harvest.

Till next harvest the price will very much depend on the rate of foreign imports. These come to us not so much in relation to price in this country as to the productiveness of the harvest abroad. A scarcity here and high prices will draw the surplus corn from every quarter of the globe to us, but it will not cease to flow when the source of supply is abundant, however low the price may fall in this country. It is an axiom in political economy that no article can remain long below the cost of production. But that cost is very different in different countries. In this country the cost of producing wheat may be taken at the maximum. In other countries where rent, rates, or wages are greatly lower than ours, and especially where, as in Southern Russia and the valley of the Mississippi, there are likewise boundless tracts of most fertile soil, they can continue to produce wheat at prices which would entail loss on the grower in England. Moreover the vast machinery of production, once set in motion, will maintain its momentum for a considerable period after the stimulus has been withdrawn. Thus in 1860, in consequence of two deficient harvests, the price rose 10s. a quarter, and the imports increased one-third over those of 1859. They continued to swell in volume until 1863, the year of abundance, when the price fell 10s. a quarter. The imports did not then decline in the same proportion; indeed but for the disturbance of the American trade, caused by the war, there would have been no decline, and if we exclude America for that reason, and limit ourselves to Russia and Germany, which between them have furnished us with 40 per cent of our imports since the Crimean war, I find that during 1863, 1864, and 1865, when the average price varied between 40s. and

44s., the imports continued at much the same rate as in the two preceding years, when the price was 55s.

A very productive harvest in France will exercise an immediate influence on prices in this country. Not only does her demand for foreign corn cease, but from the small average yield and the vast acreage under wheat a slight increase in the produce tells quickly up. Last year I computed an increase of one bushel on the acre in France at upwards of 2,000,000 qrs. If her increase has been in anything like the same ratio as ours, France will have a large surplus for export, probably quite enough to meet any decline caused by the deficient crop in Southern Russia.

IV.—*Steady Decline in the Price of Wheat under Free Trade.*

The effect of free trade in corn has been to lower the price of wheat in this country, notwithstanding the increase of the population and consequent increased consumption. The average price of the twenty years preceding 1848 was 57s. 4d., and of the twenty years of free trade, 52s. 3d. But if the disturbing influences of the cessation of supplies from Russia during the Crimean war, and from America during the later years and since the close of the American war, be eliminated, the average price of the last twenty years would have stood 10s. lower than that of the twenty years preceding free trade.

This is a fact of great importance when we come to consider the increasing population of the country, and the means we have of meeting their annually growing demands upon our resources. The popular estimate of the wheat annually consumed by each person of the community in England used to be 8 bushels. In 1850 I ventured to question that opinion. My estimates then showed that it did not probably from our own soil exceed 5 bushels. Mr. Lawes has lately entered on an investigation of this subject, the first part of which he has embodied in a very able paper in the last number of the "Royal Agricultural Society's Journal." He divides the last sixteen years into two periods of eight years each, and the results of his estimates are embraced in the following summary :

ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION OF WHEAT PER HEAD PER ANNUM.

During the Last Sixteen Years	England and Wales. Bushel.	Scotland. Bushel.	Great Britain. Bushel.	Ireland. Bushel.	United Kingdom. Bushel.
First eight years....	5.9	4.2	5.7	2.7	5.1
Second ".....	6.3	4.2	6.0	3.3	5.5
Average of whole period.	6.1	4.2	5.9	3.0	5.3

Converting these figures into pounds, it appears that during the first eight years each person consumed at the rate of 311 lbs. of wheat, and during the last period 335 lbs. But the proportions in which that was

afforded by foreign supply had also altered from 79 lbs. per head in the first, to 134 lbs. in the second. Here two very important results are shown: first, that the people are able to buy and do consume more bread; and second, that we must depend wholly on foreign countries for the increased supply necessary to meet the growing consumption.

An immense impetus seems to have been given to consumption by the general increase of wages consequent on the Crimean war and the Indian mutiny, and the great exertions put forth by this country on these occasions. The foreign imports of wheat, which up to 1860 had not exceeded an annual average of 4,500,000 qrs., then rose to 10,000,000, and during the last eight years have maintained an annual average of 8,000,000 qrs.

V.—Increasing Rate of Consumption likely to be Fully Supplied.

But we have not only to provide for an increased consumption by each individual, but for an annual increase of 240,000 in the population. This, at $5\frac{1}{2}$ bushels per head, is 165,000 qrs. In ten years, at the same rate of progress, that will have swollen to nearly 2,000,000 qrs., and in ten years more to 4,000,000. This would indicate the need of a gradual rise in our foreign imports in ten years, from the present average of 8,000,000 qrs. a year to 10,000,000, and in twenty years to 12,000,000 qrs. a year. In one generation more, say thirty years hence, the imports will at this rate be more than the home growth, if that should remain at its present point. Our past experience of the readiness with which the volume of foreign wheat has increased with the demand would lead to the conclusion that we need entertain no apprehension on that score. California promises us next year more than 2,000,000 quarters. France alone, by a slight improvement in her husbandry, only so much as would raise her average yield from 15 to 18 bushels an acre, could meet our requirements. And when we consider the extent of rich countries within the wheat region farther east which are scarcely begun to be tapped by the railway system, we must feel that we are yet far from having reached the limit at which a moderate rate of price will bring us sufficient supplies. *For wheat, which forms the great staple of the food of civilized man outside the tropics, occupies of all cereals the widest region suited to its cultivation.*

The importance of this fact cannot be overrated. If the wheat region had been of small extent the increase of population would have been quickly limited to the food resources of each country. A continued development of mining and manufacturing enterprise in Great Britain would have been impossible. For nothing can be done without bread. Wheat is the common food, the real staff of life. The hard-working poor are far more dependent on and much larger individual consumers of it than the

rich. If its price like that of most other commodities had risen, or was likely to rise, with the increasing demand, no political foresight, no more equitable arrangement of the burden of taxation, no reduction even in public expenditure could have long availed us. But the wheat region has been designed apparently to be co extensive with the progress of civilized man, and the more regular and extensive the demands upon it the more ready and continuous becomes the supply.

The natural tendency of the gradually falling price of wheat in this country since 1848, has been to diminish the breadth of our own wheat. And the force of that tendency, in spite of the great increase of gold, shows the steadiness of its operation. There has been a yearly increase of consumers, with an increased power and capacity to obtain bread, an increasing ratio in the supply of gold, the representative of its money value; and yet in spite of all that, the price has declined, and the average breadth of wheat grown in the United Kingdom has diminished. But the figures in the statistical returns show how quickly the price of wheat affects the home supply. The two fine crops of 1863 and 1864 reduced the average price to little more than 40s. But in 1867 the price had risen to 64s., and in one year there was an addition of 300,000 acres to our breadth of wheat.

I have already in a previous paper shown that the rate of increased productiveness of the land under wheat is very slow. From that source, therefore, there is little hope of any material increase in our home produce, in the face of larger foreign supplies at low prices. When the price of wheat falls below 50s., the farmer begins to turn his attention to other crops. The value of barley has been rising in nearly the same proportion as that of wheat has declined in recent years, and oats have also fully maintained their price. While the farmer in these, and in the increasing value of his live stock and its produce, will be able to compensate himself against the steady decline in the value of wheat, the people, that vast and increasing body of consumers, have the prospect of abundant supplies of bread at a moderate price, from the yearly extension of the means of foreign transport.

VI.—*General Results.*

Having thus endeavored to discuss the main question answered by the agricultural returns, viz., in how far the home crop is available for the national supply of bread, I proceed to extract from the returns certain other points affecting our food and clothing. Beyond a slight increase in the breadth of potatoes, and a nearly similar decrease in barley, and the large increase of wheat already referred to, there has been no material change in the general crops of the country during the last two years.

The table showing the percentage proportions of corn and green crop in each division of the United Kingdom is very interesting. In round numbers it appears that England supplies nine-tenths of all the home-grown wheat, Scotland and Ireland together only one-tenth. And the increased breadth, sown under the stimulus of the high prices of the past year in England, is equal to the whole acreage under wheat in Ireland. England produces more than three fourths of all the barley grown in the British Islands, nearly all the beans and peas, and one-third of the oats. Ireland grows one half more oats than Scotland, and two-thirds of the entire potato crop of the United Kingdom. The three kingdoms, as compared with France and Prussia, grew the following proportions of acres of corn to their respective populations:

England	1	acre for every	2½ persons.
Scotland	1	"	2½ persons.
Ireland	1	"	2½ persons.
France	1	"	1 person.
Prussia	1	"	1 person.

And of potatoes—

England	1	acre for every	62 persons.
Scotland	1	"	20 persons.
France	1	"	12 persons.
Ireland	1	"	5 persons.
Prussia	1	"	5 persons.

With regard to live stock, these countries stand in the following proportions:

Cattle.		Sheep.	
England	1 for every 5 persons;	1 for every 1 of population	
Scotland	1 " 8	" 2	1 "
Ireland	1 " 1½	" 1	" 1 "
France	1 " 2½	" 1	" 1 "
Prussia	1 " 8	" 1	" 1 "

Of all these countries Ireland has thus the largest proportion of cattle, and Scotland the largest of sheep.

VII.—*Increase of Cattle and Sheep.*

The entire loss sustained by the cattle plague up to October, 1867, when it had quite ceased, was 190,000 head. The natural increase in the two years since the disease began to decline exceeds 500,000, so that the effects of that calamity, so far as the national supply of food is concerned, have been fully recovered. The increase of sheep has been very rapid, the joint effect of high price of mutton, and the panic which in some counties followed the cattle plague, and led to a substitution of sheep. The total increase of the year has been 1,790,000. The sheep stock of the United Kingdom is upwards of 35,000,000, which is almost the same in number as that of the Australian Colonies and Tasmania, according to the latest returns. The total number of sheep in the United Kingdom

and the whole of the British Colonies, independent of India, cannot now be much under 100,000,000. The import of continental wool is on the decline, while that of colonial is largely increasing. At the late rate of progress, our vast woollen industry in this country will ere long be sufficiently supplied by the home and colonial produce.

Whilst the increase of sheep at home has been rapid and great, there has been a very large decrease in the supply of foreign sheep. These, which in a single year, 1865, had risen from 496,000 to 914,000, began to decline in 1867, and fell back greatly in 1868.

This was caused in some measure by the restrictions imposed on the import of sheep by the Privy Council orders, but was partly also due to the considerable fall in the price of mutton during 1868, arising from the large supply of sheep forced into the home market by the prospect of a dearth in the green crops. But the agricultural returns have revealed to us the gratifying fact, in relation to this important branch of the national food, that there is an immense elasticity in the production and supply of sheep, both at home and abroad, and that may be largely and quickly increased by a moderate rise in price.

VIII.—*Foreign Dairy Produce not Increasing.*

The foreign supply of butter and cheese has continued very steady during the last eight years. It made a sudden rise in 1861, and had nearly doubled itself in 1862; but from that year the average supply has not materially altered. As the prices of these articles are still highly remunerative to the home producer, there is every inducement to him to develop yet further that branch of agricultural industry, on which the small and middle class farmers are chiefly engaged.

IX.—*Large, Compared with Moderate Sized Farms.*

The returns afford some indications of the results of large corn farms as compared with the more mixed husbandry and interests of small or moderate sized farms. I have taken ten of the largest farm counties in England and compared them with ten of the smallest farm counties, the total area in both cases being nearly equal. The general results may be broadly summarised thus: The large farm system embraces nearly twice the proportion of corn and half the proportion of green crops and grass. In other words, it is doubly dependent on the price of corn as compared with the middle-class farm system, which relies to a far greater extent on dairy produce, its fat cattle, its vegetables and its hay. The result is that the latter pays more rent or surplus for the use of the land and a higher rate of wages to the laborer.

There can be no doubt that circumstances of soil and position are the chief cause or the distinctive modes of husbandry which have continued

to characterise different counties, notwithstanding the obvious change in the relative values of agricultural produce. The price of wheat is not higher now than it was one hundred years ago. Barley and oats have risen 50 per cent and animal produce more than 100 per cent in that time. And yet wheat maintains its prominence on the heavier soils where a bare fallow is still found the most perfect and economical preparation for that crop, and in the eastern, south midland and southern counties, where a dry climate and somewhat thin soil is less favorable to stock husbandry and grass. It is worthy of notice that in every one of the ten counties where the large farm system prevails the chalk formation predominates, and there is no coal; while in all the ten counties of the smaller farm system coal is present, and there is no chalk. The vicinity of coal has naturally influenced the increase of population and the consequent higher rates of rent and wages.

X.—*Proportions Under Bare Fallow.*

The extent of land in England under bare fallow every year is nearly 800,000 acres, which is more than one-tenth of the whole breadth of corn. The proportion in Scotland is about a twentieth, and in Ireland less than the ninetieth part. In France and Prussia an extent equal to one-third of all the cereals is annually left to lie fallow. This undoubtedly indicates the great prevalence of a poor and low state of husbandry in these countries, due in a large degree also to the dryness of the spring and summer climates. But of the three kingdoms it is very remarkable that Ireland should stand so pre-eminently above the others in her comparative freedom from the direct loss occasioned by the necessity of leaving the land to lie fallow, which cannot be wholly accounted for by the comparatively small proportion of clay soils in that country.

XI.—*Distinctive Features of Husbandry.*

There is a much greater similarity than will be generally imagined in the agriculture of England and Scotland, and a distinctive principle of difference between them and Ireland in a very important point. This will be clearly seen by the proportions of the whole area of the three countries, exclusive of heath and mountain land, thus divided:

England has in corn and potatoes 33 per cent, in green crops and grass 66 per cent.

Scotland has in corn and potatoes 33 per cent, in green crops and grass 66 per cent.

Ireland has in corn and potatoes 20 per cent, in green crops and grass 80 per cent.

The agriculture of England and Scotland seems thus alike in its prin-

ciple of one-third exhaustive and two thirds restorative crops, while that of Ireland has only one-fifth exhaustive to four-fifths restorative. I have included potatoes in the exhaustive crops, so that Ireland, which has by far the largest proportion in potatoes, suffers some disadvantage by this mode of comparison. But the result is very startling, as it places the agricultural system of Ireland, as an ameliorating and reproductive self-supporting system, far above that of England and Scotland. To this I will return. But as some illustration of the effect of this exhaustive system of corn husbandry as compared with its proportion of the restorative green crops and grass, the following figures gathered from the returns are deserving of notice :

	Percent of corn and potatoes.	Percent green crop, fallow & grass.	Av. prod. of wheat p. acre. Bushels.
England	33	66	28
Prussia	45	55	17
France	54	46	14

This would seem clearly to show that deterioration rapidly follows the loss of a due balance between the exhaustive and restorative crops, where there are no extraneous means of supplying the loss.

XII.—*Feeble Yield of France Explained.*

The state of agriculture in France is of much importance to the consumer of bread in this country. In some recent years she has contributed one-third of our whole foreign supply of wheat, considerably more than the entire produce of Scotland and Ireland. A good crop in France, therefore, at once tells on our prices, whilst a failure brings her large population into competition with us in the general market of the world. She has a vast breadth annually under wheat, but the yield is very small. This has been attributed, and would appear partly due, to the poverty and want of skill of her small occupiers; and many arguments have been founded upon it against the small farm system and the minute subdivision of land. But it has often struck me in passing through that part of France which lies between us and Paris, that the general cultivation of the land, and the appearance of the growing crops, was quite equal to our own, and the very low average rate of yield of wheat officially stated seemed to me, therefore, unaccountable. The explanation has been afforded to me by the distinguished French economist, M. De Lavergne, in the following letter, dated 25th February last: "The official returns gives a mean yield of 14½ hectolitres per hectare, the actual yield being more above than below the estimate. Eight departments, Le Nard, l'Oise, l'Aisne, Somme, Seine-et Oise, Seine-et-Marne, Seine and Eure-et Loire, have a yield equal to the English average; but the forty-five departments which form the southern part of the territory, do not yield more than 10 hetolitres to the

hectare. This feeble yield is caused in many of the departments by bad cultivation, and in the south by the dryness of the climate in Spring. The statistical returns also show 5,148,000 hectares of fallow, which is in fact the third of the surface sown with cereals." There is no help for that part of the country which suffers from great dryness of Spring climate, but there would seem much room for improvement in the yield of wheat over the remainder, which comprises probably more than one-half of the surface of France. As increasing importers and consumers we are nearly as much interested in that improvement as the French themselves. The state of agriculture must be low, indeed, where it is possible to be carried on with an average produce of 10 to 12 bushels wheat an acre. The costs and profits of cultivation must be at the very minimum to yield any surplus for rent, and the condition of the cultivator must be a hard one. He has other sources no doubt, which may help him—his vines and oil—but in the nature of things it is impossible that he can get any profit from his wheat crop, until by such a change of system as will increase its yield. Towards this object the French Government have for some years been unremitting in their attention, by contributing largely from the public resources to improve the internal communication of the country and facilitate the interchange of products. The increase of a few bushels an acre over so large a surface as one-half the wheat crop in France, would give her a regular surplus for exportation.

XIII.—*Irish Agriculture.*

It was my intention to have instituted a comparison between the large farm system of England, and the small farm system of Ireland, and I had prepared detailed statements of groups of counties in the two countries for the purpose; but there are too many elements of estimate or conjecture to warrant their publication as a statistical deduction. If we confine our attention to Ireland alone, some remarkable anomalies present themselves. The province with the highest valuation—Leinster at 20s. an acre—has the smallest population on the square mile of land under the plough; while Connaught—with a valuation of 6s. 8d. an acre—the lowest of the four provinces, has the largest population in proportion to its arable land. The poorest part of the country is thus also the most populous. But that does not seem to arise from an excess of small farms, for Leinster has a larger proportion of holding under five acres than Connaught.

XIV.—*No Recent Reduction in Small Holdings.*

A great reduction took place in the number of small holdings in Ireland during the years of the potato famine, 1845. to 1850, but since 1850 there has been very little alteration. The comparison one constantly

meets with is between the years 1841 and 1861, the small farms being stated to have fallen in that time one-half in number, and the larger sized increased in an equal ratio. But that has not been progressive. It had all taken place before 1831, and there has been no marked change in this direction during the last eighteen years. In 1867 the number of holdings was 607,000, divided thus:—307,000 farmers holding farms of 15 acres and under, and 300,000 farmers of 15 acres and upwards. But the first-class, or small farmers, hold not more than one-eighth of the cultivated land; the second-class, or larger farmers, holding seven-eighths of the whole.

We have already seen that the counties in England where the system of moderate-sized farms prevail have the smallest proportion of corn, and the highest of cattle and of dairy stock. They have a greater rainfall, a deeper soil, and are more productive of grass and green crops. Now, if we exclude from consideration for a moment the 307,000 small farmers, that is exactly the state of Ireland. Her climate and soil are very favorable to green crops and grass and to dairy farming, and she has the further great advantage, which I have already shown, of having the smallest proportion of such land as it is necessary to lay fallow; and her system shows the largest proportion in the three kingdoms of restorative to exhaustive crops. Her only disadvantage as an agricultural country is the occasional visitation of seasons of too much rain. That has several times imperilled the wheat crop. But the wheat crop is less than one-tenth of the cereals of Ireland, and her agriculture is but little dependent upon it. Oats are her chief reliance as a corn crop, and from flax she derives an annual return of between two and three millions sterling—an article which may be said to be now unknown to the agriculture of England and Scotland. If we sum all up, we find that, as compared with the sister kingdoms, Ireland has on the whole a more productive soil, and her produce is chiefly of that kind which in the last twenty years has risen most in value. I am very much disposed to think that the seven-eighths of Ireland, which are in the hands of the larger farmers, yield as great a produce per cultivated acre as the average of England and Scotland. I am not in a position to submit this to any accurate test of proof, but this is the impression left on my mind as the result of a careful investigation of the question.

XV.—Distress mainly Confined to One-eighth of Land in Hands of Smallest Occupiers.

But the position of the 307,000 small farmers who occupy the remaining eighth of Ireland is probably very different. It is among that body that real distress is found, though the class of larger farmers, not much

separated from them, have helped to swell the general complaint. Experience has shown that it is only in climates and upon soils the most favorable that an entire dependence for his subsistence can be placed by the cultivator of a few acres of land. Even in Belgium, where circumstances are favorable, the small cultivator has but a hard lot of poverty and toil. He thrives where, in addition to his land, himself and his family find regular employment in some other industry. It is the same with the English peasant. A man who has regular employment at wages finds an immense advantage in a good garden allotment beside his cottage, and that is vastly increased when that cottage is on the farm, away from the temptation of the beer-shop, and where, as part of his wages, he receives the keep of a cow. This is the system in the border counties, where agriculture is in the most prosperous state, and the agricultural laborer the best fed and clothed, the most educated and intelligent of his class in any part of the three kingdoms. But the Irish farmer of a few acres of inferior land must be in a position of chronic distress. The witnesses most favorable to him examined before Mr. Maguire's Committee in 1865, held that 15 to 20 acres and upwards was the least extent on which a man with his family could be expected to thrive. On land of good quality, and near a large population, a much smaller extent might no doubt be found sufficient. But taking the land of Ireland as it is, and the circumstances of the country, and its mode of agriculture, there is a general consent of the most competent judges in that country, that farms below 15 or 20 acres are too small to afford a due return for the entire labor of a man and his family. It would therefore follow that 130,000 of the small farmers, with their families, are as many as the remaining eighth of the surface of Ireland can profitably maintain as farmers, and that there will then remain a surplus of 170,000 and their families. These figures represent the whole number of holdings; but several holdings are believed to be in many cases in the hands of one farmer, and the total number of occupiers is therefore reckoned by Lord Dufferin not to exceed 441,000. If that be so, the surplus to be otherwise provided for will not exceed 100,000.

That seems no impossible an achievement. A wise measure for settling the long agitated question of the tenure of land will give a great impetus to improved agriculture, and the consequent demand for labor will rapidly absorb that surplus. It is, after all, little more than one additional family for every 160 acres of cultivated land. I have no doubt that the Legislature which shall pass the great measure of pacification for Ireland, which is now under its consideration, will in due time complete the work by a just land law, which will give greater security to the employment of capital in the cultivation of the land, and call into action that surplus labor, without which its latent fertility cannot be fully developed.

XVI.—*The English Agricultural Laborer.*

But, though the state of the Irish peasant has been more forced upon public attention, the condition of the agricultural laborer in England is very far from satisfactory. The agricultural returns afford no guide to its consideration. He is the only class of the community who has no representative. The Irish peasant has, directly in many cases, by his vote as a small farmer, and indirectly through his church, which (connected neither with the landlord nor the State) brings the aggregate feeling of the people to bear upon their Parliamentary representatives. By one means or another they do make themselves heard in Parliament. But so little is known of the English agricultural laborer, that when his actual condition is set forth in the report of a Royal Commission, the public are struck with astonishment, and even the landowners are surprised to find a state of things at their doors which many of them little suspected. The condition of the laborers' dwellings is in some counties deplorable. It is not my province, however, on this occasion to enter further on that subject. I attempted to introduce a clause in the last Census Act, in 1860, which would have thrown much light on the state of our cottage accommodation, but it was rejected in the English Bill. It was adopted, however, in the Scotch census, and has shown that one-third of the population of Scotland lived, each family, in houses of one room only, another third in houses of two rooms; two-thirds of the whole of the people being thus found to be lodged in a manner incompatible with comfort and decency as now understood. The same returns in the next census will show the progress that has been made in the 10 years; and the public advantage of this will, I trust, lead to the adoption of a similar system in the next English census.

In the same year I moved for the returns of the wages of agricultural laborers in England and Wales, which was subsequently followed for Scotland and Ireland. Upon these returns Mr. Purdy read to this Society an able and interesting paper in 1861. These form very important branches of the statistics of agriculture, and though it is not necessary that they should be included in the annual returns, I trust their importance will not be overlooked in the preparation of the next Census Act.

XVII.—*Great Change in proportion of the People Dependent on Agriculture.*

It has been found in Ireland, and is the case to a less extent in some parts of England, that it is not so much the low rate of wages as the irregularity of employment which depresses the condition of the agricultural laborers. That is mitigated by emigration from the agricultural to the

mining and manufacturing districts, or to foreign countries. More farming will not take up profitably the natural increase of population in a thickly-populated country like ours, and the purely agricultural districts in each of the three countries are constantly parting with their surplus. The proportion between the producers and consumers of food is thus undergoing a marked change. In 1831, 28 per cent of the population of England and Wales was occupied in the business of agriculture. In 1841 it was 22 per cent. In 1851 it had fallen to 16 per cent, not so much from an actual decrease of the numbers employed in agricultural as from the far greater proportional increase of trade. In 1861 the proportion was 10 per cent, and then not only had the proportion diminished, but the actual numbers had decreased by nearly one fifth. It is very a remarkable fact that in the course of a single generation the proportion of the people of England employed in and dependent on agriculture had diminished from a third to a tenth. The only means of arresting this is by providing better paid and more regular employment in country work, and thus diminishing the temptation of the higher wages of the mines, the factory, and the towns.

XVIII.—*Home-Grown Sugar.*

Last year I touched on this subject, and mentioned the intention of trying the beetroot sugar growth and manufacture in this country. The experiment was made in Suffolk, and with so much promise of success, that in the same locality this season a sufficient breadth of beet will be planted to keep an extensive sugar factory in full work for the four slack months from October to February. The matter, then, will be beyond experiment, for if it proves, as is anticipated, the suitability of our climate and soil to the profitable production of sugar-beet, it will be the dawn of a new agricultural industry, which may rapidly be developed, to the great benefit both of England and Ireland. The possible magnitude of the result will be readily appreciated by the fact that in this country the consumption of sugar is equal to nearly one-third of all the sugar annually produced in the tropics and on the continent, and that any disturbance which would seriously alter the state of property or labor in Cuba, must give an immense stimulus to the demand for beetroot sugar. And the reduction of price which will follow the "free breakfast table" promised to us by Mr. Bright, as one of the early results of economy in our public expenditure, will rapidly augment that demand.

In a national point of view the introduction of a new manufacture connected with agriculture, such as beetroot sugar, will both enlarge the field of remunerative labor in the country, and provide an absolute addition to

agricultural produce and wealth. For the pulp after the sugar is extracted has lost little of its value as cattle food, and therefore the substitution of sugar-beet for some of the present cattle crops will displace to a very small extent the means of feeding cattle. And even that will soon be made good by the more generous farming which the profits of sugar-growing will enable the farmer to practise on the other crops of his farm.

I have here a specimen of the first English-grown sugar, not a mere experiment, but produced as a matter of business. I find, from a French paper sent to me this morning, that the northern departments of France now produce about 200,000 tons of sugar a year, or nearly two-thirds of the sugar consumed in France. We use twice as much sugar in this country as the French do, and its consumption is always increasing. At a reduction of price equal to the present duty that increase would rapidly extend. I may be over sanguine on the subject, but I should not be greatly surprised if in ten years hence many thousand acres in the United Kingdom should be profitably employed in the production of home-grown sugar.

XIX.—Return of Horses Desirable.

The last topic on which I will touch is one of omission. The returns of live stock do not include horses, the most interesting, and individually the most valuable of all. As every man knows the number of his horses, the return can be given without occasioning a particle of trouble, and I hope therefore that the schedule for the present year will include a column for horses.

In conclusion, I think it will be generally admitted that the agricultural returns have proved most useful and most instructive, and considering the ever increasing demands of our population on the resources of agriculture, I trust that nothing will be permitted to interfere with their continuance, and with that greater development which further experience may render it desirable to introduce.

THE COMING CHINESE.

The immigration from Europe has been in a westward line and millions have come from that line of population to occupy the virgin soil of the United States. These millions now seem likely to be supplemented by other millions coming from the West and meeting the great tide that has already poured in upon us. The planting of American interests on the Pacific coast and the discovery of gold in California at once arrested the sluggish thought of Asia and turned the attention of China to this country. Many years ago the Chinese began to come, slowly at first

and then in larger numbers, until a few days ago a single steamer landed 1,200 at San Francisco; and only week before last, the Chinese merchants of San Francisco, on the occasion of meeting the Congressional Committee of Ways and Means, urged upon them the importance of doubling the subsidy to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company so that it might engage in a bi-monthly service in order to accommodate the growing business between China and the Pacific coast of the United States. There are, at least, 200,000 Chinamen in this country. They have spread all over California, their outposts are carried even East of the Mississippi. Last week 500 went down the great river in quest of a new home in Louisiana. The population of China is variously estimated at from 400 to 500 millions. It is only within six years that the Chinese emigration has gained large proportions. Persecuted and evil entreated they have been, but this has not kept them back. Harsh laws and a harsh public opinion have met them, but they have borne all and quietly asserted their right to labor. That they are needed, the immense acres of uncultivated land that we have, give proof. That they are frugal, industrious, teachable, patient and intelligent, even their enemies concede.

When the Chinese came to California and encountered the hostility that met them, they found it necessary to organize themselves into companies for mutual protection. There are six of these in San Francisco, directed by Chinese merchants of standing and influence. Each company represents a district in China, and emigrants join the company which covers the place from which they come. The companies procure labor for their members and take care of them in sickness and when unemployed. They advance money to bring out emigrants, and then take the stipulation of the emigrant for the speedy repayment of the sum advanced. This is briefly the system on which the false charge of a sort of peonage or slavery has been based. The Chinese quickly made themselves popular as house servants. They are neat, orderly, skillful, inclined to remain in a place, have no "followers" and are not troubled with a desire to attend religious services, either before breakfast or after dark. The ladies admire them so much as servants that they will be likely to change the public sentiment of California in regard to their civil and political relations. Already housekeepers at the East, wearied and vexed with the inadequate service rendered by our household dependents, turn with longing eyes to the Chinese as auspicious of a better and brighter day in the domestic economies. Once shown how to do a thing, and why, Chinamen need no further instruction. Chinese art and labor are the perfection of imitateness. They not only labor in houses, but they are book-binders and printers, setting type readily in a language they cannot read; they are careful and extraordinarily skilled tailors;

they manipulate the tools of the designer and the carver; they handle the most delicate labor-saving machines with address and intelligence. The Pioneer Woollen Mills were once burned because they employed Chinese labor; now they work in the same mills unquestioned. In gangs of street laborers they were mobbed a year ago; now they work in San Francisco streets without the protection of the police. Quiet, peaceful and persistent, they have disarmed much opposition. Under State enactments they have paid a license tax of four dollars a month for the privilege of working in the mines, besides other taxes they have paid. Once the Legislature imposed on them a special police tax of \$5 a month, but the Supreme Court pronounced it unconstitutional. Nearly all of the Chinese read and write their own language. They are anxious to acquire our language, and they send their children to the State Schools.

The cost of Chinese labor is one of its great recommendations. The Chinaman will live, and save, and thrive on the starvation wages of other laborers. They can work for one-third the cost of European labor, so that gold mines which yields \$7 per ton can be made productive where white labor halts when the result is less than \$20 per ton. But it is as the railway "navvy" that the Chinaman has made his mark. The builders of the Central Pacific Railroad hesitated long before they employed him. He turned up less earth at a shovel full than the Irishman did, but he turned up more shovel fulls in a day. He knew nothing of strikes. He never indulged in sprees or thirsted for a "row." A California railway contractor, who has worked laborers of many nationalities says, that these Asiatic laborers are the most serviceable and least troublesome of any to be found on the Pacific slope. They are promptly on the ground to begin work the moment they hear the signal, and labor steadily till notified that the working hours are ended. They will, ere long, turn the sod and build the embankment, on other lines, across the continent, and upon the numerous roads which are to be constructed in the Southern States. They will yet be familiar faces in New England factory towns.

The political and religious relations of this incoming Chinese population are foreign to our consideration of the subject. We look at the question in its bearings upon population and in the grand results to be effected in the industrial development of the country. Railways and canals, wharves and docks, public buildings are to be constructed. Farms are to be cultivated. The hundreds of millions of acres now waiting culture are to be made productive. Is it not the part of wisdom to execute these enterprises at a cost for labor of one-third that which is now paid? Great projects languish because of the cost of execution, and here come to us naturally and easily the willing hands and the eager wills. They come just fast enough to admit of their assimilation with the various masses of

people that compose our population, and which are rapidly acquiring homogeneity. They can live in any part of the land, but they tend rather to the Southern portion of the Union as more nearly allied to the climatic influences to which they have been habituated. There is a movement now in progress at the South, to tempt Chinese emigration thither. It meets with a singular unanimity of approval. It is regarded as the means and the hope of a new and higher prosperity than has ever yet visited those States productive and prosperous as they have been. To the convention which represents this movement, a report has been made that emigrants in lots of 50 or upwards can be brought from California for \$50 each in gold, and from Hong Kong to San Francisco for from \$80 to \$100 in gold. A Chinese contractor who has brought 30,000 laborers to the Pacific Coast, says that they are paid in California 90c to \$1.10 in gold, per day, that they will come from San Francisco to Memphis and work for \$20 a month, while if brought out fresh from China, they may be had for from \$10 to \$12 a month. He remarked, however, that at these low wages they were likely to abandon their situations for higher wages, unless security was exacted of them. Chinese companies organized in the South, with those in California might arrange the proper security. But of this movement we shall speak again.

THE CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK DEFALCATION.

A better proof could not be given of the judicious choice which has been made of officers for our new National Banks than the very rare occurrence among them of defalcation and breach of trust. One of these painful and exceptional instances has recently been detected and has awakened almost equal surprise and sympathy. William H. Sanford, the Cashier of the Central National Bank in this city, was, it seems, one of the sufferers in the recent Mariposa speculation which terminated so disastrously for the holders of the shares, who had supposed that this highly speculative stock had ceased to be the foot-ball of Wall street, and had taken a permanent place among the solid securities whose value would be steadily but slowly and surely appreciated with the improvement of the property it represents. The particulars of the disaster which befel this stock are fresh in the memories of our readers and were detailed by us at the time. It is sufficient for us now to say that Mr. Sanford, like multitudes of other victims, thought the decline was temporary, and did not wake up to the real state of the case until the final crash had come and had left him the loser of one hundred thousand dollars. To keep his account good with his brokers he seems to have placed in

their hands securities of which the bank was the depository and which belonged to various customers of the institution, chiefly to persons and banks outside of the city. Goaded almost to madness by the discovery that his loss was irretrievable, this miserable delinquent, placed as he was in peril of the most severe punishment from the laws of his country, obtained leave of absence from the bank, and, before his crime was found out, put himself beyond the reach of pursuit, and is now supposed to be in France or South America. The unhappy family are left quite destitute, and no trace seems to have been left by which he could be followed and brought back to justice.

Such are the chief facts of this painful case which has inflicted a loss on a banking institution of the very highest credit, and has swept away a part of the surplus which belonged to the stockholders, involving not only a crime which has blasted the career of a man heretofore stainless and respected, but has also grieved and shocked beyond measure his wide circle of friends and has plunged his family into the depths of poverty. There are two or three lessons of a general nature which we should not omit to deduce from the event.

The first is the necessity of enforcing on all our bank officers the strictest prohibition of speculation. Let the directors of every national bank adopt a rule that any officer or clerk discovered speculating in the stock market, either with his own money or not, shall be instantly dismissed without being allowed to resign. Such a rule might, it is true, be evaded. But the men who would evade it are just the sort of speculators to be detected in some other way, if the directors and the other officers of the bank do their duty. The chief effects of this prohibition would be felt by such men as Sanford, who are self respecting, frugal, honest, but anxious to be rich, and tempted by the success of others, to try to draw a prize in the Wall street lottery. When such a man is tottering on the brink of his first breach of trust and shrinks with the sensitiveness of a half-awakened, half-paralyzed conscience from taking the fatal plunge, let him have at least this one chance to rescue himself. Let him have the knowledge that if discovered he will be ignominiously discharged from his place and will find it impossible to get another.

But it may be said that the brokers, through whom these bank officers must do their surreptitious speculation, would keep the matter so secret that the risk of detection would be almost annihilated. This is not so certain. By a law of the last session of Congress, the broker who is a party to such defalcations as this of Sanford's, is liable to severe penalties, and it is not possible that perfect secrecy could be preserved in any such transactions. Somehow or other the affair would leak out, and the delinquent would be all the time in danger. In such matters it is of great

importance to raise barriers against the first offence. When a bank cashier or a bank clerk has once gone wrong, it is easy to repeat the offence. Besides, the first breach of trust involves usually a small amount, easily replaced, though perhaps urgently wanted. Yet if yielded to the temptation will grow by that it feeds on till like a canker, it destroys and ruins. Sanford would not now be a fugitive from justice after blasting his own prospects and ruining his family, had he resisted the first temptation, which involved probably a trivial sum. Public opinion will support our banks in the enforcement of the penalty of dismissal which we have suggested as the proper punishment for a bank officer or clerk who is found guilty of the crime of speculating. And except some such safeguard is given, the banks must not be surprised, if they are looked upon by some of their stockholders and dealers with anxiety not altogether devoid of distrust and fear.

There is one other point which demands notice. Mr. Sanford's accounts with the bank were all in the most perfect order. The books of the institution showed not the least indication that anything was wrong. And still he was a defaulter to an amount one half of which would have been regarded by him as an ample fortune. For aught we know, similar losses might have taken place before, but were retrieved in time to prevent discovery. Now it will be impossible to persuade the public that there is not something radically defective in this loose way of keeping bank accounts. If a bank officer can show a clean record on his books after he has made away with \$100,000 of funds belonging to his customers, it is high time that some more effective checks were devised for keeping such violent temptations away from fallible men. It will be well if this defalcation in the Central Bank, which is one of the best managed institutions in the city, should draw the public attention to this matter, and should cause some better guarantee that the records and books of the bank should give such an account of the funds in the hands of the officers that defalcations may be more easily detected and more effectively prevented.

THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK.

In the anomalous condition of our national finances, every body is asking with anxiety about the future, and there are several points which are well deserving attention with a view to forecast what awaits us. The first is that there is no lack of capital in the loan market. This capital may not be easily accessible to ordinary borrowers. There are obvious reasons why it is hard for the mercantile community and the ordinary public to obtain from the banks the usual accommodations to which they have been

so accustomed that they find the want of it a serious deprivation. Still that capital is here in large accumulated masses, the vast amounts of securities of all kinds which are offering in Wall street, offer a conspicuous proof.

The second point is that this capital is in few hands. Never was there a time in our history when capital moved in such large masses as now. The effects which this aggregation of the money power is producing in the course of speculation is destined, no doubt, to produce hereafter some very troublesome evils. It has its compensations, however, for without it the gigantic strides which the South and West are making in the career of material progress would have been impossible. There is, however, considerable jealousy of the growing power of capital, and no small apprehension prevails lest the corruption and other mischiefs it is likely to inflict on the republic should outweigh all the advantages it is likely to confer. Without acknowledging for a moment the justice of this jealous suspicion, we frankly admit that this growing power of capital will bear watching, and that some remedies for the evils it has produced and the greater evils it threatens are already demanded, and should neither be refused nor delayed.

The next point worthy of note is the large profits made on capital in this city. There are not a few national banks in the country whose officers almost reside permanently in New York, and use the money of the bank in Wall street to much better purpose, so far as profits are concerned, than if they soberly and quietly sat still at home and lent it to their neighbors in the legitimate way of loans and discounts. We do not now refer to speculative bank officers, but to those sharp, shrewd austere men who never speculate, but always in a tight money market have large sums to lend at the highest rates. How far the recent prosecutions for usury will check this trading in money we cannot tell, but there is no doubt that the vast sums which have been lending in Wall street of late at usurious rates were not wholly derived from our city banks or from city lenders. A goodly proportion of the amount we fear comes from country national banks, which are technically said to be "run in Wall street." There is some doubt whether such banks would not have their privileges revoked if these privileges, which really belong to another State, are thus transferred to New York for the sake of extra profits. The country banks are notoriously unable to make such large profits as the banks of the city, but this is no excuse for the abuse in question. We do not now discuss this aspect of the case however. We only allude to it as an illustration of the vast profits which shrewd money-lenders can make by manipulating loanable capital in Wall street.

Another of the most significant features of the financial situation is

that the trouble caused by the monetary spasms which have lately prevailed, and the dead uncertainty as to the future of the loan market, do not prevent capitalists from embarking large sums in permanent investments of almost any kind. Railroads are building, while all over the country, and especially in our large cities, new edifices are going up, and on every side there are unmistakable indications of the rapid conversion of floating capital into fixed forms. Meanwhile, almost every description of legitimate business is suffering, and there is no small apprehension among our mercantile classes as to the prospects of the fall trade. It is premature to offer any very positive opinion as to these apprehensions. But there can be no doubt that those persons are greatly in error who suppose that the country is growing poorer. Everyone who is familiar with the history of England during the first decade after the Napoleonic war will call to mind that that country passed through an experience very similar to our own, although in our case the evils are somewhat more aggravated, because our currency is more deranged, and the speculation bubble of paper money has assumed more formidable dimensions.

From all that has been said, two obvious inferences arise. First, there is no ground for fear lest we are on the eve of a general financial crash. The country is richer to-day than ever before in all the elements of material wealth, and we can bear all needful fiscal burdens if care be only taken to reform our internal tax list, to keep the national debt sacred and to enforce the most rigid economy in every department of governmental administration.

Secondly, the monetary troubles of the past six months, although artificial in their origin, indicate a highly sensitive and excitable condition of the financial atmosphere, and as they may be repeated again and again, our mercantile and industrial enterprises should be kept as nearly as possible within the limits of sound prudence and of bona-fide capital. If our merchants and business men will avoid speculative risks and trust to legitimate operations, they will soon find the country recuperating and themselves recuperating with it. If, as seems probable, a beneficent Providence gives us a copious good harvest this year, north and south, we shall soon enjoy more obvious and general prosperity, and joy and plenty will cheer those sections of our industry where now gloom and depression are but too frequently found. We see no reason to doubt the accuracy of those shrewd, far-seeing merchants of this city who, from the scarcity of goods in the interior, the anticipated good harvest, and the substantial prosperity of the country, are looking for a lively fall trade.

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR JUNE AND FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1868 AND 1869.

The results of the June traffic of our railroads, as compared with the returns for the corresponding month of last year, are highly satisfactory, showing as they do an increase of no less than 14.84 per cent in the earnings of ten leading western lines. Not one of the roads indicated has fallen behind the previous years' earnings. That these favorable results are due to enlarged business is well ascertained, since the tariff of 1869, both as to passenger and freight rates, are lower generally by several per cent than in 1868. There has been worked in 1869, however, about 150 miles more road than in 1868.

The earnings for June are as follows :

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR JUNE.

	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago & Alton.....	\$391,685	\$331,504	\$60,181
†Chicago & Northwestern.....	1,278,324	1,187,544	90,780
*Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	508,01	373,46	129,564
†Illinois Central.....	668,113	626,249	41,763
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	118,648	95,324	23,325
Michigan Central.....	264,623	325,301	41,323
Michigan Southern.....	408,139	361,17	43,032
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	678,809	478,191	220,609
Ohio & Mississippi.....	223,236	217,083	6,151
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	154,112	140,408	13,724
Total.....	\$1,775,559	\$1,153,154	\$617,405	\$....

The returns of the same companies for the first half of the same years show an increased traffic averaging of 12.36 per cent. The total earnings from January 1 to June 30, for the current and last previous years were as follows:

EARNINGS FROM JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 30.

	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago & Alton.....	\$2,168,636	\$1,731,318	\$337,308
Chicago & Northwestern.....	8,468,835	6,811,437	1,657,398
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	2,380,109	1,871,579	508,530
Illinois Central.....	3,767,531	3,335,652	431,879
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	637,341	567,983	71,359
Michigan Central.....	2,278,345	2,035,559	242,786
Michigan Southern.....	2,524,25	2,291,981	232,275
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	2,975,937	2,464,261	491,737
Ohio & Mississippi.....	1,371,189	1,383,079	\$108,890
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	914,766	839,492	85,274
Total.....	\$25,233,166	\$22,501,321	\$2,731,821	\$....

In our former statements of monthly earnings we included the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago and the Toledo, Wabash & Western Companies. The new relations of these roads, and the difficulty of obtaining separate returns, compel us to omit them. We also omit the Western Union Company.

* Miles working in 1863, 454; in 1869, 594.

† Including leased lines in Iowa.

THE PUBLIC DEBT AND FINANCES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

The public debt of New Hampshire has been created solely for war purposes, and on the 1st day of June, 1869, amounted to (bonds \$2,849,200, and notes \$321,810) \$3,171,010. The State also holds trust funds to the amount of \$42,925 22. The following statement describes the bonded debt:

Six per cent Loan of 1861.....\$705,200

Authorized by Act of July 3, 1861. Issued \$1,000,000, in 100s, 500s and 1,000s. Coupons January 1 and July 1, and principal July 1, 1866-1875 inclusive, the annual payment averaging about \$100,000. Up to date \$294,800 has been paid, and \$100,000 became due July 1, 1869. All these bonds bear date July 1, 1869. Payable at Boston or Concord.

Six per cent Loan of 1862.....\$294,000

Authorized by Act of July 9, 1862. Issued \$300,000 in 500s and 1,000s. Coupons January 1 and July 1, and principal July 1, 1876-1878 inclusive. These bonds also bear date July 1, 1861, the act authorizing them being supplemental to that of July 3, 1861. Payable, interest and principal, at Boston or Concord.

Six per cent Loan of 1864.....\$600,000

Authorized by Act of August 19, 1864, and bonds dated September 1, 1864. Issued \$600,000 in 1,000s. Coupons March 1 and September 1, and principal—\$450,000 September 1, 1884, and \$150,000 September 1, 1889. Payable at Boston or Concord.

Six per cent Loan of 1866.....\$1,250,000

Authorized by Act of July 7, 1866. Issued in 100s, 500s and 1,000s. Coupons April 1 and October 1, and principal in sums of \$250,000 annually, October 1, 1870-1874, inclusive, both payable at Boston or Concord. The act as above, and a supplemental act of June, 1868, authorized the issue of \$1,800,000, so that there remained in the Treasury June 1, 1869, \$550,000 subject to issue, and which will probably be used in taking up the short loans which mature at various dates prior to January 1, 1870. These are in the shape of notes bearing interest (6 per cent \$28,810, and 7 per cent \$293,000) \$321,810. Under the law of 1868 the Treasurer has also the authority to hire all the money that will be needed for the temporary use of the State, so that no further legislation will be necessary.

Of the State's claims against the United States for expenditures for war purposes, amounting to \$1,032,527 45, there has been allowed and paid \$1,000,618 06, leaving a balance still disallowed of \$31,908 39.

The population of New Hampshire in 1860 was 326,073, which was 11.74 per cent increase from the next previous decennial census, or 1.17 per cent per annum. The population is now estimated by the State Treasurer at 350,000, showing an increase in nine years of 23,927, or 7.34 per cent. This estimate is based on a reduced rate of increase, and is probably nearly correct, the retardation to the extent shown being due to the withdrawal of large bodies of troops from civil life from 1861 to 1865. The war debt, as above exhibited, divided among the existing population is thus only \$9.06 per capita.

The value of taxable property in 1868 was (real estate \$69,344,903, and personal property \$79,720,387) 149,065,290. Compared with the war debt of the State this amounts to one of debt to every \$47.09, or 2.12 per cent of valuation. The valuation of 1858 was \$84,758,619, the increase in ten years having been \$65,306,671, or 78.23 per cent. The valuation of 1868 has probably been based on a nearer approximation to market rates than that of 1858, and hence the enormous addition to the sum total. The valuation of 1868 gives \$425.90 to each inhabitant.

The rate of taxation in New Hampshire is 4 per 1,000 on the valuation. The amount levied for the service of 1869-'70 will hence be \$596,261.16. This rate covers taxes of all kinds levied for State purposes. There is very little delinquency in this State, the whole sum of the taxes of 1865-'67 and '8 delinquent on June 1, 1869, having been only \$1,181.54, an infinitesimal per centage on the amount levied.

The following is a synopsis of the revenue and disbursements of the State Treasury for the year ending May 31, 1869:

REVENUE.—Cash June 1, 1868, \$18,684.72; taxes of 1866, \$6.25; taxes of 1867, \$1,035.63; taxes of 1868, \$623,940.63; savings bank tax, \$92,017.58; railroad tax, \$215,615.00; civil commissions, \$630.00; copyright of vol. 46 N. H. Reports, \$100.00; tax on foreign insurance companies, \$100.00; rent of store-house, \$300.00; war claims, \$42,158.21; interest, \$4,785.65; loans, (school fund) \$25,050.00. notes \$427,660.00, and bonds \$242,500.00) \$695,160.00. Total, \$1,702,333.67.

DISBURSEMENTS.—Executive department \$3,918.80; Secretary's Department, \$3,853.29; Treasurer's Department, \$3,657.98; Adjutant-General's Department, \$9,550.74; Department of Public Instruction, \$3,604.40; Legislative Department, \$47,342.57; supreme judicial court, \$11,541.52; probate courts, \$7,685.65; State library, \$1,549.69; compiling provincial papers, \$3,501.40; State house, \$2,757.22; N. H. Asylum for Insane, \$28,888.39; education of the blind, \$3,674.84; education of the deaf and dumb, \$2,012.50; reform school, \$12,182.92; State Prison, \$10,374.25; volunteer militia, \$35,759.77; military expenses, \$6,049.29; White Mountain roads, \$2,600; miscellaneous, \$5,928.11; savings' bank

tax * \$99,917 58; railroad tax * \$100,138 61; interest, \$225,436 02; payment of bonds, \$850,100 and of notes, \$139,254. Total, \$1,627,-299 54. Cash, May 31, 1869, \$75,034 13.

Deducting the receipts from bonds and notes, &c. (\$695,100), the revenue amounted to \$1,007,173 67, and the payments of bonds and notes (\$989,354), the disbursements amounted to \$637,945 54, which last named sum paid the ordinary expenses of the State, the distributions to towns, and interest on the bonds and notes outstanding.

The condition of the Treasury June 1, 1869, is shown in the following statement:

LIABILITIES.		ASSETS.	
Bonds	\$2,849,300 00	Cash in Treasury.....	\$75 087 13
Notes	22,800 00	Taxes, delinquent	1,381 54
Trusts—Fisk Legacy.....	8,552 74	Net income of State prison.....	867 22
Kimball	6,751 49		
Surplus revenue—principal.....	1,009 44		\$77,082 39
Interest	1,286 51	Deficiency being indebtedness	
School fund.....	25,000 00	June 1, 1869.	3,136,879 33
Total.....	\$3,213,962 12	Total.....	\$3,213,962 22

The liabilities, less assets, June 1, 1868, were \$3,487,411 97, and June 1, 1869, \$3,136,879 33, showing a reduction of liabilities in the year of \$350,532 64.

In New Hampshire the township system is carried out to its full extent and there appears to be very little cohesion of the one with the other, the counties being merely so many court divisions. The towns, indeed, are so many little republics, managing their own affairs and disbursing their own revenues. It thus happens that if desirous of acquiring a knowledge of the exact measure of their burdens and abilities we must canvass the affairs of each town within itself, and so the returns of each are published separately by the State Treasury Department. It is impossible, however, to transfer these, from 230 towns, to the CHRONICLE, and hence we cluster them in counties, naming the number of towns included in each, the amount of their debts and assets, the highest and lowest rate of taxation in the towns of the counties named, and the highest and lowest tax on each poll therein. The following is the county summary:

Counties.	No. of towns.	Total debt.	Available assets.	Taxp. \$100		Taxp poll	
				II.	I.	II.	I.
Rockingham.....	38	\$1,328,901 54	\$179,515 26	\$5 00	\$1 23	\$7 20	\$2 00
St. afford.....	13	657,139 56	44,247 50	3 80	1 40	4 88	2 05
Belknap.....	10	495,880 98	46,950 12	2 52	1 91	3 78	1 91
Carrroll.....	17	442,160 09	50,067 07	4 77	2 08	5 55	3 12
Merrimack.....	26	1,220,291 03	129,385 24	2 83	1 01	4 24	1 95
Hillsborough.....	30	1,285,575 54	146,609 58	2 45	1 43	3 68	2 14
Cheshire.....	22	596,964 14	41,799 18	2 10	1 25	4 66	1 83
Sullivan.....	15	458,118 40	44,326 85	2 14	1 25	3 22	1 77
Grafton.....	38	1,043,890 41	154,010 94	5 28	1 20	7 01	1 93
Cook.....	21	308,114 38	59,163 43	4 60	1 84	6 90	1 76
Total.....	20	\$7,714,446 84	\$895 064 54	\$5 28	\$1 01	\$7 91	\$1 76

* Divided to the several towns of the State.

The highest taxed town in the State is Thornton, in Grafton County, and the next highest, Gosport, in Rockingham County; and the lowest taxed town is Cambridge, in Coos County. The net reduction in town debts during the years 1868-69 was \$77,622 04, the increase having been \$151,764 06, and the decrease \$229,386 10. Almost the whole of these debts have been incurred for permanent improvements, which have tended to the rapid development of industry and wealth in the State.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD.

The Rock Island Road formed a junction with the Union Pacific Railroad on the 11th day of May, and on the 7th of June, 1869, a second line between Chicago and the Missouri River was opened to travel and transportation. This is another great triumph of national enterprise, and an assurance of a prosperous future to our vast territories beyond the Missouri. The extension has added 140 miles to the company's lines, which at the present date consist of the following divisions and branches:

	Miles.
Chicago, Ill., to Rock Island, Ill.	182
Rock Island, bridge over the Mississippi	2
Davenport, Iowa, to the Missouri River	310
Length from Chicago to the Missouri River	494
Wilton, Iowa, to Washington, Iowa	50
Total length of line owned by the company	544

To this must be added the Peoria and Bureau Valley Railroad (leased), extending from Bureau Junction (114 miles west of Chicago) to Peoria, 46 miles—making a total length of 590 miles of road under a single management. During the year the cost of new construction and equipment has been \$5,192,609 03, exclusive of improvements and renewals on the old lines. Further sums will be required for ballasting, perfecting and equipping the recent extension. The company will also expend during the current year nearly \$800,000 in improvements in Chicago.

In the following tables we compare the company's operations in 1868-69 with the same in 1867-68:

LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS.

Statement giving the number of locomotives and cars owned by the company April 1, 1867, and at the close of the fiscal years ending March 31, 1868 and 1869:

	1867.	1878.	1899.	Inc.	Dec.
Locomotives.	Wood burning	85	87	24	11
	Coal burning	57	58	83	26
	Both descriptions	92	95	107	15
	Coaches	46	48	49	3
	Baggage, mail and express	20	22	23	3
Cars	Stock	202	210	287	85
	Box	1,109	1,345	1,534	425
	Flat	468	491	659	191
	Drovers	3	3	3
	Pay	1	1	1	...
	All kinds	1,816	2,080	2,556	710
					..

The comparative results of operations in the fiscal years 1867-68 and 1868-69 are shown in the following tables:

MILES RUN BY ENGINES HAULING TRAINS.

	1887-88.	1888 89.	Increase.	Decrease.
Passenger engines.....	575,213	607,649	32,436
Freight engines.....	1,150,489	1,692,009	542,520
Wood and gravel engines.....	171,235	214,615	43,380
Total by all engines.....	1,896,937	2,515,073	618,136
Cost per mile run.....	82.64 cts.	26.94 cts.	5.70 cts.

PASSENGER TRAFFIC—ITS DIRECTION AND AMOUNT.

	1887-88.	1888-89.	Increase.	Decrease.
Passengers, through.....	61,553	59,719	1,835
" " East.....	507,471	507,707	236
" " West.....	271,353	206,391	65,062
Passengers of all kinds.....	289,051	291,245	2,194
Passengers one mile.....	560,314	627,595	67,281
Average rate per mile.....	\$3.185,470	\$1,339,650	\$1,845,820
	4.19 cts.	4.12 cts.	0.07 cts.

FREIGHT TRAFFIC—ITS DIRECTION AND AMOUNT.

	1967-68	1969-69	Increase.	Decrease.
Loaded cars, eastward.....	39,959	51,669	11,713	
" " westward.....	55,746	63,877	18,131	
" " both ways.....	95,705	115,546	19,841	
Freight (tons) shipped.....	654,485	806,783	152,353	
Tons p r c r (average).....	8.28	7.24		1.04 cts.
Tons one mile.....	87,924,193	119,974,486	32,051,943	
Average rate per ton per mile.....	3.35 cts.	2.93 cts.		0.37 cts.

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.

The financial results of operations for the last two years are shown in the following comparative statement:

	1967-68.	1968-69.	Increase.	Decrease.
Passenger earnings	\$1,181,363 67	\$1,299,648 84	\$111,041 17	
Freight	2,934,604 15	3,675,916 66	641,111 41	
Mail	36,743 15	34,548 48		\$2,194 67
Express	128,701 11	81,883 83		47,818 28
Rents, &c.	64,540 63	70,315 37	5,794 64	
Interest on loans, &c.	108,941 68	178,908 77	70,966 19	
Total expenses	\$4,451,974 29	\$5,331,979 75	\$780,005 46	
Operating expenses	\$2,480,193 07	2,866,679 18	386,487 06	
Earnings less expenses	\$2,431,783 22	\$2,585,300 62	\$233,515 40	

Which remainder was disposed of as follows:

Legal expenses.....	\$23,593 85	\$6,621 14	\$.....	\$16,973 81
Taxes on real estates.....	107,989 59	118,153 85	10,223 46	
U. S. Government tax.....	32,110 54	82,436 49	316 45	
Rent f P. & B V. R. R.....	125,000 00	125,000 00		
Interest on bonds.....	276,440 00	667,551 79	391,311 79	
Dividends incuding tax.....	957,821 10	1,469,988 50	512,147 40	
Surplus to cred t.....	609,036 74	445,573 85		164,507 89

Included in the operating expenses are the following renewals and repairs of rail :

Track re-laid with new iron.....	14.50m.	14.55m.	0.05m.
" " re-rol ed iron.....	20.00	18.00	..	2.00m.
" " with steel.....	0.58	13.00	12.44
Total renewals.....	35.60m.	45.55m.	10.45m.	
Rails repaired.....	23.508	21.437	2.051

GENERAL ACCOUNT—LEDGER BALANCES.

The financial condition of the Company, as of April 1, 1868 and 1869'

shown on the balance-sheets of date, is epitomized in the following statement:

	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Decrease.
Capital stock.....	\$14,000,000 00	\$14,000,000 00	\$	\$
C. & R. I. mortgage bonds.....	1,397,000 00	1,397,000 00		
C. & R. I. C. mortgage bonds.....	42,000 00	29,000 00		13,000 00
C. & R. I. & Pacific mortgage sinking fund bonds.....	6,383,000 00	7,375,000 00	542,000 00	
C. & R. I. & Pacific R.R. Co of Iowa.....	540,852 75	49,85 75		540,000 00
Railroad Bridge Company.....	100,000 00	60,000 00		40,000 00
Other credit balances.....	46,263 57	7,712 72		38,550 85
Balance of income account.....	1,561,665 17	1,597,344 02	445,578 85	
Total.....	\$24,160,781 49	\$24,515,809 49	\$355,028 00	\$

Against which the following accounts are charged:

Cost of road & equipment.....	\$17,251,433 47	\$22,444,212 50	\$5,192,809 03	\$
Trusts for guar. bonds.....	74,800 96	61,810 03		13,420 23
R. E. & W. Committee.....	1,086 59	1,966 59		
Trustees L. G. Division.....	17,066 87	19,084 22	2,017 35	
Corn Ex. Bank, N. Y.....	1,756,365 16			1,756,365 16
Un-on Nat. Bk, Chicago.....	1,500,000 00			1,500,000 00
Bond-c'to special Res. June 7, 1867.....	26,568 50	18,061 87		8,506 63
C. & R. I. & P. comp. acct.....	5,419 80			5,419 80
Bills receivable.....	2,721,310 00	289,870 00		2,431,500 00
Cash in hands of Assistant Treasurer.....		1,177,045 03	1,177,045 03	
Cash in hands Cashier.....	678,075 84	606,009 25		72,066 59
Total.....	\$24,160,781 49	\$24,515,809 49	\$355,028 00	\$

The mortgage bonds of the late Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Company (\$1,397,000) will fall due July 10, 1870. The bonds of the Railroad Bridge Company, guaranteed by the railroad company (\$400,000), will become due Jan. 1, 1870. Both these liabilities will be paid or exchanged for Sinking Fund bonds.

A contract has been entered into between the company and United States Government for the erection of a bridge between Rock Island and Davenport, with a view of changing the location across the island of Rock Island to accommodate the government works. The company's proportion of the cost will be \$600,000, of which \$300,000 will be required during the year 1869-70.

GENERAL REVIEW FOR TEN YEARS.

In the following table we give the cost of the road and equipment (estimating the cost of the Peoria and Bureau Valley Railroad at \$2,100,000), and the earnings, expenses and profits from operations yearly for the ten years ending March 31, 1869:

Fiscal Years	Miles of Road Open	Gross Earnings	Ordinary Operating Expenses	Profits or Net Earnings	Inter'tion Debt	Dividend	Balance after Lease
1860-61.....	228.4	\$1,013,931	\$522,661	\$471,273	\$97,700	\$167,597	\$120,34
1861-62.....	228.4	1,164,013	78,004	155,961	97,90		41,481
1862-63.....	228.4	*1,054,704	*531,347	52,117	*97,700	168,090	82,866
1863-64.....	228.4	1,529,141	800,947	728,154	100,185	323,239	74,726
1864-65.....	228.4	2,143,875	1,010,462	1,103,413	102,400	313,438	382,112
1865-66.....	228.4	2,359,390	1,467,631	1,891,709	102,582	375,04	1,056,250
1866-67.....	228.4	3,154,235	1,711,454	1,442,81	101,535	631,579	331,632
1867-68.....	410.0	3,571,034	1,817,852	1,704,181	296,132	820,879	31,999
1868-69.....	414.0	4,451,971	2,221,112	2,131,754	576,40	937,811	609,87
1869-70.....	526.0	5,211,980	2,366,679	2,845,301	617,532	1,469,908	445,679

MARKET VALUE OF STOCK AT NEW YORK.

The course of the company's stock at the New York Stock Board monthly for the five years 1864-69 inclusive is shown in the annexed abstract from the published returns:

Months.	1864-5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
April.....	110 @ 184	81½ @ 113	110 @ 123½	85½ @ 93½	55 @ 97
May.....	105 @ 119	91 @ 05	90 @ 9½	86½ @ 92½	9½ @ 98½
June.....	110 @ 17½	93 @ 103	91 @ 9½	87½ @ 95½	96½ @ 105½
July.....	107½ @ 114	101½ @ 10½	94½ @ 108	95½ @ 104	10½ @ 110½
August.....	109½ @ 114½	1 3 @ 109	102½ @ 110	99½ @ 103½	97½ @ 113½
September.....	96 @ 09½	108½ @ 113½	108½ @ 113½	99 @ 115	10½ @ 104½
October.....	85½ @ 97	105 @ 113½	108 @ 111½	91 @ 01	102 @ 09½
November.....	99 @ 110	104½ @ 103½	100 @ 112½	94½ @ 97½	107 @ 109½
December.....	101½ @ 103½	105½ @ 108½	102 @ 103½	10 @ 99½	105½ @ 118
January.....	88½ @ 105½	9½ @ 109½	91 @ 104½	93½ @ 100½	117½ @ 115½
February.....	89½ @ 98½	9 @ 107	95 @ 01½	96 @ 101½	126½ @ 31
March.....	85½ @ 100	104½ @ 118½	92½ @ 98½	91½ @ 93½	121½ @ 121
Year.....	84½ @ 184	81½ @ 113½	90 @ 123½	85½ @ 105	55 @ 135½

Former articles relating to this company were published in the CHRONICLE of June 23, 1866; June 22, 1867, and August 29, 1868.

 THE USURY PROSECUTIONS:

All the brokers and Wall street bankers who have been prosecuted under the Usury Law of this State have pleaded guilty and await sentence. As these are, we believe, the first prosecutions under a law passed more than thirty years ago, we hope that the court will use lenity. The extreme punishment allowed by law is three months imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dollars. The judge may remit the imprisonment and reduce the fine as he pleases. It seems to be generally believed that sentence may be held in suspense. These trials have produced a good deal of excitement in certain circles in Wall street. And the most noteworthy fact about the prosecution is that it stopped the high rates of interest, so that the mercantile community have been able ever since to obtain the usual accommodation from the banks. It is this circumstance which has caused the usury law to be regarded with more general favor than formerly in New York.

The spirit of modern legislation is adverse to attempts to govern by law the price of commodities or the rates of loans. Supply and demand are believed to be better regulators of contracts and prices than the wisest human restrictions and the best human laws. Accordingly the usury law of this State, although it was passed in 1837, has never, we believe, been put in force until now. Still it has been kept on the statute-book, and the numerous attempts to repeal it have always miscarried. These attempts, we understand, are to be repeated next winter at Albany, with what success remains to be seen. For the present the law is more popular

than it has ever been before; for to it the people ascribe in part their relief from those fierce, prolonged spasms in the money market which suspended the collections of our mercantile houses, and made it impossible for almost everybody to get in his debts. The debt-paying machinery of the country was deranged and controlled by cliques and speculators, who, to fight their own battle, succeeded in throwing into confusion the financial arrangements of this metropolis, with great consequent damage to the business of the whole country. •

It has been urged, and we believe with justice, that some of the persons who have been prosecuted were mere agents and had nothing to do except as accessories with the schemes of the tight-money ring. This extenuation may properly be pleaded as a ground for inflicting a lighter punishment. But the favor has been asked for on other grounds. And it would not be easy for any judge to discriminate between the various degrees in which each of the convicted brokers is implicated.

The popular approval of these prosecutions must not be taken as evidence that any severe penalties are desired. What the people wished to accomplish was first to stop the monetary spasms and to relax the *tourniquet* with which the cliques had strangled business and arrested the vital functions of our internal commerce. The second object was to prevent a repetition of such a conspiracy. Never before in this city has so bold, so rich, so adroit a clique been formed. It was small, compact, but as usual has failed in its chief objects, which were to break down the prices of government stocks and other securities. This depression of stocks was to be produced as a result of monetary stringency. Stocks, however, were sustained, and the clique found that its profits went to the money-lenders, many of whom fell gladly into the plan of charging high rates for money and lent themselves in various ways to the projects of the speculators. There were thus implicated in the trouble several independent parties all united in the single object of tightening the money-market. Some had the ulterior aim of putting down the price of government bonds, others of depressing the railroads, while others again had no other aim than to lend their funds at the highest possible rate of interest, regardless of the mischief and commotion they were producing by this concerted attack on the money-market. It might be a useful task to detail the methods and devices by which these adroit and skilful assaults on the money-market were made, and it would at any rate be gratifying if we could show that the profits of the campaign passed over the guilty parties, and that the chief conspirators were no more successful than they deserved to be in making gain by their manoeuvres. This circumstance, however, would not be sufficient to prevent similar enterprises in the future. Accordingly, the popular desire seems to be, that if, as is probable,

the offenders who have just been prosecuted and await the sentence of the law sould be let off with a slight punishment by the court, there should be a distinct understanding that in future the law will be put in force if another combination or conspiracy to produce a financial spasm should render it needful.

Such, we believe, is the public desire, and if the usury law should thus be rendered more stringent and should become a more prominent part of our State legislation, the cliques have the satisfaction of knowing that it is the work of their own hands and the fruit of their own devices.

THE TEHUANTEPEC ROUTE.*

The proposed railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the construction of which has already been undertaken by a company of American capitalists, is an enterprise of the greatest importance to the commercial interests of the country. For several years the preparations for this work have been quietly progressing, under the direction of some of our leading capitalists, and everything is now ready for the immediate construction of railroad, carriage road, and telegraphic communication from ocean to ocean, across the Isthmus; Mr. Marshall O. Roberts, of this city, having, as we are informed, signed the company's bond, as surety, in the penalty of \$100,000, in gold, for the construction, within eighteen months, of a carriage road and telegraph line along the entire line of the proposed railway, to assist in building the latter. We are also informed that the road itself is to be begun within two years, and completed within five; the work to progress at the rate of fifteen leagues, or one third of its entire length, each year. From the elaborate and elegant octavo volume of 209 pages, prepared under the able direction of Mr. Simon Stevens, President of the Company, we learn many facts regarding the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, as well as of the proposed railroad and its advantages, that are of great importance and interest. The volume, indeed, is wholly without a rival in the literature of the great material enterprises which characterize the present century; presenting not only the resources and prospects of the company, and the results to be accomplished by the successful completion of the work they have undertaken, but a fund of useful and valuable information for the general reader as well, which would insure for it a careful perusal by the intelligent reading public throughout the country. The following summary of the contents of this comprehensive volume will doubtless be found of much interest by many who cannot readily obtain it.

* *The Tehuantepec Railway: Its Location, Features and Advantages*, under the La Sere Grant of 1863. D. Appleton & Co.

The history of the present enterprise is briefly told, although a glance at history will show that the project of opening inter-oceanic communication across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was first proposed by the daring adventurer, Hernando Cortez, as early as 1529. It was not until more than three centuries later, however, that the Mexican Government, on the 7th of October, 1867, made a concession for seventy years, to a company organized by Don Emilio La Sere, of the right to open inter-oceanic communication across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec by railroad, carriage-road and telegraph. This concession also grants large tracts of valuable lands to the company which, together with the proposed road, is declared free from taxation or imposts of any kind by the Mexican Government, except the payment of twelve cents for each through passenger, and eight per cent of the net profits whenever dividends to stockholders shall be declared. This grant was confirmed by the Congress of the Mexican Republic, with a few modifications, on the 29th of December, 1868, approved by the President, January 2, 1869, and duly officially published. Pursuant to said grant, Don Emilio La Sere formed the Tehuantepec Railway Company, composed wholly of citizens of the United States; and this company, in November, 1868, obtained a charter from the State of Vermont, incorporating it with a capital of \$18,000,000, divided into shares of \$100 each. The Company has received from La Sere the assignment of the grant, as intended by the Government of Mexico, and entered into a bond to that Government, in the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, for the construction of the road in compliance with the terms of the grant.

In connection with the proposed railroad, the enterprise contemplates the establishment of such lines of steam and sailing vessels as may be found necessary to meet the demands of international commercial intercourse. On the Atlantic side of the Isthmus the road will begin at Minatitlan, a town situated on the Goatzacoalcos River, twenty miles from the Gulf of Mexico. This point is at all times and seasons accessible to sea-going steamers, and, with the improvements to be made and the light-houses to be built, there will be no difficulties to be encountered by vessels entering the river. From Minatitlan the line takes a direction almost due south to the Pacific ocean, which it reaches at the port of Ventosa, distant 162 miles from the northern terminus. The bay at the mouth of the Tehuantepec River was for a long time regarded as the most convenient terminus; but subsequent investigations have revealed the fact that even a better harbor can be obtained at Salina Cruz, about three miles westward. From the interior, the approach to the shore is easy, and the topographical features such as to make the site suitable for the erection of all necessary buildings, or even the growth of a new city.

The anchorage is excellent : the shore being so bold that from 18 to 28 feet of water can be obtained at a very short distance. Nature has done much to prepare the way for the construction of the necessary improvements, which can be erected at a very reasonable cost.

Unlike the deadly and pestilential swamps of Panama, the country along the line of the proposed road includes some of the loveliest valleys, the most fertile stretches of high table land and luxuriantly productive "bottoms" to be found on the American Continent. It is, to the very highest degree, available for agricultural purposes, and abounds in gold and silver "placer" diggings, and petroleum springs. The land granted to the Company comprises a belt twelve miles in width extending along the entire length of the road ; in conceding which the Government of Mexico has not only given a magnificent proof of its enlightened interest in this enterprise, but has endowed the corporation with a property which needs only to be truthfully described to add materially to their financial position ; for each alternate *league* of the public lands on either side of the road, or on a strip of territory two leagues in width, is permanently conveyed to the corporation, in fee simple. As the road is to be, in round numbers, fifty leagues in length, a rough calculation reveals the fact that a landed estate of great value has been added to the other productive resources of the Tehuantepec enterprise. The lands abound in India-rubber and mahogany trees, dyewoods of the most valuable kinds, medicinal plants of great commercial value, native hemp or *ixtle* in unlimited quantities, cocoa, cochineal, sarsaparilla and numberless other plants indigenous to the country. The soil and climate are admirably adapted to the successful cultivation of coffee, indigo, tobacco, rice, pepper and maize. The coffee of this region is only second in quality to Java. The forests may be made to yield unbounded supplies of tar, pitch, turpentine and rosin. All tropical fruits, such as oranges, lemons, pineapples, bananas, etc., are abundant ; and even the most careless and inefficient cultivation stimulates them to a most luxuriant production. So that, whether as primeval wilderness or as cleared and cultivated land, the domain of the Tehuantepec Railway Company may be made immediately productive, and a local tariff built up in all respects sufficient to warrant the construction of a much more expensive line. And this is certainly a most important feature in the prospects of any enterprise, as affording a basis for safe operations, which is not always obtained even in more densely populated regions. It is with a view to the development of the rare richness of this favored province, quite as much for the inter oceanic transit, that the Mexican Government has made so munificent a donation ; and it is but right to add that the great landed proprietors, whose estates lie in the neighborhood, seem to be equally alive with the government to the

important benefits which are to accrue to them from the construction of the road, and manifest a disposition to extend the utmost liberality to its managers. The importance of this fact will be appreciated when it is considered how largely these men, who are in their way very much like feudal lords, can influence the supply of labor and assist in providing the many requirements of the employes of the Company. In speaking of the immediate resources of the Tehuantepec region, the mines may be for the present left out of the account, though no doubt exists of the auriferous wealth of this portion of the Isthmus; but mention may be made of the fact that unsurpassed facilities exist for the manufacture of salt and lime—the former of which already engages the attention of a portion of the present inhabitants.

Although lying within the limits of the equatorial belt, the climate of the Isthmus is agreeable and salubrious. The country is well drained and dry, with an abundance of swift flowing streams, and, being for the most part an elevated plateau or table land, is traversed by constant winds sweeping from ocean to ocean. It is said that the surveying expeditions of this and other enterprises on this line, though very much exposed and compelled to sleep for the most part in the open air, reported fewer cases of sickness than would have been deemed inevitable in any similar circumstances in any of the States of this country. It will therefore be seen that the climate of this portion of the Isthmus presents no obstacles in the way of the enterprise, while it exhibits many advantages over that of Panama.

There are but few natural obstacles in the way of constructing the proposed road. The "mountainous region" occupies a strip of territory with an averaged width of about forty miles, in the centre of the Isthmus, and may be said to extend from the Jaltepec river, on the north, to within twenty-five miles of the Pacific coast. Here, in the elevated ridges and spurs of the Cordilleras, are the only important obstacles to railway construction; but the continuity of the mountain chain is very nearly broken by a pass which lies nearly in the line of shortest communication between the two oceans. It is as if nature had providentially cared for such an exigency as the present proposed route; for the depression is so marked that the highest grade to the mile at any part of the line is but little more than sixty feet. On the Pacific side the gap or opening is narrow, and the descent quite rapid, to a series of table lands, which incline slowly to the coast at about fifteen or twenty feet to the mile. The surface is remarkably smooth and even, and their gentle slope is admirably adapted to railroad purposes. The amount of tunneling which will be required, even in the mountain region, is comparatively small, and none of the rivers present unusual difficulties in the way of bridging. The summit of the road will

be only 793 feet above the level of high tide, and the severest grade will be sixty feet to the mile, and this but for some twelve or fifteen miles, while for the rest of the distance the average grade will be less than twenty-five feet to the mile. The gauge adopted is four feet eight and a half inches, that having been found by experience to be the most economical in working as well as in first cost. The preliminary carriage-road will have the same general location as the railroad, but will follow a slightly different course, making its total length 200 miles. It is to have a carriage-way fifteen feet wide, and the timber on each side is to be cleared to the width of fifty feet. Ten substantial truss bridges will be required for it, beside a number of smaller bridges and culverts. The cost of the road will be about nine millions, according to the estimates of the engineers in the employ of the company. It will require \$180,000 for the carriage-road; the grading, bridging and preparation of the road bed for the railroad will take \$6,000,000; the superstructure, \$1,500,000; the equipment, \$400,000; and the other expenses—engineering, surveying station houses and similar things—a little less than \$1,000,000, making the total amount of capital necessary to be raised \$8,900,000, or about \$55,000 per mile for the 162 miles.

Of the advantages of the work when completed it is almost impossible to speak in brief. A glance at the map of Mexico will show that the geographical position of Tehuantepec will secure to the new route the entire west coast freightage, including the almost entirely, as yet, undeveloped commerce of the rich provinces of Western Mexico, and that of part of East California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, etc., which cannot be transported overland to the Atlantic shores, but will find its future way to the sea through the Colorado river and the Gulf of California; as well as the already established trade of California, Oregon and the extreme Northwest, which must eventually seek its passage across the Pacific on the line of the North Pacific current. This includes the Japanese and the best part of the Chinese freightage. The Australian trade and that part of the Chinese, East Indian and Island commerce which is compelled to take advantage of the South Pacific trade-winds and currents, will find little to choose between Panama and Tehuantepec, if it has a European destination; but, if consigned to any port of the United States, it cannot fail to find a marked advantage in seeking the more northerly transit, especially as the winter passages, even of the present New York and Panama line of steamers, are frequently made to the westward of the Antilles. As Mr. Stevens says in the volume before us:

“The Tehuantepec route is, of all the routes proposed from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, the true American route. It is the route which is entirely commanded by our possessions on the Gulf of Mexico, and not

domineered over by any British possessions whatever. In case of a war with Great Britain, our vessels bound to Chagres would be obliged to sail almost within gunshot of the British forts at Jamaica. The Mississippi river being the great artery of the West, and the Mississippi Valley destined to be the great reservoir of the population, enterprise, and nationality of the United States, we are at all times better prepared to defend the Isthmus of Tehuantepec than any other position on this side of our continent south of New Orleans."

The project of an inter-oceanic ship canal across the Isthmus is said to form a part of the plan of the Company proposing to build the railroad and carriage-way; but in the volume before us Mr. Stevens expresses the belief that such a work will not be undertaken until the demands of our commerce renders it indispensably necessary. Such a work, it is estimated, would cost about \$325,000,000. For all present purposes, however, the railroad will serve, as its carrying capacity will be found susceptible of almost indefinite expansion. Still, looking to that far future in which a ship canal across the Isthmus may become a practicable enterprise financially, the Isthmus of Tehuantepec possesses topographical features which will certainly attract to it the investigating eyes of scientific explorers for the most available route.

Considered simply as a scheme for the improvement of the facilities of intercourse between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the people of the United States have the deepest interest in the completion of the railroad, and the far-sighted capitalists under whose direction the plan has matured into a purpose deserve our heartiest sympathy and most earnest good wishes for the success of their enterprise.

THE PUBLIC DEBT STATEMENT.

The July schedule of the public debt, which appears elsewhere, demands very little special notice except as it shows as usual a reduction of the principal of the debt. The receipts from internal revenue have been swelled of late by the payment of the annual taxes which are very wisely made due in the summer, in order that the currency and the money market may be less perturbed by the influx of so large an aggregate of greenbacks into the Treasury. The income tax alone will amount to some 40 millions, and if the payment of so large a sum within a few days were not allotted to that period of the year when there is a great accumulation of idle currency in the financial centres, our clumsy and inelastic monetary machinery would receive a succession of jerks and

spasms which must cause no small trouble in the money market and in the movements of business. It was on this account that the time of paying the income tax was changed a couple of years ago from September, when business is brisk and greenbacks cannot be spared, to July, when business is dull and greenbacks can be absorbed into the Treasury with less risk from the temporary depletion of the channels of the circulation. Still this year is exceptional, and in consequence of the feverish and sensitive condition to which the money market has been reduced by the spasms and unprecedented strain of the past six months, the locking up of so large an amount of currency as is usual would have been attended with peril. Accordingly the special case had to be met by a special remedy, and Mr. Boutwell hit upon the expedient of buying up the bonds of the government. In payment for these bonds he has poured out the currency from the Treasury vaults as fast as it accumulated there, and when Congress meets he will seek instructions as to what is to be done with the 40 millions or more of Five-Twenties in which the surplus revenues have been thus invested. It is perhaps premature for us to discuss now the probable action of Congress. But various opinions are held in Wall street as to what should be done, and a lively contest of opinion will doubtless be provoked. There are indeed some persons who contend that the Secretary has exceeded his legal powers in making these purchases. We apprehend however that it will not be difficult to find law for everything that has been done, and Mr. Boutwell is too shrewd and has too enlightened advisers to be caught tripping. Moreover the necessity of the case justified some exceptional treatment, and the success of Mr. Boutwell's policy is a strong ground of defence. It has been urged that the Treasury purchases of bonds have caused a speculative advance in their price. And no doubt a part of the rapid rise in the market value of government securities is due to this cause. But perhaps too much influence is attributed thereto, and before Congress meets we shall have an opportunity of testing this point by the pertinacity with which the advance is sustained.

In presence of this gratifying appreciation of our National securities which are nominally worth to-day 250 millions more than at the beginning of the year, there has been a great deal said about the reduction of the rate of interest. It has been even affirmed that some Frankfort capitalists have offered to negotiate a loan at five per cent for 300 millions of dollars. Of course this is mere sensational gossip, for at Frankfort to-day our six per cent bonds are offered at eleven or twelve per cent below par. It is therefore absurd to say that while they can buy our six per cents at 89 or less, they will give us 100 for our five per cents, or even for our four and a half per cents. Our bonds certainly bear too high a rate of interest.

We ought to be able to reduce that rate and thus to relieve ourselves of part of the pressure of the hordes of taxation. But it may well be doubted whether this reduction and this relief are to be secured by any large loan negotiated in Europe. However this may be, the question of lowering the rate of interest is assuming more and more importance, and the pressure which will be exerted in Congress for relief from internal taxation will render it a necessity that some change should be made. It will be remembered that our debt was funded in Five-Twenties with the special purpose of securing its controllability, so that at any time after the year 1867 there might be an adequate proportion of the public debt which was subject to be paid off at par. By this expedient we expected to have the option of using our surplus in paying off our debt by degrees without being required to pay a premium as we had to do when we paid off our debt more than a quarter of a century ago; and secondly we expected to take advantage of the improving credit of the country and pay off old loans with the proceeds of new loans obtained at lower rates of interest. These objects so far have not been secured. The agitation of repudiation, with other causes have been adverse to the public credit, and instead of lessening since the war we have been rapidly increasing that burden. To illustrate this point we have completed the following table showing the various rates of interest which we paid on our debt, and the proportion of the principal which stood at each rate in each year since 1860:

July or Aug.	Coin Interest.		Currency Interest.			No Interest.	Miscella- neous.
	6 p. cent.	5 p. cent.	7.30 p. c.	6 p. cent.	5 p. cent.		
1860...	\$21,513,092	\$23,461,000	\$.....	\$.....	\$.....	\$.....	\$19,795,611
1861...	40,041,948	30,428,000	21,550,223	22,464,769
1862...	100,754,614	30,483,000	122,836,550	149,600,000	110,477,298
1863...	256,971,203	30,483,000	139,970,500	407,839,145	386,849,632
1864...	661,419,715	102,508,750	109,856,150	15,000,000	454,073,548	388,332,326
1865...	908,870,042	199,792,700	880,000,000	218,379,470	414,646,601	247,304,195
1866...	1,644,877,342	198,241,100	798,900,800	102,034,140	443,449,047	123,335,630
1867...	1,480,475,343	198,481,850	451,233,425	123,731,430	417,177,534	15,639,816
1868...	1,866,783,400	221,588,400	53,914,890	63,000,000	410,302,891	18,099,175
1869...	1,806,341,300	221,589,300	68,638,320	66,120,000	418,608,501	5,071,834

Included in the above currency six per cents are railroad bonds, and in the "no interest" column gold certificates to the following amounts. Under the head miscellaneous we have grouped together treasury notes, temporary loans and over due securities.

	R. R. Bonds.	Gold Certificates.
1864.....
1865.....	1,258,000
1866.....	6,042,000	14,403,180
1867.....	15,300,000	19,457,960
1868.....	32,210,000	22,411,000
1869.....	68,638,320	30,489,640

The chief object of this table is to show that, so far as regards the pressure of the interest, we have had no relief since the war, no change from a higher to a lower rate of interest. It is true our bonds have

risen in market value. Five-twenties are now worth in Frankfort or in London twice as much as the quoted rates of the period of greatest depression during the war. But the whole of the gain arising out of this improved credit has gone into the pockets of the speculators, the bankers and their customers; while very little, if any, of the gain has accrued to the National Treasury or has been available for the lowering of taxation and the relief of the burdens of the people. In the pressure of hard times and heavy taxes, it is the contemplation of such facts as these which has produced the outcry for a lower rate of interest on the debt—a demand which, in some way or other, will have to be satisfied.

RAILROAD ITEMS.

CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILROAD.—The Annual Report for the year ending April 30, 1869, shows the following:

The gross earnings of the railroad for the year have been as follows:

From Passengers.....	\$1,659,803 61
Freight.....	4,764,964 29
Miscellaneous.....	894,686 28—\$6,812,809 18
Interest and exchange.....	81,716 18

Total.....	\$6,846,525 86
The operating expenses of all kinds, including taxes, both State and National, and rent of tracks, and cost of transfers have been.....	\$3,177,903 22
	\$3,668,622 14

Leaving applicable for interest and dividends during the year.....	\$3,177,903 22
The balance to credit of income account at the close of last year was.....	491,068 80

Total.....	\$3,668,872 02
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There have been paid during the year—

Interest on bonds.....	\$369,547 44
Dividend No. 16.....	627,195 00
Dividend No. 17.....	627,195 00
Stock dividend.....	1,254,590 00
Tax on dividends.....	130,062 85
152 bonds for sinking fund.....	161,300 00
	\$3,169,619 79

Leaving a balance to credit of income account at the close of the year of.....	600,252 23
Exclusive of amount paid into sinking fund, which at this time is.....	1,096,761 13

If the amount paid into this fund be a proper credit to income account, that account stands at.....	\$1,537,013 36
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The gross earnings of the road have been in excess of the previous year by \$658,161 93, notwithstanding the somewhat diminished rates of fare and freight.

After referring to the various improvements, and new connections made necessary by the rapid progress of railroads and civilization in the West, the President remarks: "To provide the requisite means for these purposes, they propose to distribute stock among the stockholders, at its par value, to the extent of twenty per cent of the capital stock of the company, as being at once the easiest and, to them, most agreeable mode of raising the money."

The treasurer's report shows the following:

GENERAL ACCOUNT—DEBIT.

Capital stock.....	\$18,825,025 00
Funded debt.....	4,794,250 00
Due on mortgage of Northern Cross Railroad.....	270,000 00
Operating accounts unpaid.....	348,628 76
Due Chairman of Board for advances.....	1,226,207 18
Sinking fund.....	1,096,761 13
Balance to credit of income account.....	600,252 23
	\$21,999,134 30

CREDIT.

Cost of construction before May, 1868.....	\$14,537,344 47	
Cost of equipment before May, 1868.....	3,205,407 62	
Due on Northern Cross Railroad.....	270,000 00	
Cost of new construction during the year.....	1,287,705 60	
Cost of equipment during the year.....	644,811 73	
Material on hand for future operations.....	490,923 07	
Pullman Palace Car Company stock.....	66,200 00	
St. Ann Ferry, President and other boats.....	41,074 01	
Burlington depot, ground and accretions.....	315,946 42	
Chicago teams for transferring freight.....	4,500 00	
Monthly traffic accounts and bills receivable.....	237,404 43	
Post Office department.....	8,935 40	
Burlington and Missouri River Railroad pref. stock, 7 instalms.....	412,737 64	
Keokuk & St. Paul Railroad Company.....	\$500,401 68	
Less amount received on bonds.....	413,781 06	
		66,620 62
American Central Railroad construction account.....	\$926,032 89	
Interest on bonds.....	11,833 79	
	\$937,866 68	
Less received on sale of bonds.....	639,168 13	
		\$298,708 55
Due from agents and connecting roads.....	115,983 87	
Deposits in New York and treasury.....	31,831 73	
Total.....		\$21,999,134 30

SINKING FUND.

The sinking fund has now \$77,000 Chicago and Aurora 2d mortgage bonds; \$623,000 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy inconvertible 8 per cent bonds; \$11,000 Chicago Burlington & Quincy convertible 8 per cent bonds; \$151,000 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy trust mortgage 7 per cent bonds, and \$129,000 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy trust mortgage 8 per cent bonds; a total of \$991,000, purchased at a cost of \$1,035,761 13.

EXPORTS OF IRON RAILS FROM GREAT BRITAIN.—Messrs. S. W. Hopkins & Co., Railroad Iron and Steel Rail Merchants, Nos. 69 and 71 Broadway, N. Y., and 53 Old Broad street, London, furnish the following official statement of the export of iron rails from Great Britain:

FIVE MONTHS ENDING MAY 31st:

	1867. Tons.	1868. Tons.	1869. Tons.
AMERICA.			
United States.....	87,209	112,005	141,624
British.....	2,813	5,416	12,962
Cuba.....	937	1,612	319
Brazil.....	773	1,820	543
Chile.....	2,640	404	1,570
Peru.....	163	770	9,306
EUROPE.			
Russia.....	17,843	12,280	52,714
Sweden.....	350	413	2,890
Prussia.....	4,311	3,611	2,738
Illyria, Croatia and Dalmatia.....	...	3,810	12,975
France.....	68	44	2,770
Holland.....	6,196	14,661	4,880
Spain and Canaries.....	4,328	3,777	5,673
ASIA.			
British India.....	45,151	42,818	80,132
Australia.....	6,827	4,688	9,901
AFRICA.			
Egypt.....	8,641	10,512	3,711
Other countries.....	11,027	14,322	25,892
Total.....	199,387	233,769	320,175

—The following is a statement of the amount of interest due Virginia by the various railroad corporations:

Orange & Alexandria.....	\$17,500 00
Richmond & Danville.....	42,000 00
Virginia Central.....	67,500 00
Southside.....	252,400 00
Virginia & Tennessee.....	420,000 00
Norfolk & Petersburg.....	45,857 13
Total.....	\$543,856 13

CANADIAN RAILWAY RETURNS.—The earnings of the railways of Canada for the month of May, 1868 and 1869, were as follows :

	1868.	1869.
Great Western.....	\$244,658	\$280,992
Grand trunk.....	736,917	616,524
London and Port Stanley.....	8,871	3,642
Welland.....	9,201	10,792
Norfolk.....	81,906	74,671
Brockville and Ottawa.....	19,244	16,556
St. Lawrence and Ottawa.....	14,688	10,268
St. Lawrence and Industry.....	959	1,027
New Brunswick and Canada.....	12,321	11,273
European and North American.....	17,190	14,745

—The annual statement of the Michigan Central Railroad for the year ending May 31, 1869, shows the following results :

EARNINGS.	
From passengers.....	\$1,795,866 11
From freight.....	2,765,00 48
From miscellaneous.....	155,286 80
	<u>\$4,716,293 89</u>
The ordinary expenses of operating, including local taxation and taxes on dividend, have been.....	\$2,688,278 72
Paid in sinking fund.....	84,600 00
	<u>2,053,773 72</u>
Leaving for interest and dividends.....	1,663,514 00
Interest and exchange paid.....	646,170 63
	<u>\$1,017,343 54</u>

The proper net earnings above those of the last year have been \$115,235, and the excess of gross earnings, \$245,000. The amount of the sinking fund from the current earnings is now \$1,515,999 85. There is outstanding no floating debt.

The funded debt now stands at.....	\$5,153,488 89
Less amount paid into sinking fund.....	1,351,699 35
	<u>\$3,801,789 54</u>
Leaving the net bonded debt at.....	11,197,343 00

Bonded debt and stock to.....	\$14,999,237 64
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The bonded debt has been decreased during the year by conversion of bonds into stock by the amount of \$1,815,500, and the stock of the Company has been correspondingly increased, and has also been further enlarged by a stock dividend during the year of ten per cent, amounting to \$904,400.

—The Burlington *Hawkeye* gives as follows the gross earnings of railroads of Iowa for the year 1868, as gathered from books in the State Treasurer's office :

Railroads.	Gross Earnings.
Chicago & Northwestern.....	\$3,371,682 23
Dubuque & Sioux City.....	670,686 25
Dubuque & Southwestern.....	172,427 03
Cedar Falls & Minnesota.....	65,465 57
Sioux City & Pacific.....	17,000 02
Des Moines Valley.....	710,240 94
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	1,515,228 81
Burlington & Missouri.....	641,653 24
Council Bluffs & St. Jo.....	153,854 93
McGregor Great Western.....	498,250 03
Keokuk & St. Paul.....	71,746 11
*Dunn & Dubuque Bridge Co.....	27,824
†Dubuque Street Railroad.....	10,782 23
Total ..	<u>\$8,113,197 56</u>

RAILROADS IN GEORGIA.—Railroad enterprise is active in Georgia. The road from Milledgeville to Macon, completing the Augusta and Macon Railroad, will be built immediately. Arrangements have also been made to build the road from Augusta to Port Royal S. C. The Georgia Railroad Company have agreed to endorse the

* In operation but a few days

† In operation but a portion of the year.

bonds of the road. The survey of the long-talked of Northeastern Railroad, from Athens to Clayton, in Raybun county, connecting with the Tennessee roads, and making a continuous railroad from Augusta to Knoxville, has been ordered by the Georgia Railroad. The Macon and Brunswick Railroad will be soon completed, and the extension of the Southwestern Railroad to the Florida line is also under way. The feud between the Augusta and Columbia and the South Carolina Railroad has been settled, and the trains of both companies now come and go between Columbia, Charleston and Augusta.

Negotiations have been in progress for some time for the purchase of the Southwestern Railroad and branches by the Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia. The Savannah *Republican* says that the bargain and transfer have been perfected, the entire interests of the Southwestern road having passed into the possession of the Central Company on the 24th ult.

The Frederick and Pennsylvania line Railroad Company has issued \$20,000 worth of coupon corporation bonds in sums of \$200 \$500 and \$1000, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum in currency, payable on the 1st of June and December. The company has endorsed these bonds with a gold bearing interest—or its equivalent—of 6 per cent, and they are exempt from corporation and county tax.

RAILROADS IN MINNESOTA.—A letter in the Chicago *Tribune* gives some interesting information about railroads in Minnesota. At the present time nearly four thousand laborers are at work on the railroads in that State. One thousand men have just been taken by propeller from the lower lakes and transferred to the railroad now building from the head of Lake Superior to the Mississippi River at St. Paul.

On the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, ninety miles west of Minneapolis are under contract. The laborers come from Sweden and Germany. Agents of the Company have circulated in those countries of Europe descriptions of the choice lands in the Big Woods and the Kandiyohi prairies beyond that belt of forest; by similar personal influence, parties of emigrants have been billeted from their native villages to the particular fraction of land destined to be a Minnesota homestead; and the protection of the Company is not withdrawn for a moment of the long journey. Even after arrival in Minnesota the Company's buildings are arranged for their temporary occupation, while more permanent shelter is provided in the immediate section of the road under construction and of the lands to be occupied.

They expect in Iowa that every tier of country East and West will have its line of rail. Minnesota begins to show the same sort of Enterprise. There are railroads in the two lower tiers of counties; another in the fourth tier, and another in the fifth. The North Pacific and St. Cloud and Pembina Railroads will open other and large portions of the State, and of the region beyond. Of the lines in progress or projected, one is from St. Paul *via* Sioux City to the Union Pacific Railroad, west of Omaha. As to the North Pacific Road, the correspondent suggests that an eligible route would be on latitude 48 degrees, crossing the Missouri River near the northern boundary of the Sherman-Harney Sioux Reservation, crossing the Yellowstone at the mouth of the Big Horn, and thence west near Helena, in Montana, and through the Hell Gate Pass to the Rocky Mountains to the channel of the Columbia River.

"JOINT COMPANIES" OF NEW JERSEY.—With the view to procure funds for the improvement of the canal and railroads of the united companies, the stockholders of the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, and the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company, are entitled to subscribe at par for 15 per cent of the amount of stock which shall stand in their names on the books of the said companies, collectively, on the 1th day of July next, at the commencement of the year; the stock thus subscribed for to be stock of the said three first-named companies, and to be contributed by them in proportion to the present amount of capital stock of each company; and each stockholder entitled to a fractional part of a share shall be allowed to subscribe therefor a full share; but no fractional subscription received. The subscriptions will close August 10th. Every stockholder

holding less than seven shares will be entitled to subscribe for one share. The installments on account of the new stock shall be paid in cash, in two instalments of 50 per cent each, as follows: First—Fifty dollar a share at the time of subscription—between the 22d day of July and the 10th day of August, 1869. Second—Fifty dollars a share between the 22d day of January and the 10th day of February, 1870. Stockholders failing to subscribe within the time mentioned, or neglecting to pay the installments when due, will forfeit their right to the new stock.

RUTLAND RAILROAD.—The decision of the Court at Vergennes, Vt., on the petition of the Rutland Railroad Company for possession of the road, which was opposed by some of the first mortgage bondholders of the old Rutland and Burlington, leaves the matter as before the petition was made, the property being still in the hands of the trustees of the second mortgage bonds. Nearly all the second mortgage bonds have been converted into common stock of the Rutland company, and over \$1,000,000 of the \$1,800,000 first mortgage bonds have been converted into preferred stock. The Rutland road asks for possession, as they hold that they can manage more profitably than the trustees, by increasing the rolling stock and doing more business. This has been denied them, and the case remains in the lawyers' hands, and may be there for years to come. In most cases of contention for rights claimed equitable compromise is judicious, and we do not believe this an exceptional one. Even if the first mortgage bondholders could eventually, years hence perhaps, obtain every dollar of principal and all back interest, a fair settlement now would undoubtedly result more to their benefit than a long legal controversy, with its attendant costs and troubles. The experience of other roads would certainly confirm this view of the matter.—*Boston Journal*.

THE SUBSTITUTION OF TEN-FORTIES FOR FIVE-TWENTIES AS NATIONAL BANK SECURITIES.—The following letter has been addressed by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Comptroller of Currency, July 23:

Referring to my letter of May 14th ult., I have decided to permit the substitution of ten forties for five twenties or the exchange of any gold-bearing bonds now held as security for circulating notes on the basis hitherto adopted; the ten-forties to be received at eighty five per cent of their par value, and all other six per cent gold-bearing bonds at ninety per cent. The six per cent currency bonds issued by the United States to the Pacific Railroad will not be received as security for the circulation of National banks; and the exchange of gold-bearing bonds is subject hereafter to revision if it shall be found that such exchanges are so frequent as to become onerous to the department.

GEORGE S. BOUTWELL,
Secretary of the Treasury.

The Comptroller of the Currency has given notice accordingly.

PACIFIC RAILROAD FREIGHTS.—Under the tariff for through freights by rail to the Pacific a car load weighing 18,600 pounds is transported from Chicago to Sacramento for \$900. This is a charge of just \$5 per hundred for transportation a distance of 2,266 miles. The division of rates per car load gives the road to Omaha, 490 miles, \$110; the Union Pacific to Promontory, 1,085 miles, \$385; and the Central Pacific, from Promontory to Sacramento, \$405. So the Northwestern or the Rock Island receives about \$22 45 per car load per hundred miles, the Union Pacific \$35 50, and the Central Pacific \$58 70 per car load per hundred miles. The distance from Chicago to New York is just about two-fifths of the distance from Chicago to Sacramento.

COLORADO R. R. ITEMS.—The *Denver News* says that "a very large proportion of the goods now arriving at Denver come by the Kansas Pacific Road. Large invoices of groceries are coming in from Chicago by that route, all included under a single rate of freight, and without classification. The tariff is astonishingly low. Now let St. Louis compete with Chicago in her selling prices.

OIL CREEK AND ALLEGHANY RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY.—This Company gives notice that the Commissioners of its Sinking Fund will purchase for investment, on and after August 2d, from the several stockholders at par, five per cent of the capital of the stock as it may stand on the books of the Company on the 1st of July, 1869. Those who elect to sell that amount of their stock at par for cash, must notify the Commissioners of the fact, and present their certificates before the 20th of July. The transfer books of the Company are to be removed to Pittsburgh after the 1st proximo.

—The *Detroit Tribune* comments as follows on the vote in that city against aid to railroads: "As we intimated would probably be the case, the proposition to loan the credit of the city to certain railroad companies was defeated yesterday by a large majority. The majority against the Detroit & Hillsdale road was 3,874, the largest, and against the Detroit & Howell Road 2,206, the smallest. The total vote was not far from 6,000. The vote of the city last fall was about 12,000, showing that the vote yesterday was about half the full vote. Little interest was taken in the election. But the adverse majority is decisive enough to show that, as matters now stand, Detroit will not help build railroads. As our readers are aware, we desired a different result, and labored for it. We think the result, as it now stands, will be unfavorable to our city. The most potent agency against voting aid was the existing railroad corporations, which organized the opposition, and from their employees furnished a considerable share of the majority against it."

—The Portland, Saco and Portsmouth Railroad's stockholders at their meeting lately discussed the contract between this road and the Boston and Maine and Eastern railroads. The latter were thereby bound to pay their rent in gold and silver coin, but have for six years availed themselves of the Legal Tender act to pay in greenbacks. The lenders think that under a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, they have a right to recover back rent according to the contract's terms, which would amount to \$194,658 in gold, or \$328,600 in currency. The directors were accordingly instructed to take action to recover for the past and enforce for the future according to those terms.

The N. Y. *Tribune* gives the following items:

—The Raritan and Delaware Bay Railroad will be sold on the 4th, of September at the Manchester Depot, under a writ of fieri facias issued by the Court of Chancery at the suit of Charles J. Hendricks and Stewart Brown, complainants, who are holders of mortgages. The entire property of the Company, including the steamer Jesse Hoyt, will be sold, and the branch road from Manchester to Tom's River will be disposed of, subject to the payment of the principal of certain bonds secured by mortgage given to James W. Alexander Trustee.

—The line of the Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis Railroad is now located as far as Rhoad's Point, in Macoupin county. From that place different routes have been surveyed, with St. Louis as the objective point. One route proposed lies through Miles Station thence to the Terra Haute Road; another through Shipman; another through Brighton to Bethalto; another through Brighton and Fosterburg to the Junction; and lastly, one through Upper Alton to the Junction.

—A bill has passed the Senate of Florida in aid of the railroads in that State. It is proposed to issue bonds to the amount of \$14,000 a mile, to aid in extending the Pensacola and Georgia road to Mobile, all the bonds to be issued at the same time. The second proposition is for the State to endorse to the extent of \$14,000 a mile the bonds of any company undertaking to build a road from Gainesville to Tampa. The indorsed bonds to be issued as sections of five miles are completed.

A meeting was held at Leavenworth on July 14th to organize the Leavenworth and Gulf Railroad. The people of the counties interested in the road are in earnest, and the work will be speedily undertaken and accomplished. Many leading capitalists are among the incorporators, and the scheme is one that will command the co-operation and support of the people of a large and important section of country.

The net profit of the Great Western Railway Company of Canada for the three months ending April 30, 1869, available for dividend (after deducting interest charges lost by exchange, &c.) is \$81,710 78, against \$79,191 45 in the corresponding period of 1868.

—The Toledo, Wabash and Western Railroad Company has adjusted, its legal difficulties, and all the suits are to be withdrawn. The company is only to issue \$1,000,000 of new stock, instead of \$1,000,000, to be divided equally among the parties, represented by Azariah Bondy and Jay Gould. The road from Akron to Toledo is expected to be built within eight months, and also that from Decatur to St. Louis.

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

STATEMENT COMPARING THE RETURNS FOR JULY 1 AND AUGUST 1, 1869.

DEBT BEARING COIN INTEREST.

Character of issues.	July 1.	Aug 1.	Increase.	Decrease
5s, Bonds of Jan 1, '59 (15 yrs).....	\$20,000,000	\$21,000,000	\$1,000,000	
5s, " Jan. 1, '61 (10 yrs).....	7,022,000	7,022,000		
6s, B'ds of '61 (after Dec 31, '80).....	18,418,000	18,415,000		
6s, " (Oregon war) '81.....	945,000	145,000		
6s, " of June 30, '61 (20 yrs).....	189,317,500	189,317,000		100
6s, " May 1, '62 (5-20's).....	514,771,600	514,771,600		
6s, " June '63 (7-1).....	750,000	75,000,000		
6s, " Mar. 1, '64 (10-40's).....	194,567,300	194,567,300		
6s, " N. v. 1, '61 (5-20's).....	124,443,800	124,439,900		
6s, " July 1, '65 (5-20's).....	332,998,950	332,988,950		
6s, " Nov. 1, '67 (5-20's).....	203,327,250	203,372,500		
6s, " July 1, '67 (5-20's).....	319,582,850	319,588,450	600	
6s, " July 1, '68 (5-20's).....	44,589,350	44,589,350		

DEBT BEARING LAWFUL MONEY INTEREST.

8s, Certificates (demand).....	\$5,100,000	\$5,810,000		\$1,810,000
8s, Navy Pension Fund.....	14,000,000	14,000,000		

DEBT ON WHICH INTEREST HAS CEASED SINCE MATURITY.

6s, Bonds of 1862, '67, '68.....	\$102,000	\$95,700		\$6,300
5s, Bonds (tax indem.) 1864.....	242,000	242,000		
Treasury notes prior to 1857.....	101,512	18,615		897
" since 1857.....	879,151	868,222		10,929
6s, Certificates of indebtedness.....	12,000	12,000		
6s, Comp'd int. notes '67 & '68.....	2,879,410	2,783,910		95,500
Temporary loan.....	186,310	184,110		2,200
7-30's, 8 year notes ('67 & '69).....	1,116,500	998,500		168,000

DEBT BEARING NO INTEREST.

Demand notes.....	\$121,683	\$116,719		\$4,919
U. S. Legal Tender notes.....	355,925,195	358,000,000	61,805	
Postal & fractional currency.....	82,062,028	81,080,300		1,081,728
Gold Certificates.....	30,489,640	36,725,849	\$6,236,209	

RECAPITULATION.

Debt bearing coin interest.....	\$2,107,430,600	\$2,107,981,800	\$700	
" bearing lawful money int.....	66,120,000	64,810,000		\$1,310,000
" on which interest has ceased.....	6,071,884	4,700,007		281,827
" bearing no interest.....	419,608,501	423,872,859	5,264,358	
Aggregated principal debt.....	\$2,597,730,985	\$2,601,404,166	\$3,673,231	
Col. in circulation.....	45,378,430	31,500,000		13,823,891
Lawful money int. accrued.....	1,882,701	1,277,000		175,000
Int. accrued on matured debt.....	690,680	660,784		29,896
Aggregated bt & int. a/c u'd.....	\$2,645,178,295	\$2,633,122,730	\$12,055,565	
Deduct amount in Treasury:				
Coin belonging to Government.....	\$79,713,673	\$67,407,771		\$13,307,902
Coin for which certificates are outstanding.....	3,489,040	36,725,849	6,236,200	
Currency.....	87,097,819	233,105,454		13,716,165
Sink' fund in coin, b'ds & int.....	8,867,282	11,932,147	3,064,865	
Other U. S. coin in b'ds. purchased & accrued interest thereon.....		15,110,990	15,110,990	
Total coin & cur'y in Treas'y.....	\$156,168,414	\$183,556,002		\$2,612,419
Debt less coin and currency.....	\$2,489,009,881	\$2,449,566,737		\$17,443,144

BONDS ISSUED TO UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD AND BRANCHES.

(Under acts of July 1, 1862, and July 3, 1864: principal payable in 30 years after date, and interest semi-annually, in January and July, both in lawful money.)

6s, Union Pacific Railroad.....	\$25,998,000	\$26,600,000	640,000	
6s, Union Pacific (E. 1/2) R.R.....	6,303,000	6,303,000		
6s, Sioux City & Pacific R.R.....	1,628,320	1,628,320		
6s, Central Pacific R.R.....	22,789,000	24,751,000	1,962,000	
6s, Central Branch (Kansas).....	1,000,000	1,000,000		
6s, Western Pacific R.R.....	320,000	320,000		
Total amount issued.....	\$58,638,320	\$60,860,320	\$2,222,000	

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW

Monetary Affairs—Rates of Loans and Discounts—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Price of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at New York—Opening, Highest, Lowest and Closing Prices at the New York Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

July has been marked by a more settled feeling in monetary affairs. There has been a steady reaction from the extreme stringency in money which had prevailed for some weeks previous, and at the close of the month the rate on call loans was 5@7 per cent and on prime paper 7@9 per cent. The change of tone was due almost exclusively to the release of a large amount of currency previously taken into the Treasury. According to the Debt statement, the July purchases of bonds by the government, with premium added, amounted to something over \$17,000,000, while the receipts on account of gold sales were about \$2,750,000, so that, upon these operations, the street received a balance of \$14,250,000 of currency, about the amount which had been previously lost through the preponderance of Mr. Boutwell's sales of gold over his purchases of bonds and the large receipts of the Treasury on account of internal revenue. Contrary to expectation, there has been no influx of money from either the West or the South. The latter section is evidently hoarding currency, in the absence of banks of deposit or of any means of employing its savings, and having apparently no balance of indebtedness to the North, is not compelled to send money here. The West, instead of settling its maturing obligations in currency or forwarding here its bank balances for temporary employment, has required all its funds for local business and settled its Eastern balances by especially heavy shipments of breadstuffs. We thus find ourselves at the beginning of August, close upon the period for the Western crop movements, with the currency more than usually distributed over the country, and with but little circulation at the East, the amount of legal-tenders in the New York Clearing House banks on July 31, being only \$56,100,000, against \$73,600,000 on August 1st, 1868. This condition of things suggests the probability that the Western demand on this city for currency to move the crops will be less this fall than usual, which is a consideration favoring a steady money market for the next few weeks.

The easier feeling in money has contributed to a more settled tone on the Stock Exchange. The severe experience of operators, during the spring months, has naturally produced a marked caution, with a consequent inactivity. Some of the larger speculators have, under this condition of the market, taken a lengthy vacation, and stocks have thus been very much left to take their own course. The only features of interest have been in what are known as the Vanderbilt stocks—New York Central, Hudson River and Harlem—which have been actively dealt in at a large advance, owing to the negotiations for the consolidation of the two former roads, and, as is reported, the intended declaration of a large scrip dividend upon the latter. New York Central advanced, within the month, from 189½ to 217½; Hudson River from 159½ to 194, and Harlem from 142½ to 168½. The market generally, however, has failed to

respond to the special firmness on these stocks. But, although the transactions have been light, amounting to only 449,150 shares, recorded on the exchange, against 1,344,767 shares for the same month of 1864, yet there has been a steady improvement in the tone of the market, the result of growing confidence in the future course of money and of liberal earnings by the roads.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Dec.
Bank shares	8,786	1,929	1,667
Railroad	1,149,707	368,963	751,344
Coal	2,280	757	1,498
Mining	19,125	5,300	14,125
Improv't	14,320	1,500	12,800
Telegraph	23,833	15,680	8,153
Steamship	55,201	2,490	31,711
Express &c	76,412	82,101	44,311
Total—June	1,344,767	419,150	895,617
Since January 1	11,062,386	8,291,332	2,369,054

The measures which have contributed to the ease of money have, at the same time, been productive of an extraordinary activity and firmness in Government securities. Mr. Boutwell has bought, on the open market, \$14,000,000 of Five-Twenty bonds \$2,000,000 being on account of the Sinking Fund and \$12,000,000 subject to the approval of Congress, the Secretary probably assuming that Congress will hereafter consent to these purchases being charged to account of the Sinking Fund, for the period antecedent to his incumbency, when the law providing for these operations was not enforced. The result of these large withdrawals of bonds from the market, and the anticipation of further large purchases by the Secretary, in August, was an advance of 6@8 per cent on all bonds except those issues chiefly held in Europe. In July there is usually a free foreign demand for the reinvestment of the July interest; this year, however, the supply on the foreign markets appears to have been adequate for that purpose and few have been exported.

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds	\$26,244,200	\$32,950,100	\$6,655,900	\$
U. S. notes	282,000	82,000
St'e & city b'ds	17,590,500	6,592,000	10,798,500
Company b'ds	1,188,500	1,134,500	54,000
Total—June	\$45,095,200	\$40,676,600	\$	\$4,418,600
Since January 1	210,110,300	214,997,59	4,887,539

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of June as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of month.	—6's, 1881.—	—6's, (5-20 yrs.)—	Coupon—	—5's, 10-40—
	Coup. Reg.	1862. 1864. 1865. new '67. '68. Cpn.		
1.....	117½	121½ 117½	118½	115½ 103
2.....	117½	121½ 117½	118½	116½ 103½
3.....	117½	122 117½	118½	116½ 103½
4.....	(No day.)
5.....	117½	117½	118½	116½ 108½
6.....	116½	117½	118½	116½ 107½
7.....	117½	117½	118½	116½ 108
8.....	118	121½ 118½	119½	117½ 108
9.....	118	121½ 118½	119½	117½ 108
10.....	118½	117½ 119	119½	117½ 108½
11.....	118½	120½ 121½	120½	118½ 110
12.....	118½	120½ 121½	120½	118½ 110
13.....	118½	120½ 121½	120½	118½ 110½
14.....	118½	120½ 121½	120½	118½ 110½

Day of month.	5's, 1881.		5's, (5-20 yrs.) Coupon				5's, 10-4.	
	Comp.	Reg.	1862.	1864.	1865.	new.	1867.	1868. yrs. C'pn.
15.....	110%	120%	124%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
16.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
17.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
19.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
20.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
21.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
22.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
23.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
24.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
25.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
26.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
27.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
28.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
29.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
30.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
31.....	120%	120%	123%	121%	121%	120%	110%	110%
First.....	117%	117%	121%	117%	118%	116%	115%	103
Highest.....	123%	123%	125%	123%	123%	122%	122%	114%
Lowest.....	116%	117%	121%	117%	118%	116%	115%	107%
Last.....	123%	123%	125%	123%	123%	122%	122%	114%

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. Ill. C. 5-20s sh's.	Erie sh's.	Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. Ill. C. 5-20s sh's.	Erie sh's.				
Thursday.....	1	92%	80%	95	19%	Friday.....	23	91%	83	91%	19
Friday.....	2	92%	81%	95	19%	Saturday.....	24	91%	82%	91%	19
Saturday.....	3	92%	81%	95	19%	Monday.....	26	93%	82%	91%	19
Monday.....	5	91%	81%	95	19%	Tuesday.....	27	93%	82%	91%	19
Tuesday.....	6	93%	81%	96%	19%	Wednesday.....	28	93%	82%	91%	19
Wednesday.....	7	93%	81%	94	19%	Thursday.....	29	93%	83%	93%	19
Thursday.....	8	93%	81%	95	19%	Friday.....	30	93%	83%	94	19%
Friday.....	9	93%	81%	94	19%	Saturday.....	31	93%	83%	94	19%
Saturday.....	10	91	81%	96	18%	Lowest.....	92%	80%	93	18%	
Monday.....	12	93%	81%	96	18%	Highest.....	93%	83%	96	19%	
Tuesday.....	13	93%	81	95	18%	Range.....	1	3	2	1%	
Wednesday.....	14	91	81%	95	18%	Last.....	93%	83%	94	19%	
Thursday.....	15	93%	82%	93	19%	Low } Since Jan. 1.....	92%	74%	92%	17%	
Friday.....	16	93%	82	93	19%	Hig }.....	94	81	98%	26%	
Saturday.....	17	93%	82%	93	19%	Rng }.....	1%	9%	6%	9%	
Monday.....	19	93%	82%	93	19%	Last.....	93%	83%	94	19%	
Tuesday.....	20	91%	82%	93	19%						
Wednesday.....	21	93%	83%	94	19						
Thursday.....	22	93%	83%	95	19						

Gold has attracted little speculative interest, and the business at the Gold Room has been very light. There appears to have been considerable disappointment of the expectations of operators relative to the exports of specie, the shipments having been comparatively light, while it was supposed, from the late large excess of imports over exports, and the heavy interest payments to be made to Europe during July, we should have to ship large amounts of gold. While, therefore, it was predicted in some quarters, at the opening of the month, that upon these grounds the price would advance from 137½ to 140, it steadily declined to 134½, and ranged for the most part below 136. During the month of July, last year, the price ranged between 140½ and 145½; in 1867, between 138 and 140½, and in 1866 between 147 and 155½. The supply on the market has been increased during the month, through the government payments of July interest and the Treasury sales of \$2,000,000 of coin; and hence on the 1st of August there was over \$36,000,000 of private gold held on deposit in the Treasury, the largest amount ever reached.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing	Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing
Thursday.....	1 137%	136%	137%	137%	Friday.....	23 135%	135%	135%	135%
Friday.....	2 137%	136%	137%	136%	Saturday.....	24 135%	135%	135%	136%
Saturday.....	3 137%	136%	137%	136%	Sunday.....	25 136%	136%	137%	137%
Monday.....	4 137%	136%	137%	136%	Monday.....	26 136%	136%	137%	137%
Tuesday.....	5 137%	136%	137%	135%	Tuesday.....	27 137%	137%	137%	137%
Wednesday.....	6 137%	136%	137%	135%	Wednesday.....	28 136%	135%	136%	136%
Thursday.....	7 135%	134%	135%	135%	Thursday.....	29 135%	135%	136%	136%
Friday.....	8 135%	135%	135%	135%	Friday.....	30 136%	136%	136%	136%
Saturday.....	9 135%	135%	136%	136%	Saturday.....	31 136%	136%	136%	136%
Sunday.....	10 135%	135%	136%	135%	July 1, 1869.....	137%	124%	137%	136%
Monday.....	11 136%	136%	137%	137%	" 1868.....	140%	140%	145%	145%
Tuesday.....	12 136%	136%	137%	137%	" 1867.....	138%	138%	140%	140%
Wednesday.....	13 137%	137%	137%	137%	" 1866.....	154%	147%	155%	149%
Thursday.....	14 137%	137%	137%	137%	" 1865.....	141%	138%	146%	144%
Friday.....	15 137%	136%	137%	135%	" 1864.....	222%	222%	225%	225%
Saturday.....	16 136%	135%	136%	135%	" 1863.....	144%	123%	145%	123%
Sunday.....	17 135%	135%	135%	135%	" 1862.....	109%	106%	120%	115%
Monday.....	18 135%	135%	135%	135%	S'ce Jan 1, 1869.....	134%	130%	144%	135%
Tuesday.....	19 135%	135%	135%	135%					
Wednesday.....	20 135%	135%	135%	135%					
Thursday.....	21 135%	135%	135%	135%					
Friday.....	22 135%	135%	135%	135%					

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of June and July, 1869:

	June				July			
Railroad Stocks—	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.
Alton & Terre Haute.....	88	89	83	89
do do pref.....	64	68	69	60	60	67%	59%	69%
Chicago & Alton.....	157	262	152%	160	162	166	158	166
do do pref.....	159	160	159	160	160%	166	159	166
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	197	199	190	191	191	191	188	190
do & Northwestern.....	93%	93%	77%	81%	82%	81	78%	80%
do do pref.....	104%	105%	93%	95%	96%	96%	93%	95%
do & Rock Island.....	126%	127	115	118%	118%	118%	118%	114%
Columb. Chic. & Ind. C.....	43%	43%	39	40	38%	39%	34	36%
Clev. & Pittsburgh.....	105%	108%	91%	201	102	109%	112	107%
do Col. Cin. & Ind.....	76	75%	73	74	74	76	72	73
Del. Lack. & Western.....	117	119	113	113	112%	113	110	112%
Dubuque & Sioux city.....	108	202	105	107	105	105	102	104%
Harlem.....	152	157	142	146%	144	168%	142%	163%
Hannibal & St. Joseph.....	120	129	117%	120	119	118	115	126%
do do pref.....	123%	124	118	120	119	120	119	126
Hudson River.....	157%	166%	153%	165	165%	194	159%	187%
Illinois Central.....	146%	147	148	145	142%	146	140%	141%
Joliet & Chicago.....	96	96	96	96
Long Island.....	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
Lake Shore.....	116%	117	107%	107%
do & Mich. South.....	105	108%	102%	103%	110%	110%	104%	105%
Mass. & Western.....	120	120	120	120
Mar. & Cincin., 1st.....	23%	23%	23	23	23	23	23	23
do do 2d.....	8%	8%	8%	8%	9%	9%	9%	9%
Michigan Central.....	131	136%	128	133%	130	136%	127%	131%
do S. & N. Ind.....	118%	119	107%	107%
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	79%	80	70%	75%	76	78%	73	77%
do do pref.....	81	91%	81%	86%	86	89%	84%	87%
Morris & Essex.....	90%	93%	89	89%	89%	90	87%	91%
New Jersey.....	131	133	130	133
do Central.....	117	122%	103	103	104%	104%	97	102%
New York Central.....	191%	197%	183	195%	196%	217%	189%	215
do do N. Haven.....	139	140	135	136	127	131	125%	131
do do Scip.....	125	125	124%	124%	124	128	121	128
Norwich & Worcester.....	105	105	105	105	104%	105	104%	105
Ohio & Mississippi.....	85%	87	82	83%	82%	83	81%	82%
do do pref.....	70	70	70	70
Panama.....	300	300	295	295	295	295	270	270
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica.....	136%	139	132%	135%	136	137%	150	153%
Reading.....	100%	100%	96%	97%	98%	99%	92%	91%
Rome, W. & Ogdensburg.....	125	125	125	125
Toledo, Wab. & Western.....	77%	77%	66%	72	72%	77	71%	75
do do pref.....	82	82	80	81	76	80	76	80
Miscellaneous—								
Cumberland Coal.....	36	36	33%	34%	32	33%	30	33%
P. N. S. V. A. L.....	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225
Wilk-Barre C. A. L.....	45	66	45	65	65	62	65	62
Del. & Hud. Canal.....	132	134	130	131	131	131	127	127
Pacific Mail.....	61%	93%	80%	82%	88%	92%	81%	81%

Boston Water Power	16%	17	16%	18	15%	15%	1%	15%
Canton	66%	18	62	62	62%	62%	60	60%
Brunswick City	8%	11	8%	11	11	11	11	11
Mariposa	24	24%	7	8	9	9	8%	9
do 1st pref.	82	83	81%	81%
do pref.	50%	50%	14	14%	16	17	15	16
Quicksilver	16%	18%	14	16%	15	16%	15%	16
West. Union Telegraph	43%	43%	83	89	38%	29	36	37%
Citizens Gas	160	160	160	160
Manhattan Gas	250	250	250	250
Bankers & Brokers Ass.	109	110	108	110
Express—
American	40%	40%	40%	40%
Amer. can M. Union	39%	41%	9	41%	42%	43%	39%	42%
Adams	59%	68%	53	63	62	62	58%	69%
United States	67	73	66	72%	70	75	69%	70%
Merchant's Union	15	15%	14	16	6	6	6	6
Wells, Fargo & Co.	30%	32%	29%	33	31%	31%	31%	31%

Foreign Exchange has been steady at about specie shipping rates; the supply of commercial bills and of bond bills, however, has proved sufficient to obviate the necessity of any considerable covering of draft with specie.

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

Days.	London. 54 pence.	Paris. centimes for dollar.	Amsterdam. florin.	Bremen. rix daler.	Hamburg. M. banco.	Berlin cents for thaler.
1.....	109% @ 109%	517% @ 515%	40% @ 40%	78% @ 78%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
2.....	109% @ 109%	518% @ 515	40% @ 40%	78% @ 78%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
3.....	10% @ 109%	518% @ 515	40% @ 40%	78% @ 78%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
4.....	Holiday.
5.....	109% @ 109%	518% @ 515	40% @ 40%	78% @ 78%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
6.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 518%	40% @ 40%	78% @ 78%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
7.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
8.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
9.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
10.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
11.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
12.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
13.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
14.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 514%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
15.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
16.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
17.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
18.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
19.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
20.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
21.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
22.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
23.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
24.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
25.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
26.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
27.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
28.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
29.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
30.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%
31.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	35% @ 35%	71 @ 71%

July, 1869.....	109% @ 110%	517% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	78% @ 79%	35% @ 36%	71 @ 71%
July, 1868.....	110 @ 110%	513% @ 512%	41% @ 41%	79% @ 80	36% @ 36%	71% @ 72

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1 :

Date.	NEW YORK CITY BANK RETURNS.					
	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
January 2....	\$259,060,037	\$10,736,122	\$34,379,009	\$180,490,445	\$18,896,421	\$586,017,99
January 9....	258,792,562	27,334,780	34,314,156	187,908,539	51,141,128	701,772,051
January 16....	262,338,831	29,238,536	34,279,153	195,484,843	52,927,083	675,765,611
January 23....	264,951,639	28,864,197	31,305,936	197,101,163	51,022,119	671,234,542
January 30....	265,171,109	27,784,923	34,231,156	196,985,442	54,747,569	690,367,266
February 6....	266,541,733	27,939,404	34,246,436	196,602,599	53,424,133	700,329,470
February 13....	264,380,467	35,854,331	34,263,451	192,977,60	52,334,952	690,764,499
February 20....	268,424,064	28,311,91	34,247,321	187,612,546	50,997,197	701,591,049
February 27....	261,371,597	20,832,103	34,217,981	186,216,175	50,835,054	539,716,021
March 6....	262,080,883	19,486,634	31,275,885	182,601,437	49,145,569	727,118,151
March 13....	261,699,695	17,358,671	34,630,445	182,592,458	49,639,621	691,775,66
March 20....	263,098,302	15,213,306	34,111,310	183,501,999	51,774,874	730,710,008
March 27....	263,909,579	12,013,722	34,777,814	180,113,910	50,555,103	797,987,488
April 3.....	261,933,613	10,707,389	31,816,916	175,325,789	48,496,359	837,232,692

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
April 10.....	257,140,327	8,791,543	81,609,360	171,495,500	48,614,732	810,06,455
April 17.....	255,184,882	7,811,779	81,436,761	172,203,494	51,001,88	772,965,372
April 24.....	257,163,074	8,830,160	81,060,511	177,310,080	54,677,888	752,965,766
May 1.....	269,435,160	9,267,615	83,972,059	183,948,565	56,495,722	743,768,349
May 8.....	268,486,372	16,081,499	83,986,190	191,833,37	55,103,573	91,174,577
May 15.....	269,491,397	15,374,769	83,977,793	199,392,449	56,501,256	861,720,880
May 22.....	270,275,352	15,429,404	83,927,806	199,414,869	57,810,873	788,747,832
May 29.....	271,985,461	17,871,230	83,920,805	203,055,600	57,810,873	781,446,491
June 5.....	275,019,609	19,051,138	83,928,995	199,124,402	57,889,422	766,28,026
June 12.....	271,983,785	19,053,580	84,141,790	193,886,045	50,599,258	856,006,646
June 19.....	265,841,006	19,025,444	81,198,829	186,214,10	49,612,488	836,224,021
June 26.....	260,431,732	20,271,140	84,214,785	181,774,695	48,161,920	761,170,743
J. ly 3.....	285,368,471	23,520,267	84,217,973	179,929,467	47,737,263	846,763,300
July 10.....	255,424,942	30,266,912	84,277,945	183,177,237	48,161,920	676,540,391
July 17.....	257,008,249	31,055,450	81,173,437	184,431,711	51,559,106	711,328,111
July 24.....	259,641,889	30,071,424	84,110,748	193,622,261	51,271,263	58,455,097
July 31.....	260,530,225	27,819,933	81,683,617	196,416,443	59,101,617	614,455,467

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.....	\$51,716,989	\$354,483	\$132,039,7	\$38,21,023	\$10,593,719
January 11.....	51,642,237	544,691	13,495,109	38,168,511	10,599,560
January 18.....	52,122,738	478,462	13,729,498	38,625,158	10,598,914
Janu ry 25.....	52,537,015	411,847	14,054,870	39,586,463	10,599,351
Feb uary 1.....	52,632,818	82,784	14,266,570	39,677,943	10,586,552
February 8.....	53,039,716	317,011	13,735,595	40,000,999	10,488,446
February 15.....	52,929,391	804,681	13,578,043	38,711,575	10,488,446
Febr ary 22.....	52,416,146	211,307	13,208,607	37,990,886	10,488,446
March 1.....	52,251,351	258,933	13,010,508	37,735,205	10,488,446
March 8.....	52,232,000	297,887	13,258,201	38,293,956	10,488,446
March 15.....	51,911,542	277,517	13,028,267	37,677,582	10,488,446
March 22.....	51,328,419	235,037	12,765,759	36,990,009	10,488,446
March 29.....	50,597,001	210,644	13,021,315	36,863,344	10,488,446
April 5.....	50,499,866	199,048	12,189,221	35,975,854	10,488,446
April 12.....	50,770,193	181,246	12,643,357	36,029,183	10,488,446
April 19.....	51,478,371	167,819	12,941,733	37,031,747	10,488,446
April 26.....	51,294,222	164,291	13,640,063	37,487,235	10,488,446
May 3.....	51,510,984	201,753	14,203,371	38,971,241	10,488,446
May 10.....	51,936,530	270,525	14,624,903	39,178,893	10,488,446
May 17.....	52,168,826	276,167	14,696,365	40,692,742	10,488,446
May 24.....	52,391,764	174,115	15,087,008	41,611,400	10,488,446
May 31.....	52,210,574	185,257	15,484,947	42,471,819	10,488,446
June 7.....	52,826,257	169,316	15,318,388	42,810,890	10,488,446
June 14.....	51,124,800	152,451	15,178,342	42,005,077	10,488,446
June 21.....	53,810,095	148,795	14,972,123	42,066,901	10,488,446
June 28.....	53,601,172	180,681	14,567,327	41,617,716	10,488,446
July 5.....	53,937,521	808,621	14,011,439	41,321,637	10,488,446
July 12.....	53,110,735	485,293	13,415,498	40,140,197	10,488,446
July 19.....	53,128,598	456,751	12,944,898	39,834,862	10,488,446
July 26.....	52,461,100	390,377	13,076,180	36,160,614	10,488,446

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
Jan ry 4.....	\$98,423,444	\$1,203,401	\$12,938,332	\$37,638,767	\$5,151,345
January 11.....	100,727,070	3,075,814	12,864,700	38,082,891	25,276,667
January 18.....	102,205,209	2,677,688	12,912,327	39,717,193	25,248,223
Janu ry 25.....	102,959,942	2,394,710	13,228,874	39,557,747	25,272,800
February 1.....	103,696,155	2,161,284	12,564,225	40,238,462	25,312,917
February 8.....	104,312,425	2,073,908	12,452,795	39,693,877	25,248,223
February 15.....	103,215,044	1,845,524	11,642,556	37,759,772	25,352,122
February 22.....	102,252,632	1,545,418	11,600,790	36,323,814	25,304,055
March 1.....	101,309,519	1,238,936	11,200,149	35,893,468	25,301,537
March 8.....	101,425,382	1,297,599	10,985,972	35,555,680	25,315,377
March 15.....	100,820,303	1,273,315	10,869,188	34,081,715	25,315,377
March 22.....	99,553,319	1,330,861	10,490,448	32,641,077	24,539,317
March 29.....	99,670,945	937,769	11,616,222	32,930,130	25,254,167
April 5.....	96,969,114	862,276	11,243,834	33,504,199	24,711,716
April 12.....	99,625,472	750,160	11,391,519	34,392,377	25,338,782
April 19.....	99,117,501	639,460	11,490,965	34,257,071	25,351,814
April 26.....	98,971,711	617,435	12,361,827	35,302,203	25,319,757
May 3.....	100,137,413	708,963	12,352,113	36,736,742	25,310,060
May 10.....	100,535,642	1,187,749	12,534,727	37,457,897	25,391,539
May 17.....	101,474,827	1,134,786	12,688,547	38,708,904	25,398,663
May 24.....	102,042,184	934,560	13,191,542	39,347,681	25,398,663
May 31.....	101,573,275	772,897	13,696,837	38,403,624	25,173,392
June 7.....	103,643,549	640,582	13,454,691	38,491,446	25,292,157
June 14.....	104,352,545	601,743	12,645,415	37,405,719	25,247,667
June 21.....	103,691,658	959,796	12,087,305	36,243,986	25,313,661
June 28.....	102,515,825	1,103,662	11,784,802	34,831,417	25,304,865
July 5.....	102,633,948	814,076	9,695,668	31,861,745	25,336,701
July 12.....	101,405,211	8,255,151	9,511,879	31,520,417	25,326,085
July 26.....	102,704,510	8,024,595	9,798,461	32,211,103	25,351,204

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SEPTEMBER, 1869.

THE RAILWAYS OF INDIA.

Now that the necessity of further railroad development in India is becoming so important, and the plans for its accomplishment are being discussed, the following, showing the extent of the present system and its results will be of special interest.

If the introduction of railways into India was tardy, their development in that vast country has, all things considered, been encouraging. Sixteen years ago India had no railways. In 1853 the first line was opened; by the end of the year 22 miles were in working order; now 3,943 miles are in use by the public. Since 1860 the construction of permanent ways has been effected with greater vigour than at first, for during the six years ended with 1866, no less than 2,735 miles of new road were laid down and opened. The average work of those years was 456 miles annually. Last year 349 miles more were added, and thus the aggregate mileage was brought up to the number stated above. Contrasted with the net work of railways stretching over England, the Indian system appears simplicity itself; the roads are nearly all main or trunk lines. Of branches, at present there are very few indeed.

Three companies—the East Indian, the Great Indian Peninsular, and the Madras—have between them to lay down 656 miles in addition to their existing works; that accomplished, Madras will be in direct railway communication with Bombay; from Bombay a line will run through Central India and join the East Indian at Allahabad, thence eastward to Calcutta, and westward to Delhi and the Punjab. From the terminus of the Punjab line at Moulton, goods and passengers can be carried down the Indus by the steam flotilla to the Scinde line, and by that means reach Kurrachee, the extreme north-western seaport. An inspection of the railway map of India shows that of existing lines there are three termini on the eastern and four on the western seaboard of the Peninsular. The route just traced lies along the grand arteries of traffic. Of the smaller lines the Bombay and Baroda and the Nagpore branch of the Great Indian drain the principal cotton fields.

Though certain lengths have to be completed, yet the benefits, both strategical and commercial, already derived from the existing lines are enormous. Ten years ago, when only 300 miles of railway were opened, “it took,” says Mr. Danvers, “about four weeks to travel by day, and as many months to convey a regiment from Calcutta to Simla; now it occupies five or six days.”

The railways are in the hands of eleven companies; their relative importance is disclosed by the figures of the subjoined tables:—

MILEAGE 1ST OF MAY, 1868, AND LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK OF INDIAN RAILWAYS, 1ST OF JANUARY, 1868.

Railway.	Miles open.	Locomotives.	Passenger carriages.	Total vehicles, includ. waggons & trucks
East Indian.....	1 356	425	850	6,052
Great Indian Peninsula.....	874	209	958	5,538
Madras	645	106	262	2,942
Bombay, Barado, and Central India....	306	65	181	3,055
Scinde	109	25	61	804
Punjab.	246	38	116	785
Delhi.....	54	6	107	361
Eastern Bengal.....	114	32	92	601
Great Southern of India	168	15	33	238
Calcutta and Southeastern.....	29	12	56	534
Oude and Rohilkund.....	42	4	12	49
Total.....	8,948	937	2,738	20,959

The total length of lines a present sanctioned by government is 5,609 miles, so that 1,666 miles remain to be finished. The East Indian main line has 145 miles, the Great Indian 393 miles, the Madras north-west line 180 miles, the Bombay and Baroda 7 miles, the Punjab (Delhi line) 266 miles, the Eastern Bengal 45 miles, and the Oudh and Rohilkund no less than 630 miles. As the last company has only 42 miles opened, it must be the least advanced of any in the country. The other companies appear to have completed the lines sanctioned.

There are great variations discernable in the proportion of locomotives to mileage and rolling stock on the different lines; thus, the East Indian has one locomotive to 3.18 miles, the Madras one to 6 miles, and the Great Southern one to 11 miles, while the ratio of vehicles to each locomotive on the respective roads was 14, 28, and 16. The great cotton line, the Bombay and Baroda, has 46 vehicles per locomotive.

The sketch map which accompanies the Government directors' report shows that nearly all the great cotton fields of India are now connected by railroad with shipping ports. The collapse in the Indian cotton trade which followed the termination of hostilities in America must, to a considerable degree, have injured railway enterprise. During the half-year ended at Midsummer, India sent us only 729,000 bales of raw cotton; in the corresponding months of 1867, 940,000 bales; and for the same period of 1866 no less than 2,378,000 bales, or more than thrice this half-year's supply. Nevertheless, it is officially reported that "railways are beginning to tell upon the cultivation of cotton in India in other ways than merely providing a more rapid and less costly mode of conveyance than formerly. Steam factories for cleaning cotton are springing up; machines for half-pressing are established in many places, and in others steam presses for packing the bales for shipment have been constructed."

Upwards of £75,000,000 has been expended on the Indian railways; the chief part of that sum was subscribed in England. The total number of proprietors on the 31st December last was 49,690, of whom 40,221 were stockholders registered in England, and 819 in India; of the latter number 422 are described as Europeans and 397 as natives. The debenture holders numbered 8,656.

To England also the contractors had to look for goods and machinery, as well as money. The value of railway material and machinery shipped hence to India during the years 1853-67 was £23,253,000., exclusive of freight and insurance, which last year amounted to 25 per cent, on the value sent. These ponderous cargoes weighed in the aggregate 3,529,000 tons, and required 5,339 ships for their conveyance.

A census of the number of persons employed on part of the railways was taken at Michaelmas last, when it appeared that there were 39,099 engaged; 36,048 were natives, and only 3,051 were set down as "Europeans and East Indians." At this time and for this number—the returns for the lines on the Bombay side are not included—2,475 miles and 271 stations were open; this, therefore, is less than two-thirds of the total mileage. It will be observed that of the railway establishments twelve out of thirteen employes are natives. True, this proportion does not hold with all departments; thus, in the printing and stationery department, of 362 persons engaged, 353 were natives; in the stores department, of 1,744

hands, 1,675 were natives; in the locomotive department there were 1,288 Europeans and East Indians to 5,219 natives; the special knowledge wanted for the latter department, rendering the employment of a larger number of Europeans necessary.

The European portion of the railway service is composed of a class of men who until recently were little connected with any department of Indian administration. "A civil engineer was seldom seen in India before railways were introduced, and the usual staff of a railway, from the traffic manager and locomotive superintendent to the engine driver and stoker—were of course unknown. Now, it will be observed, they are to be counted by thousands. They go out from this country generally between 25 and 30 years of age, and many spend the best years of their lives there. The mortality amongst them, notwithstanding the exposure to which they are subject, has been below the average." The pay is already high, usually double that which a man of the same calling would obtain at home, and other inducements are held out to healthy and efficient hands to enter the Indian railway service.

The capital authorized to be raised is at present upwards of £84,000,000; the amount actually raised up to the 31st of March of the current year, £76,579,000; £80,049,000 on shares or stocks, and £16,530,000 on debentures. Included in these sums is £9,000,000 raised during 1867. The capital account of each company is shown hereunder:—

CAPITAL AUTHORIZED BY GOVERNMENT; THE AMOUNT RAISED, AND THE AMOUNT EXPENDED ON INDIAN RAILWAYS UP TO THE 31ST OF MARCH, 1868.

Railway.	Authorized Capital.	Amount Actually raised.	Amount Withdrawn for Expenditure.
East Indian.....	£28,600,000	£28,437,518	£28,362,397
Great Indian Peninsula.....	19,000,000	18,248,180	17,614,586
Madras.....	10,000,000	9,550,411	8,765,962
Scinde.....	2,250,000	2,97,494	2,111,072
Indus Flotilla.....	624,000	381,405	577,052
Punjab.....	2,750,000	2,040,253	2,618,391
Delhi.....	5,000,000	3,451,164	3,129,145
Bombay, Baroda and Central India.....	7,500,000	7,369,164	7,06,126
Eastern Bengal.....	2,662,000	2,519,498	2,336,286
Calcutta and Southeastern.....	600,000	441,350	615,242
Great Northern.....	1,350,000	1,351,000	1,344,077
Oude and Rohilkund.....	4,000,000	742,549	861,319
Total.....	£84,386,000	£76,579,016	£75,071,656

It would appear from this statement that, at the latest date to which the accounts were made up, £1,500,000 odd was the cash balance in hand, for it had not been "withdrawn for expenditure." The total amount of Capital which the companies estimated they should require was £93,916,000; the Government sanction was, as the table shows, 10 per cent under that sum.

The money was obtained in the following manner :

Raised in England—		
By shares.....		£59,258,018
By convertible debentures.....	£6,357,445	
By inconvertible debentures...	10,172,700—	16,530,145
Raised in India.....		795,358

Total at 31st of March, 1868.....£76,579,016

The pecuniary share of India in these great undertakings was evidently insignificant.

The £75,000,000 which has already been expended on the railways does not represent the whole of their cost. The land granted by Government to the companies cannot be taken at less than £2,500,000; besides this, the Government, by making up the difference between the contract rate of the rupee—namely 1s. 10d.—and the average rate of exchange during the construction of the works—i. e., 2s.—has contributed about 8 per cent to the capital expended in India. This difference in value would amount to £3,600,000. “The actual cost of the railways,” Mr. Danvers remarks, “is thus raised from £75,000,000 to £81,000,000. But the amount upon which the profits are divisible is, fortunately for the companies, limited to their contribution.”

Of the shareholders' contribution £45,000,000 were expended in India, and for goods, freight, and insurance £30,000,000 in England.

II.

We are told that “Indian railways do not form an exception to the rule that expenditure always exceeds estimates. In some cases the cost has been three or four times greater than was expected. In others the excess has been very small.” If the companies have had grants of land and other advantages afforded them by Government, the charge for freight and marine insurance has borne heavily upon their resources. The East India line will average about £22,000 per mile, but this expenditure includes losses sustained by the mutiny. The Bombay and Baroda will be at the same rate until the extension to Delhi is completed. The Scinde will cost £20,000. The Madras has cost only £15,000 or thereabouts; the Great Southern, £10,000; and the line between Cawnpore and Lucknow less than £7,000 per mile.

The bulk of the expenditure on each line is stated in the report under five or six chief heads for each company. We select the four largest undertakings :

Chief Items of Expenditure.	—Railways.—			
	East Indian.	Great Indian Peninsula.	Madras.	Bombay, Baroda, &c.
Works and bridges.....	£3,775,000	£6,841,600	£2,446,900	£2,806,500
Permanent way and stations.....	6,485,000	4,938,500	2,999,800	1,735,400
Freight and insurance	2,785,000	1,517,700	1,61,000	536,800
Rolling stock and engines ..	3,145,000	1,888,090	798,000	1,096,800
Establishments.....	3,381,000	1,155,200	717,200	43,800
Miscellaneous, electric telegraph stores, &c.....	3,352,000	196,000	362,700	40,000
Total.....	£27,922,000	£16,842,000	£8,385,600	£7,210,300

The construction of the Madras line, one of the cheapest, involved an outlay of one-eighth of the total expenditure for freight and insurance. The Bombay and Baroda appears to have been more fortunately situated with respect to the same items.

Single rails are characteristic of the Indian permanent way. Of nearly 4,000 miles now open, only 209 are provided with double rails, and these are found on four lines, viz., the East Indian, which has 94½; the Great Indian Peninsula, 98; the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India, 11½; and the Scinde 5 miles. The traffic is eminently a good traffic, for less than one-third of the total revenue is raised from passengers. The passenger traffic is markedly a third-class traffic. Last year 13½ million of passengers were conveyed by the various Indian lines, and of these persons 13,000,000 were third class and parliamentary passengers. This contrasts curiously with the statistics of passenger traffic in England, where the travelers hold this proportion or thereabouts—to four persons using the third class and parliamentary carriages there are two who go by the second class, and one who travels first class. Season ticket holders on Indian lines are numerically insignificant, being but slightly over 6,000. The passenger traffic for each line is shown by the following table :

PASSENGER TRAFFIC OF INDIAN RAILWAYS FOR THE YEAR ENDED THE 30TH OF JUNE, 1867.

Railway.	Number of Passengers.			
	First Class.	Second Class.	Third Class and Parliamentary.	Total.
East Indian.....	84,119	111,850	4,280,642	4,426,611
Great Indian Peninsular.....	32,688	207,761	2,830,164	3,070,613
Madras	8,019	70,375	1,887,752	1,912,146
Bombay, Baroda and Central India.	7,102	40,216	1,505,404	1,552,722
Scinde.....	2,097	5,549	135,589	143,235
Punjab	6,312	25,873	585,113	616,509
Eastern Bengal.....	39,827	47,957	1,102,804	1,190,289
Great Southern of India.....	2,133	..	487,027	439,160
Calcutta and South-eastern... ..	3,653	16,215	392,277	359,145
Oude and Rohilkund.....	801	813	34,469	35,584
Total.....	136,251	526,119	13,083,941	13,746,311

Indian fares are low. The third class vary from one-third of a penny to one half penny per mile; the second class from three farthings to something over 1d. per mile; and the first class from 1½d. to 2½d. mile.

With the exception of sheep, the live stock traffic appears to be very small. During the year the Great Indian conveyed 208,000, and the Bombay and Baroda 212,000 sheep. The aggregate weight of general merchandise carried, exclusive of minerals, was nearly 2,000,000 tons. excluding shunting, the number of miles travelled by trains of the four largest companies were these: the East Indian, 5,230,000 miles; the Great Indian Peninsula, 2,630,000 miles; the Madras, 1,362,000 miles; and the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India, 757,000 miles during the year.

The subjoined statement shows that the aggregate gross receipts of all the companies in 1866-67, approached the large sum of £5,000,000, of which £1,377,000 was collected from passengers, or £100,000 more than in the previous year; and £3,321,000 for minerals and goods, showing an increase of £229,000; the year's increase, therefore, from both branches of receipts was £329,000—this was on the "gross receipts," be it observed. The net revenue was only £32,000 in excess of the previous twelve months. But last year the increase over its predecessor was very large, for it is stated that in the "two years the revenue has increased upwards of £1,000,000."

RECEIPTS OF INDIAN RAILWAYS FOR THE YEAR ENDED WITH 30TH JUNE, 1867.

Railway.	From			Total.
	Passengers, &c.	Goods and Minerals.	Telegraph and Sundries.	
East Indian.....	£557,511	£1,438,290	£111,333	£2,157,134
Great Indian Peninsula	323,880	1,073,811	19,469	1,417,160
Madras	168,375	289,929	16,282	465,586
Bombay, Baroda and Central India.	186,546	225,113	22,066	433,725
Scinde.....	15,067	96,225	111,292
Punjab.....	34,869	56,977	91,846
Eastern Bengal.....	61,666	71,608	7,083	140,357
Oude and Rohilkund*.....	2,540	120	2,660
Great Southern of India.....	27,353	27,534	1,460	55,352
Total.....	£1,376,812	£3,320,607	£177,693	£4,875,112

The working expenses and maintenance of the Indian lines absorbed more than half the gross receipts; in England, the corresponding charges are very appreciably less than one-half of the receipts. The total expenditure of the Indian companies amounted to £2,538,000 leaving £2,337,000 as net receipts.

EXPENDITURE AND NET RECEIPTS OF INDIAN RAILWAYS FOR THE YEAR ENDED WITH THE 30TH OF JUNE, 1867.

Railway.	Expenditure.		Total.	Net Receipts.
	Working Expenses.	Maintenance.		
East Indian	£782,397	£201,544	£984,441	£1,172,693
Great Indian Peninsula.....	624,323	159,792	784,115	633,045
Madras	137,724	66,805	204,529	261,037
Bombay, Baroda and Central India.	233,311	76,336	309,647	124,078
Scinde.	89,186	22,156
Punjab.....	71,314	20,532
Eastern Bengal	54,111	14,247	68,368	71,999
Oude and Rohilkund†.....	1,160	1,160	1,500*
Great Southern of India	19,955	5,157	25,112	30,240
Total	£1,853,481	£523,881	£2,387,312	£2,337,300

Mr. Danvers has instituted a rather minute comparison of receipts and expenditure per train mile of the Indian lines with those of Great Britain

*For nine weeks only, viz., from 9th April.

†For nine weeks only.

and the Grand Trunk Line of Canada. We place the receipts and the expenses in juxtaposition after the names of a few lines, by way of illustration, thus: East Indian, 8s. 3d.—3s. 6d.; Great Indian Peninsula, 10s. 9d.—6s.; Madras, 6s. 1d.—3s. 1d.; Bombay, Baroda and Central India, 11s.—7s. 4d. The railways of Great Britain in 1865, 5s. 1½d.—2s. 6d.; and the Grand Trunk of Canada in 1866, 5s. 7½d.—4s. The Indian bear comparison with the British lines, but their economic plight would be wretched indeed if they approached the condition of the Great Canadian company. The price of fuel seriously affects the cost of the locomotive departments of the various companies. In the East Indian the locomotive expenditure per train mile was 1s. 3¼d.; in the Great Indian Peninsula it was 2s. 6¼d.; in the Bombay and Baroda it was 2s. 3¼d.; and in the Madras 1s. 1½d. It is officially stated that "with regard to wood fuel, measures have been taken by the government for planting and preserving forests for the purpose. With respect to coal, an abundant supply is obtained in Bengal; but the beds in Central India have not yet been made available for railway purposes, access to them having been delayed by the tardy operations of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway." But little insight of these lines is needed to discover how much their prosperity is dependent on the price of fuel. The line last named paid 51s. a ton for coal; the cost in England being £27,418, the freight, &c., amounting to nearly four times that sum, namely, £98,708; coke, 62s. a ton; and patent fuel, 54s. a ton; and these are not the highest figures quoted. The Madras lines are as dependent on England for coal as the companies in Western India. The lower expenditure of the Madras "is partly due to the more general use of wood, but partly also to the economical system of management, which reflects credit on the railway authorities in the Madras presidency."

Perhaps no better evidence is wanted of the general success of Indian railways than that afforded by the large sum recouped the government for guaranteed interest. The whole sum which has been paid by government under its guarantee now amounts to £22,212,500, of which about £9,500,000 has been recovered from the companies, leaving something above £12,000,000 as their present debt, and which is chargeable against the half of their surplus profits over 5 per cent. The interest advanced to the companies in 1867 was £3,238,000; almost all of this was paid in England.

We conclude with a passage that may be profitably conned by railway directors in England. "One great advantage of the guarantee system," observes Mr. Danvers, "is that it provides effectual means for keeping the capital and revenue accounts perfectly distinct. Every sixpence which is advanced by the government for interest on the capital, both

before and after the lines are opened, is charged against revenue. An account is kept of the sums so advanced, and the government is reimbursed, under the terms of the contracts, out of the profits of the railways. Rules have, moreover, been laid down for the guidance of those who have to make up and examine the half yearly revenue accounts. True and real profits are carefully defined, and it is shown how they are to be ascertained." By these means the confusion between capital and revenue accounts is rendered impossible.

THE ANTICIPATED MONETARY STRINGENCY.

The general report has been in circulation that we shall have a very close money market during the fall months, and an apprehension of stringency, whether well founded or not, has no doubt exerted a beneficial influence in developing caution, stimulating foresight, and checking the disposition to speculation and overtrading. When the fall trade opens there will thus be a more substantial basis for it to build itself upon, and if the fears of monetary stringency should be dissipated, then the movements of business during the autumn will be likely to be all the more vigorous. It is no wonder then that the interest attaching to the prospects of the fall trade should give great importance to the monetary question, and that the future of the loan market is discussed with great anxiety by a larger class of persons than usual.

There are two or three points involved in this discussion to which it will be well to direct our attention if we would avoid error. The first is as to the movement of the currency. The South and West have for some time past been absorbing greenbacks, and of the amount which went hence to the interior last fall 30 millions at least did not flow back again, as usual during the spring and summer. This absorption is of course, equivalent to a contraction of the currency to the extent of 30 millions, and hence arose a part of the forces which have given a downward turn to the price of gold at the Stock Exchange. Now it is predicted by persons who ought to know, and whose experience gives weight to their opinion, that the South will this season repeat the process of absorption, and that of the greenbacks and national bank notes shipped thither, from 15 to 25 millions will never be seen in the North again until they come up as worn-out mutilated notes for redemption. How far this expected depletion and derangement in the movements of the currency may be correct, and if correct to what extent it may disturb the money market, are matters well worthy of consideration. We are inclined to think, however, that the influx of gold into the reserve

funds of the banks, and the 50 millions of three per cent certificates which are held by the banks as reserve, so as to set free 50 millions of currency, will more than counterbalance any disturbing influences that may arise from causes such as those to which we have referred. Besides this, Mr. Boutwell is alive to the mischief which arises from the locking up of currency in the Treasury. We have the assurance that he will not allow trouble to invade the money market through any mismanagement in that respect. And experience shows that so long as the Treasury is not a cause of monetary stringency, the other causes which tend to produce it will soon spend their force. On the whole, therefore, the monetary outlook, so far as regards the movements of the currency, is not unpromising.

Nor is this view of things darkened if we look at the supply of capital seeking investment. From causes, some of which are very obvious, the accumulation of capital in all our great monetary centres has been going forward of late with almost unexampled rapidity. It is true that capital is too much concentrated, and is held in few hands. But this very circumstance is favorable to the availability of the capital for the purposes of the loan market, and tends to make money easy. We have, however, to make allowance for the rapidity with which in all parts of the country floating capital is assuming fixed forms. But this phenomenon always accompanies the rapid increase of capital to which we have pointed and indicates the presence of confidence to embark that capital in useful enterprises.

Here, then, we see before us for our fall trade the three grand conditions of an easy money market: We have abundance of capital seeking investment, we have adequate confidence among those who own that capital and are willing to lend and use it, and thirdly, we apprehend in the currency no sudden contraction or spasmodic movement such as would be likely to trouble the monetary equilibrium. It is true the New York bank deposits are lower than for several years past, but this arises in part from changes in the methods of doing business among the country banks which used to keep large deposits here—changes some of which have had their rise in the monetary stringency of the past six or eight months. We may safely infer, therefore, with a large number of the shrewdest men in Wall street, that if there should be no artificial tampering with the money market we shall have no such stringency this fall nor any such monetary spasms as would be likely to disturb business. In confirmation of these views we copy the following opinion of a broker who is one of the best authorities on such subjects in Wall street:

"The trade with the interior," he says, "and especially with the South, is rather backward, when the improved financial position of that section is considered. This is

possibly due, in some degree, to the natural changes wrought by the extension of railroads and telegraphs, which have to a great extent annihilated time and distance. The merchants of remote sections can now wait until the results of the harvest give them intimations whether or not to make large purchases, with the certainty of finding ready sales at home. But as good crops are assured, there seems to be no reason to doubt that any present shortcoming, with regard to the general trade, will be amply compensated as the season advances. The only drawback that appears is in relation to the course of the fall money market, but from the present aspect of affairs no serious financial disturbance seems probable. The prospective drain of currency to the South and West, for crop and trade purposes, is likely to be at least partially offset by government disbursements on account of bond purchases, in accordance with the understood policy of the Secretary of the Treasury. At present indications are in favor of a steady trade movement during the autumn months, and a result far more satisfactory than last year, when business was seriously interrupted by an excited political campaign, may be expected. Still much depends on the movement of the money market. If monetary ease prevails the best results are to be anticipated.

THE COAL QUESTION.

By J. C. BAYLES.

Messrs. Horatio Seymour, A. G. Stevens and Robert Hadding, a committee appointed at a recent meeting of the citizens of Buffalo to memorialize Congress on the coal question, have lately submitted a report embodying the results of their inquiries and observations on this important subject, which presents many facts of interest and value that are deserving of especial notice. In this document it is stated that the average cost of all the coals mined in Great Britain in 1854 was \$1 15 per ton at the mouth of the pit. In 1859 the lowest estimate of cost in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania, including all expenses of machinery and repairs, was about 65 cents per ton, and the highest seldom reached \$1. The report further states that, up to 1859, anthracite coal was never sold for more than \$4 per ton, which was above the general average for several years. From 1856 to 1861 the wholesale range in Philadelphia and New York was from \$3 19 to \$4 50, and it ordinarily varied but little from \$3 50. When the inflation began, the price of coal rose to \$6 50 in August, 1863, and to \$10 75 in August, 1864. Since then the value of anthracite has fluctuated considerably, falling as low as \$4 50 in May last, and again rising within the past few weeks as high as \$10 75. These facts are significant.

Under ordinary circumstances, the question of how to obtain an abundant supply of coal at fair prices, important to all classes of the community alike, would resolve itself into a simple question of labor and transportation; in other words, how cheaply it can be mined and distributed. This is true in the present instance, but before we are likely to have the difficulties growing out of these important questions satisfactorily adjusted, it will be necessary that the existing combinations between mining and carrying companies be broken up. This can only be effected through competition. As long as we are dependent for our fuel on one locality of very

limited extent, from which the largest possible yield cannot very much exceed the immediate demands of consumers, co-operation between the various interests involved will be possible and indeed inevitable. This fact is fully appreciated by the miners, as well as the operators, of the anthracite basin, and to this dangerous knowledge the present difficulty between the workmen and employers at the mines is in a great degree attributable. The case is simply this: Knowing that the Pennsylvania companies control the only source from which anthracite can be obtained, the miners demand, first, such a share of the profits of the business as they may at any time see fit to ask; second, the right to cut off the whole supply of coal and all employment of the capital invested in mining operations whenever they please, and until consumers are forced to pay such prices as may suit the miners. Added to these unreasonable demands, there is also the reserved privilege of using force to prevent the employment of those who may be willing to work on other terms than those prescribed by the miners' unions. It is evident that no such conditions as those demanded in the "basis" can be accepted by the companies. Whatever may be the terms of the compromise agreed upon, the miners must eventually abandon their position. In order to be in harmony with, the interests of labor must be subservient to, the interests of capital. Labor in this department of industry is and always will be abundant. There are skilled miners in many parts of the United States besides Pennsylvania, and England, Wales, France, Belgium and China can furnish as many as may be needed. The proposition to import a large force of Coolies is now under consideration, and it is probable the scheme will be carried into effect before very long. Many of the collieries are now standing idle that, if steadily operated, would materially increase the supply of coal now annually put upon the market. This would no doubt have some influence in lowering the price of fuel, but we have but little reason to believe that the adoption of such a course would prove of much permanent benefit to the great mass of consumers throughout the country.

While the immediate cause of the present high price of coal is the strike on the part of the miners, it is equally true that the question of labor is of secondary importance, and that the temporary adjustment of the difficulty which assumes a new phase each year, would not bring down the price of anthracite to the lowest figure at which it could be profitably sold to the consumer. The coal business is at present practically controlled by four or five great transportation companies, who own and operate many of the mines, beside possessing the only avenues of communication with the markets; which enables them to manage those owned by individuals and corporations otherwise independent. The greatest of the carrying companies is the Reading Railroad, which has almost a monopoly of the coal

transportation from the Schuylkill region to Philadelphia, and carried in 1868 about 3,600,000 tons, besides the amount shipped by the Schuylkill Canal, which is controlled by the railroad company, amounting to about one million tons during the same period. From the Lehigh district there are two rival carriers—the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company and the Lehigh Valley Railroad; the former owning the Lehigh Canal to Easton and leasing the Delaware Division Canal from that point to Philadelphia; and the latter having a road from the Wyoming Valley to Easton, with branches to other important points. From the Wyoming mines there are three coal routes: the Delaware and Hudson Canal, which last year carried some 1,640,000 tons of anthracite; the Delaware, Lackawana and Western Railroad carrying 1,700,000 tons in 1868; and the Pennsylvania Coal Company, a New York corporation, owning a road from Pittston to the Delaware and Hudson Canal at Hawley, and connecting with the Erie Railway. In 1868 this company carried about 950,000 tons to the New York market. It cannot be claimed that there is any combination between these carrying companies against the interests of consumers; but the relations existing between the mining and carrying companies are so close and intimate that the results are practically the same. As the leading transportation companies generally represent the entire capital invested in coal mining operations, no one but the consumer has reason to complain at a charge of two and a-half or three cents a mile per ton for carrying coal to market, when it is an admitted fact that it could be carried profitably for one and a-half cents. A single exception to this is found in the case of the Reading Railroad, which is complained of by the operators as charging a tariff of prices that absorbs nearly the whole profits of the trade of the Schuylkill region. These few facts are all that are needed to show that although there exists a rivalry between the carrying companies, the competition is not of a kind to result in benefit to the consumer.


A correspondent of the *Evening Post*, whose letters from the anthracite region evince a thorough knowledge of the subject of which he treats, estimates the carrying capacity of the five companies supplying the New York market from the Wyoming and Lehigh Valleys, at 10,000,000 tons annually, if fully and constantly employed. This amount is greater than could be sold at a wholesale price of five dollars per ton. The same authority states that the Reading Railroad and Schuylkill Canal could bring six millions tons more to Philadelphia; and that the various railroads and canals to the interior could distribute three million more; so that with existing facilities, nearly 19,000,000 tons could be distributed annually. With this abundant supply, which would not be in excess of the producing capacity of the mines, coal could be sold by the cargo at \$4.85 per ton and then yield a handsome

profit to all who were interested in mining or handling it. Under these circumstances the highest retail price would not exceed six dollars per ton. The disproportion between these figures and the prices now charged shows that there is a wrong somewhere, and it is reasonable to infer that it is not to the interest of the producing and carrying companies to right it.

It is probable, however, that the true solution of the coal question will soon be found in the establishment of an active competition with the anthracite interests of Pennsylvania. Fortunately, we are not dependent on any one locality for our supply of available mineral fuel. An area of more than two hundred thousand square mile of our territory is known to be covered with bituminous coal, and as this is nearly forty times as great as the entire coal deposits of Great Britain, the supply may be considered practically inexhaustible. These deposits are found in Maryland, Virginia, Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Missouri and many other sections of the country, and even the least of them are considered sufficiently large to supply any local demand that is likely to arise. Of these almost boundless coal fields, the most convenient to New York and the Eastern markets, are the Cumberland deposits of Maryland and Virginia, where mines are now actively worked by the Baltimore and Ohio Company. The retail price of this coal in the New York market is about \$7 50 per ton, and although less convenient for general use than Anthracite, can be burned in most ranges, furnaces and stoves, as well as in grates. The trade in this coal has fairly doubled within the past five years, and in 1868 over 1,300,000 tons were sent to market. If the price of Anthracite does not fall before cold weather, it is probable that the demand for bituminous coal will be largely increased, and as it can be mined cheaper than Anthracite, may at no distant day supercede it for general use. Should the demand exceed the supply obtainable from the Cumberland region, the bituminous deposits of Western Pennsylvania could easily make up the deficiency. There is another source besides those enumerated to which the people of the Northern and Eastern States are now turning their attention, and where it is hoped not only to obtain an abundant supply of cheap fuel, but also to find the only permanent remedy for the present and prospective disorders of our mining interests; the mines of British North America, and especially of the Province of Nova Scotia. The prominence lately given to these coal fields by the statements published concerning them in most of the leading journals of the United States, and the effort now being made to force the repeal of the tariff on foreign coal, in order to secure its introduction to the American market in competition with Pennsylvania Anthracite, shows that the extent and

quality of these deposits are not generally understood, and a few facts respecting them may be of interest to our readers.

The only coal deposits of Nova Scotia are bituminous, and the average yield of the veins already opened is no better than that now mined in the Cumberland region. There are but three important coal fields in the Province, those of Glace Bay, Sidney and Pictou. The mines of Glace Bay and its immediate neighborhood yield an excellent quality of gas coal, considerable quantities of which are now used in the gas works of Boston and New York, mixed with Pennsylvania gas coals. The mines of Sidney and Pictou are of less value, yielding only a limited quantity and of a much poorer quality, in no sense adapted to domestic use. As the demand for these coals is entirely local, and therefore limited, but few veins are opened and comparatively little capital is invested in mining operations. Should a new demand arise it is probable that abundant capital could be obtained in the United States for the opening of new veins, but under the circumstances we do not see that such a demand is likely to arise, even in case the tariff should be repealed at the next session of Congress, as it probably will be. The lowest price at which Nova Scotia coal can now be sold by the cargo at New York is \$9 per ton, including the duty of \$1 25 in gold. If this duty were repealed, Nova Scotia coal would still be worth more than Cumberland coal. The actual cost of mining in that Province is \$2 per ton, and of freight to New York \$3. This would equal in value the present wholesale price of bituminous coal, allowing no margin for profits to the producer and dealer, or the incidental expenses of handling. Cumberland coal is now selling at Alexandria for \$4 75 and at New York for \$6 75, cheaper than Nova Scotia coal could be imported duty free. Considered practically, therefore, and without any reference to the principles involved, we cannot see how the repeal of the tariff would be productive of any great benefit to the community. Evidently the movement in favor abolishing of the tariff arises from a popular over-estimate of advantages to be derived from the competition thus opened with Pennsylvania anthracite. In fact, it would seem as if the only immediate solution of the coal question was to be found in the more general use of our own bituminous coal, wherever it is possible to substitute it for anthracite. It is not likely that the present prices of the latter will long be sustained, but we have no reason to hope that, as long as the present demand for it continues, it will again fall to the comparatively low price at which it was sold in former years.



THE PUBLIC DEBT.

The purchase during the last few months of thirty-seven millions of government bonds by Mr. Boutwell, for which he has paid out about forty-five millions of currency, will no doubt be fully vindicated to Congress, in part by the provisions of the loan act of Feb., 1862, and in part by the beneficent results which have been conferred on the money market and on the movements of finance and business. Still, aside from these general results which Mr. Boutwell's policy has brought about in the domain of commercial and industrial activity, there are some points specially affecting the debt itself which are receiving attention and are likely to attract much discussion, as the time approaches for the opening of Congress. The first of these questions regards the Sinking Fund and the desirableness of changing the established policy of the Treasury which for several years has been allowed to go on without being challenged either by Congress, by the press, or by the people. What this policy is, will be easily inferred from the subjoined statement of the aggregate principal and interest at the close of each fiscal year since 1860:

Showing the amount of the Public Debt Ju'y 1, 1860-1869, inclusive, with the Interest thereon Annually, in Coin and Currency; also the equivalent of the total, both in Coin and Currency, adjusted on the basis of the average price of Gold in each Year:

	Total debt outstanding at date *	Interest payable in—		Average price of gold.	Total equiv. in't in—	
		Coin	Currency.†		Coin.	Currency.
July 1.....	\$61,769,708	\$3,651,572	\$3,651,572	100	\$3,651,572	\$3,651,572
1860.....	117,480,035	5,271,553	5,271,553	100	5,271,553	5,271,553
1861.....	514,211,372	7,569,437	15,595,700	116	21,100,901	21,476,235
1862.....	1,098,798,181	17,148,376	25,632,597	148	34,460,941	51,002,193
1863.....	1,740,690,467	44,810,620	33,380,078	208	60,861,620	125,592,168
1864.....	2,632,593,026	64,521,907	83,491,812	154	115,737,270	182,555,396
1865.....	2,783,425,879	71,670,282	77,193,117	142	126,031,539	178,964,917
1866.....	2,692,199,215	93,509,125	43,900,651	138	127,321,191	175,703,243
1867.....	2,636,207,049	121,984,334	6,795,681	139	126,873,318	176,333,905
1868.....	2,597,750,965	124,258,943	5,501,899	137	128,275,928	175,738,021

From these figures it will be seen that since the fiscal year closed on the 30th of June, 1866, we have paid off 186 millions of the debt, and have reduced the principal from 2,783 millions in July, 1866, to 2,597 millions in July, 1869. In view of this fact, the requirement of the Sinking Fund law may be said to have been abundantly provided for, as the law only prescribes that one-tenth of the outstanding debt shall be paid or bought up every year, provided that the surplus coin revenue from customs duties shall be large enough to admit of such payment or purchase. If Mr. Boutwell had not bought a single bond since the 1st July last, then the Sinking Fund law would have been fully complied with, and enough has already been paid of the principal of the debt to

* Including non-interest debt and matured debt on which interest has ceased.

† Including Pacific Railroad 6 per cent loan bonds, viz.: in 1865, \$1,253,000; in 1866, \$5,042,000; in 1867, \$15,402,000; in 1868, \$32,310,000; and in 1869, \$58,633,320.

meet the requirements of the law for several years to come. The defence of the recent Treasury purchases of bonds, then, will have to meet the following objections: First, such purchases were not demanded by the strict letter of the Sinking Fund law; secondly, the five-twenty six per cent bonds, which are so rapidly bought up by the Secretary, do not mature or fall due for 18 years. In buying them he actually increases the public debt, as is proved by the fact that for every million of bonds which he cancels he has to pay out nearly \$1,200,000 of money. It is true that the income tax has just yielded 40 millions, so that the Treasury is full to overflowing. But the objectors inquire why Mr. Boutwell could not have cancelled and paid off more than 37 millions of debt with 45 millions of surplus tax receipts. We have a vast aggregate of debt payable on demand. This could be reduced at par. Why not pay off part of this demand debt instead of giving 20 per cent for the privilege of redeeming bonds eighteen years before maturity? Such are some of the arguments used against Mr. Boutwell's policy. And having detailed them, we are bound to say that that policy is now regarded with more favor than when it was first begun, and that many persons who criticised it the most severely are now disposed to approve it. The relief it has given to the money market is certainly the chief justification of this policy; and though we are by no means sure that the relief might not have been given in some other way, still the success Mr. Boutwell has achieved will no doubt justify his continuing his purchases for another month or even more. Moreover, if he were to stop now, most of the benefit of his past purchases would be lost. We do not profess to know how much of weight Mr. Boutwell may attach to these conflicting views, but the general impression is, that he is so well satisfied with the working and the popularity of his plans that he will not give them up for the present. Great anxiety prevails in Wall street to learn what will really be done, as our hopes of an easy money market and of a good fall trade depend largely on the course the Treasury may adopt in this matter; for, however much we may regret the fact, a fact it undoubtedly is, that the money market is under the control of the Treasury, and works easy or tight just as Mr. Boutwell locks up currency or pours it out from his vaults.

If we now leave the principal of our national debt, and turn our attention to the interest, we shall find the yearly aggregates very suggestive. The table we have compiled above shows how much of our annual payments of interest have been paid each year in gold and in greenbacks, as well as how much is the equivalent of the total interest when computed in currency. The reader will thus see what is the real pressure of the debt upon the resources of the nation. This is, after all,

one of the most important fiscal aspects of our national obligations. It is, of course, gratifying to see that the principal of the debt is gradually diminishing, but the interest must be paid to the day whatever happens while the redemption of the principal is voluntary, and depends upon our choice, and upon our surplus of national taxation, industrial growth and material prosperity. Many of our readers will no doubt be surprised to find that the interest aggregates on our public obligations, computed in coin, were larger last year, and constituted a heavier burden on the resources of the people than at any previous period in the history of our national debt.

THE FISCAL YEAR.

Last Wednesday a novelty was witnessed at the Treasury. The government advertised to buy two millions of its bonds from the public at market prices, but was unable to get so many, and were obliged to buy the remainder (\$863,000) on the following day. Whatever other reasons may help to account for this unprecedented scarcity, the chief reason, doubtless, was that a fall of 3@4 per cent had taken place, and that the holders of the bonds, in view of the prosperous fiscal report for the past year, and of the promising position of the Treasury for the coming year, regard their bonds as worth more than the current prices. The fiscal report for the past year is indeed very gratifying. Instead of the alarming deficit which was so confidently predicted, we have a surplus of income, amounting to about, 50 millions of dollars of which 45 millions have been gained under the present administration from April 1st to June 30th. Three things have conspired to give us this large surplus. First, the internal revenues have been better collected; secondly, there has been a great saving made in every department of the administration; and thirdly, the income tax has just brought into the Treasury some 40 millions of dollars. This last circumstance it is which has enabled Mr. Boutwell to engage to purchase with his surplus currency on hand six millions of United States bonds in June, nine millions in July and ten millions in August. It is claimed that these government purchases may have tended to deplete the supply on the market so as to give an artificial stimulus to the price. What of truth there may be in this conjecture will be seen when Mr. Boutwell ceases to buy and leaves the market to itself. This may perhaps be next month, for it is doubtful how far his currency balance, which is now running down, will justify the continuance of purchases in the present liberal scale. However this may be there is no doubt whatever that the improved credit of the government at home and abroad, which is indicated in the large advance and high rates of our bonds during

the past few months are largely due to the fiscal returns to which we have referred. The figures of this report are stated as follows for each of these four quarters:

UNITED STATES REVENUES AND EXPENSES—JUNE 30, 1866.

REVENUES.					
	July 1 to Sept. 30.	Oct. 1 to Dec. 31.	Jan. 1 to March 31.	April 1 to June 30.	Total of fiscal year.
Customs.....	\$49,996,594	\$36,900,468	\$49,389,594	\$44,021,835	\$179,996,496
Internal taxes.....	88,785,866	80,433,386	82,599,537	56,587,614	159,122,349
Direct tax.....	15,536	746,938	3,813		
Land.....	714,886	796,195	1,294,890	1,274,434	4,030,235
Miscellaneous.....	6,350,036	7,833,219	5,706,854	7,963,676	27,752,795
Total	95,342,838	76,769,301	88,934,057	109,947,619	370,893,745

EXPENSES.					
	July 1 to Sept. 30.	Oct. 1 to Dec. 31.	Jan. 1 to March 31.	April 1 to June 30.	Total of Fis. year.
Civil service.....	\$31,247,103	\$10,910,060	\$11,506,595	\$13,191,000	\$56,394,661
Pensions and Ind.....	13,358,647	5,048,128	12,187,941	5,928,838	35,519,549
War.....	27,919,117	23,918,373	13,710,033	13,651,977	78,502,433
Navy.....	5,604,786	6,303,379	3,710,466	4,483,188	20,000,769
Interest.....	38,742,814	26,328,313	88,372,709	27,450,406	130,694,242
Total	\$105,152,470	\$72,317,748	\$79,834,034	\$51,636,344	\$321,041,014
Receipt over expenses.....					\$49,862,731
Of which gained in fourth quarter, April 1 to June 30, 1866.....					45,211,375

The foregoing statements are very suggestive. The customs duties have yielded 180 millions, against 164 millions last year, 176 millions in 1867, 179 millions in 1866, 84 millions in 1865, and 102 millions in 1864. The customs duties may now be regarded as yielding an assured revenue of 160 to 180 millions. This sum could not probably be increased with advantage. But a due regard to the public credit will not allow it to be diminished, for on it we are dependent for the means to pay the interest on our national debt.

In last year's internal revenue aggregates, there is a great decrease. The amount was only 159 millions, against 191 millions the previous year, 266 millions in 1867, 309 millions in 1866, 209 millions in 1865, 109 millions in 1864, and 37 millions in 1863, which was the first year of its collection. The falling off in the internal revenue receipts is due, of course, to the repeal of taxes, and the decrease would have been much more but for the stringent and faithful collection of the taxes, especially of those on whiskey and tobacco, which have been of late enforced with a precision and impartiality unattained before under our revenue system. The general opinion seems to be, that our internal revenue might with advantage be still further simplified, and that all the minute and less productive taxes should be swept from the statute-book altogether. There are not a few persons who believe that the income tax, the whiskey tax, and the tobacco tax, if faithfully collected, would yield almost all that can safely be levied in this country by internal taxes.

Leaving this vexed question of taxation, however, it is gratifying to glance

at the other side of the balance sheet. Our navy has cost 20 millions against 25 millions in 1868, 31 millions in 1867, 43 millions in 1866, and 122 millions in 1865. The army cost last year 78 millions against 123 millions the previous year, and 95 millions in 1867. The civil service cost us 56 millions last year, and the pensions and Indians 35 millions. From the lack of detail, these items cannot be at present conveniently compared with those of previous years. We shall probably resume these considerations hereafter. The result of our analysis, so far as it has been pursued, is amply sufficient to confirm the opinion of those who see in the high prices of our government bonds a result of the improving fiscal strength of our National Treasury.

THE JUNE STATEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL BANKS.

Elsewhere are detailed our usual tabular returns of the National banks, as shown by the quarterly statement of 12th of June. These figures will be scrutinized with unusual anxiety. They show in one view the condition of the National banks at the close of the severest and most prolonged period of financial stringency on record. It will be useful to compare this report with that made on the 17th of April, in the early part of the monetary trouble. Two principal points offer themselves for special inquiry. The first regards the deposits of the banks, and the other their reserves; but both alike have to do with the strength of the banks themselves and the general stability of our financial system.

With regard to the bank deposits, we find that their aggregate amounts to \$574,367,383, being about twenty-seven millions more than in April. These twenty-seven millions represent the accumulation of idle capital which usually finds its way into the banks and lending institutions during the summer. This accumulation will be less this year than usual, for several reasons. First, the South has absorbed, and is still absorbing, immense amounts of floating capital, part of which would otherwise be on deposit in Northern banks. Secondly, there is an unusual expenditure going on in every part of the country for improvements of various kinds. Both these causes tend to use up floating capital and to diminish by consequence the deposits of such funds in bank. A third cause, tending in the same direction, may be found in the depression of business which during the last six months has impoverished large multitudes of the dealers in our banks, and has prevented their keeping their balances as large as formerly. This fact is in part modified, however, by the results of speculation which have made a few persons and speculative cliques enormously rich at the expense of impoverishment to legitimate business. The large balances which some of these parties can afford

to keep in bank produce some of those severe spasmodic movements of deposits which have played a prominent part in the manipulation of the money market since last New Year's day. Here, too, we see one of the serious dangers of the financial situation. The banks are liable at critical moments to be seriously incommoded by the manoeuvres of the tight money cliques who have on deposit prodigious sums which can at any time be checked for at sight. What remedy can be applied to avert this notorious danger does not as yet appear. The banks owe it however to themselves to take some appropriate action. They enjoy their privileges, not only for their own profit, but for the convenience of business, and that they may supply a financial machinery which shall work smoothly without spasms or jerks. If our existing national banks cannot give us such a machinery, Congress will be called upon to interpose. It is better, therefore, that the banks should exert themselves and correct this evil before it goes any further. Several plans for combined action have been proposed, but the necessity for some action is imminent.

The second point relative to the strength of our banking system, which is suggested by the statement before us, has reference to their reserves. Here the public will be glad to see a decided improvement. We have repeatedly called in question the propriety of that provision of the law which allows the banks to hold interest-bearing securities of various kinds as part of their reserve. Waiving this objection, however, the 151 millions of reserve which they hold against 733 millions of demand liabilities, gives a larger per centage than that of the preceding statement. It will indeed be a fortunate thing for the country if the banks determine to protect themselves against the possible financial troubles of the autumn months by increasing considerably their reserve funds, and especially that part of them which is held in greenbacks. Scarcely any policy which the banks could propose for themselves would have so salutary an influence, or would tend so surely to prevent the incipient movements towards a financial panic.

In other respects the returns before us offer few changes of importance. The only point requiring notice is that the government deposits remain at about the same level as in April, so that the reports are incorrect which ascribed in part the late stringency in the money market to the sudden withdrawal of these deposits from the banks.

THE ERIE CANAL AND THE RAILROADS.

Some weeks ago in treating of land and water transportation for agricultural products, we urged the importance of a reduction of rates to the

lowest possible limit and the abandonment of restrictions local or otherwise upon internal traffic. There then appeared to be an unusual interest on this subject among commercial men, shippers to the seaboard, all along the lakes and the canals to the Mississippi. Committees were sent out to consult with the merchants of the lake ports, and there seemed to be an understanding that the local rates should be uniformly reduced and then maintained at the reduced figure. We do not understand that this arrangement has been carried out. Had it been, the charge per ton on wheat from Chicago to this city would have been reduced from \$9 64 to \$6 98, and on corn from \$9 06 to \$6 51, leaving the State tolls unchanged. There was a strong hope that the canal tolls would also be reduced. The prominent canal men of the State favored the reduction. The Governor spoke encouragingly with regard to it. Still no change was made. Local charges for handling, shoveling, elevating, &c., were reduced at Buffalo, however, from some 2½ cents to about one-fourth of that amount. But the ports at the West, to whose charges exception had been taken, made no reduction, or if they did the change was temporary, or rather in the way of mutual competition, than for the sake of compliance with any uniform rule applicable alike to canal and lake ports. Of course so far as the Western cities were concerned, they had less interest in the reduction of charges than the canal ports of this State. With rates as high as they had been, the railroad was likely to come in as a successful competitor, but the lake ports would lose only such grain as would avoid the water routes entirely by taking the cars at interior ports directly for the East. These lake ports, with their great facilities for receiving and shipping grain, would continue to gather the crop largely to them, and once there, it was of little importance to them what route it would take in seeking the sea board; that would be determined by the rate of transportation. Their real interest in the reduction proposed along the line, was simply to govern the direction of the trade, and to bring to them such portions of the crop as oscillated between the solicitation of the lake ports and other interior shipping points.

The natural result of these continued high rates by water is seen in the successful competition of the railroad from Buffalo to the sea board, with the Erie Canal. Within the past two weeks the railroad managers placed their charges on grain from Buffalo to New York at 25c per 100 lbs., or, for wheat 15c a bushel, for corn 14c, for oats 8c, and for flour 60c per barrel. The canal charges were for wheat 14c a bushel, for corn 12c, for oats 7½c, and for flour 48c per barrel. By railroad this produce would be brought in three days; by canal twenty days would be required. The shipper has his return in the first case so much quicker than in the last, that the minute difference in the rate would hardly be

an object worthy of consideration. Now it is to be noticed here that of the canal charges about one-half are for tolls. Wheat pays about 6c a bushel. The other articles pay in like proportion. Is it not then easy to see that interest and profit alike demand a large reduction of these tolls? Experience must certainly soon teach that, and also the further lesson that the canal facilities of this State need enlargement. As we remarked a few weeks since, as little as possible should be taken from the producer and consumer for transportation charges for the whole country reaps the benefit of any reduction in these rates. Besides, the present canal tolls are actually a discrimination in favor of railroads, and at this very time they are taken advantage of by the shrewd men who control the railroad interests.

CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY.

The annual report of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1869, has just been published, and taken as a whole, must be considered the most favorable report yet issued. The gross earnings of the road, on a mileage nearly the same as in the previous year, show the important increase of \$1,326,496, while the percentage of operating expenses to earnings is only 56.84 per cent (taxes included), against 62.42 per cent in 1867-8. The result of the economy of operations will more fully appear by a comparison of the gross and net earnings for the last two years, as follows:

	Gross earnings.	Net earnings.
For the year ending May 31, 1868.....	\$12,614,846 46	\$2,762,362 51
For the year ending May 31, 1869.....	18,941,343 19	3,566,070 26
Amount of increase.....	\$1,326,496 73	\$1,203,707 75
Per centage of increase.....	10 62-100	50 9-10

Liberal outlays have been made during the year for permanent improvements and equipment; the funded debt has been decreased \$783,000, part of which was by the payment of bonds in cash; two dividends of 5 per cent each in cash have been declared and paid (the latter June 30, 1869); and the balance of \$281,771 remains on hand to be carried to the income account of next year. Details of the new issues of stock, and the several changes which have taken place in the funded debt are given at length below. It is to be noticed that the Directors of the Northwestern Company have pursued the policy of giving full information to their stockholders of all its affairs—the weekly and monthly earnings of the road are promptly issued, as also its annual report at the close of the fiscal year, and inquiries made at the office of the Company are courteously answered. This policy has the natural effect of inspiring confi-

dence among dealers in its stock, and makes the "Northwest" Common and Preferred especial favorites at the New York Stock Exchange. Since the close of the fiscal year the Company has been called upon to lament the death of its distinguished President, Mr. Henry Keep, to whose great energy and ability the success of the Northwestern Company is largely due. Mr. Keep was considered by many persons as, without exception, the ablest railroad man in this country, and by all, his extraordinary talents were fully acknowledged. The highest eulogy which can be pronounced upon him as a business man, is to say that he managed the properties committed to his care with great integrity and always for the benefit of the stockholders interested. Without taking a romantic view of the subject, it may truly be said, that there are hundreds of persons of limited means in this country, who bless the memory of Mr. Henry Keep, as the man to whom they are indebted for an income, out of property which was once considered almost worthless.

The lines of railroad owned, leased and operated by the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company at the termination of its fiscal year, ending May 31, 1869, were as follows:

WISCONSIN DIVISION.....	314.6 miles.
Chicago, Ill., to Fort Howard, Wis.....	242.2
Kenosha, Wis. to Rockford, Ill.....	72.4
GALENA DIVISION.....	261.0 "
Chicago Ill., to E. bank of Mississippi (opp Clinton, Ia.).....	137.0
Junction (80 m. W. Chicago) to Freeport, Ill.....	91.0
Elgin (42 m. N. W. Chicago) to Richmond, Ill.....	33.0
IOWA DIVISION (leased lines).....	354.0 "
Bridge, E. bank of Mississippi, Ill. to Clinton, Ia.....	1.1
Chicago, Iowa and Nebraska RR.—Clinton to Cedar Rapids, Ia.....	81.3
Cedar Rapids and Missouri River R.R.—Cedar Rapids to Missouri river	271.6
MADISON DIVISION.....	67.6 "
Belvidere, Ill., (78 m. W. Chicago) to Madison, Wis.....	67.6
PENINSULA DIVISION.....	73.8 "
Escanaba, Mich., to Cleveland Mines, Mich.....	67.9
Branches and Extensions to mines.....	5.9
MILWAUKEE DIVISION—Chicago, Ill., to Milwaukee, Wis.....	85.0 "

Total length of railway owned, leased and operated, 1,156 miles; second track, 30 miles, and sidings (in Chicago 37.6, and on lines 144.1) 181.7 miles; gauge, 4 feet 8½ inches.

The stock of locomotive and cars on hand at the date of consolidation, and at the termination (May 31) of each subsequent year are as follows:

	June 1, '64.	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.
Locomotives—						
{ 1st class.....	94	123	139	203	204	204
{ 2d class & switchings.....	28	31	38	44	44	49
{ Total number.....	122	154	173	247	248	253
Description and number of cars:						
Passenger—						
{ 1st class.....	71	79	109	112	118	125
{ 2d class.....	15	15	21	21	21	30
{ Total.....	86	94	124	133	139	155
Caboose and way.....	79	83	99	117	137	149
Baggage, mail and express.....	70	75	83	101	107	100
Boarding.....	2	4	4	4
Freight—						
{ Box.....	1,892	2,000	2,230	3,554	3,560	3,625
{ Platform.....	366	611	737	901	901	904
{ Cattle.....	109	109	207	3.7	307	311
{ Coal.....	53	53	53	53	13	53
{ Total.....	2,420	2,773	3,227	4,915	4,824	4,922
Iron ore.....	..	214	222	519	522	536
Total of all cars.....	2,655	3,239	3,667	5,689	5,733	5,872

REVENUE, EARNINGS, EXPENSES, ETC.

The following statement exhibits the sources and amount of revenue, and the objects of disbursement, in each of the four years ending May 31, 1869:

	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
Passenger earnings.....	\$2,510,727	\$2,945,016	\$3,593,081	\$3,990,998
Freight ".....	5,393,191	6,649,589	8,266,809	9,291,478
Express ".....	187,187	316,016	464,406	516,164
Mail ".....	77,060	124,485	173,606	175,959
Miscellan's ".....	106,108	96,627	187,964	166,742
Total gross earnings.....	\$8,243,840	\$10,161,735	\$12,614,846	\$13,941,343
Operating expenses.....	\$5,072,939	\$5,734,265	\$7,438,481	\$7,507,540
U. S. taxes on earnings.....	200,169	107,611	89,245	99,711
U. S. revenue stamps.....	4,514	5,890	6,153	4,915
State and county taxes.....	249,439	266,426	289,764	312,869
Total operating expenses & taxes.....	\$5,537,058	\$7,103,993	\$7,823,646	\$7,924,519
Earnings less expenses.....	\$2,716,786	\$3,057,742	\$4,741,199	\$6,016,823
Expn. to earnings (excl'v of taxes).....	61.54 p c.	66.17 p c.	59.56 p c.	58.85 p c.
Taxes to earnings.....	5.50	3.74	3.99	2.99
Expn. to earn. (incl'v of taxes).....	67.04	69.91	63.42	56.84

The following is a statement of the gross earnings monthly for the same years :

	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
June.....	\$741,943	\$928,968	\$983,659	\$1,180,932
July.....	702,191	708,523	888,214	1,076,673
August.....	767,508	797,474	1,063,256	1,261,940
September.....	946,707	1,000,065	1,444,942	1,507,479
October.....	932,689	1,201,215	1,541,066	1,570,066
November.....	764,671	1,010,891	1,221,530	1,107,083
December.....	547,842	712,358	879,500	1,001,866
January.....	623,535	696,146	734,169	832,093
February.....	309,917	574,664	607,977	830,266
March.....	524,844	765,398	850,192	1,142,165
April.....	587,518	774,279	1,064,597	1,112,190
May.....	556,948	696,711	1,211,149	1,263,444
Yearly earnings.....	\$8,243,840	\$10,161,735	\$12,614,846	\$13,941,343
Yearly earnings per mile operated.....	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
Yearly earnings per mile operated.....	\$3,917 08	\$9,888 80	\$10,937 09	\$12,059 99
Yearly expenses per mile operated.....	5,978 45	6,913 19	6,226 47	6,855 12
Yearly profits per mile operated.....	2,938 63	2,975 61	4,110 62	5,204 87

The earnings and expenses by divisions for the years 1867-68 and 1868-69 was as follows:

	1867-8.	1868-9.
Divisions.	Gross earnings.	Gross earnings.
Wisconsin.....	\$3,156,059	\$3,143, 69
Galena.....	4,393,657	4,622,895
Iowa.....	5,415,695	4,260,894
Madison.....	228,797	227,888
Illinois.....	445,123	534,085
Milwaukee.....	1,027,617	1,122,114
Total.....	\$12,614,846	\$13,941,343
	Operating expenses.	Operating expenses.
Wisconsin.....	\$2,009,173	\$1,876,094
Galena.....	2,483,706	2,353,006
Iowa.....	2,360,961	2,673,536
Madison.....	153,375	144,646
Illinois.....	278,837	317,785
Milwaukee.....	588,593	558,440
Total.....	\$7,823,646	\$7,924,519

INCOME ACCOUNT—DISPOSITION OF REVENUE.

The following table exhibits the nett receipts from earnings, and the mode of their disbursement for the four fiscal years, as above:

	1865-66.	1866-67.	1867-68.	1868-69.
Balance from previous year.....	\$157,603	\$483,988	\$408,224	\$20,174
Net earnings in year.....	2,716,786	3,057,742	4,741,199	6,016,823
Total resources.....	\$2,874,389	\$3,541,730	\$5,209,424	\$6,036,997

Disbursed on the following accounts :

Interest and exchange (including interest and dividends on the Chic. and Milw. RR. and the Beloit and Mad. RR. bonds and stocks).....	\$ 943,795	1,275,334	1,342,878	1,262,998
Sinking funds.....	65,120	59,130	53,130	45,120
Chic. Iowa & Nebr. RR. Rent.....	965,831	373,411	562,990	660,374
Cedar R. & Mo. Rv. RR. rent.....	152,690	265,819	419,848	475,300
Discount on securities sold.....	415,799	117,834
Dividends on preferred stock.....	447,135	932,000	*1,823,130
Dividends on common stock.....	*1,486,930	1,671,891
To all disbursements.....	\$2,590,372	\$3,073,506	\$5,188,947	\$4,122,643
Balance to next year.....	\$43,983	\$468,224	\$20,476	\$1,914,656

Since the beginning of the last fiscal year, on the 1st of June, 1868, the funded debt has been decreased to the extent of \$783,000, and this amount, added to the amount of \$275,000 of 10 per cent equipment bonds, paid off on the 1st of May, 1868, as stated in the last annual report, shows a total decrease of the funded debt, in the last two years, of \$1,058,000. Of this amount there has been paid off in cash—

10 per cent equipment bonds.....	\$825,000 00
1st mortgage, and Beloit and Madison 7 per cent bonds.....	10,000 00
	\$835,000 00
Amount retired by the conversion of consolidated sinking fund, and Peninsula bonds, and by exchange of 7 per cent equipment bonds.....	223,000 00
Total.....	\$1,058,000 00

The share capital of the company has been increased during the year \$337,296, of which \$34,486 has been an increase of common stock, and \$302,810 an increase of preferred stock; all of which has been issued for the conversion of bonds, and in exchange for Beloit and Madison, and Chicago and Milwaukee Railway stocks.

The condition of the company on the 31st of May, 1869, in respect to its stock and bonds, is as follows :

Amount of common stock.....	\$14,590,161 61
" " preferred stock.....	16,659,097 42
" " bonds as per schedule appended to report.....	17,290,400 00
Total of stock and bond.....	\$48,539,659 03

Three payments of the 10 per cent equipment bonds, issued September 1st, 1866, have already been made as they matured, in the respective amounts of \$275,000 every six months; and two more of such payments, amounting together to \$550,000, will accrue and be paid in November and May of the current fiscal year, ending with the 31st of May next.

No new issues of bonds have been made to replace the amount of these maturing bonds, nor for any other purpose; but in view of these payments, which will materially decrease the funded debt, and of the large expenditures during the year for additional equipment and permanent

* 10 per cent payable on stock. Out of which dividend 5 per cent (\$1,632,635) was paid June 30, 1869, leaving balance to income of \$281,771.

The stock of the Chicago and Milwaukee Railroad Company, which figures largely in the returns for 1865, '66 and '67, has been carried to construction and so charged off. There is still a fraction in other hands amounting to \$41 090; the total amount was \$2,250,000. Of the Beloit and Madison Railroad Company's stock but \$8,214 remains in foreign hands. With these trifling exceptions the whole property of these companies has been absorbed by the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company.

FUNDED AND GUARANTEED DEBT.

The funded debt at the close of the years 1866-69, both inclusive, stood as follows :

	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.
Flagg Trust 8 p. c. bonds.....	\$445,000	\$300,000	\$.....	\$.....
Prof. skg. fund 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 198 m.) 1885.....				
Funded coupon 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 198 m.) 1888.....	1,250,000	1,250,000	1,249,000	1,249,000
Gen. 1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 193 m.) 1885.....	756,000	756,000	755,000	758,000
Appleton extension 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 23 m.) 1885.....	3,600,000	3,600,000	3,595,000	3,594,500
Green Bay extension 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 26 m.) 1885.....	184,000	184,000	184,000	184,000
Equipment 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W.) 1874.....	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds (Gal. & Chic. U. R.R., 249 m.) 1883.....	330,000	165,000	138,000	101,000
2d mort. 7 p. c. bonds (Gal. & Chic. U. R.R., 249 m.) 1875.....	1,948,000	1,919,000	1,919,000	1,919,000
Mississippi River Bridge 7 p. c. bonds (Gal. & Chic. U. R.R., 249 m.) 1881.....	1,232,000	1,173,000	1,029,000	1,029,000
Elgin & State Line R.R. purchase 6 p. c. (Gal. & Chic. U. R.R., 249 m.) 1878.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000
Peninsula R.R. 1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds, 712 m.) 1883.....	189,000	189,000	189,000	189,000
Consol. skg. fund 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 803 m.) 1915.....	1,200,000	1,075,000	1,075,000	1,610,000
Equipment 10 per cent bonds, 1888-71.....	2,637,100	3,040,000	3,422,000	3,276,000
		2,300,000	1,923,000	1,775,000
Total funded debt.....	\$14,051,000	\$6,261,000	\$15,978,000	\$15,302,000

The "bonds guaranteed" by the Company are as follows:

The "bonds guaranteed" by the Company are as follows:

1st mortgage 7 per cent bonds	(Chic. & Mil. RR., 45 m)	1874.....	\$397,000
3d	"	"	"
2d	"	"	"
3d	"	"	"
1st	"	"	"
1st	"	"	"
	(Mil. & Chic. RR., 40 m)	1874.....	87,903
	"	"	"
	"	"	"
	"	"	"
	(C. & M. Railway, 85 m)	1898.....	1,098,000
	(Beloi: & Ad. RE., 48 m)	1888.....	83,000

Bonds of leased roads guaranteed by company.....	\$2,039,400
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MARKET PRICES OF COMPANY'S STOCKS.

Statement of the lowest and highest prices of the stocks of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company at New York in each month from June, 1864, to the close of the fiscal year ending May 31, 1869.

COMMON STOCK.					
Months.	1861-5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
June	50 @ 90	23 @ 77	28 1/2 @ 21 1/2	84 1/2 @ 14	65 1/2 @ 72
July	48 1/2 @ 58	26 @ 30 1/2	30 @ 31	4 1/2 @ 51 1/2	73 @ 54 1/2
August	52 1/2 @ 57 1/2	26 @ 31	35 1/2 @ 37 1/2	4 1/2 @ 53 1/2	50 @ 53 1/2
September	44 1/2 @ 54	27 1/2 @ 29 1/2	34 @ 37 1/2	38 1/2 @ 17	84 @ 40 1/2
October	84 @ 16	25 1/2 @ 34 1/2	33 @ 40 1/2	41 1/2 @ 18	38 1/2 @ 97 1/2
November	40 1/2 @ 44 1/2	31 @ 39 1/2	39 1/2 @ 62 1/2	47 5/8 @ 5	73 @ 90 1/2
December	38 @ 44 1/2	24 1/2 @ 37 1/2	43 @ 55 1/2	55 @ 65 1/2	74 1/2 @ 86 1/2
January	32 @ 40 1/2	28 @ 36 1/2	33 @ 16 1/2	53 1/2 @ 62 1/2	81 @ 31 1/2
February	26 1/2 @ 17	26 1/2 @ 2 1/2	34 @ 39 1/2	58 1/2 @ 61 1/2	69 @ 44 1/2
March	21 @ 34	25 1/2 @ 27 1/2	32 1/2 @ 36	63 @ 44 1/2	51 @ 55 1/2
April	25 1/2 @ 34	25 1/2 @ 29 1/2	29 1/2 @ 36	60 @ 64	54 @ 62 7/8
May	21 1/2 @ 38	27 @ 29 1/2	31 1/2 @ 38 1/2	63 @ 70	85 @ 94
Year.	30 @ 60	23 @ 39	28 1/2 @ 32 1/2	84 1/2 @ 70	65 1/2 @ 97 1/2
June, 1869.	71 1/2 @ 89 1/2	78 1/2 @ 83.			

PREFERRED STOCK.

Months.	1864-5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
June.....	86 @91½	53 @57	58 @81½	5½ @94½	77½ @94½
July.....	84 @93	56½ @66	59½ @86½	65 @78½	78½ @94½
August.....	85½ @91½	58½ @64	64 @98½	67½ @71½	79½ @83½
September.....	77 @83½	60½ @64	65½ @72½	68 @71½	83½ @91½
October.....	67½ @81	62½ @69	72½ @81	64½ @70	88 @98½
November.....	75½ @83½	64½ @69	69½ @82	62½ @71½	77½ @91½
December.....	69½ @98½	61 @85½	68½ @84½	66½ @71½	75½ @88½
January.....	61½ @71½	53½ @82½	58 @83	70½ @76	83½ @92½
February.....	61½ @71½	58½ @86½	68½ @89½	73 @75½	80 @92½
March.....	48 @64	52½ @87	59½ @85½	72½ @76½	89½ @98½
April.....	48 @67	58½ @91½	56½ @85½	68 @76½	91½ @98½
May.....	52½ @64½	56 @61½	56½ @83½	73 @80½	96½ @116½
Year.....	48 @94½	52½ @69	56½ @84½	58½ @80½	75½ @106½
June, 1869, 93½ @105½; July, 93½ @96½.					

Former notices of this Company will be found in the MAGAZINE, of December, 1865, September, 1867 and November, 1868.

MARIETTA AND CINCINNATI RAILROAD (AS REORGANIZED.)

The original Marietta and Cincinnati Company became insolvent in 1857, and the property passed into the hands of a receiver. At that date about \$12,000,000 had been expended on the work, of which \$3,500,000 was share capital, \$6,000,000 mortgage bonds, about \$1,200,000 domestic bonds, and \$1,500,000 floating debt. On the 15th of August, 1860, the company was reorganized on a capital of \$8,000,000, all the mortgage bonds having been surrendered and cancelled, and the old stock and unsecured debts wiped out by virtue of foreclosure and sale. Thus the new company took the property free from all debts and incumbrances, except a loan of \$200,000 made by the trustees for the purpose of effecting the transfer.

What is now the Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad is made up of the old line, which extended from Blanchester to Harmer, and of several roads that were purchased by the company, chiefly with stock, soon after the reorganization of 1857. These were the Hillsboro' and Cincinnati, extending from Loveland, on the Little Miami Railroad, to Hillsboro', and which now constitutes a portion of the main line, and a branch from Blanchester to Hillsboro'; the Union Railroad, connecting the main line with the Parkersburg branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which is to be more closely connected with that great line by a bridge over the Ohio river, now being built; also the Scioto and Hocking Valley Railroad, now called the Portsmouth Branch. The scheme of the work includes an extension into Cincinnati, of which about seven and a half miles still remain to be constructed. The improvements, when perfected, will make up a line of uniform gauge from Baltimore to Cincinnati, virtually under one direction, and if in the future the gauge of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad be changed from the wide to the

narrow gauge, a line from Baltimore to St. Louis and West, via the Pacific Railroad of Missouri and connections to the cities of the Pacific Slope and Coast. It is scarcely possible that those interested in this great project can fail to perfect the plan thus laid out, and furnish Baltimore with the means of developing its natural share in the over-commerce of the continent. The extension into Cincinnati will also give the road a valuable connection via Indianapolis west and north.

The lines of the present company may be described as follows:

	miles
Main line: Harmar to Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad.....	190 8
Branches: { Blanchester to Hillsboro	21.0
{ Hamden to Portsmouth	56.0
{ Scott's Landing to Belaire.....	9.0
Total road owned by company.....	276.
Leased: Cin. Ham. and Dayton (Junction to Cincinnati).....	7.

The length of sidings and other second tracks is about 22 miles. The iron ranges from 56 to 60 lbs. to the yard. Previous to the construction of that part of the road west from Loveland, the company's trains reached Cincinnati via the Little Miami Railroad, for which privilege they paid \$60,000 a year. They now pay to the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Company, for the use of seven and a half miles of road, \$25,000 a year, and to the Cincinnati and Indiana Company, for the use of depot, &c., in Cincinnati, \$5,000 a year.

The company have 52 locomotives and 580 cars, of which latter 24 are passenger, and ten baggage, mail and express the remainder being freight cars.

The mileage made by engines hauling trains in 1868 was as follows: Passenger trains, 450,760; freight, 471,380; wood, &c., 180,760, and construction, 87,700—total, 1,190,600 miles. The number of passengers transported on the lines was 311,805, and the quantity of freight, 328,877 tons. It does not appear that the through business of the lines is extensive, the number of passengers between Cincinnati, Harmar and Belpre having been only 4,419, and the tons of freight only 12,652. The earnings in the same year amounted to \$1,295,367 55, of which \$32,206 43 was from through passengers, and \$196,586 01 from way passengers. This through business has increased yearly, and when the termini are completed, the prospects are favorable to a large development of this branch of the business of the line. The expenses of operating in the same year were \$1,117,617 35, leaving net earnings at \$177,750 20. This amount was not sufficient to pay even the interest on the company's first bonds, and hence the debt of the company was largely increased. In the following table we give the earnings of the road for five years:

	FREIGHT		PASSENGER		Mail, Exp. &c.	Total Amount.
	Local.	Through.	Local.	Through.		
1864.....	\$451,167 86	\$66,000 00	\$466,313 74	\$600 00	\$55,083 65	\$1,038,165 25
1865.....	445,662 53	147,190 57	596,765 51	1,006 00	60,429 56	1,534,018 16
1866.....	591,879. 75	113,073 29	413,974 79	20,936 00	74,547 63	1,203,410 86
1867.....	675,870 45	125,628 88	873,686 89	29,877 00	76,451 85	1,280,514 67
1868.....	656,549 39	196,586 01	838,741 45	33,306 43	71,184 87	1,295,367 55

These figures are scarcely encouraging, but when the connections east and west are completed, there will, undoubtedly, be a large increase in the annual receipts. The balance to the loss of the company increased in 1868 from \$435,685 38 to \$874,372 65, or, by the large sum of \$438,688 27. The financial status of the company on January 1, 1864, and January 1, 1869 (five years apart), is shown in the following abstract of the general balance sheets of date:

	1864.	1869	Increase	Decrease
Shares, 1st preference.....	\$5,445,442 21	\$3,180,719 44	\$2,264,722 28
" 2d "	3,483,571 97	4,460,263 28	976,796 26
" common.....	1,850,000 00	2,029,778 25	179,778 25
	<u>\$10,779,014 18</u>	<u>\$14,670,865 92</u>	<u>\$3,841,851 74</u>
Bonds, 1st mort. sterl'g....	\$1,000,000 00	\$1,060,000 00	\$60,000 00
" " curr'cy.....	609,977 84	2,454,342 51	1,844,364 67
" 2d mortgage.....	2,500,000 00	2,500,000 00
" Scioto & H. Val.....	300,000 00	300,000 00
Baltimore loan to Union Railroad Co..	20,000 00	20,600 00	600 00
	<u>\$1,629,977 84</u>	<u>\$6,334,342 51</u>	<u>\$4,694,364 67</u>
Pay-rolls.....	\$23,461 16	\$131,408 87	\$107,947 71	\$.....
Bills payable and cash borrowed.....	26,508 95	241,263 13	214,754 18
Cash dividend unpaid.....	162,478 50	7,468 50	155,010 00
Individual accounts.....	99,620 87	99,620 87
Profit and loss.....	242,464 34	<u>242,464 34</u>
Total.....	<u>\$12,963,904 97</u>	<u>\$21,421,969 80</u>	<u>\$8,461,064 83</u>

Per contra, the following assets, viz.:

Railway and equipment.....	\$9,443,432 19	\$11,585,896 19	\$2,152,464 00
Union R.R. purchase.....	153,603 68	177,916 50	24,307 93
Hillaboro' & Cincinnati R.R. purchase.	1,553,317 57	1,884,796 93	335,479 36
Scioto & Hocking Valley R.R. purchase	300,000 00	300,000 00
Total.....	<u>\$11,140,353 34</u>	<u>\$14,452,609 62</u>	<u>\$3,312,255 28</u>
Construct'n—Main line.....	\$590,364 03	\$2,740,312 55	\$2,149,948 47
" " Cin ex.....	1,531 10	1,251,110 30	1,249,579 20
Discount on mort. b'ds.....	1,134,661 20	1,134,661 20
	<u>\$592,195 18</u>	<u>\$5,126,284 05</u>	<u>\$1,534,088 87</u>
Suspense Account.....	\$.....	\$155,000 00	\$155,000 00
Real estate.....	102,544 70	550,256 77	447,712 07
Bonds and stocks.....	12,965 02	52,965 02
Materials and fuel.....	10,307 03	105,549 69	95,242 61
Bills receivable.....	7,999 34	7,999 34
Uncollected revenue.....	49,950 56	49,950 56
Col. and Hock Val. R.R. subscription.....	10,000 00	50,000 00
Profit and loss.....	874,372 65	874,372 65
Total.....	<u>\$12,963,904 97</u>	<u>\$21,421,969 80</u>	<u>\$8,461,064 83</u>

The funded debt of the company, as shown in the statement of January 1, 1869, is described as follows:

	Interest Rate.	Payable.	Principal payable.	Amount outstanding.
1st mortgage, sterling.....	7	Feb. & Aug.	Aug. 1, 1891	\$1,052,000 00
1st mortgage, currency.....	7	Feb. & Aug.	Aug. 1, 1891	2,449,500 00
1st mortgage (scrip). currency.....	7	Feb. & Aug.	4,342 51
2d mortgage, currency.....	7	May & Nov.	May 1, 1896	2,500,000 00
1st mortgage (S. & H. Val R.R.).....	7	May & Nov.	May 1, 1896	300,000 00
Balt. loan to Union R. R. Co.....	61870	30,000 00

The stocks of this company are almost without market value. First preference shares have recently been sold at 20@23, and second preference at 6@8. The common stock is not quoted.

EXPORT OF TREASURE FROM SAN FRANCISCO.

The San Francisco *Commercial Herald* gives the following statement of the amount and destination of treasure exported from San Francisco during the first six months of 1869, as declared at the Custom House :

TO NEW YORK.

In January.....	\$1,697,053 75	
In February.....	799,903 74	
In March.....	1,170,150 85	
In April.....	1,622,180 57	
In May.....	201,975 46	
In June.....	161,068 99	
From May 8 to June 30 (overland).....	1,421,811 95—	\$7,074,139 31

TO ENGLAND.

In January.....	\$800,440 99	
In February.....	1,451,021 10	
In March.....	1,483,496 52	
In April.....	682,831 77	
In May.....	432,617 80	
In June.....	1,878,423 69—	6,728,831 37

TO FRANCE.

In January.....	\$190,542 78	
In February.....	162,341 33	
In March.....	283,473 28	
In April.....	84,170 84	
In May.....	168,750 18	
In June.....	155,740 09—	975,923 50

TO CHINA.

In January.....	\$571,701 21	
In February.....	335,209 77	
In March.....	783,521 13	
In April.....	322,526 53	
In May.....	673,182 43	
In June.....	742,098 30—	2,400,239 40

TO JAPAN.

In January.....	\$181,593 28	
In February.....	129,849 43	
In March.....	110,022 37	
In April.....	168,710 83	
In May.....	661,739 08	
In June.....	424,964 08—	1,678,869 04

TO PANAMA.

In January.....	\$60,000 00	
In February.....	5,000 00	
In March.....	50,000 00	
In April.....	60,000 00	
In May.....	40,000 00	
In June.....	127,007 84—	417,007 84

TO CENTRAL AMERICA.

In January.....	\$10,000 00	
In February.....	37,712 77	
In May.....	581,470 08	
In June.....	161,936 53—	751,119 99

TO VICTORIA.

In January.....	20,100 00	
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Total first six months 1869.....	\$21,046,229 95
Total first six months 1868.....	19,987,491 65

Increase the year.....	\$1,108,738 30
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COTTON CULTIVATION IN THE SOUTH.*

We, a special committee from the Commercial Convention now sitting in the city of Memphis, Tennessee, as memorialists, represent that we are closely connected with the cotton trade now carried on between Great Britain and America, and deeply interested in all that relates to the progress, prosperity, and commerce of both countries.

The extensive mercantile relations existing between the two countries, which are every year increasing in magnitude and importance, render it highly expedient and desirable in the opinion of your memorialists, that more accurate information be given respecting the condition and advantages now afforded for increasing future "cotton supply" in the United States, inasmuch as great interest is now being manifested by the cotton spinners, both of Europe and America, respecting a sufficient supply of the "raw material," at a cheaper price and in greater quantity.

On the 2d March, 1869, the memorials of the "Cotton Supply Association," the "Cotton Spinners Association," and the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester, England, to the Duke of Argyll, the principle Secretary of State for India, in council, urged a special Cotton Bureau for India, inasmuch as they looked to that country for relief in case of failure of supply from America.

The report of the Cotton Supply Association says; "There appears to be little probability that the production of cotton in America will, for many years to come, be adequate to the requirements of this and other countries; your memorialists, therefore, believe that India is the great source to which they must look for enlarged supplies that are so urgently needed," etc.

Though we hail with pleasure any exertion to increase the supply of cotton in India and all other countries, we can but think that to the Southern States of America, at last, must we look for any permanent increase in the supply of the "raw material." In East India, Egypt, Algeria, and the Levant, as in Brazil, Peru, and the West Indies, there are many difficulties attendant upon any permanent increase in the future growth of cotton, and in furnishing such cotton, at a cheaper price, in sufficient quantity to supply the wants of the world.

Can these countries grow cotton at a cost of sixpence per pound? If they cannot, then they are unable to compete with the United States.

* Memorial to the "Cotton Supply Association of Manchester," England, and to the "National Association of Cotton Manufacturers and Planters" of the United States, and through these Associations to the Cotton Spinners of Europe and America.

EAST INDIA.

In East India the difficulty of obtaining any tenure to the soil; the rude and insufficient means of transportation; the tropical nature of the climate deluging the land for one-half the year with rain, and parching it with drouth the other half, stamp it as a clime but poorly suited to the growth of a plant requiring so long and so regular a supply of moisture to mature its fruit—all of which make against any speedy increase in the supply of cotton from that country. Out of 16,000,000 acres annually appropriated to cotton growing, the largest yield for exportation was in 1866 (when stimulated by high prices), and did reach 1,840,648 bales—decreasing in 1867 to 1,508,903 bales, and in 1868 to 1,420,576 bales—averaging 347 pounds. In the district of Orissa and in Eastern Bengal, when the large crop of 1866 was made, over 1,350,000 souls perished from starvation, produced from putting in cotton lands that should have been appropriated to breadstuffs. It is now predicted that the cotton crop of East India will still further be reduced the present year—declining, perhaps, to 1,250,000 bales.

EGYPT, TURKEY, SMYRNA, GREECE, ETC.

In Egypt a more strict system of irrigation is adhered to, and the heavy expenditures for canal dues, steam machinery and English coal for fuel, to raise water from the Nile, with the high price of cotton lands, joined to onerous taxes exacted by the Government, will discourage, to a great degree, any further increase in cotton supply. Besides, in 1865, when a large attempt at cotton growing was made, some 350,000 of the population of Egypt perished from actual starvation. The yield that year, 1864-65, was 404,411 bales, and since that time has never been attained. Only 193,035 bales were imported into Great Britain the past year, averaging 500 pounds each.

Though the Viceroy of Egypt and the Sultan of Turkey have both been recently memorialized by the "Manchester Cotton Supply Association," respecting the future growth of larger crops of cotton throughout their dominions, the yield has not increased to any extent in Egypt, and both Turkey and Greece together only exported the past year into Liverpool 12,623 bales of cotton.

Smyrna cut down her fig and fruit trees in 1864, for the purpose of growing cotton, but has now abandoned it, while the rest of the Levant, except for domestic purposes, has given it up altogether.

BRAZIL, PERU AND WEST INDIES.

South America is steadily increasing in the production of cotton, but so slowly it does not amount to much. The past year the yield was

180,000 bales more than in the year 1867. But, as the bales in Brazil only average 155 pounds, and those in the West Indies and Peru only 180 pounds, the actual increase for the whole of South America, reduced to the American standard of 500 pounds each, does not amount to over 65,000 bales of cotton for the past year. This increase, however, in South America, does not atone to the cotton world for the decrease in East India the past year, which amounts to 88,327 bales, and compared with 1866, to 420,072 bales, and not as many pounds of raw cotton were imported into Great Britain in 1868 as during the year 1866.

Brazil and Peru are dependent almost solely on irrigation for the production of their cotton crops. The Pernambuco, Maceio, Bahia, and Santos cotton, so favorably known in the European markets, are produced by damming up the "rigolletas," or rivulets of melted snow that come from the Cordilleras, and thus, during the summer months, furnishing means of irrigation, so necessary in that arid climate to the maturity of the cotton plant. But for the terraces and irrigating canals of Peru, which convey the melted snows from the Andes, she could not grow cotton at all—and even now her crop is very small, for that imported into Liverpool the past year amounted only to 58,911 bags, of 180 pounds—equivalent to a little over 31,000 bales of 500 pounds each. While that of Brazil, although it amounts to 629,502 bales, of 155 pounds each, when reduced to 500 pound bales amounts to a little over 195,000 bags.

COMPARATIVE VALUE OF AMERICAN COTTONS.

But America is the home of the cotton plant, and the Southern States of America the only country where cotton can be produced successfully and regularly without resorting to the artificial means of irrigation. It is to those States that the trade must then look to furnish the deficiency in "cotton supply" for the world.

American cottons are of more general utility both of warp and woof, than those of other countries. In Europe they are used almost exclusively for warp, while the filling is of India or some other less costly cotton. The world, therefore, requires not only a large supply, and a cheap supply, of cotton, but a supply of a peculiar kind and quality.

There are, properly speaking, now in use three kinds or classes of cotton.

1st. The "Sea Island," or long staple cottons, grown principally on the coasts of Florida, Georgia and South Carolina. Of this denomination of cotton, comparatively, the consumption is small.

2d. The medium long staple cottons of American growth, denominated in Liverpool, "Uplands," and "New Orleans;" in the United States, known as New Orleans, Texas, Mobile, Savannah, Charleston and "Mem-

phis cottons." It is stated that prior to the war, nine bags of American cotton were used to one bag of all other descriptions put together. The American cottons are used almost entirely in European factories for warp, while the woof or filling is of other less costly grades. For the warp or extended threads, strength and length of fibre is especially required; while for the woof or transverse threads of the loom, softness and fulness are the chief requisites. No other cotton is better adapted as to strength and length, either to spin into the higher numbers, or to sustain the tension friction to which the threads are exposed in the loom.

3d. The short staple cotton—used almost exclusively for woof or filling. It is drier, "fuzzier," more like rough wool, and principally grown in India.

It is, therefore, seen that while the cotton spinners of Europe require only to a limited extent the first and third classes of raw cotton, viz., Sea Island and India cottons—of the second class, or medium staple cottons of American growth, they need and can consume an almost unlimited supply.

It is the insufficient supply and the high price of American cotton that has driven English manufacturers upon the short stapled native article of India—called "surat." But so beautifully have the manufacturers reduced the system of mixing the two in the fabrics, that the more American cotton manufactured in England, the greater will be the necessity for Surat cotton; and the less American cotton that is passed through British looms, the smaller will be the quantity of surat taken.

It must, therefore, be borne in mind that the great desideratum now for Europe, is not simply one of more cotton—but more cotton and at a cheaper price of the character and quality of that grown in the Southern States of America.

If India were to send to Great Britain three millions of bales of cotton in place of the fifteen hundred she now furnishes, the desideratum would not be supplied—and she would still be almost as dependant on America as ever. She cannot grow the needed character of cotton, and the growth of British India must continue to command attention only when better descriptions cannot be obtained.

Although several quarters of the world supply the long staple—and India furnishes enormous quantities of the short staple—the United States of America have hitherto produced the medium and most necessary kinds, and unless American production can be stimulated and increased, the cotton trade of the world must suffer to an enormous extent.

CONSUMPTION OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

The cotton interests of Europe and America alone require an annual supply of over 6,000,000 of bales of cotton to keep their machinery moving—whereas, the actual available production of the world will not amount, the present year, to 5,000,000 bales.

Granting that East India and the United States make full average crops of cotton, the most favorable production cannot supply the deficiency.

Say for the crop of the cotton year 1860 :

East India, more than last year.....	1,500,000
Egypt, " "	23,000
Turkey, Levant, &c., "	12,500
Brazil, Peru, and West Indies, same as last year....	707,500
United States, more than last year.....	2,100,000
All other sources.....	50,000

Making a liberal estimate of 5,000,000

for the production of the world, while the consumption is over 6,000,000, leaving the apparent deficit in supply in the "raw material" over 1,000,000 bales of cotton, at the end of the present year.

AVAILABLE PRODUCTION OF THE WORLD.

The cotton crop of the world does not now amount to four millions of bales, averaging 500 pounds, and exclusive of the United States, the available production of the globe does not much exceed eighteen hundred thousand bales, of the same average.

How to supply this deficit is the question, and how to supply it with the needed character of cotton.

From the census of 1860 it is ascertained that the cotton crop of the United States for the year 1859-60 amounted to five millions one hundred and ninety-six thousand nine hundred and forty-four bales, of 400 pounds each. The same crop if reduced to bales of 500 pounds each, shows a yield for that cotton year of forty-one hundred and fifty-seven thousand five hundred and fifty bales—a larger quantity of cotton than is now produced on the globe. Since 1861 the largest yield was that of the past year, amounting to twenty-four hundred and thirty thousand eight hundred and ninety-three bales of cotton.

We have the same soil, the same peculiar climate, influenced by the Gulf Stream, causing a regular system of irrigation from the clouds wafted from the bosom of the Southern seas, and producing the moisture and heat so requisite during the summer months to the health and vitality of the cotton plant. All the natural advantages possessed by the Southern States for the culture of their principal staple remain. But we want labor,—and with an abundance of labor the increase of cotton would not only be commensurate with the wants of the world, but the cost of production as the increase progressed would be lessened by an unerring law governing all trade.

At present it is estimated that nearly one-half of the cleared lands of the South are uncultivated, for want of labor, and therefore the cost at

which labor is now acquired, and cotton produced, is disproportionately dear.

AREA OF SOUTHERN COTTON STATES, ETC.

The area of the ten largest cotton-growing States—North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee—is six hundred and sixty-six thousand one hundred and ninety six square miles or four hundred and twenty-six millions three hundred and sixty-five thousand four hundred and forty acres. If we add Missouri and Virginia, we embrace a territory of over eight hundred thousand square miles—almost as large as the aggregate area of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Italy. The single cotton State of Texas is larger than either Great Britain, France, Prussia, or Italy, and nearly equal in area to the Austrian Empire. Southeastern Missouri might, with great propriety, be entered in the list, as the Bureau of Statistics at Washington now report nearly as large an average yield per acre from that State as any other, thereby confirming the theory that the “Isothermal lines,” or lines of equal heat, do not correspond with the parallels of latitude, but diverge from given points on the Atlantic seaboard, in a northwestwardly direction, demonstrating the fact that Columbia, in South Carolina, is not much warmer, if any, than New Madrid in Southeastern Missouri, though two degrees farther south.

In confirmation of these scientific observations, the experience of a few years past has shown that Tennessee, which was formerly scarcely considered a Cotton State, now ranks high among the cotton producing, and third among the cotton receiving, States; and that lands lying along the northern edge of the cotton belt produced sure and steady crops, being less liable to the “cotton worm” and the “rot,” although the product per acre is not so much as further south.

PRODUCTION TO BE STIMULATED.

From a region then of such vast extent, what might we not expect if there were union of effort amongst those interested, to stimulate a larger production? Practically, there is no limit to the cotton production of these States.

If the cotton spinners of the United States of America, whose interests are identified with the cotton planters, who have been favoring railway and wild land speculations in the far West, instead of turning the tide of immigration to the open fields of the South, would now pursue a contrary course and lend us their aid, the production of the “raw material” could soon be increased. If the “National Association of Cotton Manufacturers and Planters” of the United States would direct public attention to the subject, it would materially assist us.

If the "Cotton Supply Association" and the Cotton Spinners Association," of Manchester, England, would induce a surplus portion of the population of Great Britain and Europe to come among us and assist in cultivating our unoccupied cotton lands, then would Lancashire be greatly benefited and saved the fears of future "cotton famines," with the certainty of being furnished the "raw materia." at a cheaper price than it can be produced in any other quarter of the globe.

The planters and the ryots of India will not grow cotton except stimulated by high prices. The imperfect system of irrigation, the constant deterioration of exotic or American cotton seed, necessitating large outlays annual for their importation, the poor means of transportation, and the great difficulty of obtaining breadstuffs in the interior of that remote country, will deter them from risking it and increasing the production to much extent, unless they are paid remunerative prices.

The lands of Egypt are too valuable and the cultivation of the "great staple" attended with too much expense, to grow cotton to any extent at a less price than twelve to fifteen pence per pound. The lands along the banks of the Nile, suited to cotton growing, all command from twenty to forty pounds sterling (\$100 to \$200 in gold) per acre. Besides, the arable land in Egypt is confined to a very narrow strip along both banks of the Nile, most of which must continue to be cultivated in cereals for the support of its already overcrowded population. The remainder of the country is but a desert of burning, moving sands—the sport of the simoon and the home of the sirocco.

TENNESSEE, LEVEES, ETC.

We stand to-day upon the soil of a cotton State worth more to the world than the whole of South America and the West Indies. The State of Tennessee is credited in the last annual cotton statement with three hundred and seventy-four thousand eight hundred and sixty bales of cotton, averaging over 443 pounds per bale.

The production of Brazil, reduced to the same standard of 443 pounds per bale, would give a yield the past cotton year of 220,256 bales; Peru, 24,837 bales, and the West Indies, 8,382 bales, making total crop for exportation, 253,477 bales from South America and West Indies. Not more than was received by the city of Memphis the past season; for Memphis received the past cotton year 253,207 bales, and so far this season has already received over 245,000 bales of cotton.

The Yazoo basin, in the State of Mississippi, lying immediately south of Tennessee, bounded on the west by the Mississippi river, and on the south and on the east by the Yazoo, Tallahatchie, and Coldwater rivers, covers an area of nearly four millions of acres, and is worth more as a

cotton country to the world than the whole of Egypt. From the Tennessee line to the mouth of the Yazoo, not a stream enters the Mississippi river for 350 miles possessing, in this respect, superior physical advantages for easy and safe protection to any other portion of the Mississippi Valley.

In 1860 the State of Mississippi produced 1,202,507 bales of cotton; and it is estimated that of this amount nearly one-fourth was produced in the delta of the Yazoo. Here was the widest portion of the inland sea which once occupied the lower valley of the Mississippi. Its exceeding fatness is Nile-like, without the aridity of Egypt. Its soil resembles, in fineness, the silt of the ocean's bed, and is enriched by the opulence of the sea and the munificence of the land in the dead organisms of former prolific and vigorous life, which furnish in abundance the lime and potash and other elements which cotton requires. It is the most fertile and productive cotton domain on this continent, and Congress should, as an act of justice to the cotton-spinners of the North, and to the cotton-growers of the South, repair at least the "Yazoo Pass," and the portion of the levees that were destroyed for military purposes during the late civil war. With the levees up and secure from inundation, the successful cultivation of the Yazoo delta would alone secure annually an addition to the American cotton crop of 1,000,000 bales.

CHEAP COTTON—IMPROVED CULTIVATION, ETC.

Cheap cotton, then, and in sufficient supply, is what the world requires and must have. Lancashire and the continent of Europe must obtain cheaper cotton, or their mills must stop. For the past two years they have paid for "American middlings" and "fair Egyptians" an average over ten pence per pound; and many mills are now closed, or working on "short time," in consequence of the continued high price of raw cotton.

With our levees up, the freedman would seek the alluvial lands of the Mississippi Valley, finding there a better reward for his labor. The climate agrees with him, and he with the climate. With an intelligent white immigration settling upon the "uplands" of the cotton States; with smaller farms and improved seeds; with deep plowing, commercial manures, an enlightened system of cultivation—using all the appliances of improved husbandry, and employing every available means to render the soil increasingly productive—we could easily extend the yield of the Southern cotton crops again to five millions, in place of two millions five hundred thousand bales.

It is estimated that Georgia alone, the present year, has consumed over twenty thousand tons of commercial manures, in guanos and

phosphates, improving her cotton lands. The product is doubled by it, the cultivation of one-half the area is saved, and the laborer has time to devote to the cereals and fruits, making life on a cotton plantation more agreeable to the habits and tastes of the white man. This revolution has been inaugurated by David Dickson, E-q., of Sparta, Georgia, who last year invested thirteen thousand dollars in commercial manures with great profit, and who, in the midst of his extensive operations, has found time, by judicious selections and crosses, to introduce the best cotton seed in America.

We commend this system to the attention of the cotton trade, because they can safely advise immigrants to come to the healthy and well-watered "uplands" of the South, with a fair prospect of growing cotton successfully, without the constant drudgery which was once thought necessary to its production, and at the same time surrounding their little habitations with the luxuries and comforts which they have been accustomed to in their Northern and European homes. For although necessity may compel the introduction of laborers from the half civilized Pagan races of the earth, we confess we have a strong preference for those of a higher stamp, and who will ultimately make good citizens, merged into our population.

CONDITION OF LABOR, ETC.

There is a great mistake generally made in regard to the amount of labor now employed in the cultivation of cotton. When the emancipation occurred the planters made great efforts to associate the laborers together on their large plantations, but the system has completely broken down and given place to the "squad system," where from two to eight hands only work together, in many instances a single family. The "squad system" on large plantations is much less productive than the old system of "associated labor," as there is no concert of action and fair division of labor according to the recognized laws of political economy.

The freedman is unambitious of accumulation, but shows great anxiety to have his little home, with his horse, cow, and hogs separate and apart from others. Therefore, he strenuously insists on a full grain crop for subsistence of his family and stock, and only a moderate cotton crop. On a majority of the plantations, in projecting the cotton crop, the freed women are entirely ignored, and are left to attend to the household and the garden, except when the season is very difficult, when they give some assistance to their husbands and fathers in the cultivation, and, also occasionally in the gathering of the crop. This fact in itself is sufficient to account in no small degree for the disappearance of a large proportion of the efficient labor once directed especially to the production of cotton.

Perhaps it is more potent in this direction than the loss by death in the negro population during the late war, now variously estimated from five hundred thousand to one million of souls. The labor most efficient, and now most to be depended on, is that of the older negroes, whose habits of industry have been confirmed. The young negroes growing up since the war are generally idle, fond of pleasure, impatient of the control of their parents, and do not give promise of much usefulness.

The total number of slaves in all the American States and Territories, according to the census of 1860, was three million nine hundred and fifty-three thousand seven hundred and sixty. The ten cotton growing States, however, contained but three million and thirty thousand, two hundred and forty-five. Of this number not twelve hundred thousand were cultivators of our "great staple." The remainder, less the men and women who were too old, and the children who were too young, being employed in other kinds of agriculture, in mechanical pursuits, and as house servants. It would be safe to say that not over half this number (six hundred thousand freedmen,) are now employed in the cultivation of cotton. What proportion of white labor is so employed is hard to conjecture; but even estimating it as high as 200,000, that with the labor of the freedmen, at the high average of three bales to the hand, would not give an annual yield of over 2,400,000 bales of cotton.

It may be that the estimate of 600,000 freedmen now employed in the cultivation of cotton is too small, and the lessening of the cotton crop may be owing in some degree to the fact that less cotton per head is planted, and more grain, since the war. But it is quite apparent that if the amount of white labor now engaged in the cultivation of cotton does not amount to one-fourth, it is certainly on the increase, stimulated by present remunerative prices.

OVER-ESTIMATING COTTON PRODUCTION, ETC.

Another mistake generally is in over estimating the cotton yield per acre of the United States. It requires three acres on an average to make one bale of cotton, and only in a few instances does the census record a larger yield.

In 1860, in the parish of Tensas, in Louisiana, and in San Augustine county, Texas, a bale of cotton was made to the acre—weighing 400 pounds. In East India the average yield from indigenous or native seed is one bale for nine acres; but since the introduction of exotic or American seed the yield per acre has been greatly improved.

No material increase in the production of cotton can be expected from the Southern States unless our supply of labor is increased by immigration.

Notwithstanding the remarks of the Hon. Reverdy Johnson, who recently in the Town Hall, Manchester, assured the people of Lancashire that "when free labor comes to be properly developed and organized," Manchester would rejoice, not only in four or five, but in a few years, in six or seven millions of bales from America, we are forced to the conclusion that the average yield of the Southern cotton crops, with the present labor system, cannot exceed 2,500,000. Could we grow 3,000,000 it could not be picked out and saved. His hearers, the English people, have had some experience in "developing and organizing free labor" in their West India possession for nearly a generation, and they are better judges than that distinguished diplomatist, whose experience extends only over the past three years. Such remarks clearly show what errors men of distinguished abilities fall into when they leave the sphere in which they usually revolve, and venture to give opinions on subjects of which they have no practical information.

So far from looking for any speedy increase in the cotton crops of the United States, we hear, on the other hand, that labor in cotton culture is fast diminishing. It is from three causes: Emigration from the cotton fields to the towns and cities, the deaths on the plantations, and the retiring of women from cotton growing. Nothing but the free use of fertilizers, and the best success in cultivating the land planted, can keep the average cotton yield, with the present labor, up two and a half millions of bales. The picking power—the quantity that can be picked—is the limit of our capacity in producing cotton; and, even if the present labor could produce more, we could not save more. We do not think the deterioration of the negro labor will subside here so low as it has done in the British West Indies, on account of the climate of the Southern States being more rigorous, demanding more clothing, and the absence of indigenous and tropical fruits, on which they are fed so largely there. This fact will create a necessity on the part of these inoffensive and easily contented people for a larger amount of work to secure their subsistence. But for this difference the results in both countries would be identically the same.

IMMIGRATION, ETC.

Improved lands can now be had in any of the Cotton States at prices varying from £1 to £5 sterling—\$5 to \$25—per acre, and farming utensils and work stock can be purchased at fair prices. The great aversion that proprietors formerly had to the subdivision of their plantations is now rapidly giving way, and lands can now be purchased or leased in convenient lots of any size. Whilst we candidly admit that there is a great aversion in the Southern mind to political adventurers, who come

into our midst for the sole purpose of foisting themselves into office, we can insure immigrants (no matter from what quarter they come), who are honest and industrious men who come to seek homes among us and to add to the wealth and prosperity of the country, that they will meet everywhere with a friendly and most hearty welcome.

With the many inducements now presented to purchase cheap, healthful lands and comfortable homes, in a country possessing natural advantages unequalled in any other portion of the cotton world, does it not behoove the cotton trade, both of Europe and America, to direct public attention and immigration to us, and aid us in working our unoccupied cotton fields? By so doing, they would indirectly benefit themselves and very materially aid us. Every variety of climate and soil is presented in the cotton belt, stretching from the Atlantic to the Rio Grande, and from the Ohio river to the Gulf of Mexico.

The sun of heaven shines not on a land more varied in soil, climate, and production, or better fitted for the habitation of man.

In consideration of all these advantages, your memorialists ask that the influence of your Associations be exerted in directing intending emigrants to these States—believing them to be the best cotton producing districts on the globe—and that with requisite labor there is no limit, practically, to their facilities for the production of raw cotton—and that, too, at the comparatively low figure of sixpence per pound.

ROBERT T. SAUNDERS.

Of Memphis, Tennessee, Chairman.

NOTE.—In this memorial the average of the Liverpool Cotton Brokers Association for American cotton, is adopted, viz.: 443 pounds per bale. Memphis cotton is much heavier, 475 pounds per bale being the average the past season, as shown from the books of Bronson, Bayliss & Co., cotton brokers, at Memphis, Tennessee.

MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD.

The Michigan Central Railroad extends in a very direct line from Detroit to Chicago, a distance of 284.8 miles. At Detroit connection is made with the Great Western of Canada (now supplied with an extra rail for the accommodation of narrow cars) and through that road (via Suspension Bridge) with the New York Central route to the seaboard. From Chicago by this route to New York the distance is 960 miles. Within a short time several valuable auxiliary roads have been opened, as the Grand Rapids and Indiana (Grand Rapids to Kalamazoo); the Jackson, Lansing

and Saginaw (Jackson to Wenona,) and the Grand River Valley (Jackson to Grand Rapids). These roads promise to become valuable contributors to the traffic of the Michigan Central Company. Including the Joliet and Northern Indiana Railroad (diverging from the main road at Lake Station, and extending to Joliet 44.5 miles) the total length of road immediately operated by the Central Company is 329.2 miles. The track, and equipments of motive power and rolling stock, appear to have been not only kept up to standard, but considerably improved during the year. The present equipment consists of 100 engines, of which 22 are coal, and 78 wood-burners. The cars in use (reduced to 8-wheel cars) are classified as follows:

Passenger coaches (12 wheels).....	65½	Conductors' cars.....	38
Pullman (12 wheels).....	4½	Stock cars (31x8½ feet).....	311
Pulman (16 wheels).....	14	Stock cars (28x8½ feet).....	109
Second class (12 wheels).....	6	Double decked stock cars.....	74
Second class (8 wheels).....	4	Merchandise cars.....	697
Military (4 wheels).....	8	Blue Line cars.....	155
Baggage and mail (12 wheels).....	12½	Platform cars.....	234
Baggage and mail (8 wheels).....	7	Hand and rubble cars.....	290

These details aggregated give 89 passenger cars, equivalent to 122 8-wheel cars; 20 baggage and mail, equivalent to 122 8-wheel cars; 20 baggage and mail, equivalent to 26½ 8-wheel cars; 1,513 freight cars, all probably 8-wheel cars, and 286 hand and rubble cars. In the following tables we compare the operations, and the fiscal results therefrom, for the two years ending May 31, 1868 and 1869 comparatively:

1—Miles Run by Trains.

	1867-68.	1868-69.	Increase.	Decrease
Passenger trains.....	809,918	851,803	40,890
Freight trains.....	854,019	1,076,394	222,375
Working and switching.....	84,991	46,747	75,766
Total of all trains.....	2,065,916	2,974,934	899,018

2—Traffic on Road.

Way passengers.....	659,419	698,010	38,361
Through passengers.....	126,956	148,142	21,486
Passengers of all classes.....	7,814,025	846,452	60,047
Freight tonnage.....	638,586	802,885	164,219

3—Financial Results.

Passenger earnings.....	\$1,721,506 97	\$1,795,806 11	\$74,299 14
Freight earnings.....	2,480,974 16	2,775,260 48	274,286 32
Miscellaneous.....	268,393 57	165,248 31	\$103,112 21
Total gross earnings.....	4,470,871 64	4,716,914 89	245,413 25
Operating expenses & taxes.....	2,714,545 00	2,886,943 39	172,397 55
Net earnings.....	1,756,326 64	1,829,971 50	73,645 50
Passenger earnings per mile.....	5,232 54	6,223 26	1,090 72
Freight.....	7,440 95	9,701 41	2,160 46
Miscellaneous.....	815 80	681 99	283 81
Gross.....	13,539 29	16,606 68	3,067 37
Expenses to earnings.....	60.71 p. c.	61.21 p. c.	0.50 p. c.

The general results of the business of the two years are summed up in the following comparative statement. It will be seen that the figures differ somewhat from those shown in the above tables, in which the earnings, as distinguished from the receipts, are made use of:

	1867-68.	1868-69.	Increase.	Decrease
Receipts from all sources.....	\$4,430,280 37	\$4,752,224 02	\$321,991 29
Operating including taxes.....	2,714,515 61	2,886,943 39	172,377 75
Net receipts.....	\$1,765,664 69	\$1,865,281 23	\$99,596 54

Which remainders were disbursed as follows, viz.:

Payments to sinking funds.....	\$84,500 00	\$84,500 00	\$.....	\$.....
Interest and exchange.....	846,170 68	538,895 98		109,504 68
July dividends, 5 per cent..	407,025 00	426,435 00	20,410 00	
Jan. " " 5 " " "	408,810 00	452,190 00	43,380 00	
U. S. tax on dividends, &c.....	87,817 13	101,187 95	63,870 82	
U. S. tax on receipts.....	43,578 30	46,313 68	2,794 48	
Balance on new account.....	138,793 73	217,789 63	75,995 69	

The balance from 1866-67 was \$443,450, and, including the balances from the two years as above, the balance to 1869-70 is \$800,033 50 carried to the general account.

The financial condition of the Company at the close of the years 1867-68 and 1868-69, as shown on the general balance sheet is compared in the following tabulation :

	1888.	1889.	Increase.	Decrease.
Capital stock.....	\$8,477,366 00	\$11,197,381 00	\$2,719,992 00	
Funded debt.....	6,998,988 89	5,153,748 89		1,815,500 00
Unpaid dividends &c.....	9 77 60	753 00		195 60
Incoms acct, balance.....	582,243 95	500,083 57	217,789 62	1,815,500 00
Total.....	\$16,082,946 44	\$17,151,623 46	\$1,22,027 02	

Per contra : the charges and accounts which follow, viz.:

	1868	1869.	Increase.	Decrease
Construction.....	\$14,914,167 47	\$15,951,936 56	\$1,037,769 09	\$
Carb on hand and call.....	354,573 77	284,547 50		69,826 27
Materials on hand.....	153,739 60	146,745 50		6,996 10
Assets in hands of general Receiver.....	58,697 68	167,113 19	108,414 50	
Arrears of interest.....	85,251 27	94,748 29	8,849 02	
Joliet & N. Ind. R. R.....	168,235 00	168,235 00		
Chicago land account.....	97,627 00	97,627 00		
Jackson land account.....	24,411 81	24,411 81		
Advances J. L. & S. R. Co.....	105,000 00	105,000 00		
U. S. 5 per cent tax.....	2,690 89			2,690 89
Treasury accounts.....	64,766 45	65,323 81	557 36	
J. L. & S. R. Co.'s bonds.....				
(40 per cent of earnings).....		43,945 00	43,945 00	

Total.....	\$16,029,546 44	\$17,157,622 46	\$1,122,076 02
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The capital stock has been increased during the last year, by the conversion of bonds, \$1,815,500, and by the amount of stock dividend January 1, 1869, \$904,400. The funded debt has decreased by the amount of bonds converted. Construction has been increased by \$1,037,769 08, the principal part of which is the amount of the stock dividend, (\$904,400) representing permanent improvements for a series of years, the cost of which had been previously charged to operating account.

The funded debt, June 1, 1868 and 1869, stood comparatively as follows:

	1899.	1898.
1st mortgage (sterling) 6s, due June 1, 1872.....	\$477,488 89	\$467,488 89
1st mortgage (tz conv.) 8s, due Sept. 1, 1869.....	500,000 00	500,000 00
1st mortgage (conv.) 8s, due Sept. 1, 1869.....	1,994,500 00	312,000 00
1st mortgage (conv.) 8s, due Oct. 1, 1883.....	600,000 00	577,000 00
1st mortgage (conv.) sink'g fund 8s, due Oct. 1, '83.....	4,207,000 00	2,290,500 00
Total.....	\$6,968,988 89	\$5,153,488 89

The bonds of this company, which are by their tenor convertible into stock on the 1st of January only of every year, will be converted at *any time* upon presentation at the office of the treasurer, Boston, Mass. See Report.

The market value of Michigan Central stock is shown in the following table of monthly ranges at the New York Stock Exchange Board :

	1868-69. (6x6)	1869-70. (12x6)	1870-71. (4x5)	1871-72. (5x5)	1872-73. (2x5)	1873-74. (5x5)
Cash div.....	106	119½	142½-156½	103	112	109
June.....	107	116½	132	108	110	108½-112½
July.....	118	128	133½-140½	112	114	108½-112½
Aug.....	116	128½	128½-131½	108	115½	108
Sept.....	120½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
Oct.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
Nov.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
Dec.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
Jan.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
Feb.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
March.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
April.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
May.....	119½-128½	114½-130	110½-116	113	117½	108
Year.....	106	127	9½-156½	100½-117	102	117½-131

Stock dividends were paid in July, 1865, 5 per cent \$389,472, and in January, 1869, 10 per cent, 904,400. The dividend paid in July, 1869, not included in the above table, was 5 per cent on the increased capital.

TOTAL RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF THE NATIONAL BANKS.

The following is an abstract of the reports made to the Comptroller of the Currency, showing the condition of all the National Banks of the United States, at the close of business on the 12th day of June, 1869.

RESOURCES.

Loans and discounts.....	\$632,926,822 02
Overdrafts.....	3,420,938 79
United States bonds to secure circulation.....	834,609,750 00
United States bonds to secure deposits.....	27,625,350 00
United States bonds and securities on hand.....	27,476,650 00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	30,777,560 53
Due from redeeming agents.....	62,912,636 82
Due from National banks.....	35,556,504 51
Due from other banks and bankers.....	9,110,919 24
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	23,859,271 17
Current expenses.....	5,829,577 87
Premiums.....	1,809,010 01
Checks and other cash items.....	161,442,385 66
Bills of National banks.....	11,534,447 00
Bills of other banks.....	172,567 00
Fractional currency.....	1,901,855 53
Specie.....	15,435,080 48
Legal tender notes.....	80,917,509 00
Compound interest notes.....	16,610 00
Three per cent certificates.....	49,315,000 00
Total.....	\$1,564,174,410 65

LIABILITIES.

Capital stock.....	\$422,659,260 00
Surplus fund.....	82,218,576 47
Undivided profits.....	43,812,898 70
National bank notes outstanding.....	292,763,286 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	2,553,874 00
Individual deposits.....	574,307,382 77
United States deposits.....	10,301,907 71
Deposits of United States disbursing officers.....	2,454,048 99
Due to National banks.....	100,983,910 03
Due to other banks and bankers.....	28,046,771 30
Notes and bills red counted.....	2,392,305 61
Bills payable.....	1,735,289 07
Total.....	\$1,564,174,410 65

NATIONAL BANKS OF EACH STATE—THEIR CONDITION JUNE 12, 1869.

We are indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for the following reports of the National Banks of each State and redemption city at the close of business on the 12th day of June, 1869.

	RESOURCES.	Massa- chusetts.*	City of Boston.	Rhode Island.	Connecticut.	New York State.
Maine.						
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,641,639 36	\$5,770,056 57	\$44,825,406 38	\$71,570,075 13	\$29,030,004 00	\$29,300,823 47
Overdrafts.....	10,502 32	22,613 50	77,033 64	78,377 15	1,955 21	\$60,578 (91 57
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	8,280,750 00	4,897,000 00	6,695,570 00	35,262,450 00	29,968,650 00	14,314,000 00
U. S. bonds to secure deposits.....	705,000 00	725,000 00	6,085,000 00	2,838,150 00	8,168,150 00	1,877,100 00
U. S. bonds and securities on hand.....	614,700 00	326,000 00	532,560 00	3,327,600 00	277,300 00	1,693,100 00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	253,991 68	93,000 00	84,600 00	253,430 00	299,600 00	1,581,210 68
Due from redeeming agents.....	1,616,034 43	1,000,056 41	8,211,658 31	6,950,337 43	5,933,734 10	4,346,713 07
Due from national banks.....	74,910 30	50,687 34	204,045 92	677,210 11	2,508,632 76	2,163,807 76
Due from other banks and bankers.....	3,388 68	12,975 74	27,942 11	2,508,632 76	85,160 98	185,342 76
Due from other banks and bankers.....	239,276 79	116,310 41	132,673 18	831,437 32	1,231,140 41	767,681 78
Due from other banks and bankers.....	44,313 16	40,800 11	24,163 33	217,827 34	285,740 41	1,736,85 35
Current expenses.....	6,732 33	629 07	41,483 67	28,311 16	14,700 59	54,244 10
Checks and other cash items.....	235,118 19	122,632 39	94,320 87	781,076 17	7,097,109 51	697,390 04
Notes of national banks.....	166,869 00	126,635 00	153,672 00	690,076 00	1,234,006 00	273,935 00
Notes of other banks.....	634 00	800 00	1,874 00	1,874 00	56,73 00	96 40
Specie.....	25,544 08	17,608 21	15,407 74	98,093 18	45,672 34	59,007 67
Prepaid taxes.....	20,028 88	3,537 02	31,688 27	643,905 63	33,659 73	58,706 59
Legal tender notes.....	1,030,129 00	438,025 00	686,370 00	3,987,359 40	7,731,605 00	5,430,158 00
Compound interest notes.....	20,000 00	80,000 00	110,000 00	10,320 00	1,800,153 00	2,408,084 00
8 per cent certificates.....						660 00
Total.....	\$24,370,026 44	\$12,314,170 60	\$16,088,148 31	101,210,655 93	\$137,840,911 30	\$124,458,766 79
LIABILITIES.						
Capital stock.....	\$9,125,000 00	\$4,350,000 00	\$27,182,000 00	143,000,000 00	\$24,006,930 00	\$34,573,241 00
Surplus fund.....	1,806,212 61	664,787 30	8,138,185 41	9,094,309 29	1,574,334 21	4,232,430 96
Undivided profits.....	994,749 92	419,688 48	2,562,921 21	3,377,625 91	2,705,338 31	1,981,439 95
State bank notes outstanding.....	7,410,805 10	4,254,725 00	5,900,023 00	39,957,691 00	25,679,902 00	17,318,419 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	51,026 00	20,661 00	38,843 00	277,768 00	171,805 00	276,455 00
Individual deposits.....	4,948,780 14	1,724,473 82	1,740,947 56	19,169,078 19	30,476,192 89	12,191,889 81
U. S. Deposits.....	935,728 67	183,214 84	800,297 73	800,297 73	5,697,505 37	12,191,889 81
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	27,191 65	9,923 11	56,535 13	92,375 81	145,635 37	26,045 12
Due to national banks.....	40,867 64	8,235 00	67,831 69	914,076 26	12,070,822 46	4,237,819 74
Due to other banks and bankers.....	60,604 81	107,920 29	24,164 08	173,167 01	1,501,303 33	1,116,119 13
Notes and bills redeems.....				117,637 02	423,305 73	597,719 81
Bills payable.....	20,000 00	19,612 00	1,379 74	81,115 00
Total.....	\$24,370,026 44	\$12,314,170 60	\$16,088,148 31	101,210,655 93	\$137,840,911 30	\$124,458,766 79

*Exclusive of the cities of New York and Albany.

RESOURCES.

New York.	Alb. ny.	Penn'sy.	Philadelph.	P. Ueburg.	Delaware	Maryland.
Loans and discounts.....	\$17,283,313.59	\$19,514,611.09	\$2,010,397.93	\$13,212,485.90	\$2,125,514.56	\$2,385,164.63
Overdrafts.....	505,314.49	14,477.29	27,910.00	60,873.81	2,505.57	35,644.82
United States bonds to secure circulation.....	41,914,400.00	10,445,650.00	23,100,000.00	7,754,300.00	1,314,300.00	2,052,000.00
United States bonds to secure deposits.....	1,494,000.00	680,000.00	21,800.00	2,000,000.00	60,000.00	200,000.00
United States bonds and securities on hand.....	6,744,400.00	439,450.00	2,310,000.00	1,151,400.00	1,000,000.00	34,000.00
Other stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	6,222,916.67	3,704,000.00	2,310,000.00	1,200,000.00	1,500,000.00	4,672,218.00
Line from Federal Reserve Bank.....	2,228,414.45	3,234,643.43	4,233,100.00	1,491,365.49	93,173.00	1,472,218.00
Due from National Banks.....	1,043,942.13	2,745,092.13	2,432,714.31	31,457.71	7,251.29	242,212.68
Due from other banks and bankers.....	2,210,318.68	285,681.88	7,100,000.00	69,311.00	6,874.56	2,494,911.00
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	6,883,394.88	188,965.18	1,232,195.46	1,043,146.63	119,418.29	1,174,469.44
Current expenses.....	1,488,873.92	5,625.00	208,192.01	1,247,500.17	19,613.23	2,020.40
Premiums.....	760,853.19	12,760.75	20,611.57	82,180.92	8,217.23	1,940.40
Checks and other cash items.....	154,330,358.63	453,371.92	670,000.00	666,110.08	70,255.53	183,932.09
Bills of National banks.....	1,112,000.00	322,200.00	827,031.00	61,708.00	81,719.00	4,831.00
Bills of other banks.....	1,112,000.00	1,034.00	8,837.00	1,159.00	1,182.00	1,910.00
Federal currency.....	2,815,774.00	61,571.63	1,161,999.92	40,003.48	7,808.87	14,601.11
Specie.....	15,412,226.78	87,491.85	53,787.56	1,400,840.00	4,819.85	28,190.14
Legal tender notes.....	16,132,011.00	1,912,544.00	4,333,810.00	1,139,719.00	26,287.00	470,104.00
Compound interest on notes.....	30,615,000.00	535,000.00	8,500.00	615,000.00	80,000.00	600.00
Three per cent certificates.....	452,176,838.21	\$16,909,645.67	\$77,563,138.55	\$63,829,878.78	\$4,544,284.94	\$7,122,688.57
Total.....	\$17,283,313.59	\$19,514,611.09	\$2,010,397.93	\$13,212,485.90	\$2,125,514.56	\$2,385,164.63

LIABILITIES.

New York.	Alb. ny.	Penn'sy.	Philadelph.	P. Ueburg.	Delaware	Maryland.
Capital stock.....	\$73,510,000.00	\$2,650,000.00	\$11,465,250.00	\$9,000,000.00	\$1,438,155.00	\$2,398,917.50
Unpaid stock.....	17,491,079.26	973,000.00	4,810,820.00	2,000,000.00	3,840,608.00	840,728.26
Undivided profits.....	1,497,236.73	43,889.83	1,581,232.40	1,477,735.69	12,000.00	3,616,500.00
National bank notes outstanding.....	34,584,800.00	1,878,000.00	9,234,113.00	10,481,662.00	1,891,444.00	1,763,171.00
State bank notes outstanding.....	247,765.00	25,000.00	135,546.00	93,610.00	7,843.00	80,117.00
Individual deposits.....	243,575,525.53	8,017,832.54	13,201,542.63	41,080,867.47	1,181,851.85	2,386,756.57
United States deposits.....	12,354.53	24,023.81	258,455.16	63,420.71	42,285.89	50,900.14
Deposits of United States officers.....	55,915,481.91	1,018,477.53	1,844,316.00	790,311.05	1,05,097.55	91,785.20
Due to National banks and bankers.....	16,354,331.13	387,161.69	273,269.61	947,515.86	18,598.00	21,741.85
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	73,632.21	16,540.00
Bills payable.....	1,147.00
Total.....	\$17,283,313.59	\$19,514,611.09	\$2,010,397.93	\$13,212,485.90	\$2,125,514.56	\$2,385,164.63

* Exclusive of the city of Baltimore.

* Exclusive of the city of Philadelphia.

RESOURCES.

	Baltimore.	Washington.	Virginia.	W. Virginia.	N. Carolina.	S. Carolina.	Georgia.	Alabama.	N. Orleans.
Loans and discounts.....	\$15,919,706 35	\$1,251,899 90	\$3,892,446 09	\$2,686,134 26	\$1,093,251 63	\$1,121,705 43	\$2,051,377 46	\$374,078 00	\$1,127,310 67
Overdrafts.....	13,331 66	23,519 64	46,378 53	41,834 67	11,111 77	5,983 44	7,131 41	454 54	10,817 44
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	8,007,500 00	1,093,000 00	2,331,000 00	2,143,350 00	413,600 00	277,000 00	1,383,500 00	810,500 00	1,308,000 00
U. S. bonds to secure deposits.....	500,000 00	200,000 00	250,000 00	200,000 00	200,000 00	100,000 00	100,000 00	550 00
U. S. bonds, etc., on hand.....	600,000 00	245,000 00	1,500 00	219,250 00	107,000 00	1,000 00	10,491 66	101,000 00	41,000 00
Other stocks, bonds & mortgages.....	738,377 97	10,839 50	60,897 32	69,030 00	106,419 79	84,574 47	639,865 61	92,631 86	567,677 57
Due from reserve agents.....	1,010,641 49	138,741 11	341,751 38	172,137 13	135,286 96	483,430 63	639,865 61	92,631 86	567,677 57
Due from national banks.....	231,174 74	30,774 63	141,653 38	172,892 39	24,709 96	20,320 53	77,323 67	69,191 96	138,519 55
Due from other banks & bankers.....	63,916 56	44,858 84	73,381 93	36,031 95	141,653 38	172,892 39	100,930 03	15,694 72	184,331 47
Real estate, furniture & fixtures.....	582,360 93	250,128 84	283,403 45	202,066 50	7,133 21	33,859 01	6,384 23	15,233 60	28,497 82
Current expenses.....	131,083 83	52,970 74	61,471 37	35,460 50	22,680 68	28,879 85	8,616 31	30,451 98	82,000 00
Prepaid expenses.....	40,518 75	6,394 37	58,467 41	31,016 20	10,284 32	2,292 59	8,616 31	30,451 98	82,000 00
Checks and other cash items.....	1,065,656 83	53,386 88	255,630 48	72,318 10	22,961 66	2,292 59	8,616 31	30,451 98	82,000 00
Liabilities of national banks.....	192,154 00	153,370 00	124,221 00	22,063 00	67,071 00	138,473 00	233,566 00	33,096 00	6,750 00
Liability of other banks.....	2,205 00	760 00	25,083 00	1,730 00
Fractional currency.....	2,720 25	11,386 14	22,150 40	22,150 40	8,385 52	2,819 65	95,043 03	7,193 44	8,810 54
Legal tender notes.....	220,150 34	21,484 31	63,505 45	11,673 27	32,917 19	14,740 46	82,690 68	44,201 75	72,343 89
Compound interest note.....	2,044,063 00	831,478 00	438,331 00	838,406 06	253,918 00	278,716 00	737,410 00	185,000 00	261,444 00
Three per cent certificates.....	1,060,000 00	210,000 00	5,000 00	63,000 00	110 00	75,000 00
Total.....	\$33,350,207 75	\$4,258,555 17	\$3,058,785 65	\$5,701,843 97	\$2,692,323 60	\$2,555,409 91	\$5,730,603 07	\$1,217,719 64	\$4,032,661 46

LIABILITIES.

	Baltimore.	Washington.	Virginia.	W. Virginia.	N. Carolina.	S. Carolina.	Georgia.	Alabama.	N. Orleans.
Capital stock.....	\$10,391,985 00	\$1,250,000 00	\$2,231,810 00	\$2,116,400 00	\$633,400 00	\$593,400 00	\$1,600,000 00	\$400,000 00	\$1,300,000 00
Surplus fund.....	1,044,203 80	2,510 00	166,449 80	250,580 48	47,592 10	61,598 26	168,000 00	13,873 15	60,000 00
Undivided profits.....	1,018,068 81	136,866 25	251,083 91	261,749 88	120,974 28	133,774 03	332,311 68	57,101 60	132,663 81
National bank notes outstanding.....	9,590,054 00	810,500 00	2,092,590 00	1,884,774 00	8,312,250 00	174,900 00	1,232,575 00	263,481 00	1,014,879 00
State bank notes outstanding.....	131,453 00	911 00
Individual deposits.....	10,724,928 75	1,814,818 26	8,291,147 97	1,909,447 11	1,153,357 72	1,255,916 05	2,172,934 14	470,914 73	1,862,892 69
United States deposits.....	124,359 73	138,246 23	1,264,204 33	1,06,943 40	107,008 14	100 00	100 00
Deposits of U. S. Officers.....	112,817 59	1,05,554 00	47,554 00
Due to national banks.....	1,791,677 59	53,952 64	156,498 16	80,516 32	21,054 14	24,956 09	52,683 00	418 89	62,617 54
Due to other banks & bankers.....	310,323 49	9,891 69	95,599 63	23,781 01	7,158 33	48,655 53	51,339 09	2,780 79	64,118 42
Notes and bills Redemitted.....	100,000 00	70,516 14	71,100 00	7,100 00
Total.....	\$33,350,207 75	\$4,258,555 17	\$3,058,785 65	\$5,701,843 97	\$2,692,323 60	\$2,555,409 91	\$5,730,603 07	\$1,217,719 64	\$4,032,661 46

	Texas.	Arkansas.	Kentucky.	Missouri.	Illinois.	Ohio.	Indiana.
Loans and discounts.....	\$441,389	\$54,087 13	\$2,193,307 00	\$1,028,591 35	\$2,788,000 00	\$3,334,793 48	\$4,894,600 95
Overdrafts.....	61 78		19,343 18	8,759 03	78,301 05	186,793 08	38,289 03
U. S. bonds to secure deposits	472,000 00	50,000 00	1,777,934 00	95,500 00	1,476,900 00	14,997,800 00	2,284 0 00
U. S. bonds to secure deposits in	200,000 00		183,040 00	150,000 00	460,000 00	1,061,500 00	5,600 00
U. S. bond & secut's on hand	70,000 00		9,870 00	6,800 00	46,550 00	130,717 08	36,300 00
Other stocks b. n. d. & mort's	8,410 93		7,600 00	5,800 00	306,531 05	210,717 08	9,512 27
Due from redeeming agents.	5,080 71		307,268 08	135,418 58	700,534 81	1,006,000 00	547,615 36
Due from Nat. ion. banks.	2,926 41		43,437 93	84,907 14	500,127 85	750,544 13	929,588 44
Due from other b. n. s. & b. kers	2,168 45		68,340 33	93,890 14	101,978 11	480,372 19	242,479 29
Real estate, furniture, &c.	17,228 58		108,331 17	25,394 33	171,081 26	818,380 01	1,977 83
Current expenses.....	10,035 34		9,421 44	2,691 03	64,349 51	111,453 00	197,139 50
Pre-paid.....	11,202 01		2,491 76	21,377 63	21,630 41	18,113 80
Checks and other cash items	8,078 34		11,230 50	9,739 77	67,414 14	836,535 49	140,024 75
Bills of National banks.....	32,356 00		44,454 00	17,839 00	211,592 00	351,835 00	77,361 00
Bills of other banks.....			6,114 59	1,32 94	19,403 77	8,614 00	8,339 00
Fractional currency.....	981 79		3,724 74	11,295 81	21,311 93	85,827 19	16,763 25
Specie.....	217,152 32		297 89	22,398 00	547,469 00	28 5 0 41	18,293 64
Legal tender notes.....	148,840 00		297 89	22,398 00	547,469 00	2,871,354 00	2,365 29
Compound interest no. e.....	1 00		5,000 00	30,000 00	400,000 00	608,808 00
Three per. cent. certificates.....			5,000 00	30,000 00	400,000 00	1,320 00
Total.....	\$1,915,639 05	\$133,049 43	\$5,120,285 31	\$2,600,417 86	\$1,733,784 61	\$46,818,230 25	\$9,433,660 50
							\$36,613,628 91
Capital Stock.....	\$525,000 00	\$50,000 00	\$1,883,070 00	\$930,000 00	\$1,987,400 00	\$15,330,700 00	\$3,057,600 00
Surplus Fund.....	39,230 00	7,113 13	150,969 88	127,813 54	181,928 87	2,711,184 98	634,140 79
Undivided profits.....	10,068 83	3,001 71	201,593 14	89,832 23	202,731 27	708,404 96	86,995 07
National bank notes out-d'g	387,735 00	44,477 00	1,533,131 00	787,901 03	1,141,713 00	12,897,828 03	1,838,665 00
State bank notes outstand'g	65,151 61	23,740 88	1,023,080 13	487,600 70	8,781,440 11	69,240 00	10,513 00
Individual deposits.....	65,516 21		111,350 13	11,460 09	210,734 84	13,299,407 03	8,611,493 59
U. S. deposits.....	182,813 23		14,308 73	19,819 53	835,553 34	835,553 34	283,001 74
Deposits of U. S. dis. officers	8,748 00	9,709 71	40,383 16	191,593 97	20,610 26	418,691 93	90,378 00
Due to Nat. ion. banks.....	23,645 49		117,698 35	68,415 74	63,536 53	253,797 82	115,739 26
Due to other banks & bankers			10,009 33	19,330 00	39,714 18	94,546 04
Notes as a bills rediscounted			140,000 00
Bills payable.....			6,922 00
Total.....	\$1,915,639 05	\$133,049 43	\$5,120,285 31	\$2,600,417 86	\$1,733,784 61	\$46,818,230 25	\$9,433,660 50
							\$36,613,628 91

† Exclusive of the Cities of Cincinnati and Cleveland.

* Exclusive of the City of Louisville.

	RESOURCES.					LIABILITIES.				
	Illinois.*	City of Chicago.	Michigan.†	Wisconsin.‡	Minnesota.‡	Capital stock.	Surplus in d.	Undivided profits.	Other assets not to be paid out to stockholders.	Other assets not to be paid out to stockholders.
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,414,611.31	\$14,591,293.81	\$1,638,547.67	\$2,849,607.26	\$1,520,101.03	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00
Overdrafts.....	254,696.93	190,075.00	119,979.81	66,560.61	39,888.53	1,478,365.61	1,554,010.00	787,378.46	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61
U. S. bonds to secure deposits	6,362,450.00	4,840,000.00	3,371,301.00	1,816,530.00	791,550.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
U. S. bonds to secure deposits	731,000.00	60,000.00	2,000,000.00	200,000.00	300,000.00	5,509,400.00	4,371,677.00	2,533,316.00	5,509,400.00	5,509,400.00
U. S. bonds & securities on hand	332,400.00	181,650.00	98,800.00	1,465,000.00	3,650.00	1,737.00	1,073.00	1,073.00	1,737.00	1,737.00
Other stocks, bonds & mortgages	22,541.87	20,738.67	16,114.23	37,222.48	94,823.92	9,118,677.27	1,851,870.20	3,670,061.73	9,118,677.27	9,118,677.27
Due from redeeming agents	1,959,268.63	2,812,785.67	587,367.60	87,431.00	38,211.94	178,371.60	178,371.60	178,371.60	178,371.60	178,371.60
Due from National banks	109,967.63	511,000.34	891,385.43	81,171.00	492,571.00	1,478,365.61	1,554,010.00	787,378.46	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61
Due to other banks & brokers	401,163.00	408,000.97	37,000.19	87,000.00	20,000.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Real estate, furniture & fixtures	132,048.95	200,123.01	94,251.00	12,241.00	1,111.00	5,509,400.00	4,371,677.00	2,533,316.00	5,509,400.00	5,509,400.00
Prepaid expenses	7,247.92	185,000.32	1,734.36	6,440.22	21,241.00	1,737.00	1,073.00	1,073.00	1,737.00	1,737.00
Cheques and other cash items	293,123.53	1,247,655.12	1,761.00	53,428.29	20,000.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Bills of National banks	340,661.00	620,318.00	76,714.00	112,739.00	35,310.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Bills of other banks	571.00	29,388.43	86,865.12	25,872.91	56,089.53	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Specie	54,324.81	40,351.94	31,457.15	6,814.00	0.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Legal tender notes	1,693,857.00	3,253,213.19	518,315.00	487,957.00	381,940.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Compound interest on loans	2,000.00	2,000.00	100.00	20,000.00	40,000.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Three Per Cent Certificates	105,000.00	580,000.00	85,000.00	20,000.00	25,000.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00	1,912,625.00
Total.....	\$34,638,425.23	\$30,224,119.42	\$11,940,742.85	\$26,747,120.50	\$14,640,725.96	\$34,638,425.23	\$30,224,119.42	\$11,940,742.85	\$34,638,425.23	\$34,638,425.23
Capital stock.....	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00	\$1,570,000.00
Surplus in d.	1,478,365.61	1,554,010.00	787,378.46	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61	1,554,010.00	787,378.46	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61
Undivided profits	1,478,365.61	1,554,010.00	787,378.46	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61	1,554,010.00	787,378.46	1,478,365.61	1,478,365.61
Other assets not to be paid out to stockholders	5,509,400.00	4,371,677.00	2,533,316.00	5,509,400.00	5,509,400.00	5,509,400.00	4,371,677.00	2,533,316.00	5,509,400.00	5,509,400.00
Individual deposits	9,118,677.27	1,851,870.20	3,670,061.73	9,118,677.27	9,118,677.27	9,118,677.27	1,851,870.20	3,670,061.73	9,118,677.27	9,118,677.27
U. S. deposits	6,362,450.00	4,840,000.00	3,371,301.00	6,362,450.00	6,362,450.00	6,362,450.00	4,840,000.00	3,371,301.00	6,362,450.00	6,362,450.00
Deposits of U. S. disbursing offices	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83	172,987.83
Deposits of National banks	69,067.18	3,511,664.76	35,313.31	69,067.18	69,067.18	69,067.18	3,511,664.76	35,313.31	69,067.18	69,067.18
Deposits of other banks & brokers	208,689.13	2,419,301.90	14,584.68	208,689.13	208,689.13	208,689.13	2,419,301.90	14,584.68	208,689.13	208,689.13
Notes and bills in discount	47,600.00	204,737.04	191,675.72	47,600.00	47,600.00	47,600.00	204,737.04	191,675.72	47,600.00	47,600.00
Bills payable	20,140.00	20,140.00	3,400.00	20,140.00	20,140.00	20,140.00	20,140.00	3,400.00	20,140.00	20,140.00
Total.....	\$34,638,425.23	\$30,224,119.42	\$11,940,742.85	\$26,747,120.50	\$14,640,725.96	\$34,638,425.23	\$30,224,119.42	\$11,940,742.85	\$34,638,425.23	\$34,638,425.23

* Exclusive of the City of Chicago.

† Exclusive of the City of Detroit.

‡ Exclusive of the City of Milwaukee.

§ Exclusive of the City of St. Louis.

RESOURCES.

	St. Louis.	Kansas.	Leavenworth.	N. brack.	Nevada.	Ore. on.	Calo. ad.	Mont. a.	Idaho.
Loans and discounts	\$1,603,400.99	\$30,451.46	\$330,000.00	\$24,640.74	\$2,177.25	\$1,533.00	\$17,438.17	\$86.00	\$3,000.10
Overdrafts	44,214.00	0.00	1,438.75	29,688.72	18.00	8,654.11	24,141.00	4,400.00	6,721.81
U.S. bonds to secure circulation	3,861,000.00	182,000.00	300,000.00	93,000.00	156,000.00	100,000.00	97,000.00	4,000.00	75,000.00
U.S. bonds to secure deposits	31,000.00	70,000.00	330,000.00	47,000.00	156,000.00	60,000.00	150,000.00	30,000.00	75,000.00
U.S. bonds to secure other loans	22,500.00	18,400.00	1,500.00	6,750.00	156,000.00	60,000.00	150,000.00	30,000.00	75,000.00
Other loans, bonds, and mortgages	1,160,000.00	25,107.70	59,463.51	241,301.98	18,015.83	4,771.81	16,000.00	1,084.83	1,499.41
Due from other national banks	98,186.77	40,408.71	119,711.41	124,401.98	4,063.97	4,611.84	13,651.40	1,175.45	1,499.41
Due from other banks	187,892.00	181,755.45	79,955.76	46,610.00	4,063.97	4,611.84	13,651.40	1,175.45	1,499.41
Due from other banks & branches	10,000.00	8,953.94	14,603.61	19,871.40	43,800.18	6,999.71	1,438.75	4,400.00	6,721.81
Real estate, furniture, and fixtures	190,000.00	95,757.82	48,700.00	98,150.00	24,137.77	2,529.11	9,441.00	17,573.57	13,217.83
Current expenses	1,000.00	1,757.81	6,000.00	31,000.00	3,916.35	4,032.77	15,711.00	1,000.00	67.69
Checks and other cash items	15,100.00	2,000.00	11,717.39	38,666.46	250.50	2,808.75	1,562.85	7,000.00	8,883.41
Due from other banks	371,000.00	4,000.00	15,077.00	1,458.00	6,600.00	17,235.98	77,945.25	1,000.00	600.00
Due from other banks	159,171.00	20,856.00	15,077.00	1,458.00	6,600.00	17,235.98	77,945.25	1,000.00	600.00
Due from other banks	4,000.00	1,940.81	9,541.20	16,621.13	812.91	5,043.25	5,043.25	1,000.00	1,000.00
Due from other banks	20,610.00	1,157.65	8,800.00	14,971.79	59,119.89	25,114.05	80,620.51	16,500.00	9,017.74
Due from other banks	47,151.61	1,689.00	7,034.00	819,980.00	20,065.00	24,113.00	148,341.00	30,000.00	24,800.00
Due from other banks	320.00	320.00	10,000.00	140.00
Due from other banks	626,000.00
Three per cent certificate
Total	\$18,961,127.75	\$895,078.51	\$1,226,969.03	\$2,716,139.91	\$926,306.07	\$376,053.49	\$1,519,641.72	\$300,629.69	\$50,727.81

LIABILITIES.

	St. Louis.	Kansas.	Leavenworth.	N. brack.	Nevada.	Ore. on.	Calo. ad.	Mont. a.	Idaho.
Capital stock	\$6,810,300.00	\$200,000.00	\$700,000.00	\$400,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$5,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$100,000.00
Surplus fund	1,300,836.96	9,945.00	41,808.88	2,432.08	1,541.00	4,100.00	18,000.00	10,000.00	2,210.10
Undivided profits	572,381.61	2,300.65	20,171.71	196,794.42	6,223.65	20,800.00	4,400.00	1,415.84	5,934.81
Notes and bills received	8,550,140.00	130,200.00	17,000.00	160,500.00	13,000.00	8,200.00	254,000.00	35,000.00	63,800.00
Individual deposits	38,000.00	435,717.12	4,300.00	1,87,883.37	179,233.39	78,969.49	702,841.33	40,977.99	75,854.14
Deposits	24,100.00	44,700.00	71,850.00	81,411.25	44,917.83	44,917.83	1,185.00	2,000.00	2,000.00
Deposits	9,200.00	11,111.51	2,121.65	1,531.41	20,638.41	3,243.31	3,017.53	8,715.71
Deposits	6,100.00	2,500.00	28,719.73	7,000.00	1,533.11	1,100.00	1,000.00
Deposits	1,000.00	2,100.47	9,000.00	4,800.00	1,100.00	60,300.00	1,000.00
Deposits	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00
Total	\$24,171.75	\$8,051,035.55	\$1,226,969.03	\$2,716,139.91	\$926,306.07	\$376,053.49	\$1,519,641.72	\$300,629.69	\$50,727.81

* Due to the City of Leavenworth.

NATIONAL BANK RESERVES,

We are indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for the following tables, showing the state of the lawful money reserve of the National banks on the 12th day of June, 1869.

Statement of the condition of the lawful money reserve (required by sections 81 and 82 of the National Currency Act) of the National Banking Associations of the United States and Territories as shown by his reports of their condition at the close of business on the 12th of June, 1899.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.									
Number of banks reporting.	Liabilities to be paid out by reserve of 15 per cent.	Amount required as reserve.	Items of reserve.			Three per cent. on circulation.	Amount of avail. reserve.	Per cent. available re- to liabilities.	
			Legal tender notes.	Specie.	U. S. bonds.				
Maine.....	61	\$12, 94, 389	\$1, 093, 139	\$2, 049, 484	\$10, 000	\$1, 618, 084	21	21	
New Hampshire.....	41	7, 285, 221	458, 025	4, 827	30, 000	1, 471, 618	21 7-10	21 4-10	
Veront.....	40	7, 285, 221	1, 182, 161	686, 340	100, 000	1, 601, 121	21 4-10	21 4-10	
Washington.....	160	21, 704, 948	3, 992, 659	162, 514	235, 000	6, 200, 887	20 7-10	20 7-10	
Rhode Island.....	62	18, 766, 073	1, 369, 153	33, 000	1, 369, 153	1, 762, 493	17 5-10	17 5-10	
Connecticut.....	81	30, 691, 278	4, 990, 689	58, 797	215, 000	4, 765, 533	10, 406, 591	13 1-10	
New York.....	213	72, 855, 773	10, 572, 773	6, 520, 715	193, 471	1, 250, 000	7, 246, 717	14 200, 930	
New Jersey.....	54	23, 490, 130	6, 534, 418	1, 912, 644	37, 494	355, 000	8, 334, 740	19 6-10	
Pennsylvania.....	151	44, 637, 742	6, 830, 558	4, 300, 128	63, 787	85, 000	4, 433, 740	21 8-10	
Delaware.....	11	2, 505, 833	377, 948	208, 287	4, 830	80, 000	269, 172	22 8-10	
Maryland.....	10	2, 315, 001	682, 970	470, 164	26, 181	4, 000	464, 263	13 3-10	
Virginia.....	16	6, 696, 570	761, 475	439, 164	86, 805	5, 000	481, 163	14 2-10	
West Virginia.....	14	3, 903, 310	663, 567	384, 245	14, 673	65, 000	173, 147	25 6-10	
North Carolina.....	6	1, 604, 144	247, 006	82, 307	254, 065	133, 287	63 9-10	
South Carolina.....	16	1, 440, 556	219, 228	779, 716	11, 710	767, 877	41 7-10	
Georgia.....	8	3, 263, 471	628, 771	737, 594	82, 691	75, 000	694, 666	41 7-10	
Alabama.....	2	723, 246	110, 074	135, 580	18, 185	148, 580	52 7-10	
Texas.....	4	1, 270, 551	157, 043	148, 580	917, 182	263, 143	52 7-10	
Kentucky.....	11	9, 749, 773	2, 749, 773	207, 809	3, 343	5, 000	8, 77, 289	22 3-10	
Tennessee.....	13	6, 373, 713	785, 546	547, 009	24, 345	6, 000	613, 110	22 3-10	
Ohio.....	10	57, 058, 713	4, 075, 807	2, 871, 553	26, 500	400, 000	1, 372, 289	29 8-10	
Indiana.....	69	20, 112, 073	8, 016, 805	31, 519	81, 319	900, 000	6, 206, 314	19 5-10	
Illinois.....	69	15, 580, 342	9, 332, 046	1, 694, 027	77, 496	1, 612, 824	8, 872, 601	19 5-10	
Michigan.....	33	6, 588, 732	968, 819	758, 194	24, 452	15, 000	1, 539, 688	24 8-10	
Minnesota.....	91	4, 711, 091	606, 114	487, 057	17, 141	50, 000	1, 476, 044	21 4-10	
Iowa.....	43	9, 568, 210	1, 483, 230	1, 317, 151	36, 501	25, 000	1, 018, 233	25 1-10	
Missouri.....	17	4, 027, 413	64, 112	388, 097	19, 475	25, 000	2, 876, 757	24 7-10	
Wisconsin.....	10	2, 591, 613	8, 904, 199	2, 307, 777	27, 889	10, 000	435, 345	33 6-10	
Kansas.....	8	6, 611, 369	97, 705	106, 181	1, 158	137, 798	32 7-10	
Nebraska.....	4	2, 015, 521	802, 328	330, 068	14, 975	336, 405	33 6-10	
Nebraska.....	1	807, 84	46, 87	301, 005	93, 144	181, 265	42 4-10	
Oregon.....	1	292, 169	34, 875	94, 173	25, 519	9, 918	29 6-10	
Colorado.....	8	1, 021, 984	153, 249	20, 521	20, 521	817, 416	31 1-10	
Montana.....	1	138, 193	20, 840	30, 500	26, 564	48, 289	74 7-10	
Idaho.....	1	138, 193	20, 840	30, 500	26, 564	48, 289	74 7-10	
Total.....		\$235, 296, 207	\$36, 117, 329	\$1, 607, 173	\$4, 335, 001		\$33, 262, 913	\$85, 492, 315	21 0 10

Statement of the condition of the lawful money reserve required by sections 31 and 32 of the National Currency Act, of the National Banking Associations located in the cities named in section 31, except in New York, as shown by the reports of their condition at the close of business on the 12th day of June, 1869.

REDEMPTION CITIES.

		\$7,570,126	\$7,781,605	\$648,904	\$4,845,000	\$5,923,731	\$19,114,245	27 3-10
Boston.....	46	\$70,340,505	\$7,781,605	\$648,904	\$4,845,000	\$5,923,731	\$19,114,245	27 3-10
Albany.....	7	116,355.3	1,416,653	12,130	64,000	2,380,435	4,838,213	37 9-10
Philadelphia.....	20	60,685.87	8,183,716	140,068	5,791,000	1,281,231	15,388,015	30 4-10
Pittsburg.....	15	14,801,073	5,722,703	38,851	145,000	1,401,303	3,714,935	24 9-10
Baltimore.....	13	11,810,740	4,404,185	2,024,579	1,060,000	1,140,004	4,500,200	25 5-10
Washington.....	3	2,755,788	657,197	2,484	240,000	1,387,541	757,703	27 5-10
New Orleans.....	2	2,261,65	381,614	72,543	..	1,675,683	1,001,575	44 3-10
Louisville.....	4	1,302,321	280,948	14,203	5,000	153,49	875,712	26 8-10
Cincinnati.....	6	8,850,416	1,006,241	15,949	150,000	920,585	2,152,873	24 1-10
Cleveland.....	6	5,100,319	5,46,306	2,305	275,000	641,605	1,731,178	25 9-10
Chicago.....	16	50,143,71	8,524,253	40,373	590,000	2,842,798	6,725,491	33 4-10
Detroit.....	8	2,634,03	648,375	6,372	150,000	576,404	1,220,113	30 7-10
Minneapolis.....	5	2,630,07	384,320	6,314	60,000	276,242	507,706	30 7-10
St. Louis.....	8	8,493,184	580,445	47,816	65,000	900,167	2,461,138	27 4-10
Leavenworth.....	2	901,734	67,034	800	10,000	109,719	157,653	20 5-10
Total.....	164	\$2,2,040,716	\$28,549,623	\$1,386,311	\$11,905,040	\$19,304,317	\$61,205,261	28 9-10

Statement of the condition of the lawful money reserve, required by sections 31 and 32 of the National Currency Act, of the National Banking Associations located in the city of New York, as shown by the reports of their condition at the close of business on the 12th day of June, 1869.

		Liabilities to Number of banks rep rtd. g.	Amount by reserve of as e rve.	Legal tender crs.	Specie.	Gold Treasury notes.	3 p c tem- per rty loan certificates.	3 p c tem- per rty loan certificates.	Amount of avail. reserve.	Percent of liab e resce ve to liabilities.
New York.....	55	\$203,206,964	\$50,801,151	\$16,152,021	\$5,542,579	\$8,953,695	\$19,055,000	\$11,500,000	\$61,203,225	30 1-10

* Liabilities of banks in cities to be protected by a reserve of twelve and a half per cent of the amount.
† Amount in New York City available for the redemption of circulation.

THE CHINESE AGAIN.

Since the article in this MAGAZINE last month upon Chinese emancipation, the action of the Memphis Convention has been made public. It adds something to our positive knowledge of the subject, but it is more fruitful in suggestions and speculations. One result of that Convention was the organization of the Mississippi Valley Emigration Company, the capital stock of which was placed at \$1,000,000, in shares of \$100, and \$40,000 were at once subscribed. The object of the company is to bring in Chinese laborers as fast as possible and to distribute them first among the stockholders and then through the community at large. From statements made at the Convention it appears that Chinese laborers can be brought to San Francisco from Chinese ports for \$45 in gold. From San Francisco to Memphis they can be transported for from \$45 to \$50 in currency, the rate depending upon the number in a "consignment." From Memphis to various points at the South they can be distributed at rates varying from one cent per mile by rail, to from \$1 to \$2.50 a head on the water routes, as the distance may be. From Hong Kong to New York by sail, the rate would be from \$100 to \$125 in gold. The time from China to the Mississippi would be thirty-five or forty days by the California route, and by New York, say, one hundred and twenty-five days. On the subject of wages it was generally conceded by the speakers at the Memphis Convention that the rates paid would be far below the wages under the present system. It was impossible to arrive at exact statements but Mr. Koopmanschaap, the Chinese contractor, said the Chinese now in California must have \$20 a month to induce them to come east, but fresh importation could be made upon a five year contract for ten or twelve dollars a month and transportation paid.

A Chinese merchant addressing the Convention warned them against the importation of the Chinese labor of the coast cities, and urged the importance of carefully selecting them from the agricultural classes and the artisans of the interior. The Hawaiian Commissioner of Emigration, in a letter to the Convention, spoke of the striking differences in Chinese laborers, and said that in consequence of inattention to selection, the Coolies had given great disappointment in Peru, Cuba and the Sandwich Islands. He urged the importance of a careful and experienced personal selection of young, healthy and intelligent laborers. Mr. Koopmanschaap, the Chinese contractor, has brought 30,000 to California, and he is ready to promise to bring 100,000 in the coming year. Through him the Central Pacific Railroad was supplied with labor. He asserts that the Chinese keep their contracts.

Considerable opposition to the Chinese has been excited by the circum-

stance that they will work for less wages than is now paid for labor. It is precisely for this reason that they will prove a desirable addition to the productive force of the country. Hostility to the Chinese on this account is as unphilosophical and shortsighted as the former opposition to labor saving machinery and to the new mechanical inventions which promise to increase production, lessen cost and add to the happiness of all classes. If this unskilled labor comes here it will at once need the service of our skilled mechanics and laborers to instruct and direct it. At once a host of our present workmen become overseers, foremen, even employers and capitalists. Our workmen have already found foreign labor more profitable in canal and railroad building than if they had done this work themselves. They have been advanced from drudgery to direction, and they have seen, in spite of the enormous emigration from Europe, a gradual and steady increase in the wages of labor, and the sum of comfort that the reward of labor secures. Such will be the result of an Asiatic emigration, and the ones who bewail its approach now and predict an inroad of evils, will live to regret the hasty and unreasonable judgement they have formed. The great need of this country is labor—labor in the lowest grade and labor that is skilled and intelligent. Here is a broad field for development for an increasing population, for expanding interests. Whatever cheapens products benefits all these interests and adds to the aggregate wealth of the community.

It is a curious fact that the Convention of both political parties in California, held within the last few weeks, have passed such resolutions against the emigration of Chinese as they never would have passed against the emigration of Europeans. The California senators have also spoken. The difference in the language of the two parties is this: One objects *in toto* to Chinese emigration and Chinese suffrage. The other objects to Chinese suffrage but would protect "inoffensive" emigrants. One California senator says that it is the duty of every class of citizens to prevent the introduction of the Chinese. To-day he says they will compete with the common laborer, "to-morrow with the mason, the bricklayer, the carpenter, and the machinist, for they are *the most frugal, industrious and ingenious people on the face of the earth.*" The senator pointed to a "splendid granite building," the stone of which was cut in China, and said that he favored keeping such men out of the State—men who can do the work for less than half the price paid the white mechanic. The fact that these men are "frugal, industrious and ingenious," would imply that they were most valuable additions to our labor force. In building our great public works, railroads, canals, wharves and piers, in dredging harbors, in developing mines of coal and iron, it is this cheap labor that is needed. This senator's speech clearly refutes itself. Another

California senator writes a letter on the same subject. But he, too, is evidently influenced by the prevalent California sentiment. He does not fear the State will be overrun, but thinks the Chinese will be apt to find their way to Mexico. He adds, however:

Besides Mexico, nearly all of Central and South America is open to them, and mankind would be greatly benefited by their coming. The wealth and happiness of the world would be indefinitely increased thereby. I cannot sympathize with that eminently Chinese policy of excluding from the uncultivated fields of the New World a y people who desire to increase the number of blades of grass and ears of corn. It has long been our proudest boast that America is the asylum of the oppressed of all lands and if the crowded populations of Asia as well as of Europe desire the privilege of expanding their labor here, let them come. Our immigration from Europe this year is unusually large—more than 25,000 in excess of last year at this date. These tides may meet and possibly mingle, but it is more likely that the Asiatic portion will be deflected southward, where a more congenial home for them can be found.

I can remember no country that has not been benefited by legitimate immigration. Our own is a conspicuous example of this. In some cases we could have desired a better class of immigration, but we have repelled none, and the general result has been advantageous. The character of population, independent of race, depends much upon the country and climate in which they are thrown, and the descendants of the Chinese, should their descendants grow up in this country, may conform closely to our habits of thinking and acting. Such at all events, has been the case with every other race that has come to this country. If, in that event, they should claim, and be permitted to exercise the privileges of citizenship, no evil can come of it.

We have quoted the opinions of these Senators rather as representative of the opinion that prevails on the Pacific Slope than for any other purpose, and we firmly believe that they are opinions that time will so modify, that in a few years no more objection will be made to an Asiatic than to a European emigrant, and a decided preference will be given to industry, frugality and ingenuity, come whence they may.

In the midst of this discussion of Chinese emigration, a law of the United States, passed in 1862, is brought up, and it is claimed that this act is prohibitory of this emigration as it has been conducted. It is just possible that the act is misunderstood, and that it applies not to the transportation of Coolies from China to the United States, but to the use of American vessels for carrying Coolies from China to ports in other foreign countries. But whatever interpretation is placed on the act this fact remains, that the "free and voluntary emigration of any Chinese subject" is not prohibited. Besides this, it would seem strange, considering the hostility of Californians to the Chinese, that Mr. Koopmanschaap and his associates had never been interfered with. There was United States law against them. There was local antipathy pervading not only the masses, but inspiring the politicians, and yet they imported the Chinese without interference or question. If the law of 1862 should be interpreted as it is, by those who use it as a shield against the emigration of Chinese, there is little doubt it will be modified, and that the emigra-

tion of Asiatics will be protected only by the same safeguards that are thrown about all emigration. The fear of peonage or slavery will not be felt. The Constitutional guarantee which protects the negro will protect the Asiatic; and, under a beneficent government of equal laws, with climate and production unrivalled, with labor free and unharnessed, there can be no doubt that prosperity and development will be all that we could wish or hope for.

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR JULY AND SINCE JANUARY 1.

The earnings of the several important lines of railroad which report their monthly traffic, have now been obtained and are published in our usual tabular form below. It is much to be regretted that so few companies furnish to their own stockholders, who are indeed the actual owners of the property, a statement of the monthly earnings of the roads, since the *bona fide* value of the shares which they hold, depends from time to time, almost entirely upon the condition of the traffic. It is hardly possible to suggest a single remedy, which would be more effective in preventing the gross and dishonorable speculations in railroad stocks by directors and their friends, to the injury of innocent stockholders, than the passage of a law or Stock Exchange rule, requiring every company, whose shares are sold at the board, to have a monthly report of expenses and earnings recorded where stockholders could examine it at their pleasure. The tendency of legislation is now in this direction, and within a few years it is more than probable that such laws will be made.

There are several points worthy of attention in regard to the July earnings. The Chicago and Alton road shows a considerable decrease from the earnings of July, 1868, as in that month the additional mileage from the leased line (150 miles) was added, and the comparison for the previous months of the current year having been made with the earnings of a shorter line, has naturally shown a very large apparent increase.

The earnings of the consolidated "Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway" are given now for the first time, and show an increase of about \$40,000 over the earnings of the constituent roads in 1868.

The earnings for July are as follows:

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR JULY.				
	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
*Chicago & Alton.....	\$333,739	\$101,012	\$.....	\$53,276
Chicago & Northwestern.....	1,167,155	1,011,164	75,649
†Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	440,804	34,385	98,415
‡Illinois Central.....	66,793	649,714	112,079
Merietta & Cincinnati.....	119,503	108,413	1,049
Michigan Central.....	320,910	321,012	8,947
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern.....	727,045	685,934	40,111
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	586,342	431,397	162,915
Ohio & Mississippi.....	192,361	104,415	2,091
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	129,761	143,991	14,223
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	810,800	259,331	23,917
Total.....	\$5,009,718	\$4,519,108	\$536,212	\$65,692

*The comparison now includes, for the first time, the same mileage as in 1868.

†Mileage greater than last year.

‡Includes Dubuque and Keokuk City leased line.

§The earnings of consolidated lines now first reported.

The total earnings from January 1 to July 31, for the current and last previous years were as follows:

EARNINGS FROM JANUARY 1 TO JULY 31.			
	1899	1898	Inc. Dec.
Chicago & Alton.....	\$2,464,663	\$2,189,430	\$275,233
Chicago & North Western.....	7,035,411	6,914,964	692,514
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	2,770,409	2,220,464	549,945
Illinois Central.....	4,429,374	3,835,066	544,008
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	747,444	643,396	104,048
Michigan Central.....	2,608,815	2,406,681	202,134
*Lake Shore & Michigan Southern.....	3,271,310	2,907,810	363,500
Missouri & St. Paul.....	3,562,639	2,907,467	655,172
Ohio & Mississippi.....	1,065,533	1,077,544	11,981
St. Louis, Ito. & Terre Haute.....	1,049,547	980,474	69,073
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	2,186,084	1,926,178	259,906
Total.....	\$24,161,218	\$23,762,918	\$3,975,381

FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES.

From the last monthly report of the Bureau of Statistics we compile the following statement of the imports and exports of the United States for the first eleven months of the fiscal year 1898-9. The imports are of course invariably entered in specie value, and, in order to facilitate comparison, the official statistician has reduced the exports of produce, which are entered in currency value, to gold value also:

IMPORTS FOR ELEVEN MONTHS ENDING, MAY 31, 1899.			
1898.	Merchandise.	Gold and Silver.	Ag. equiv.
July.....	\$3,332,154	\$46,762	\$3,898,916
August.....	33,218,621	1,341,176	34,559,797
September.....	23,098,070	1,438,705	24,536,775
October.....	31,259,236	1,048,209	32,307,445
November.....	27,908,366	1,007,064	28,915,430
December.....	21,110,534	887,442	21,997,976
1899.			
January.....	29,610,742	501,892	30,112,634
February.....	32,586,085	2,587,641	35,173,726
March.....	47,807,922	2,988,178	50,796,100
April.....	47,096,941	5,144,491	52,241,432
May.....	40,901,822	637,003	41,538,825
Total.....	\$379,774,245	\$18,115,113	\$397,889,358

EXPORTS DOMESTIC PRODUCE AND SPECIE FOR ELEVEN MONTHS ENDING MAY 31, 1899. (PRODUCE REDUCED TO GOLD VALUE.)

1898	Specie.	Produce and Merchandise.	Aggregate.
July.....	\$10,400,270	\$1,311,095	\$11,711,365
August.....	1,647,391	15,102,394	16,749,785
September.....	2,677,849	15,062,452	17,740,301
October.....	2,466,430	20,377,909	22,844,339
November.....	1,811,809	27,038,985	28,850,794
December.....	2,391,258	31,310,192	33,701,450
1899.			
January.....	4,695,601	22,912,561	27,608,162
February.....	3,768,061	26,700,333	30,468,394
March.....	1,824,773	22,848,874	24,673,647
April.....	1,944,802	31,556,055	33,500,857
May.....	3,067,895	20,177,759	23,245,654
Total.....	\$33,732,218	\$251,674,404	\$285,406,622

* Includes the consolidated lines for July, and Michigan Southern previously.

EXPORTS OF FOREIGN PRODUCTS AND SPECIE, FOR ELEVEN MONTHS ENDING MAY 31, 1869.

1868.	Merchandise.	Gold and Silver.	Aggregate.
July	\$786,178	\$854,492	\$1,640,670
August	740,712	1,738,973	2,479,685
September	1,067,448	422,554	1,490,002
October	981,843	626,775	1,608,618
November	70,119	293,293	363,412
December	737,845	904,852	1,642,697
1869			
January	677,369	1,588,172	2,265,541
February	511,992	1,715,548	2,227,540
March	980,973	1,359,173	2,340,146
April	1,211,575	1,768,862	2,980,437
May	1,185,225	2,111,684	3,296,909
Total	\$9,612,649	\$12,558,075	\$22,170,724

RECAPITULATION.

Total imports eleven months	\$37,394,357
Exports domestic produce and produce and specie eleven months	\$29,406,680
Exports foreign produce and specie eleven months	22,170,701
Total exports eleven months	\$31,677,381
Excess of imports	\$4,716,976

The result of the eleven months' trade is a balance against the country of \$4,716,973, upon the purely commercial exchanges.

Since the above was written we have received by telegraph the figures for June, the last month of the year. They are not, however, furnished in sufficient detail to classify them, as is done for the eleven months in the foregoing tables. Copies of the printed report will probably be ready in about two weeks. The total statement for the twelve months is given by telegraph as follows:

	Imports.	Gold Values Exports.	Re-exports.
For the year ending June 30, 1869	\$137,026,541	\$118,103,765	\$25,130,167

From the foregoing it will be seen that our imports during the year exceed our exports and re-exports combined by \$93,792,609.

THE USURY PROSECUTIONS.

Judge Cardozo has acted wisely in inflicting a very lenient punishment on the brokers who were convicted on their own confession under the usury laws of this State. We have no sympathy with those who clamored for severity on the ground that by sending to prison for three months some of the richest money-lenders in Wall street, the law would become odious, and would be more certainly repealed at the next session of the Legislature. It is only within the last two years that flagrant violations of this law have been practised in this city. Previously the banks were extremely scrupulous, as were also private lenders, to keep within the strict letter of the statute. The recent combinations to lock up

currency and to put the *tourniquet* on the money market have, however, produced so much mischief to general business and have inflicted losses of such magnitude and cruelty on our mercantile and industrial interests, that some prompt remedy had to be applied. The remedy of prosecution under these old usury laws was tried, and was found successful. This result has secured a popular approval for the usury laws which they have never had before, and as every effort to repeal these statutes has failed heretofore, so there is now the more probability that future efforts would fail, even if supported by the odium of severe and rigorous punishments inflicted on persons convicted. Such ill-timed severity would have been objectionable for many reasons. Prominent among them is the notorious fact that the ringleaders in the conspiracy to lock up money have not been prosecuted and cannot be reached, and that as frequently happens in this class of prosecutions the persons proceeded against are almost exclusively subordinate agents. Moreover, the law has slumbered for more than thirty years, and no conviction we believe has been made under it before. Hence the judicious and moderate forbearance of the court is much approved and meets exactly the great principle of penal legislation, that it is the certainty rather than the severity of punishment which deters from crime.

There is no necessity to conceal the simple questions of fact involved in these proceedings by any general disquisitions as to the causes which govern the rate of interest, and the necessity of leaving untrammelled the great laws of supply and demand, both in the money market and elsewhere. The popular mind discards such refinements of reasoning as inapplicable here. What is patent is that a grave wrong was done to thousands of business men and to the public generally by the manoeuvres of a tight money clique as it was called, and that for this wrong a remedy was found—an effective remedy—in the prosecutions for usury. As the trouble was stopped by these prosecutions, so the people will be likely to insist that the statutes whose enforcement as seemed to confer a public service shall be maintained in force, or at least shall not be repealed until some safeguard of equal efficacy can be substituted.

Such, we say, is the popular view of this affair. And hostile as we are to any unnecessary interference by governmental authority with the free movements of business, we cannot wonder at the turn which the popular sentiment has taken. For our financial machinery is so wanting in elasticity, so liable to spasms and jerks, so sensitive to slight disturbances and interruptions, that we have lately seen a shrewd clique, who can control but 10 or 12 millions of dollars, throw the whole money market into confusion. And until this needful elasticity and strength can be imparted to our monetary machinery, the people will be sure to look

with favor to any expedients—and even to such expedients as usury laws—if thereby protection can be had from such mischiefs and widespread calamities as have been caused by the monetary stringency and financial spasms of the last few months.

The great lesson, then, we should learn from the usury prosecutions and from the popular approval that they have secured is, that there is a pressing need for such elasticity in that the currency, artificial monetary stringency shall not be under the control and at the bidding of any band of speculators who may choose to club their means together to produce trouble. When the money market is strengthened against these sinister influences, the people will feel safe and they will be less likely to look to usury prosecutions to protect them.

But how, it has been asked, is this elasticity to be given. Mr. Boutwell has answered this question by his recent purchases of bonds for the sinking fund. By them he has returned to the channels of business, all the currency received into the Treasury vaults, and has prevented any undue depletion of the circulating current. This policy, however, gives only a temporary relief. The receipts for taxes will now fall off. In September and October Mr. Boutwell will have very little currency to spare for the buying of bonds. And yet, in these months, the circulating current will be depleted by a drain of 50 or 60 millions of currency to move the crops in the interior, and especially in the West and South. How will the vacuum be filled up? How shall we avoid financial trouble in consequence of the depletion? Such are the questions which are every day forcing themselves more and more on thoughtful men. The CHRONICLE has several times of late discussed these questions and suggested a solution of the difficulty. Whatever course may eventually be adopted, one thing may be taken for granted that, under no circumstances, and as a remedy for no present trouble or threatening danger, will the country submit to have the currency inflated by any further issues of paper money, either in the form of greenbacks or of bank notes. In a pressing emergency, our people may be glad to see mischief prevented and wrong undone by such exceptionable proceedings as prosecutions for usury, but they will never cease to detest and prohibit further issues of paper money as a remedy worse than the evil it might be designed to cure.

STATISTICS OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES.

The monthly report of the Bureau of Statistics, just published, exhibits the statistics of our commerce and navigation for the month of May, 1869, and for the eleven months ending May 31st, 1869, as compared with the eleven months ended May 31st, 1868. The following is a synopsis.

Months ended	Imports.	Exports.	Re-exports.
May 31, 1869.....	\$41,544,089	\$39,124,331	\$3,295,909
May 31, 1868.....	35,023,100	42,608,645	884,384
Eleven months ended May 31, 1869.....	397,944,357	377,511,072	22,200,704
Eleven months ended May 31, 1868.....	339,329,890	421,898,240	20,134,187

Proportions of the foregoing shipped in American and foreign vessels during the eleven months ended May 31st, 1869 :

American vessels.....	\$192,405,391	\$122,739,677	\$14,112,493
Foreign vessels.....	74,989,156	24,771,435	8,088,211
Total.....	\$397,394,557	\$377,511,072	\$22,200,704

From this it will be seen that 69.2 per cent of the imports, 67.5 per cent of the exports, and 26.5 per cent of the re-exports were carried in foreign vessels. The domestic exports are expressed in currency values, except merchandise from the Pacific ports and specie and bullion. The value of foreign commodities remaining in warehouse May 31, 1869, was \$56,105,192, against \$43,016,503 in May, 1868.

The statements are followed by summaries giving the totals of imports, exports, re-exports, warehouse transactions and tonnage by months since July, 1867.

Number and tonnage of American and foreign vessels entered and cleared in the foreign trade during the eleven months ended May 31, 1868 :

	Entered.		Cleared.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American vessels.....	8,933	3,552,741	9,151	3,779,064
Foreign vessels.....	14,111	3,684,243	14,514	4,043,378
Total.....	23,044	7,236,974	23,584	7,874,442

Eleven months ended May 31, 1869 :

	Entered.		Cleared.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American vessels.....	8,164	3,178,189	8,693	3,063,075
Foreign vessels.....	16,485	4,810,470	16,434	4,818,413
Total.....	24,649	7,888,659	25,127	7,881,478

The report contains an elaborate table, which exhibits the imports, exports and re-exports into and from each of the ninety-seven customs districts, reporting transactions during May, to and from each of the thirteen principal countries with which the United States have trade. From this table the following is obtained :

	Imports.	Exports.	Re-exports
United Kingdom.....	\$13,006,533	\$18,274,544	\$400,255
Canada.....	2,321,653	2,163,219	519,837
Other British America.....	85,388	342,582	92,418
Spain.....	14,328	642,118
Cuba and Porto Rico.....	10,919,113	1,175,276	1,137,278
Other West Indies.....	844,224	732,679	10,567
China and Japan.....	927,991	1,208,218	60,435
France.....	2,741,825	3,949,610	173,273
Hamburg and Bremen.....	1,971,347	4,113,096	99,806
Brazil.....	2,315,168	412,651	9,297

In addition to the foregoing the report contains comparative statements showing the number and tonnage of vessels—distinguishing their nationalities—which entered into and cleared from Great Britain in the five months ended May 31 of the respective years 1867, 1868 and 1869; the net receipts in Great Britain from stamp duties during each of the ten years ended May 31, from 1859 to 1868 inclusive; exports from the ports of Quebec and Ontario for the fiscal years 1867 and 1868; exports to the United States and total exports from the several provinces in the fiscal year 1868; the value of imports, exports and the amount entered for home consumption; and also the amount of duty collected at each port in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Summaries of the indirect, in transitu and transshipment trade are also given, with an anticipatory statement of the imports, exports and re-exports for June, 1869.

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

STATEMENT COMPARING THE RETURNS FOR AUGUST 1 AND SEPTEMBER 1, 1869.

DEBT BEARING COIN INTEREST.

Character of issues.	Aug. 1.	Sept. 1.	Increase.	Decrease
5s, Bonds of Jan. 1, '59 (15 yrs).....	\$30,000,000	\$31,000,000	\$.....	\$.....
" Jan. 1, '61 (10 yrs).....	7,922,000	7,922,000
6s, B'ds of '61 (after Dec 31, '80).....	18,415,000	18,415,000
" " (Oregon war) '81.....	945,000	945,000
6s, " of June 30, '61 (30 yrs).....	189,317,500	189,317,600
6s, " May 1, '61 (5-20's).....	514,771,600	514,771,600
6s, " June '63 ('61).....	75 0 0.000	75,000,000
5s, " Mar. 1, '64 (10-40's).....	194,567,300	194,567,300
6s, " Nov. 1, '64 (5-20's).....	12,443,800	12,443,800
6s, " July 1, '65 (5-20's).....	332,998,950	332,998,950
6s, " Nov. 1, '65 (5-20's).....	203,327,250	203,327,250
6s, " July 1, '67 (5-20's).....	319,588,850	319,588,850	5,000
6s, " July 1, '68 (5-20's).....	42,539,350	42,539,350

DEBT BEARING LAWFUL MONEY INTEREST.

2s, Certificates (demand).....	\$50,810,000	\$52,130,000	30,000
3s, Navy Pension Fund ...	14,000,000	14,000,000

DEBT ON WHICH INTEREST HAS CEASED SINCE MATURITY.

1s, Bonds of 1862, '67, '68.....	\$95,700	\$72,850	\$16,850
5s, Bonds (tax indem.) 1864.....	242,000	242,000
Treasury notes prior to 1857.....	103,615	103,615
" since 1857.....	368,222	338,832	9,890
6s, Certificates of indebtedness.....	12,000	12,000
6s, Comp'd int. notes '67 & '68.....	2,785,910	2,714,980	70,930
Temporary loan.....	184,110	193,110	1,000
30s, 3 year notes ('67 & '68).....	993,700	955,550	42,950

DEBT BEARING NO INTEREST.

Demand notes.....	\$116,719	\$114,914	\$1,805
U. S. Legal Tender notes.....	356,000,000	356,000,000
Postal & fractional currency.....	31,030,300	30,711,800	318,500
Gold Certificates.....	36,725,840	23,647,580	13,078,260

RECAPITULATION.

Debt bearing coin interest.....	\$2,107,931,800	\$2,107,986,300	5,000
" bearing lawful money int.....	64,810,000	64,700,000	30,000
" on which int. has ceas'd.....	4,790,057	4,618,487	141,570
" bearing no interest.....	423,872,859	410,474,293	13,398,566
Aggregate principal debt.....	\$2,601,404,716	\$2,587,839,080	13,565,136
Coin interest accrued.....	31,560,000	36,963,600	5,118,561
Lawful money int. accrued.....	1,267,700	1,212,550	4,850
Int. accrued on matured debt.....	660,794	638,640	22,144
Aggregate debt & int. acc'd.....	\$2,635,122,739	\$2,626,653,870	\$.....	8,468,569

Deduct amount in Treasury:

Coin belonging to Government.....	\$103,131,611	\$101,314,937	\$1,916,624
Currency.....	23,341,054	12,114,437	11,227,167
Sinking fund in coin, b'ds & int.....	11,932,147	14,020,830	2,088,683
Other U. S. coin int. bonds purchased and accrued interest thereon.....	15,110,590	23,311,065	8,200,475
Total coin & cur'y in Treas'y.....	\$153,556,002	\$150,661,369	\$.....	\$2,864,633
Debtless coin and currency.....	\$2,481,566,737	\$2,475,962,501	\$5,604,236

BONDS ISSUED TO UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD AND BRANCHES.

(Under acts of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864, principal payable in 30 years after date, and interest semi-annually, in January and July, both in lawful money.)

6s, Union Pacific Railroad.....	\$36,638,000	\$36,638,000
6s, Union Pacific (E. D) R.R.....	6,304,000	6,304,000
6s, Sioux City & Pacific R.R.....	1,628,320	1,628,320
6s, Central Pacific R.R.....	24,371,000	24,371,000
6s, Central Branch (Kansas).....	1,600,000	1,600,000
6s, Western Pacific R.R.....	320,000	320,000
Total amount issued.....	\$60,860,320	\$60,860,320

MOBILE AND MONTGOMERY RAILROAD.

The consolidation of the Alabama and Florida and Mobile and Great Northern Railroad Companies having taken effect on the 1st of May, 1868, no reports were made of the operations of those roads at the usual time; and this, the first annual report of the Mobile and Montgomery Railroad Company, is in lieu of the 18th annual report of the former, and the 10th of the latter company. The receipts from operations of the road for the year ending April 30, 1869, were as follows:

From passengers.....	\$165,490 49
freight	216,653 63
express matter.....	14,897 43
United States mail	18,600 00
Government transportation	20,000 00
other sources.....	10,881 26
	<u>\$445,921 79</u>

Expenses, viz.:	
Conducting transportation	\$97,061 22
Maintenance of way.....	106,782 06
Maintenance of cars	30,731 22
Motive power.....	80,014 80
Steamboat and ferry.....	29,525 68
Government taxes	4,031 44—
	<u>\$448,116 32</u>
Leaving net.....	<u>\$97,805 47</u>

—a fraction under 22 per cent of the gross receipts. The President in his report says: In settlement of the various classes of the debts of both companies, there has been issued \$1,788,700 of preferred stock, and \$109,000 of first mortgage bonds. The preferred stock is conditioned to pay eight per cent per annum, provided it is made in the current year over and above all expenses and interest, but not otherwise; or, in other words, all that is made in any current year, over and above expenses and interest, will be paid to the preferred stock, until it pays 8 per cent, and any surplus in any one year, after paying 8 per cent to the preferred stock, goes to the common stock, but there is no accumulation of interest on the preferred stock.

The debts now outstanding of every class, and in the names of the several companies, are as follows:

In name of Alabama and Florida Railroad Company:

First mortgage bonds and interest.....	\$295,000 00
Floating debt.....	14,510 87
Endorsed bonds and interest.....	115,000 00
Second and third mortgage and income bonds.....	94,800 00
	<u>609,310 57</u>

In name of Mobile and G. N. Railroad Co.

First mortgage bonds.....	\$38,000 00
Floating debt	34,089 16
	<u>72,089 16</u>

In name of Mobile and Montgomery Railroad Co.

First mortgage bonds.....	\$109,000 00
Floating debt.....	213,673 18—
	<u>\$322,673 18</u>
From this deduct the second and third mortgage and income bonds of the Alabama and Florida Railroad Co., outstanding, for which preferred stock will be given	94,800 00
And you have the sum of	<u>909,323 91</u>

as the interest-paying debt of the company on the first of May, 1869, against \$2,427,000 on the first of May, 1868.

Of the debt outstanding of 909,323 91, there is in the new mortgage bonds having 20 years to run, the sum of \$109,000. Leaving yet to be arranged \$800,222 91.

Our means to do so, are the new first mortgage 8 per cent bonds for \$1,141,000, remaining on hand of the issue of \$1,260,000.

The first debts to be arranged are the First Mortgage Bonds of the Alabama and Florida and Mobile and Great Northern Railroad Companies.

The First Mortgage Bonds of the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad Co., which were originally issued for \$200,000, are all in the possession of the company, with the exception of \$38,000; these are nearly all held by parties who are known to the Board, and who will not dispose of, but hold them, to be settled by the company.

The First Mortgage Bonds of the Alabama and Florida Railroad Co. were issued in 1857, for \$300,000. They were guaranteed by the Atlanta and West Point, and Montgomery and West Point Railroad Companies, and became due in 1867. Since that time \$290,000 of these bonds have been taken up by the engineering companies, and with the past due interest, now amount to about \$375,000. They are held by the Hon. John P. King, of Augusta, Ga., as trustee for the two companies. A satisfactory arrangement has been made with him, by which we are only required to pay by the first of July \$50,000, and to pay on the first of July and January of each year, until the first of January, 1873, interest on the remaining \$325,000, by which time the principal of the debt must be paid. This enables us to retain on hand that portion of our new mortgage bonds set apart for the payment of this debt, and to exercise our discretion as to the time of sale.

It will require, to provide for the cash obligations of the company between this and the first of December next, and to meet extraordinary expenses, as follows:

To pay John P. King, trustee, on account of the first mortgage debt.....	
of the Alabama and Florida Railroad Co.....	\$50,000
To pay the first mortgage bonds of the Mobile and G. N. R. Co.....	38,000
To provide for floating debt.....	200,000
To provide for increase of outfit and repair of road.....	100,000
Making the sum required.....	\$388,000

TENNESSEE BONDS.

In regard to the non-payment of the July interest, the *New York Tribune* says:

The report that the State of Tennessee would default upon the July interest on their bonds caused much disappointment to the friends of that State. The total debt of the State at the close of the war was \$19,000,000; it has since been swelled to the sum of \$40,000,000. The larger portion of this increase has been made by issuing bonds to railroad companies, and a large portion to roads that will not be able for a long time to pay the interest. The annual expenses of the State are \$4,237,000, and the total revenue for last year, including the receipts from railroads, was \$2,055,444, showing a deficit of over \$2,000,000. By the report of the Controller of October, 1867,

The amount of State debt was.....	\$3,843,806 66
Add interest funded.....	735,553 00
Total.....	\$4,579,359 66
Amount owing on account of turnpike and plank road companies \$490,000 00	
Add interest funded to January, 1866.....	102,060 00
	592,060 00
Amount due from railroad July 1, 1867.....	23,601,000 00
Being a total of.....	\$28,772,419 66
Add estimated amount due school fund and used directly by the State for payment of interest on debt.....	1,000,000 00
Amount due by the State October, 1867.....	\$29,772,419 66

In December, 1868, or in fourteen months after the above statement, the Controller makes out

The State debt due to be.....	\$34,441,873 44
Add amount due to the school fund.....	1,500,000 00
Total.....	\$35,941,873 44
And reports a probable deficit of \$377,642 39, which will have accrued when the interest due January 1, 1869, shall have been paid.....	877,642 39
Total amount of debt due January 1, 1869.....	\$36,819,515 83

Being an increase in the state debt, within 15 months of \$7,547,098 17. This unfavorable exhibit has occasioned considerable disturbance among the holders of the bonds of the State here, upon the reports that a party in favor of repudiating the new bonds was forming in the State upon the theory that the State Constitution forbids the sale of the bonds of the State at less than par, while the greater portion of these new bonds have been sold at from 60@70 per cent by the railroads in order to raise money. The present condition of the State is lamentable, but any talk of repudiation in any form will no doubt be voted down by the citizens, who have struggled so manfully to sustain the credit of the State in the past; and holders of the bonds, who bought them knowing that the faith of the State was pledged for their payment, will no doubt ultimately be paid in full.

RAILROAD ITEMS.

THE TEHUANTEPEC RAILWAY.—On the 6th of October, 1867, a grant or concession for 70 years, to open and operate a railway between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean was made by the Mexican Government, and fully confirmed and approved in December, 1868, by the Mexican Congress, and in January, 1869, by the President. This grant, after due assignment according to law, is owned by the Tehuantepec Railway Company, of which Mr. Simon Stevens is the President. Messrs. D. Appleton & Co. have recently published a handsome little volume of some 250 pages, giving the history of the grant from the Mexican Government, and its possession by the present company; a full description of the characteristics of the proposed route; an estimate by Mr. Julius Adams, Civil Engineer, of the total cost of the road, &c; a historical sketch of the country through which it passes; and the statistics of commerce and travel which show the traffic that may reasonably be expected on the rail road when completed. The proposed route is 162 miles long, and the entire cost of road, equipments, building, &c., is estimated at \$8,823,000. In our limited space it is impossible to give a full review of this interesting and important volume, and we recommend all our readers who may desire to obtain information, of what seems in all probability to be the next route across the Continent to procure the book from Mr. Simon Stevens, President of the Company, 174 Chambers street.

PORT HURON AND CHICAGO RAILROAD LINE.—The work on this line is being pushed forward eastward from Battle Creek, and westward from Port Huron, and iron is constantly going forward—more than 2,500 tons having been shipped during the past month. Engines and cars are already on the line, and others are now being manufactured. At the present rate of progress the road will be complete from Port Huron to Flint (65 miles), and in operation in season for the fall business this year, and through to Battle Creek before January 1st.

Westward of this point the road is ready for the superstructure and track laying will follow in due course.

This line comprises four roads, viz., the Port Huron and Lake Michigan Railroad, the Peninsular Railway of Michigan, and the Peninsular Railroads of Indiana and Illinois, running from Chicago to Port Huron, and there connecting with both the Grand Trunk and Great Western Railways of Canada, for Buffalo or Suspension Bridge; thence over the New York Central or Erie road, making the shortest of the through routes between New York and Chicago.

In addition to its through travel, the local business of the line must be very large. The western part of the route is through an agricultural district as rich as any in the West, and it passes many large and prosperous towns. The eastern portion will transport the lime, salt and gypsum from the Grand River and Saginaw, and it brings within reach of a market the vast forests of pine and hard wood timber which exist in this part of Central and Northeastern Michigan.

Better than all, the line is in the hands of shrewd and practical men, who know how to push through such an enterprise, and who, knowing how, are determined to do it. —*Railroad Journal.*

THE MEMPHIS, EL PASO AND PACIFIC RAILROAD.—This important line of railway is now in progress in the State of Texas, and is destined to form a part of the great through line of road between Norfolk on the Atlantic coast and San Diego on the Pacific. In addition to the portion of the road from Norfolk to the Mississippi River which has long been in operation, 150 miles of the Memphis, El Paso and Pacific Road in Texas are nearly completed, and contracts are about to be made for the second section of 150 miles, with the requirement that it shall be completed by October 1, 1870.

A great injustice was lately done this company and General Fremont, its agent in Paris, by statements in the *N. Y. Times* to the effect that General Fremont had made false representations as to the condition and property of the company, in a prospectus issued in Paris, and had thus brought its bonds into disrepute. The real facts of the case, however, appear in a letter of Mr. Edward Gilbert, counsel for the company, which was published in the *Times* to correct the erroneous impressions given to the public by its previous article. Mr. Gilbert says:

Your editorial notice of the 3d inst., respecting General Fremont and the Memphis, El Paso and Pacific Railroad Company in Paris does both the General and Company injustice, by making them responsible, impliedly at least, for the publication of the prospectus referred to.

Neither the General nor the officers of the Company had anything to do with its publication.

The statements in that prospectus were doubtless attributable to a want of distinction in the minds of its authors in France between the action of our General Government and that of one of the States.

The Memphis, El Paso and Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated by the State of Texas to build a railroad through that State upon or near the thirty-second parallel, which road it is now engaged in constructing. It has a land grant from the State upon which its bonds are based. These bonds have been sold in Europe. They are in the ordinary form of coupon bonds, and show upon their face how they are secured, and what obligations the Company assumes. No construction bonds have ever been offered for sale.

The representations made by the Company, and by General Fremont in its behalf, are in writing, and are scrupulously and definitely correct in every particular.

The negotiations abroad were committed to persons versed in that kind of business, and residing there, and have been attended with such results that about one half of the entire issue of \$10,000,000 of land bonds have been sold.

The proceeds are being applied as needed in the construction and equipment of the road, which, from the methodical and economical organization and management of the Company, promises to be built and put in operation with more despatch and less waste than any other railroad in the United States.

The company is apparently sure to obtain the right of way to the Pacific at the next session of Congress, and may probably obtain a grant of government lands (in addition to the grant already made by the State of Texas) whenever application for such a grant is made. It is the clearest policy in the world for the government to grant lands on the line of a new railroad through its Territories.

LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN AND TOLEDO, WABASH AND WESTERN CONSOLIDATION.—The *New York Tribune* says of this: The consolidation of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Road has been agreed upon and attracts general interest. By this arrangement the Michigan Southern extends from Buffalo to the Mississippi River, and control, including branch lines, 1,500 miles of road. The basis of consolidation is made at 120 for Michigan Southern and 100 for Toledo, Wabash & Western. The stock of the Toledo & Wabash Road does not receive any dividends this year, but after the first of January, 1870, will receive the same amount that is now paid on the Michigan Southern. The managers of the property claim that without any increase of earnings the property will pay 8 per cent on its new capital after providing for the interest and sinking fund accounts. The stock and bonded debt of the consolidated company will then stand as follows:

Present stock of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern	\$35,000,000
Twenty per cent to be added	7,000,000
Toledo, Wabash & Western stock	8,000,000
Bonded debt of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern	20,000,000
Bonded debt of Toledo, Wabash & Western	15,000,000
Total	\$55,000,000

The consolidated company will have on hand a large amount of assets transferred by the Cleveland, Painesville & Ashtabula Railroad Company, the Cleveland & Toledo and the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.; also, about \$500,000 cash assets from the Buffalo & Erie. The consolidation will go into effect as soon as it has received the assent of the stockholders. Notice was given at the Stock Exchange

this morning by the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Company that in thirty days they will issue \$1,200,000 new stock; this stock is for the additional equipment necessary for the new consolidated company, and is included in the \$36,000,000 stock which the company contributes to the new company.

ALBANY AND SUSQUEHANNA RAILROAD BONDS.—Mr. Ramsey, President of this road, in a letter to the *New York Times*, gives the following history of the negotiations in regard to bonds and stock:

"There has been no attempt on my part, or Mr. Phelps', the Secretary and Treasurer, to prevent the transfer of stock, nor is there any truth in the statement that I issued 3,000 shares of new stock with reference to the coming election.

The issue of stock, and which has been the pretext for this raid, was in pursuance of a contract made more than a year ago, and with the unanimous approval of the Board of Directors, as follows: There had been about six thousand shares of stock subscribed, upon which one or more installments of ten per cent paid, and subsequently forfeited for non-payment of the balance. It was suggested that other stock might be issued in its place, and a portion used in the negotiation of the second bonds of the company, and with what had been received and would be in the sale, would make it nearly or quite full paid stock. Accordingly the first issue of this stock was made by Azro Chase (one of the parties now acting with Fisk & Co.), who took \$50,000 of the second bonds of the company, with an option to take \$10,000 stock at 20, that being the then market price for full paid stock. The stock was taken by Chase and paid for at that price. After this and in the spring of 1868, the company having failed to obtain an appropriation from the Legislature, relied upon to complete the road, an effort was made to negotiate or obtain a loan upon the second bonds of the company to obtain money for that purpose. Negotiations were opened with New York parties, where I found it was known that the company had the right to issue stock in place of the forfeited stock aforesaid, and had done so to Chase. A proposition was finally made by David Groesbeck and others to loan the company for eighteen months, 70 per cent or \$560,000, on \$800,000 of the second bonds of the company, with the privilege or option of taking 80 per cent or 2,400 shares of said stock at 25 (being only one-half the amount in proportion to what Chase had, and at 5 cents more price), and in case the stock was taken at that, the parties were to take the bonds at 80, within one year, if not, the company were to have six months further time to pay the loan and to sell or hypothecate the bonds and stock for that purpose. This proposition was accepted and the parties subsequently elected to take the bonds and the stock at price agreed upon, and have fully paid for the same.

ST. LOUIS AND IRON MOUNTAIN RAILROAD.—The completion of the above road now makes a very important through route between St. Louis and the Southern States East of the Mississippi. The *Western Railroad Gazette* says:

By this new route the distances from St. Louis to the following towns of the South and Southeast are as follows:

	Miles.		Miles.
Belmont.....	195	Nashville.....	377
Jackson, Tenn.	281	Chattanooga (via Corinth).....	554
Memphis.....	347	Chattanooga (via Nashville).....	528
Jackson, Miss.....	540	Atlanta.....	696
Vicksburg.....	588	Macon.....	769
New Orleans.....	723	Augusta.....	837
Mobile.....	667	Savannah.....	959

A transfer boat has been obtained, and river approaches prepared at Columbus and Belmont, so that passenger and freight cars can be taken over the river as they are at Detroit and St. Louis, and were until lately at Dubuque, Burlington and Quincy. Only one railroad, the Mobile and Ohio, reaches Columbus, but this one within a short distance connects with others to Nashville, Memphis and New Orleans, which by their connections make nearly every railroad in the South, east of the Mississippi river, accessible to cars from St. Louis.

PENNSYLVANIA.—The Allegheny Valley Railroad is said to traverse one of the most picturesque regions of Pennsylvania. The railroad bridge, now in process of erection at Venango City, connecting the Oil Creek and Allegheny with the Valley

line, will be finished toward the close of the fall months. The Keystone Bridge Company are the builders. The structure will have three spans of 120 feet each. The estimated cost is \$100,000. The requisite legislation authorizing the extension of the road to the west branch of the Susquehanna having been obtained, steps have been taken for the early and vigorous prosecution of the work. The surveys of the route are nearly completed, and at several important points ground has been broken for the road bed. The projected line is located along the valleys of Mahoning Creek and Bennett's branch, and connects with the Philadelphia and Erie road at Emporium. The grades will be easy, not exceeding twenty feet to the mile. The material aid for the extension has been obtained upon terms highly advantageous to the State. The Commonwealth receives for \$6,500,000 worth of bonds for the Philadelphia and Erie road, not payable till 1912, an equal amount of the bonds of the Allegheny Valley road guaranteed by the Pennsylvania, Northern Central and Philadelphia and Erie Companies, payable after 1875, at the rate of \$100.00 per annum.—*Western Railroad Gazette*.

CONNECTICUT & PASSUMPSIC R.R.—The receipts from operations for the fiscal years ending May 31, 1868 and 1869, were as follows:

	1868	1869.
From passengers	\$170,173 10	\$177,346 47
From freight	302,412 55	330,519 64
From mail	11,160 09	11,117 00
From express	4,960 00	6,000 00
From rents	4,107 96	4,333 97
Total	\$481,808 70	\$539,347 08
Expenses	\$319,894 46	\$337,162 95
Net earnings	\$171,914 24	\$192,184 13

A comparison of the earnings of the past with those of the preceding year shows an increase of \$47,538 88; with an increase in expenses of \$17,268 49—making the increase in net earnings, \$20,269 89.

OGDENSBURG AND LAKE CHAMPLAIN RAILROAD.—The earnings of this road for the years ending March 31, 1868 and 1869, were as follows:

	1868.	1869.
From freight	\$701,462 26	\$819,474 60
“ passengers	173,217 94	171,883 99
“ mail	10,710 00	10,710 00
“ express	4,999 91	5,000 00
“ rents	7,995 62	8,163 11
“ use of engines	585 00
Total	\$998,980 70	\$1,015,221 70
Expenses	\$597,333 18	\$608,362 46
Net earnings	\$301,742 52	\$356,839 24

From which has been paid—

One dividend of three per cent on the common stock	\$92,310 40
Two dividends, four per cent each, on the preferred stock	95,104 00
One year's interest on first mortgage bonds	65,491 54
One year's interest on equipment bonds	2,000 00
Revenue tax on dividends and coupons	10,500 70
Bridge timber on hand	7,435 50
New locomotive	12,032 39
	\$306,942 22

Net earnings April 1, 1869	\$208,932 55
Net earnings on hand April 1, 1868	130,891 31
Premium on preferred stock sold	2,134 22
Total	\$341,958 08

Compared with the previous year, the gross earnings show an increase of \$146,241; with an increase in expense of \$91,144 28, making the increase in net earnings \$55,096 72. The report says:

The large expenditure upon the road bed and track, which it was deemed judicious to make, has added about fifty thousand dollars to the expense; a similar expenditure will be necessary the ensuing year, after which the track will probably require only the ordinary renewals.

The \$300,000 of equipment bonds issued a year ago have been invested in rolling stock, by the building and purchase of 327 freight cars, 8 passenger cars, and 4 locomotives.

The requirements of the road are such that the board have decided to make a still further issue of bonds to the amount of \$200,000, to procure additional rolling stock, for all of which we shall have ample use; and with this addition we shall have one of the most completely equipped roads in the country.

The wisdom of the expenditures already made in building the elevator and furnishing rolling stock, is clearly demonstrated.

Since we took possession of the road in August, 1865, we have paid to the stockholders—

Nine per cent dividend and tax	\$358,000 00
Dividends on preferred stock and tax	157,000 00
Interest on 1st mortgage bonds and tax	255,000 00
Interest on equipment bonds and tax	25,000 00
Paid for new bridges	50,000 00
Paid on account of the elevator	15,000 00
Paid for new iron and ties	400,000 00
Surplus of profits on hand	305,922 55
Total	\$1,477,922 55

This amount has actually been paid out of the earnings.

There remains outstanding of first mortgage bonds \$605,700; they mature in July next, and the money is in the Treasury to pay them.

\$3,040,900 second mortgage bonds have been converted into stock, leaving outstanding \$36,100.

\$1,994,000 preferred stock has been issued to provide for the payment of the first mortgage bonds and equipment purposes, and the accounts closed; as will be seen from the financial statement, \$28,134 22 has been received for premiums on the same.

TRIAL BALANCE MARCH 31, 1869.

Cost of road	\$5,071,930 00	Capital stock	\$3,040,900 00
Equipment purchased by loan of 1868	800,000 00	Preferred stock	1,994,000 00
Bills receivable	15,210 22	First mortgage bonds	605,700 00
Northern Transportation	30,000 00	Second mortgage bonds	32,100 00
Co. stock	73,588 89	Bills payable	60,000 00
Material on hand	73,234 68	Coupons due	4,111 25
Real estate, wood lots, &c.	45,357 15	Unpaid dividends	4,593 00
Sundry accounts	47,535 03	Equipment bonds of January, 1868	300,000 00
Cash and due from other roads	618,400 57	Sundry accounts	18,977 74
Total	\$6,274,209 54	Net earnings	208,922 55
		Total	\$6,274,209 54

—The Indianapolis, Bloomington and Western Railway has been formed by the consolidation of the Indianapolis and Danville, and the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin roads. This consolidation was completed on the 20th inst. by a vote of the stockholders at Urbana. A meeting for the election of officers will be held in Urbana September 8.

The present condition of the road is described as follows:

"Two hundred and four miles of the road are completed; from Indianapolis to Crawfordsville, forty-two miles, and so much work has been done between Danville and Pekin that all the track, except thirty miles, will be ready for the iron in three weeks. The managers will push the work rapidly, and intend to have the cars running through before a year."

NEW YORK CITY RAILROADS.—The following are the returns of gross receipts made by the following companies during the month of July, 1869:

Second Avenue	\$52,497	Tenth Ave C P, N & E River	\$66,749
Third Avenue	121,463	42d street and Grand street	28,329
N Y, Harlem & 4th Ave	91,021	Bleecker st & Fulton carry	67,725
Sixth Avenue	54,502	Dry Dock, E B'way & Battery	213,145
Seventh Avenue	55,459	Hudson River	138,503
Eighth Avenue	70,762	New York & New Haven	
Ninth Avenue	10,491	Total	\$971,493

EARNINGS OF THE BROOKLYN CITY RAILROADS.—The following are the receipts of the different railroad companies in Brooklyn for the month ending July 15th, 1869 :

Van Brunt et al Erie Basin.....	\$2,276	Grand street & Newtown.....	\$8,180
B'klyn, Bath & Coney Island.....	7,926	Southold.....	23,200
Coney Island and Brooklyn.....	21,874	Brooklyn City.....	111,922
Sackett, Hoyt & Berven etc.....	1,749	B'klyn City & Hunter's Point.....	18,540
Brooklyn City & Newtown.....	14,106	Brooklyn & Rockaway.....	7,504
Pushwick Avenue.....	7,978	Coney Island & Shell Road.....	474
Grand at Ferry & Middle Vile.....	8,318	Broadway.....	13,300

INTERNAL REVENUE DECISION.—*Payment of Taxes by Corporations.*—The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has made the following decision :

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1869.

"It has been reported to this office that railroad companies, canal companies, banks, insurance companies and other corporations required by law to withhold and pay over to the United States a tax of five per centum upon the dividends, interest coupons representing interest, surplus and contingent funds, profits used for construction, &c., are accustomed to treat the amounts thus withheld and paid as an expense of business, and to deduct them in all returns where expenses of business are deductible.

"This practice is erroneous and should not be allowed. The amounts thus paid are not an expense of business. No such returns should be accepted until the assessor is convinced no deduction of this kind has been made.

"Former returns should be carefully re-examined. In all cases where there has been such a deduction within the fifteen months immediately preceding its discovery, there should be a re-assessment.

"C. DELANO, Commissioner."

—The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad, Central Railroad and Banking Company, the Southwestern and other railroads, have joined in a bill of complaint, and applied for an injunction against the Brunswick and Albany Railroad and N. L. Angier, State Treasurer. The object is to arrest the construction of the Albany and Brunswick Railroad, and to restrain the State Treasurer from indorsing its bonds, on the ground that the road would infringe the vested rights and privileges of the complainants, and that the State aid would be unconstitutional, etc. Judge Schley has granted the injunction.—*Memphis Avalanche.*

—A bargain has been made with the North Missouri Railroad Company, by which that company agrees to build the St. Louis and Cedar Rapids Railroad from the present terminus of the North Missouri at Bloomfield, near the State Line, to Ottumwa, by the 1st of December next. The distance is about eighteen miles.

—In the case of N. A. Cowdrey and others vs. the Galveston and Houston Railroad and others, Justice Swaine of the Supreme Court at Washington last week made a decree holding the railroad, &c., of the old company subject to the mortgages, and dismissing that part of the complaint which claimed the property of the successor company, and an individual liability of the defendants. Both parties take an appeal to the Supreme Court. Mr. Cowdrey, representing the bondholders, is placed in possession of the railroad until the appeals are determined, he giving security to account for the rents and profits while in possession.

LEASE OF THE PITTSBURG, FORT WAYNE AND CHICAGO RAILWAY.—This important line of road has been leased, in perpetuity, to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company at an annual rental of \$1,380,000, to be paid to the stockholders of the former, over and above all other claims or charges, including the government dividend tax on the rental to be paid. This sum is 12 per cent upon the share capital of the Fort Wayne Company, and equals the interest on a capitalized sum of \$19,714,285—a sum \$8,214,285 greater than the share capital of the Company at the date of the lease. By its terms its share capital is to be increased by a like amount, upon which, in perpetuity, and free of government tax, dividends of 4 per cent, in quarterly payments of 1½ per cent, are to be forever paid. The fulfillment of the terms of this lease is guaranteed not only by the net earnings of the leased road, which for the past five years have been \$3,600,000 in excess of the rental that would have been

called for had the lease been in operation, but by those of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, which are twice greater, over and above all changes upon it. A security has thus been created of unexampled excellence, and one which will be sought for as an investment for trust funds—an investment bearing a high rate of interest, and one in which no change will ever be required, and for which every possible condition of safety is supplied. The books of the Company are now closed, so as to call in the old and issue the new stock.

LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN.—The consolidation is now complete, and one company, the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, owns a line of railroad extending from Chicago to Buffalo. The road now owned by the company consists of the following lines and branches:

	Miles.
Chicago to Buffalo, via Air Line.....	539
Toledo to Elkhart, via Adrian and White Pigeon.....	142
Ja-kron Branch.....	44½
Adrian to Monroe.....	33½
Toledo to Detroit.....	59
White Pigeon to Constantine (ceased).....	4
Branch to Graytown, from Junction 8 miles east of Toledo.....	9
Elyria to Sandusky.....	35
Total.....	856

CENTRAL BRANCH OF THE UNION PACIFIC.—This road is completed to Waterville, one hundred miles west. There it was to connect with the Kansas Pacific, but that road, instead of turning northward to Fort Kearney, as originally contemplated, continues due west to Denver, leaving the Atchison line with no outlet. The Atchison road received a subsidy of \$16,000 per mile; and its managers claim that as they have fulfilled their part of the contract, the government is bound in good faith to give them a Western connection by continuing the endowment for 150 miles further, to Fort Kearney, where they can connect with the Union Pacific. They allege that the road is so well built that not even Kansas freshets have ever destroyed a single culvert.

The local business is already very large, and will ultimately become very heavy. The company has just put 250,000 acres of land into the market, at from \$2 50 to \$10 00 an acre, payable in instalments running through ten years.—*Chicago Railway Review*.

—Telegrams from Buffalo and Cleveland announce that the consolidation of the Lake Shore Roads from Buffalo to Chicago has been ratified, on the basis of the par value of all the Stocks, by the general meeting of the Buffalo and Erie Stockholders at Buffalo, and of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern at Cleveland. The style of the Consolidated Company is to be the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway.

TENNESSEE RAILROADS.—KNOXVILLE, Tenn., Aug. 23.—Colonel Folsom, Quartermaster United States Army, is here under orders from the Government to take possession as Receiver of the East Tennessee and Georgia and East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad Companies, for an indebtedness of \$600,000 due the Government for engines and rolling stock purchased at the close of the war.

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW

Monetary Affairs—Rates of Loans and Discounts—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Price of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at New York—Opening, Highest, Lowest and Closing Prices at the New York Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

August has been characterised by comparative steadiness in financial circles. Among the banks, there has been a conservative feeling, inspired by their limited resources and the prospect of the fall demand for money for crop purposes; but,

at the close of the month, this feature was less conspicuous than at the commencement. During the first two weeks, considerable amounts of currency were sent to the West, mainly for moving the crops of the Southwest; but, during the latter half of the month, this outflow very sensibly diminished. The operations of the Sub-Treasury have been in favor of the market. About \$12,000,000 have been disbursed in the purchase of bonds, while only \$2,700,000 have been taken in through the sales of gold, so that these operations have placed about \$9,300,000 of currency in the hands of the banks. Notwithstanding the gain from this source, the associated banks held on Aug. 28th only \$52,800,000 of legal tenders, against \$56,100,000 on the 31st of July. This decrease of legal tenders, in the face of large payments by the Treasury, is due partly to the fact that the Government has been receiving large amounts on account of internal revenue, and partly to the Westward outflow of currency above alluded to. The loss of currency, however, is much beyond the amount indicated in the decrease of legal tenders in the banks; for the banks have naturally used national currency as freely as possible in making their remittances; so that while, at the beginning of the month, that form of circulation was so abundant as to be loaned temporarily free of interest, at the close it was comparatively scarce. The banks, in anticipation of the withdrawal of Western balances, later in the season, have shown a marked preference for demand loans, and the rate of interest on good collaterals has consequently been 5@7 per cent, while discounts of prime paper have ranged mostly between 9 and 12 per cent.

At the close of the month, there was less disposition to calculate upon any marked stringency during the fall months. It was generally regarded as certain that the Secretary of the Treasury will show the utmost possible consideration for the monetary convenience of the public, during the period of moving of the crops, and that his late policy of buying bonds freely and selling gold sparingly will be continued until the meeting of Congress. This expectation has produced a more settled feeling, and it has afforded a basis of calculation for operation during the next three months. The following comparison shows the condition of the associated banks on the 28th of August, 1869, and the 29th of August, 1868:

CONDITION OF ASSOCIATED BANKS AUGUST 28, 1869, AND AUGUST 29, 1868.

	August 28, 1869.	August 29, 1868.	Changes.
Loans and discounts.....	\$261,012,000	\$271,700,000	Dec. \$10,769,000
Specie.....	19,469,000	16,940,000	Inc. 2,529,000
Circulation.....	33,909,000	34,112,000	Dec. 119,000
Deposits.....	188,751,000	210,834,000	Inc. 21,580,000
Legal tenders.....	52,793,000	67,767,000	Dec. 14,969,000

The speculation in railroad stocks has been languid and without any special bent. The effort early in the month to depress prices, upon an expectation of stringency in money, was early discontinued, from an impression that the movement had been undertaken too early, and the market has since drifted along without any special effort to control its direction. There is no disposition to buy, so long as it is probable that before long the money market may be within the control of speculators, and none to sell, when the present condition of the loan market is against "short" sales. The transactions at the Exchange have been only 333,499 shares, against 1,151,003 for the same month of last year.

STOCKS SOLD AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Dec.
Bank shares	2,332	2,383	51
Railroad "	1,008,925	281,673	727,253
Coal "	2,421	2,315	106
Mining "	6,700	2,650	4,050
Improv't "	7,200	1,800	5,400
Telegraph "	23,660	7,235	16,425
Steamship "	33,957	15,365	18,592
Expr's &c "	70,808	19,499	51,309
Total—August	1,151,003	833,099	817,904
Since January 1	12,518,889	8,626,431	4,186,953

The course of speculation, in Wall street, has been remarkably dull. The month opened with a general disposition to discount the probabilities of an unusually active money market later in the season; and there was a consequent extensive selling out of securities, attended with a general decline in prices. Even government bonds sympathized with this tendency. Large amounts had been held on speculation, in expectation of a rise growing out of the purchases of the Treasury; and under the gloomy tone of the street, these were hastily spilt upon the market, with the result of a decline of $2\frac{1}{4}$ @ 4 per cent. This supply, however, was soon absorbed by the government, whose purchases for the month aggregate \$10,000,000; and as very few bonds came out of the hands of bona fide investors, the market generally stiffened toward the close, being strengthened by an expectation that Secretary Boutwell would continue his purchases at the rate of about \$10,000,000 per month, until the meeting of Congress. At the close price were $1\text{ @ }1\frac{1}{2}$ below the opening quotations. The transactions, have been very limited, the total sales at the board having been only \$13,398,850, against \$29,432,650 for the same period of 1868.

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds	\$29,432,650	\$13,398,850	\$	\$16,033,800
U. S. notes	1,760	1,751
St' & city b'ds	8,105,900	5,094,060	3,111,900
Company b'ds	969,000	1,124,000	134,500
Total—August	\$38,629,800	\$19,616,860	\$	\$19,012,950
Since January 1	248,770,120	234,614,709	14,155,411

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of August as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement :

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of month.	6's, 1851.	Comp. Reg.	1862.	1864.	1865.	new.	'67.	'68.	5's, 10-40 Cpn.
2.	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	116
3.	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	116
4.	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	124	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	116
5.	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	124	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 $\frac{1}{2}$
6.	125	125	125	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
7.	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	125	125	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
8.	125	125	125	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	115
9.	125	125	125	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	115
10.	125	125	125	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	115
11.	125	125	125	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	115
12.	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$
13.	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$
14.	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$
15.	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$
16.	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$
17.	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$
18.	123	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$
19.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114
20.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114
21.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114
22.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114
23.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114
24.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	123	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	114

Day of month.	6's, 1881.		6's, (5-20 yrs.) Coupon				5's, 10-4.		
	Coup.	Reg.	1862.	1864.	1865.	new.	1867.	1868.	yrs. C'pn.
25.....	123½	127½	121½	121½	120½	120½
26.....	123	128	123½	121	114½
27.....	123½	123½	122½	122	120½	121½	115½
28.....	121	120½	120½	120½	115
30.....	123½	123	123½	122½	122½	121½	12½
31.....	123½	123½	123½	122½	122½	121½	121½	115½
First.....	124½	124½	125½	123½	124½	122½	122½	122½	116
Highest.....	125	125	125½	124	124½	122½	122½	122½	116½
Lowest.....	121½	122½	122½	120½	120½	119½	119½	119½	112½
Last.....	123½	123½	123½	122½	122½	121½	121½	120½	115½

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. Ill. C. Erie 5-20s sh's.				Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. Ill. C. Erie 5-20s sh's.			
Monday	2	98½	83½	94½	19½	Monday	23	93½	84½	9 ½	19½
Tuesday	3	93	83½	94½	19½	Tuesday	24	93½	84½	95½	19½
Wednesday	4	92½	83½	94½	19½	Wednesday	25	93½	83½	91½	19½
Thursday	5	92½	83½	94½	19½	Thursday	26	93½	84½	94½	21½
Friday	6	92½	83½	94½	19½	Friday	27	93½	84½	94½	23
Saturday	7	92½	83½	94½	19½	Saturday	28	93½	83½	91½	23½
Monday	9	92½	83½	94½	19½	Monday	30	91½	83½	91½	24½
Tuesday	10	92½	83½	94½	19½	Tuesday	31	93½	84½	94½	23
Wednesday	11	92½	83½	94½	19½						
Thursday	12	9½	83½	94½	19½	Lowest	92½	81½	94½	19½	
Friday	13	92½	83½	94½	19½	Highest	93½	84½	95½	23½	
Saturday	14	92½	83½	94½	19½	Range	92½	81½	94½	23½	
Monday	16	92½	83½	94½	19½	Last	93½	84½	94½	23	
Tuesday	17	92½	83½	94½	19½						
Wednesday	18	93	83½	94½	19½	Low	92½	74½	93½	17½	
Thursday	19	93	83½	94½	19½	Hig	94	81½	95½	20½	
Friday	20	91½	84	94½	19½	Rng	1½	9½	6½	9½	
Saturday	21	93½	84½	94½	19½	Last	93½	84½	94½	23	

Gold opened at 131½ and closed at 133½, having, during the interim, touched at 131½. The first half of the month speculation was languid and generally in favor of a lower premium. Later, however, the diminishing stock on the market encouraged a few very large holders to buy, in the hope of being thereby enabled to control the market and force up the price. The premium has not been materially affected by affairs extraneous to the market, the speculative situation being such as to render the price peculiarly insensible to the considerations which more legitimately control it. The Treasury sold \$2,000,000 of coin during the month. The exports of specie have been quite nominal. About \$2,000,000 gold was transferred from this market to San Francisco, through the agency of the Treasury; the gold being deposited in the Sub-Treasury here, while the United States Treasurer gave the depositors an order on the Assistant Treasurer at San Francisco to pay an equal amount to their correspondents in that city.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing	Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing
Monday.....	5 136½	136	136½	136	Tuesday.....	24 132½	133½	132½	132½
Tuesday.....	3 135½	135	136½	135½	Wednesday.....	25 133½	133½	133½	133½
Wednesday.....	4 126	135½	136	135½	Thursday.....	26 133½	133½	133½	133½
Thursday.....	5 134	136	136½	136	Friday.....	27 132½	132½	132½	132½
Friday.....	6 136½	136½	136½	136½	Saturday.....	28 134½	133½	134½	133½
Saturday.....	7 120½	136½	136½	136½	Monday.....	30 134	123½	134	133½
Monday.....	9 136½	135½	136½	135½	Tuesday.....	31 133½	133½	133½	133½
Tuesday.....	10 135½	135½	135½	135½					
Wednesday.....	11 135½	135	135½	135	August 1869.....	136½	121½	136½	133½
Thursday.....	12 135½	134½	135½	134½	" 1869.....	145½	143½	150	144½
Friday.....	13 134½	134½	134½	134½	" 1867.....	130½	137½	143½	141½
Saturday.....	14 131½	136½	134½	134½	" 1866.....	140	146½	152½	147½
Monday.....	16 14	134½	134	133½	" 1865.....	144½	140½	145½	144½
Tuesday.....	17 183½	133	133½	133½	" 1864.....	256	281½	261½	238
Wednesday.....	18 133	132½	133½	133½	" 1863.....	126½	122½	123½	137½
Thursday.....	19 133½	132½	133½	132½	" 1862.....	115½	111½	116½	115½
Friday.....	20 132½	132½	133	132½					
Saturday.....	21 134	131½	132	131½	S'ce Jan 1, 1860.....	134½	130½	144½	133½
Monday.....	23 131½	131½	131½	132½					

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of July and August, 1869:

Railroad Stocks—	July				August			
	Open.	High.	L. w.	Clos.	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.
Alton & Terre Haute.....	60	60½	59¾	59¾	83	86	83	85½
Chicago & Alton.....	162	166	158	166	168	163	158	165
do do pref.....	100½	106	109	106	102½	102½	105	106
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	191	191	183	190	196	201	194½	194½
do do Northwest'n.....	82½	84	78¾	80½	84	92½	83½	83½
do do pref.....	96½	96½	93½	95½	96½	101	93½	93½
do do Rock Island.....	118½	118½	113½	114½	114½	111½	114½	114½
Columb., Chic. & Ind. C.....	88½	89½	88	88½	87	87	84	85
Cleve. & Pittsburg.....	102	106½	102	107½	107½	108½	104	106½
do Col., Cin. & Ind.....	74	76	73	73	73½	82	79½	79
Del., Lack. & Western.....	112½	113	110	112½	112	113	111½	112½
Dubuque & Sioux city.....	105	105	102	104½	104½	113	104½	112
Harlem.....	144	168½	142½	163½	161	167	160	160
Hannibal & St. Joseph.....	119	123	115	126½	126½	131	124	125
do do pref.....	119½	120	119	126	125	128½	120	121
Hudson River.....	165½	164	159½	187½	187	188½	179	184
Illinois Central.....	142½	146	140½	141½	142	142	132½	139½
Long Island.....	60	60	60	60	106	109½	104½	105½
Lake Sho. & Mich. South.....	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Macon & Western.....	23	23	23	23	22	22	22	23
Mar. & Cincln., 1st.....	9½	9½	9½	9½	9	9	9	9
do do 2d.....	180	186½	177½	181½	182½	182½	178	179½
Michigan Central.....	76	78½	73	77½	79	84½	78	79½
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	86	89½	84½	87½	89½	92½	86½	87½
do do pref.....	89½	90	87½	87½	88½	84½	87½	88½
Morris & Essex.....	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
New Jersey.....	101½	104½	97	102½	102	108½	102	107½
do Central.....	196½	217½	189½	215	200½	212½	197	199
New York Central.....	127	131	125½	131	132½	145	132½	140
do do N. Haven.....	124	128	124	128	128	140	128	135
do do scrip.....	104½	105	104½	105	112	113	112	112
Norwich & Worcester.....	32½	33	31½	32½	32½	32½	31½	32½
Ohio & Mississippi.....	235	245	270	270	270	270	280	280
Panama.....	156	167½	160	163½	153½	154½	151½	151½
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica.....	93½	99½	93½	97½	97	98	96½	96½
do do guar.....	100½	100½	100½	100½	100½	100½	100½	100½
Reading.....	72½	77	71½	75	74	83	74	83
Rome, W. & Ogdensb'g.....	76	86	76	80	74	87½	74	85
Toledo, Wab. & Western.....	109	110	108½	108½	109	110	108½	108½
do do do pref.....	150	160	150	160	150	160	150	160

Miscellaneous—

Cumberland Coal.....	32	33½	30	33½	34	35½	33	33
P. nosylvania.....	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225
Wilkesbarre Coal.....	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
Del. & Hud. Canal.....	181	181	127	127	127	128	126	126
Pacific Mail.....	88½	92½	81½	84½	84½	87	79	80
Boston Water Power.....	15½	15½	15½	15½	15	15	13½	13½
Canton.....	68½	62½	60	60	62½	68½	68	68
Brunswick City.....	11	11	11	11	8½	8½	8½	8½
Mariposa.....	9	9	8½	9	8	8	8	8
do pref.....	16	17	15½	16	16	16	10½	12
Quicksilver.....	15	16½	15½	16	16	16	14	15
West. Union Telegraph.....	88½	89	86	87½	88	89	87	87½
Citizens Gas.....	160	160	160	160	150	150	150	150
Bankers & Brokers Ass.....	109	110	108½	108½	109	110	108½	108½
Union Trust.....	150	160	150	160	150	160	150	160

Express—

American M. Union.....	43½	43½	39½	42	41½	43½	36½	36
Adams.....	62	62	53½	59½	59½	59½	56	56½
United States.....	70	75	69½	70	69½	69½	62½	63½
Merchant's Union.....	6	6	6	6	10	11	10	11
Wells, Fargo & Co.....	31½	31½	21½	21½	21	22	18½	19

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

Days.	London, cents for 54 pence.	Paris, centimes for dollar.	Amsterdam, cents for florin.	Bremen, cents for M. banco.	Hamburg, cents for M. banco.	Berlin, cents for thaler.
2.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
3.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
4.....	10% @ 110	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
5.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
6.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
7.....	1 0 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
9.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
10.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
11.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
12.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
13.....	110 @ 110%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
14.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
15.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
16.....	109% @ 110	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
17.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
18.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
19.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
20.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
21.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
22.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
23.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
24.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
25.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
26.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
27.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
28.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
29.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
30.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
31.....	109% @ 109%	515 @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79 @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
August, 1869.....	109% @ 110%	517% @ 513%	40% @ 40%	79% @ 79%	85% @ 85%	71 @ 71%
August, 1868.....	108% @ 110%	518% @ 513%	40% @ 41%	79% @ 80%	85% @ 88%	71% @ 72%

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1 :

NEW YORK CITY BANK RETURNS.						
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
January 2....	\$259,690,037	\$20,738,123	\$34,379,609	\$180,490,445	\$48,896,421	\$585,501,799
January 9....	258,792,562	27,334,730	34,314,156	187,902,530	51,141,129	707,772,075
January 16....	262,338,831	29,258,536	34,279,133	190,484,843	62,927,083	675,795,671
January 23....	264,964,619	28,964,197	31,265,946	197,102,103	51,022,119	671,234,641
January 30....	265,171,109	27,784,923	34,231,166	196,986,462	54,747,669	609,369,242
February 6....	266,541,733	27,989,404	34,246,486	196,602,899	53,424,183	670,329,470
February 13....	264,390,467	25,854,331	34,263,451	192,977,360	52,324,055	690,754,499
February 20....	268,423,061	28,371,291	34,247,321	187,612,546	50,997,197	50,991,049
February 27....	261,371,897	20,832,603	34,247,981	186,216,175	50,835,064	629,316,051
March 6....	262,089,883	19,486,634	34,275,885	182,604,437	49,146,629	737,118,131
March 13....	261,689,695	17,353,671	34,690,445	182,392,458	49,639,692	629,177,566
March 20....	263,086,302	15,218,806	34,741,310	183,501,999	50,774,874	730,710,009
March 27....	263,909,539	12,073,732	34,777,814	180,113,910	50,555,103	797,987,459
April 3.....	261,933,675	10,737,889	34,816,916	175,395,769	48,496,359	837,923,692
April 10....	237,430,227	8,731,543	34,609,360	171,495,510	48,644,732	810,064,455
April 17....	255,184,862	7,811,779	34,436,763	172,203,494	51,001,788	773,395,294
April 24....	257,453,074	8,930,360	34,060,511	177,310,080	56,877,898	752,905,764
May 1.....	260,435,160	9,267,616	33,972,053	182,948,565	56,496,722	793,763,249
May 8.....	263,498,372	16,081,459	33,958,160	190,812,387	55,109,673	901,174,877
May 15....	269,499,897	15,374,769	33,977,793	199,392,449	56,501,856	860,730,857
May 22....	270,375,963	15,429,404	33,927,566	199,414,869	57,818,398	738,747,893
May 29....	274,935,461	17,871,220	33,920,855	200,056,000	57,810,873	731,646,493
June 5.....	275,919,009	19,051,133	33,932,935	199,124,042	57,239,429	796,234,091
June 12....	271,963,735	19,063,590	34,144,790	198,886,905	50,859,258	826,006,646
June 19....	163,341,906	19,025,444	34,198,829	184,214,110	49,612,488	836,224,021
June 26....	260,431,723	20,371,140	34,214,745	481,774,605	768,170,743	768,170,743
July 3.....	266,268,471	23,530,267	34,217,978	179,929,467	46,737,263	46,737,263
July 10....	253,494,944	30,266,912	34,377,945	163,197,239	48,702,723	678,540,520
July 17....	267,008,239	31,055,430	34,178,437	183,431,711	51,859,706	711,328,151
July 24....	259,641,899	30,079,424	34,110,736	193,632,261	51,777,862	57,835,097
July 31....	260,530,245	27,319,923	34,068,677	196,416,443	56,101,637	614,455,457
August 7....	264,879,357	26,003,295	33,947,985	200,221,008	56,006,844	614,875,631
August 14....	268,505,365	24,154,499	33,992,267	198,952,711	54,730,039	539,321,621
August 21....	262,741,133	21,694,610	34,023,104	192,034,546	53,070,831	566,650,537
August 28....	261,012,109	19,469,108	33,999,743	183,754,539	52,792,834	603,301,341

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.....	\$51,716,999	\$352,483	\$18,210,397	\$38,121,023	\$10,593,719
January 11.....	51,642,237	344,091	13,438,109	38,168,511	10,559,872
January 18.....	52,122,793	473,462	13,729,493	39,025,153	10,596,560
January 25.....	52,537,015	411,837	14,034,870	39,555,463	10,593,914
February 1.....	52,632,813	32,784	14,296,510	29,677,943	10,599,351
February 8.....	53,039,716	317,011	13,735,595	40,080,529	10,586,552
February 15.....	53,922,391	204,681	13,573,943	33,711,575	10,582,226
February 22.....	52,416,146	211,307	13,208,607	37,960,986	10,458,546
March 1.....	52,251,351	256,933	13,010,503	37,735,305	10,458,546
March 8.....	52,232,000	297,887	13,253,201	38,293,356	10,458,953
March 15.....	51,911,522	277,517	13,028,297	37,571,582	10,459,061
March 22.....	51,328,419	225,097	12,765,759	36,960,009	10,461,406
March 29.....	50,597,101	210,614	13,021,315	36,863,344	10,472,429
April 5.....	50,493,666	189,033	12,169,221	35,575,854	10,622,896
April 12.....	50,770,193	184,246	12,643,357	36,029,537	10,622,166
April 19.....	51,178,371	187,813	12,941,783	37,031,747	10,629,425
April 26.....	51,294,222	164,261	13,610,063	37,437,285	10,624,407
May 3.....	51,510,982	201,753	14,210,371	38,971,231	10,617,815
May 10.....	51,936,530	270,525	14,621,303	39,173,803	10,617,934
May 17.....	51,698,226	276,167	14,696,365	40,692,742	10,614,112
May 24.....	52,391,764	174,115	15,087,008	41,691,410	10,618,246
May 31.....	52,210,874	183,267	15,484,947	42,447,319	10,618,551
June 7.....	52,826,257	198,316	15,378,928	42,390,330	10,610,390
June 14.....	53,124,800	152,451	15,123,342	42,003,077	10,621,932
June 21.....	53,800,045	143,795	14,972,123	42,066,901	10,617,884
June 28.....	53,061,172	180,684	14,567,327	41,517,716	10,622,704
July 5.....	53,937,521	303,621	14,011,449	41,521,537	10,618,845
July 12.....	53,140,755	486,293	13,415,493	40,140,497	10,618,275
July 19.....	53,128,598	456,731	12,944,886	39,634,862	10,618,766
July 26.....	52,446,100	394,377	13,076,180	39,160,641	10,614,973
August 2.....	51,953,813	384,869	13,613,911	39,717,126	10,610,233
August 9.....	52,022,930	325,216	13,530,061	39,506,423	10,608,331
August 16.....	51,932,911	266,089	13,047,635	39,141,196	10,610,861
August 23.....	52,309,626	244,236	12,977,027	39,010,065	10,608,352
August 30.....	52,038,652	242,513	13,018,213	38,333,414	10,603,834

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.....	\$98,423,644	\$1,203,401	\$12,938,332	\$37,533,767	\$5,151,345
January 11.....	100,727,077	3,075,814	12,894,700	38,032,891	25,276,667
January 18.....	102,205,203	2,677,688	12,942,327	39,717,193	25,243,223
January 25.....	102,959,942	2,391,790	13,228,874	39,555,747	25,272,300
February 1.....	103,696,854	2,161,284	12,961,225	40,228,462	25,312,917
February 8.....	101,342,425	2,073,908	12,452,795	39,692,877	25,210,557
February 15.....	103,215,044	1,845,924	11,642,856	37,759,772	25,352,122
February 23.....	102,252,632	1,545,418	11,269,790	36,323,814	25,304,035
March 1.....	101,309,589	1,283,933	11,200,149	25,959,466	25,301,537
March 8.....	101,425,932	1,297,599	10,985,972	26,525,690	25,335,377
March 15.....	100,820,303	1,217,315	10,869,188	34,051,715	25,351,654
March 22.....	99,553,219	1,330,864	10,490,448	32,641,037	24,559,313
March 29.....	99,670,945	937,769	11,646,223	32,930,430	25,254,167
April 5.....	96,969,714	862,276	11,348,884	33,504,099	24,671,716
April 12.....	99,625,472	750,160	11,391,559	34,392,877	25,338,783
April 19.....	99,119,750	639,460	11,439,995	31,257,071	25,351,814
April 26.....	98,971,711	617,435	12,361,827	35,392,203	25,319,751
May 3.....	100,127,314	763,963	12,352,113	26,735,742	25,330,000
May 10.....	100,555,542	1,257,749	12,513,472	37,457,837	25,321,533
May 17.....	101,474,527	1,134,886	12,888,527	38,709,804	25,209,662
May 24.....	102,042,132	934,566	13,191,542	39,347,881	25,290,332
May 31.....	101,573,278	772,297	13,696,837	38,403,621	25,173,222
June 7.....	103,643,819	640,582	13,454,611	38,491,446	25,292,167
June 14.....	104,352,548	601,742	12,643,615	37,403,719	25,247,667
June 21.....	103,691,658	959,796	12,087,305	36,243,995	25,213,661
June 28.....	102,575,825	1,103,662	11,744,002	34,331,417	25,304,858
July 5.....	102,633,948	3,140,676	9,595,608	31,251,746	25,335,701
July 19.....	101,403,211	3,259,121	9,511,879	31,520,417	27,395,095
July 26.....	102,704,540	3,024,595	9,793,461	35,211,103	25,251,904
August 9.....	103,801,554	2,865,920	10,719,569	37,308,687	25,514,706
August 16.....	104,511,271	2,154,616	10,438,545	36,117,793	25,279,222
August 23.....	102,988,791	2,117,374	11,210,664	34,933,731	25,244,004
August 30.....	103,053,007	1,571,713	11,908,736	35,229,149	25,200,083

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THE INCREASE OF MATERIAL PROSPERITY AND OF MORAL AGENTS, COMPARED WITH THE STATE OF CRIME AND PAUPERISM.

BY J. H. ELLIOTT, ESQ.*

PART I.—I.—*Introduction.*

It is proposed to place some groups of familiar facts and figures in an unusual apposition, to see what conclusions they point. The subsequent tables are exceedingly suggestive when so placed. The population was taken in 1851 and 1861, showing an increase of 12 per cent in England and Wales, 6 per cent in Scotland, and a decrease of 12 per cent in Ireland. The net increase of the United States being 6 per cent. Let this numerical increase be remembered while studying the Tables A and B, which exhibit a much greater relative supply of the various things which go to make up the material of human well-being—food, clothing, and fuel; add also of education, as narrowly understood, and of educa

* Read before the Statistical Society of London.

tion in its true meaning, either for good or for harm, and of religious instruction. To this add the improved sanitary condition of the people, by reason of better drainage; of improved dwellings, as far as they go; extension of medical aid and hospital relief; more temperate habits; and, what does not admit of measurement, the kinder social and moral relations of the various classes of the people. The wealthy and intelligent, if they err at all, err now on the side of too much solicitude and active interference, with their less fortunate fellow creatures. Friendly and courteous behavior seems to increase daily; and gentler manners, arising from the better training and example of the upper and middle classes, which reflects usefully upon the conduct of all. Very much good, little heeded, is attributable to railway discipline, and to the honorable and generous policy under which the affairs of railways are usually conducted. All these are so much moral teaching for the millions of railway passengers. The less use of alcoholic drinks, consequent upon railway traveling, allows the brain to continue in a more normal state of tranquil health, a condition closely affecting human conduct. All this, if carefully thought out, will indicate a very great increase in the power and quantity of those agents which tend to improve the morals and manners of the people. They must produce great practical results of a most cheering kind, but they do not do so nearly to the extent they ought to do. There is a portion of the people which do not illustrate much, if any, of these happy results, or the amount of violence, of crime, and of indigence would not concurrently manifest so much increase. It is not enough that crime should be even stationary, which it is not; for if these good agents did their specific work undisturbed, moral disease, crime, and misery, would very much decrease; and in such a wealthy and improving nation as is Great Britain, we have a right to expect this result. If certain medical treatment were known to be capable of relieving certain diseased symptoms, and yet did not do so in some or many cases, the physician would say, as he often does say (especially when attending ignorant and vicious people,) "There is something wrong here; that does not take place, which all experience shows should take place; there is some antagonistic agent at work. I apply known and proved remedies, yet the disease continues, and is even aggravated." So, if vice and misery, crime and pauperism, still increase among a people, when so many curative agents increase, we must inquire more deeply, and ascertain what the antagonistic agents are which spoil our work, baffle our hopes, and resist our sanitary influences as well moral as physical.

Notwithstanding all this, which, according to moral and physical laws, should be followed by less and less misery; when we find that misery

increases under our hands, we are compelled to ask what is yet omitted, or what, if anything, is still done of an evil tendency which spoils our work? What other things do we do which may or may not be snakes in the grass? Whatever they be, they ought to be fearlessly exposed, candidly and honorably acknowledged, and our policy changed. Some things are good in moderation which are destructive in excess, but some things are bad in every degree.

Much of human ill depends upon organization, which is hardly to be reached by human interference, at least in the present state of our appliances, but a larger portion of human ill is amenable to wise management. The causes of misery which depend on our organization are, defective animal strength, depraved appetites, imperfect intelligence, defective self-control, commonly shown in the absence of industrious and frugal habits, or in the undue energy of the passions, the healthy action of which are indispensable to happiness—due adjustment is virtue, too much or too little is vice.

Improvvidence, i.e. want of thrift, is the usual cause of misery among multitudes. Common prudence seems a very uncommon virtue; but with increase of so many good influences improvvidence ought to decrease and thrift to increase, but they hardly do so. The lower orders especially, consume much more than they did, and in a wasteful manner. If luxuries increase, the consumption thereof must not be allowed to increase without due regard to the future.*

The people obtain more and more good things, but they consume and waste so much of this excess that they ever fall into indigence; those who do so, suffer deservedly, and they ought to be let alone. Year by year there is less excuse for poverty in this country, therefore those who so suffer, ought not to be relieved, or only with utmost stringency, else they are thereby encouraged in their vicious course of life, and, what is much worse, bystanders are demoralised, that is, they are discouraged in their

* The dietary of a mechanic in the East of London (where there is now much poverty,) earning from 86s to 40s per week, was in 1865 thus: he goes to work at 6, taking a dram of rum, breakfasts at 8, tea or coffee, eggs and bacon; luncheon at 10.30, bacon, mutton chops, or sausages, with beer; dinner at 1, meat, bread, potatoes, beer; at 3 to 3.30, a dram, usually of rum; 4.20 he goes to tea; home for the evening at 6, unless extra hours at extra rate of payment. Supper at home, sometimes of hot meat or poultry.—(*On the Statement of the Master.*)

Others in the same district would go into a public house on a Monday, throw down 20s, and order four bottles of sherry, and returning to work on Tuesday, would boast that since Saturday they had been living at the rate of a £1,000 a year. Men engaged in the city have wages from 15s to 16s a week, but make with fees 40s to 45s weekly. If they take home 15s for the wife out of 16s, keeping one for themselves, they think they make fair contribution—they say nothing of the 24s to 30s extra.—(*Idem*)

Men who two years ago were employed six days in the week at 40s to 50s, gave the smallest sum to their family on which they could drag on, and now that they get work only four or five days in the week, their families are no worse off, for they always did and do get only the minimum. The man himself has less to drink.

A man with a gang of laborers under him, working on a farm near London, makes sometimes 40s a week. His wife complained the family had barely necessities, but showed the visitor the beer score for the week—17s 6d.

own difficult self-denial, and invited to disregard the future. If we cannot annihilate misery, our duty is to reduce it to the minimum, but by injudicious means we seem to insist that it shall ever continue at its maximum. It would be much more humane even, to leave all such suffering persons to their fate (but that is not necessary,) for misery would be reduced by such severe but unwholesome examples. Our practical teaching is, "be lazy, wasteful, and extravagant, and if any evil come there are those who will relieve you."*

The true dogma is this, that in England there ought to be but one charity in the whole land, *i.e.*, the national poor law. All who suffer ought to be relegated to that really grand national charity; to it and nowhere else, except it be that small section of suffering persons, who are the surrounding of each one of us, who are known to us, and with whom we have some special or personal sympathies, our relations and intimate friends, and it may be our faithful servants, if such exist, honest to us and thrifty to themselves, these may be specially relieved by ourselves on the condition of our closer and affectionate sympathy with them.

All the rest of human sufferers are our common fellow creatures, who have equal claims upon us; none of them ought to have special aid or arbitrary preference. Special charity to small groups of sufferers fancifully selected beyond the circle of those we respect and esteem, is partiality and injustice to the larger mass who suffer on and get no special relief. After having aided one's own friend or his children, who cares whether it be Jones or Smith who enters the almshouse or the orphan asylum? who cares whether it be Brown or Hobbs that goes only to the union? All these persons are our fellow creatures, have equal claims to our sympathy, and they ought all to be equally well and kindly treated: and, if children, they should be usefully educated, not one better than another, for that is whimsical partiality and fanciful injustice. They ought all to go to the one national charity. Other public charities interfere with the good order of the State. Our own kind aid is due only to those we love and esteem, the national charity for all the rest.

That large mass of suffering which is the result of diseased organization, or of organic depravity, depends as much on our original formation (inscrutable as it may be) as lameness or scrofula, idiocy or deafness, and should not be so treated as to extend and perpetuate such depraved constitutions. A multitude of these diseased persons, but not quite all,

* During a late outflow of charity in the east of London, a sack manufacturer complained that he had great difficulty in getting any sacks made. See also Statistical Journal, vol. xxxviii, p. 196, "Lancashire's Lesson."

should be left alone. Nature intended that the diseased stock should disappear and become extinct, and she has provided accordingly. Organic depravity should not be propagated and diffused by injudicious artificial interference. The healthy undisturbed process of animal life is to eliminate diseased organisms. The gardener propagates and encourages only the best fruits and flowers of their kind. The people of Scandinavia collect those hapless beings who are afflicted with leprosy into special hospitals. In Norway there are two, one at Molde another at Bergen where they keep in comfort and ease those of their fellow creatures who are infected with this loathsome and incurable disease. They say, here you shall live; but you shall not be abroad, contracting marriage and transmitting to another and another generation your dreadful affliction. There is much vice which is a leprosy of the soul, is as incurable, and should be so treated.

But the curable are still a large section of evil-doers. Those persons who are amenable to educational discipline, a discipline of no subtle and recondite sort, arrived at only by some difficult process, like that which enables men at last, after many trials and failures, to make a new die or a new engine. What has hitherto been done with the most amiable motives—nor labor nor money spared—has almost entirely failed, if the figure-facts before us is any evidence. The reports of various charitable and reformatory societies point at best to very uncertain results, the larger portion of those who are reported to the world as reformed offenders—cases of moral cure—are at best doubtful. They cannot be, and they are not thoroughly traced. Besides, the most satisfactory cases of cure are of persons who, having been taught some useful handicraft, are sent to the colonies where, labor being scarce and work abundant, and the land and the produce of the land in excess, the wretched offender and mendicant, the transient reformatory, whose existence has been that of severe continued self-denial or of criminal abundance, is placed in a new state of life, where he gets £3 or £4 a week. Not much moral pharmacy, good advice-alteratives, are required to change the youth who has matriculated in these penal schools into useful and fair-living workers, where they must behave well or disappear in the wilds. It is not that their moral nature, not that the diseased volitions of their brain, or it may be of a naturally depraved organization, have been changed, but that new and large rewards to industry have supplied strong motives to good conduct. Some few creatures there are who are bad, inveterately bad, for the pleasure of being bad, but excepting these, make it worth people's while, and most will become honest for a handsome consideration. At a familiar united meeting of *mauvais sujets* and of philanthropists, one man said, "Well, by picking pockets and such like, I make £10 a week (£500 a year); if you

will secure me as much, with no harder work, I will emigrate to the Cape at once." Words, phrases, moral lessons, good advice, will not alone effect a change in men's conduct; with such gentle influences must be added the alternative of pain and suffering, with the secured reward in the end, of honest food for honest work. Many who have been submitted to the *materia medica* of the reformatory, have left that dispensary in improved moral health; but then they were persons of a class, hapily rather numerous even among the evil-doers, who wanted no treatment at all, who did wrong once, and who, if they had escaped, would probably have played the fool no more. Many persons are submitted to medical treatment who would get well as soon, and perhaps sooner, *if left alone*; and these are the cases which form some of the triumphs of the doctor, and are the source of his reputation. Going his rounds, an hospital surgeon—an honest one—said to his pupils, "Gentlemen, there is here nothing to interest us, one portion of these patients will get well if we leave them alone, the rest will die and we cannot help them." Some few moral sufferers are in the same hopeless condition, others can be cured, but only by other treatment than it has hitherto been the custom to apply.

[II.—*Aliments.*

The large increase of material good things, as shown by Tables A and B (Appendix), has been chiefly appropriated and enjoyed by what are called the working classes. This mere numerical quantity inadequately illustrates their great material improvement, if we omit to notice that the richer classes of society have hardly shared this increase, because they *have always had enough and to spare of all such commodities*. In this respect they were equally well off in 1851 as in 1861 or 1865. Persons of £200 or £300 a year and upwards, except in as far as the number of the class have increased, consume no more food, no more in weight and nutriment of beef, mutton, bread, tea, coffee, &c., in 1865 or 1861 than they did in 1851. The increase with them, can but have been in the luxurious and extravagant use of wine, silk, and perhaps a little extra wool and cotton, which, encouraging extravagance in apparel, has probably done as much harm as good to the national morals. This enormous addition to the good things, to the comforts of life, has been appropriated almost exclusively by poorer persons. During the 15 years this increase (in addition to the home supply), of 200 or 300 per cent of animal food, 235 of butter, 162 of cheese, has been consumed almost entirely by the million. The upper ten thousand, or hundred thousand, have not had it, for this good reason, they could not have consumed it, "their cup already runneth over." If they take more it is wasted, and that would be inconsiderable

seeing that they belong (chiefly to the thrifty, saving, and, as a consequence, *well doing, good-managing class*.

The increased supply of one period over the other of those articles, chiefly of comfort and luxury, which are entirely of foreign growth, as tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, maize, spirits, is an absolute increase, and is not like the foreign increase of one period over another, which must be added to the *unknown quantity* of home produce of wheat, &c. We know that the total quantity of tea, *e. g.*, has increased almost 100 per cent, but we only know that butter has increased by 235 per cent of foreign butter added to the unknown quantity of home-made butter.

III.—*Wages.*

Whatever may be the advanced *price* of food, &c., the increasing *quantity* consumed is evidence of increasing *ability* to purchase.

The subject of wages has been searchingly investigated in the *Journal* of this Society. It is needless to weary attention by any exposition showing how much wages have advanced during the fifteen years under comparison. In volume xxiii of the Society's *Journal*, Mr. D. Chadwick states that wages have increased in Lancashire in twenty years, from 1839 to 1859, 10 to 25 per cent in the cotton trade, and in the silk trade 10 per cent. In the building trades wages have increased 11 to 32 per cent. In many mechanical trades a general advance, even up to 45 per cent.

In the South, wages in the building trade advanced about 10 per cent from 1851 to 1861, and much more subsequently; at the same time there has been a diminution of the hours of labor claimed and readily granted, on the plea that time was wanted for these workers to improve their minds by the study of mathematics, geography, history, &c.; a great sham by the bye, which it is not creditable should have been listened to. Advance wages and shorten labor if you will, but do not believe that much use will be made thereof for mental improvement. Many of these people (and rightly enough) use their increased leisure by working for themselves. The best fellows among the builders and the like, do jobs on a Saturday afternoon if they do not idle about, and even that is not so bad recreation for men who work hard either with their brains or their muscles. Study they do not, and they would profit little if they attempted it.

Mr. Purdy's exhaustive paper, in volume xxiv, shows the wages of the agricultural laborers in thirty-four counties to have increased about 12 per cent from 1837 to 1860. A subject of great rejoicing to all who know the admirable though humble virtues which illustrate the lives of that class of the community, who are at once the most useful and the most hardly done by, the most patient, enduring, and uncared for, just because

they have been the least troublesome, and have kept their sorrows to themselves.

A few additional facts may be interesting.

In Kendal, in the woolen trade, during the period under notice, the wages of—

Young persons have advanced.....	20 to 25	per cent
Women.....	25	"
Skilled women, working in looms and machines.....	50	"
Skilled men " " "	5 to 10	"
Power loom weavers, women, from.....	5s 3d to 8s 2d	per week
Spinners, from.....	18s 4d to 22s	"

During this time the population of the borough of Kendal increased about 2 per cent only.

Persons in the web trade, in Somerset, earned in—

1851, Men.....	12s	1861, Men	15s
" Women and boys.....	5s	" Women and boys.....	6s

No change took place in the wages of letter-press printers from 1816, when sixty hours' work earned 33s., until 1866, when an advance to 36s. was made, or 9 per cent.

It is then much within the truth to say, that in the last ten or fifteen years wages have advanced, at a minimum, 15 per cent; at the same time there has been so steady an increase in the demand for workers, that none need have been out of work who could and would work. The demand is almost above the supply, or it has been so until lately, as well for unskilled as skilled laborers.

IV.—*Savings Banks.*

The *capital* deposited in the savings banks for the United Kingdom was for the periods—

1851	£30,277,000
1861	41,546,000
1865	45,228,000

(including the Post Office Savings Banks) being an increase in fifteen years of 50 per cent. But, as Table C (Appendix) shows, the increase is more in the amount of deposit, 22s. 2d. and 29s. 7d., than in the number of depositors, the *greater thrift* of the thrifty depositors is better shown than the *greater number* of depositors. Thrift, it seems, is rather a fixed quantity.

In this cheering increase, Ireland enjoys its full proportion. Thus, the virtuous section of the people, making wise use of prosperity, goes on

improving their state of independence, for we cannot believe that the dangerous classes make any considerable deposit in savings banks. These have full command over other and ever-increasing funds provided by the public for their relief—in parochial and other luxurious charities, in pillage, in the warm and comfortable asylum of the prison-house, the reformatory, and the hospital, and now in the casual ward of the union house. Perhaps of all modern fancies this is the most mischievous. Here the wandering idler is supplied with food, lodging, bath, and attendance, gratis, such lodging as used to cost him 2s. 6d. to 8s. a week. The stone-breaking and the oakum-picking is but nominal, or amusing exercise. Discipline cannot be enforced. The officials and others are so ill-used alike by the paupers, by the humane magistrates, and the public, that they almost give up their duty in despair, and connive at the ill-conduct they cannot suppress and have no means of punishing. This is very much the case now in many prisons, and other asylums for the repose of evil-doers. It is only people in the best moral health who deposit in savings banks, the rest—that is, those who are morally diseased—know better, and are too much encouraged in their unthrift.

Thus, *the means* by which the people have been enabled to buy an ever-increasing quantity of good things, *have increased still faster*, so that the thrifty portion of the humbler classes have been enabled in fifteen years to increase their savings from thirty to forty millions. To say nothing of the millions which have been added to their own or to the national capital by the richer class, who thereby have supplied the improving fund, wherewith more workers are better employed. There is much sound political economy in the maxim of low life, “What are the rich for but to take care of and keep the poor?” Capital for their work, money for their relief.

V.—*Emigration.*

Emigration for the ten years 1851–61 (continued to the present time), has steadily relieved the labor market. This is another cause of the increasing wage-rate, and by which the eaters become fewer and their severer competition is lessened. Thus there has been again more and more bread for the eater. It is time to consider if the State should continue at the public cost its emigration agency. We cannot without limit, be at once a nursery and an almshouse for half the world, losing so many of our best workers, and making our colonies richer at an undue charge to the mother country, which is thus left to struggle with an ever-increasing proportion of lame, lazy and helpless persons who must be maintained by the labor of a less and less proportion of workers. The

cost of rearing so many useful workers, during the period of their unproductive growth, is almost solely defrayed here in England, and when they are sent *elsewhere*, at our own cost, or chiefly so; the only compensation being that they become better customers to us abroad than if they had remained at home. A farmer would soon be impoverished if he endured the cost of rearing foals or colts, and was deprived of his mature horses. At a time when there is a demand beyond the supply for domestic servants there are busy people, well meaning but not very wise, who, selecting the stoutest and best ordered of our young women, send them carefully consigned to Australia. If such young women desire to improve their own condition by emigration, they ought first to engage in some useful labor here, and with their own saved earnings depart themselves to other regions. A few years of thrifty labor here, especially as domestic servants, would render them at once self-dependant and properly trained workers elsewhere; in all respects better qualified to become good settlers.

VL.—Education.

For the purpose of education, or for that limited education more correctly called pedagogy, treasure has been liberally bestowed. The sum expended in the United Kingdom in 1854 was £715,000, which increased in 1865 to £1,369,000, or nearly double. In 1854, 1 in 38 of the population attended schools; in 1865, 1 in 22 (see Table D, Appendix). A large percentage of the population ought to have exhibited the good effects of this education in their conduct in life, for during this time some at least must have emerged from the state of pupilage into that of adolescence and active life. That such has taken place in but a small degree, if at all, subsequent tables will show.

Still more ought such good effects to appear, when we add the great increase of religious teachers and places of worship. Clergymen, priests, and all such, have been, and very consistently, most tenacious that religious training is of essential importance in the States, and that no good can be expected from any teaching which is not intimately allied with their own especial ministrations. Some seven or eight millions yearly is appropriated to special religious purposes, and the sum is increasing.

The means—other than religious—of moral and intellectual teaching have also enormously increased. Newspapers, halfpenny and penny books, pamphlets, serials, works of art, not to omit photography, come forth in myriads. Especially does the photographic portrait maker deserve a place in the ranks of moral teachers. In these literary educational agents, England contrasts favorably with France. Three or four years ago there was but one journal, "Le Petit Journal," of universal

circulation over the country, inferior in size and still more in matter to any of our lowest priced English newspapers.* It is worth while briefly to inquire why all this has so greatly failed.

The pedagogy of education has little to do with crime and pauperism, though it is taken to be a specific against those evils. Reading and writing, as mere reading and writing, may do as much harm as good, and can no more make an educated person than does a pen make a scribe, or a box of carpenter's tools a boat-builder; yet that sort of so-called education, is correctly taken to be a sign or symptom of some really good training more or less. Those parents who have taken care to get their children schooled are usually a good sort of people, and have done much for their children in home training. As the weather-cock shows the way of the wind, so the sending to school shows the way of the family.

Useful education means habitual industrious work and severely enforced self-denial. The training of a good laborer commences from the time when, as a boy, he follows his father into the fields; and so far from an agricultural laborer being unskilled—though unschooled—he is a variously skilled workman, and, to be good for anything he must be brought up to his profession from his early boyhood. It requires more varied qualities of mind and body to be a good laborer than to be a good carpenter, whose tools keep him square, "By line and by rule," &c., while the other makes parallel lines in a field, with an awkward thing called a plough, and still more awkward things called horses.

Further, our tables show a sorrowful dissonance between means and results, because, with regard to females, true training has been misplaced by false schooling. Domestic servants, male and female, were one million in 1861, and to fit them for such useful labors, their own future natural occupations as heads of families, and especially as wives and mothers, the duties of the household afford the best kind of training, and until the market for domestic female servants is full, charity ought not to push necessitous women into any other so appearing more genteel occupations.

* Of the state of literature in 1860 we have very ample statistics. Of monthly magazines more or less devoted to fiction, there were 2,210,000 circulated annually; of journals published weekly, the chief feature being novels, 703,000; of single romances issued at a penny, 5,000; of immoral publications, 52,000; and of magazines at twopence, 374,000, exclusive of secular literature, religious, temperance, educational, &c.; total, in round numbers, 3,349,000. Comparing this with 1831, before the stamp tax or advertisement duty had been repealed, we see against the 125,000 of monthly magazines circulated then over 2,000,000 now; and whereas there existed then no cheap fiction of a really wholesome kind, we have now a circulation of over a million of journals at a penny and two pence, containing stories not classed as immoral, against only 72,500 of a notoriously immoral kind. But the great impetus to the spread of cheap literature of all kinds was given by the repeal of the paper duties in 1861. We learn by an article in the "Bookseller," of May 31, 1861, the materials for which were supplied by Mr. Francis, the following facts concerning fiction. Three years after the repeal of the excise there were of journals containing novels, sketches, &c., thirteen at a penny and a halfpenny, with an aggregate weekly issue 1,053,000 of romantic tales published separately, eight publications, aggregate issue 195,000; of immoral publications, 9,000; of higher class magazines, published monthly, 244,350. This is not including religious and other literature where fiction was a secondary object. Thus we have a weekly and monthly issue of respectable publications as most equal to the entire annual issue of a few years previous, and of immoral publications we have 9,000 against 52,500 then.—*Social Science Journal*.

The things taught in a school, useful as they may be, are of small value indeed, compared with the practical training which girls receive in that true school of humble life—the kitchen; where they are (or ought to be) taught *obedience*, and required to perform *subordinate* labor, drudgery it may be, though much of it is indeed skilled labor, in well-ordered households, of an expenditure of £200 or £2,000 a year.

It would be well if those kind ladies who do so much for school education and out of door charities, would inquire if the true schools for their superintendence be not their own households, their kitchens, pantries, nurseries; if they cannot teach there they can teach nowhere. Some of our most sensible ladies take girls into their households for the mere purpose of teaching the accomplishments of good housewifery. All educational schemes and charitable fancies are likely to do more harm than good, if the *nomos oikou* (the law of the house) be unknown and neglected. The great merchant and the little mechanic, alike *collect* the grains of subsistence, which in the end the good housewife *distributes* with as sharp a percentage of saving here and there as they have been scraped together by keen commissions and profits.*

PART II.—VII. *Introduction.*

All these moral and material agents having enormously increased during ten or fifteen years, and much above the increase of population,† we now seek for their effects on the conduct of the people. If they show no favorable result, or at best a very inadequate one, we had better give

* The practical good of this sort of training, even among persons of a superior class, was better understood in former times. We read in MacDiarmid's "Lives of British statesmen," that, "as a further step in his education Thomas More was placed in the family of Cardinal Morton. In consequence of the form into which society was thrown by the feudal institutions, the only road by which men of inferior rank could hope to reach distinction and power was by the favor of the great proprietors of land, the chief ecclesiastics, &c. In their families, also, the politeness, elegance, and knowledge of the age were to be found; for while the rest of the community, groaning under the tyranny of their superiors and the terrors of superstition added the most afflictive poverty to the most degraded ignorance, the patronage of the great was necessarily coveted by men of learning as their only resource; and distinguished scholars, having a ready access to the tables of persons of condition, at a period when learning from its rarity, was held in high estimation, brought along with them a comparative degree of information and refinement. At the same time the internal economy of a great man's family, presenting a singular appearance with that of the monarch on a small scale, was the proper school for acquiring those accomplishments and that address by which success at court might afterwards be insured. Influenced by the considerations of these advantages, persons of good condition were eager to place their sons in the families of the great, as the surest road to fortune. In this state of it was not accounted grading to submit even to menial offices; while the greatest barons of the realm were proud to officiate as stewards or cup-bearers, carve to the monarch; a youth of good family, could wait at the table or carry the train of a man of high condition without any loss of dignity. The patronage of the great man being naturally secured to those who had acted as his inmates and retainers, admission into the families of the principal officers of the State, who had preferment most directly in their power, was particularly courted." This illustrates a custom common in England among all classes, and continued from the times of Henry VIII. toward the end of last century.

† The smaller population-increase, when the whole United Kingdom is noted, arises from the fact that, while the outflow of the people from Ireland has reduced the redundant population there, the large migration of the men into Great Britain from Ireland has unduly raised the percentage of increase here, and has unhappily increased in large ratio the ill-conditioned population. The Irish constitute an unfair proportion of our criminals, a state of things imminently dangerous as well morally as political, and one with which the Government must concern itself, or some catastrophe may be feared.

up the expense and save our fruitless toil. But these agencies, counteracted as they have been, are still of priceless value, and had it not been for their salutary force we should have sunk lower in pauperism and crime. The small diminution of crime—where crime has diminished, a grave matter of doubt—is by no means commensurate with the prodigious increase of all these wholesome influences, which would have produced on the largest scale their own specific effects, had they not been so gratuitously disturbed by evil agents. What those agents are, is well enough known and understood by thinkers, though not very readily admitted by people in general, and scarcely ever declared in public. They form one group, and one alone. All has been going on for good in this country, but a sentimental humanity, interfering with the criminal law and prison discipline, and an inconsiderate multiform charity, which have put out of gear the action of the laws of nature and of man. Let any man tell the world why pauperism increases, why crime increases, or why, at best, do both remain stationary, except as both are influenced by bad discipline, and he will discover the philosopher's stone. The inquiry is exhausted; none will say that the causes enumerated if left undisturbed can produce any effect upon society but good. All except one, and if that one be not the disturbing evil hand, which puts out of order all the rest, then why do vice and misery so increase under our hands? The increase must have a cause, and there the one cause lies, patent before us; for if it be not that, then we have an uncaused effect, or the cause is still latent, unknown, undiscovered, and hardly to be reached by human inquiry. But to say that the cause which has been just alleged is not the true one, is to deny all human experience, to deny one's own instincts, and to ignore the laws of our moral nature, indeed of the whole animal world. If more food, more employment, more social kindness, do not cause those who are under their influence to behave better—in truth to be happier—there must be some concealed disturbance to look after. If a man—any one man—having all these things in abundance, yet sink down in atrophy, there surely must be some diseased action, in his own nature, or in some poison with which he is infected that resists and repels all nutritive agents.

VIII.—*Pauperism.*

The forces which have produced so large and increasing a mass of pauperism (see Table E, Appendix) have been too energetic to be resisted with much effect by the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, aided by our resources of moral and intellectual hygiene and pharmacy. The political physician—statesman or philanthropist—has applied the costliest remedies of his art, for many a long year, and here is the result; but a sound education by

the law and by public opinion, would long ere this have taught men, and enforced them at their peril, to provide in prosperity against adversity.

It is no new thing to be told the truth, that the pauper must be in all respects worse off than the humblest self-supporting laborer; yet, as an illustration of the contrary practice, a man was some weeks since taken into a union house near London, he said, "If I had known how comfortable I should have been in this place, I would not have struggled as I did all last winter." We have weakened all the motives to industry and thrift. The sound rules of government are as old as reason itself. They are taught clearly enough in Scripture, and Tacitus tells us: "By false compassion we injure the community; industry will go to ruin; sloth will predominate; men will no longer depend on themselves, but having from their own conduct nothing to hope or fear, they will look to their neighbors for support; they will first abandon their duty, and then be a burden on the public." Surely some of the errors which caused the ruin of old Rome, were not such as are doing the mischief to old England!

IX.—*Insolvency.*

Insolvency may be called the pauperism of the middle and upper classes, and insolvency laws will be wholesome in as far as the vices which cause insolvency are thereby restrained. But as both laws now exist and are administered, they form an influence in our national system of education, not for good but mainly for harm, and so far the people have a bad education. Fifty years of incessant changes have left the insolvency laws in a worse condition than at any former period. Such laws, to be effectual, ought to restrain by punishment those who by wilful and avoidable conduct will not or cannot pay what they justly owe.

We know little of the magnitude of insolvency, we know not the true number of insolvents, nor the amount of treasure of which they despoil their creditors. It would be one step towards a reformation of the law, if we were informed yearly of our losses by insolvency, as we are of our losses by pauperism.

Some twenty years ago the estimated loss was £50,000,000, and in all probability it is more now, especially when we add the gigantic disasters of 1866 and 1867, to which belong the large and new class of limited liability insolvencies.

In the year 1865, out of 8,300 bankruptcies, nearly 6,000 were upon the petition of the debtors—the wrong-doers—seeking the protection of the law against those they had injured. And 5,200 trust deeds show how injured creditors submit to any terms rather than accept the assistance of the court. The shades of difference between many of these cases

and compounding felony itself are not morally very distinguishable. In one case lately a dividend of 9d. in the pound legally satisfied debts of £2,000,000, and in another case the like dividend on £500,000. Such dividends on enormous debts are not rare (see *Times*, 13th and 17th February, 1869). We sometimes read, "One murder makes a villain, thousands a "hero."

X.—*Police.*

Police is a transition force, intermediate between those agents which improve the education of the people, constrain good conduct and prevent crime, and those which discover and bring crime to punishment. It has now grown up into a large army (1866) of 23,728 men, costing £1,827,106, yet this force has with difficulty prevented things from becoming much worse. Better results ought long ere this to have appeared. An efficient police restrains crime as well as detects it, but it does not correct the tendency to crime—it does not reform depraved natures—it only renders the development thereof into active life more difficult or impossible. When we put a drunkard under restraint, we prevent but do not reform him. The good citizens are mercilessly taxed to restrain evil-doers. A much less costly apparatus would control the desire, and would therefore in the end effectively and permanently reform the wicked. That is to say; humane discipline would present a stronger motive to work and take care than, as is now done, to be lazy, dishonest and cruel.

When it is said crime increases, the answer is often made, "Aye, but a vigilant police brings more crime to light." There is much fallacy in this; the truth being that for one crime that is detected by the police, there is many which are prevented. It is good to prevent, but it is still better to reform; that is, to diminish the power of the motives within a man which urge him to crime, by the active presence of counter-motives, rather than to restrain him in the deed he desires to do, by the presence of merely repressive forces acting upon him from without, which do not lock him up truly, but which hold the key before his eyes. All this is only force from without, acting on a weaker force within. We want men's conduct under their own will, to be directed in the right course by the energy of motives to do well being stronger than the motives to do evil. The one set of motives being of an agreeable kind, the other being of a very disagreeable but useful kind, i. e., reward and punishment. Work and food, or pain. Respect, peace and comfort on one side, or sharp suffering on the other. Bread earned, or stripes inflicted. "Prisons' bonds, bread and water, will put sense into a fool's head." They knew that more than two thousand years ago in ancient Greece.

1857-59 was 250,619, or 128 in 10,000 of the population; for the three years 1860-2, 290,084, or 131 in 10,000; in 1863, 333,641, or 138 in 10,000; and for the three years 1864-66, 317,568, or 149 in 10,000. But there were committed for trial or bailed, in the first period, 27,427; in the second period, 18,108; and in the third period, 16,155—making a total for the first period, or three years' average, 278,044; second period, 282,202; and for the third period, 1864-66, 322,953—being an increase of 16 per cent in ten years, while the estimated increase of population has been 10 per cent.

Again, the average number of persons committed or bailed were, for seven years, 1848 to 1854, *i. e.*, before the change in the law, 28,125; for seven years, 1856 to 1862, *i. e.*, after the change, 18,366.

Taking the four years after the alteration of the law, 1856 to 1859, the average number, 18,559; increasing afterwards, from 1860-63, to 18,786; while the class of commitments for one year, 1864, were 19,506; 1865 19,614; 1866, 18,849.

Again, in five years ending 1861, inclusive, the totals were 90,234, and in five years ending 1865, inclusive, 98,265.

The increase of crime coincident with relaxed punishments is shown over a period of forty years, from 1817 to 1857, in table F, appendix.

Offences against property without violence were, in 1851, 21,489; in 1861, 12,606—a decline caused by the Act of 1854; in the five years ending 1861, 62,828, and for the five years ending 1865, 67,146—being an increase of 4,318, or 6.9 per cent.

Offences against property with violence decreased, 1851 to 1861, from 2,013 to 1,905; but for the five years ending 1860 the total of these offences was 9,351, while for the five years ending 1865 they increased to 10,521. In burglary and housebreaking there has been very great increase. Malicious offences against property (including arson) in 1851 were 270; in 1861, 257. But for five years ending 1860 these offences were 947, and for five years ending 1865, 1,816. A singular increase.

Offences of all sort against the person in 1860 were 10,043, and in 1865, 12,146. Assaults of all kinds, committed or bailed in 1860 were 4,361, and in 1865, 5,814. In the year 1865 the total of assaults brought before magistrates was 60,406, and on peace officers, included in the above (one-fifth of the whole), 12,270.

Of murders and murderous assaults the total of five years ending 1860 was 2,86, and 1865, 2,585. The total of ten years ending 1856 and 1866 were 20,219 and 22,589, or about ten per cent increase. (Tables G and H, appendix.)

Crimes of violence indicate a more depraved state of the moral sense, and are very specific tests of the low state of education, not of the peda-

gogue, but of public opinion and of the law—the law, which the all-powerful schoolmaster. There has been so much talk about capital punishment of late, in which an affectionate interest in the blood-guilty has been strongly put forth in richly-colored relief, while the victims and their ruined families have been left in darkest and most neglected shade, that public opinion seems to have lost much of its horror and all of its holy anger. Yet venerable authority says, “Ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer which is guilty of death, but he shall surely be put to death.”*

We know but little of the crime of murder. In the year 1866 there were—

Verdicts of murder by inquests.....	272
Reported by police.....	131
Committed for trial.....	55
Acquitted or insane.....	24
Sentenced to death.....	26
Executed.....	12

So that of notoriously known murderers, 12 only met a righteous doom out of 272, or 1 in about 23. But with the greater sharpening of men's wit by education and reading, it is to be feared that deeds of death have become more subtle and refined, and more scientifically perpetrated. Undiscovered murder, as by poison, is practised to a great extent in England, as well as in other parts of the world. We know this by the testimony of competent persons, especially doctors. 272 doubled will fall short of the total of lives sacrificed yearly, encouraged in great part by fanciful legislation and literature.

The proportion of convictions for serious offences has in a small degree declined in the ratio of population, but even with this improvement, the increased cost of our police may indeed be grudged (see Tables I and K, Appendix.) This insignificant result is at last obtained only by an oppressive burden of two millions of money yearly, and by an inglorious abstraction of an army of now more than 24,000 stalwart men, at the most energetic period of their lives, from the productive industry of the

* Ancient Germans had no scruples about public executions: on the contrary, they thought the Just gods themselves might fitly preside over these; that these were a solemn and highest act of worship it rightly came. When a German man had done a crime deserving death, they in solemn general assembly of the tribe doomed him to die with ignominy. Certain crimes there were of a supreme nature; him that had perpetrated one of these they believe to have declared himself a prince of scoundrels. Him once convicted, they laid hold of—nothing doubting—bore him after judgment to the most convenient peat bog, plunged him in there, drove an oaken frame down over him, solemnly in the name of gods and men. “There, prince of scoundrels, that is what we have had to think of thee on clear acquaintance; our grim good night to thee is that! Lie there, and be our partnership with thee dissolved henceforth. It will be better for us, we imagine!”—“Model Prisons,” by Thomas Carlyle.

country.* The game hardly pays for the candle. More wholesome and less costly means are at hand, had we the energy and benevolence to use them. But while this small improvement is concurrent with, as we see all along, an enormous increase in all the material and moral agents which ought to diminish crime, however much they may have aided to the comfort and have caused a decrease in the physical suffering of multitudes, they have not done the best part of the work expected of them.

CRIME, ENGLAND AND WALES, CONVICTED AND PUNISHED.†

	Number summarily punished. { cannot be ascertained. }	Number of criminal prisoners sentenced and convicted.	Ratio per cent of criminals to population convicted.	Total of offenders.
1851.....	{ cannot be ascertained. }	21,579	0.13
1861.....	263,610	13,879	0.07	277,389
1862.....	272,969	15,312	0.08	288,281
1863.....	288,641	15,799	0.08	299,440
1864.....	300,781	14,726	0.07	315,457
1865.....	312,882	14,740	0.07	327,622
1866.....	339,091	14,254	0.07	353,345

In respect of religious training there were, on the 1st of January, 1862, out of a total of—

Prisoners in England Wales.....	25,153	4,189 or $\frac{1}{4}$ Roman Catholics
Population being.....	20,000,000	1,500,000 or 1-13th only ditto.

Thus the Catholic offenders, instead of being 1 in 13, were 1 in 6.

Prisoners in Liverpool.....	888	485, or above one half.
Population.....	443,874	130,000, or about 1 in $\frac{1}{3}$.
Prisoners in Ireland....	2,888	2,433, or six sevenths.
Population.....	5,764,643	4,490,583, or near four-fifths.

Thus in Ireland, where the people are under the strictest ecclesiastic

* The total charge of the criminal classes was stated in a daily paper in the year 1866:—

	£	s.	d.
Police.....	1,827,105	16	7
Paid by treasury for criminal prosecutions.....	143,511	6	6
Cost of prisons.....	614,677	12	8
Cost of convict prisons.....	237,333	2	..
Reformatory schools (treasury).....	51,794	6	1
Industrial schools.....	19,567	10	6
Criminal lunatics.....	45,037	12	..
Total.....	2,937,967	6	4

—to which must be added the special cost incurred by prosecutors, the earnings of thieves while following their profession, and the innumerable but great waste and destruction of property. It is no exaggeration to put this at £7,000,000, or £3,000,000 more.

† The convictions in Ireland were, in 1851, 14,377, but from 1861 to 1865 the number declined from 3,371 to 2,663, the average of five years being 3,305. But the great decrease of criminals of late years in Ireland, has been apparently followed by a corresponding increase in the United States, as well as by an undue proportion of Irish offenders in England. Of 80,533 persons arrested in New York (population 805,651) during 1867, 38,128 were natives of Ireland, 2,764 of England, 970 of Scotland. Thus nearly one-half of the total offenders were Irish.

discipline and exclusive infallible teaching, the offenders are 6 out of 7 instead of being 4 out of 5.

Prisoners in Scotland of.....	3,155	1,523 were Catholics.
Population.....	3,061,329*	

The state of education among offenders, like all else belonging to that class, is beset with trick, deceit, and fraud. They come to prison again and again, and every time they report themselves illiterate, though they have been taught as often to read and write. More schooling, and less oakum-picking, result naturally in quick progress in learning, especially when the learning is of an old lesson, which shows a good lad or good man, and obtains a better character from the schoolmaster and the chaplain.

These are among the reasons why so large a proportion of offenders appear to be illiterate, and they will ever continue so until a compulsory system gives opportunity to all of the population to learn to read and write, who are not naturally incapable of doing so, and they are rather a considerable number.

In our reformatories and prisons we teach evil-doers mechanical trades, and thus change them, at the public cost, from unskilled into skilled workers. Offences are profitable to them; they are rewarded; thereby they are enabled to earn higher wages when they come out of prison. "If one has a protector he escapes from a murder with only two or three years of imprisonment. The bagnio at Rome is not a very bad place. The prisoners acquire a trade there, and on returning to their villages are not dishonored, but rather feared, which is often of utility." ("Italy," by H. Taine.) Wordly London thus imitates the prison discipline of Holy Rome, and the results are singularly alike. How extremes meet!

The table L, showing the number of fires in London, is painfully suggestive that, with increasing education and prosperity, people have become more and more careless, or worse.

Incendiarism is a crime second only to murder; in some forms our ancestors regarded it as of equal atrocity. The total of commitments for malicious offences against property of this kind, in five years ending 1866, were 804; 1862, 670; 1866, 1,231.

XII.—Conclusion.

The most elaborate statistical tables leave our knowledge of crime still uncertain. The crime which travels on to punishment is but a small part of that which comes within the first grip of the officers of justice, and

* Out of this number the Irish-born, according to the census, were 204,008, or 6.6 per cent.

that is only a fraction of the crime which is known, but passes on unheeded, even though it be murder, to which must be added that still largest part of all which is unknown, and escapes with complete impunity, it may be for years, or for ever.

The causes of crime in England are, in addition to natural depraved organization,* the carelessness of people with regard to person and property. People ought to go about armed, as in former times, to resist the ruffian; and they ought, as a part of their education, to be trained to defend themselves. When there is danger they cry "Police," who, in order to answer effectually the cry, had need be 20,000 in London alone, instead of 7,000. One ruffian disabled on the spot is more exemplary than many punished after the slow and very uncertain process of law. There is also the reluctance of people to prosecute, because they think it amiable and virtuous to forgive offenders; and further, there is the expense and trouble of prosecution, and the risk of considerable ill-treatment in the court of justice itself by barristers and others concerned in the defence. He must be a very enlightened philanthropist, or a very severe and almost malignant persons who will nowadays seek to punish an offender. Juries will hardly convict in the face of clearest evidence; and judges, partaking of the gentle tendencies of the age, pass trifling sentences quite out of all proportion to the offences;† and, when all is done, and death or some long period of penal servitude is the culprit's doom, in comes the Secretary of State, who reprieves and commutes.‡ A remarkable illustration of this was shown at the Thames Police Court, 23d February, 1868, where a man was convicted as a begging impostor, having been of course at large, although within ten years he had been sentenced to no less than twenty-three years' imprisonment—twice for forgery, once seven years, and once fourteen, and thrice liberated on a ticket of leave. This is indeed "making a scarecrow of the law;" but old birds are not frightened from their pilfering ways by such scarecrows. Whatever the punishment may be, it should be strictly carried out. Destutt Tracy says, "*Les plus puissans de tout les moyens moraux, et aupres desquels les autres sont presque nuls, sont les lois répressives, et leur parfaite et entière exécution.*" [^]₃

* Of which too little heed is taken. Dr. Gay, who brings a rare but indispensable pathological knowledge to bear upon this and kindred objects, has judiciously treated it, in the "*Transactions of the Social Science Association for 1862.*"

† Our prison discipline itself is a satire on punishment. A troublesome jade in Holloway Gaol works ten hours' hard labor, i. e., in picking three pounds of oakum, while a poor, honest woman at Rotherhithe must pick more than six pounds to earn one shilling; and while a laborer in Sussex earns 12s. a week, a scoundrel in Woking Prison costs 21s. a week, and while detained in Newgate, he costs £3 a week, or more than a £100 a year, the salary of many hundred clergymen.

‡ Two cases of miscarriage of justice curiously illustrate the administration of the law. Pallazzini, an Italian, in 1865 was convicted on clearest evidence of the murder of one Harrington, but escaped at last on the confession of a relation, and on the evidence of a fresh batch of Italian witnesses. *ra. cieco Gardinieri* in 1866 was convicted for the murder, on equally good evidence, of a German sailor at Cardiff, but to whom a pardon was granted on condition of his leaving the country.

It is a failing of the multitude to go to extremes. Formerly the law and public opinion were needlessly severe; now they are cruelly lax, and the one error is not less cruel than the other. No cause for self-gratulation that we now practise a sentimental surgery. It is a matter of great doubt who is the more unfeeling officer in the army or navy, be he who orders 700 lashes, or he who orders none at all. Instinct under the control of reason is our unerring guide. Obedience to the four instincts of hunger, thirst, lust, resentment (the common attributes of the whole animal creation,) is virtuous, degenerating into vice only when alike intemperate, plus or minus. Respecting injuries to ourselves and others, we have been erroneously taught to allow, or manifest, no resentment towards the offender, yet whenever so righteous an instinct has been suppressed nature has been thwarted, evil-doers have flourished, and the world has been going wrong. It is the instinct—the virtuous instinct—of the whole world to impose retributive pain, for pain inflicted wilfully and criminally, just as it is the instinct of the whole world, to slake thirst with drink; no need of drunkenness therefore.* Pain should be the certain punishment for all violent offences against the person, and either pain or some ignominious punishment, as the pillory, is due to malicious offences against property, especially on living animals. In the *Statistical Journal* is a useful notice, and admirable for the courage of the writer, Dr. Mouat, wherein he says, “Flogging is found to be very reforming of the prisoners in India, and is successful in clearing the gaols,” of India (vol. xxx).

“As thou doest so shalt thou be done by.”

“It is right to deal with one’s enemy according to his wickedness.”

“Word for word and blow for blow, says (heathen) Justice when she calleth for payment.”

And in confirmation of all this, for the use of stripes so wholesome and so reforming we have not merely the highest authority by precept, but the same highest Authority, by example. We are told of One who, and not for the extremest of offences either, “made a scourge of small cords.”

* “First follow nature, and your judgment frame
By her just standard.”

Is as correct a rule of law as it is of criticism. Art, jurisprudence, morals must not depart very far or wide from the canon of nature’s instincts, or the savage man will remain more virtuous than the so-called refined and civilized men.

APPENDIX.

A.—COMPARATIVE QUANTITIES OF CERTAIN ARTICLES IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND RETAINED FOR HOME USE.

[000's omitted from the quantities].

Articles	Average of 1850-53.	Average of 1860-63.	Increase in 1860-63, on 1850-53. Per cent.	1865 only.	Increase in 1865, on 1860-63. Per cent.	1866.
Oxen, bulls, cows, and calves.....No.	82,	108,	26	283,	245
Sheep and lambs.....	192,	311,	62	914,	376
Bacon and ham...cwt.	209,	729,	250	713,	242
Beef.....	126,	202,	60	244,	94
Butter.....	323,	957,	196	1,084	235
Cheese.....	325,	665,	104	853,	163
Eggs.....No.	109,832,	201,110,	83	364,	281	..
Fish of foreign taking, exclusive of eels...cwt.	92,	350,	279	472,	411
Hops....	2,	117,	4,753	82,	3,313
Lard.....	138,	351,	155	137, 1	decrease.
Pork.....	154,	178,	19	222,	45
Potatoes.....	920,	767, 17	decrease	807, 12	decrease
Rice.....	339,	2,920,	243	1,942,	131
Wheat.....	15,292,	31,795,	108	20,936,	36	23,109
Barley.....	2,946,	6,989,	117	7,818,	165	8,433
Oats.....	3,047,	5,277,	73	7,711,	153	8,829
Maize.....	6,505,	10,937,	68	7,087,	9	15,000
Wheat flour..	4,282,	6,088,	41	3,888, 9	decrease.	4,953
Currants.....lbs.	407,	656,	61	799,	96	756
Raisins.....	218,	281,	29	294,	35	301
Pepper....	4,512,	5,186,	15	4,713,	4
Rum.....gals.	2,894,	3,500,	21	3,698,	28	4,127
Brandy.....	1,881,	1,586, 16	decrease	2,664,	42	3,120
Other foreign and colonial	39,	27,	456	370,	849	549
Tobacco, manuf'd....lbs.	202,	313,	55	325,	308	379
do unmanufactured..	27,771,	34,848,	25	38,072,	37	39,621
Wine.....gals.	6,354,	9,059,	43	11,994,	89	13,244
Coals for consumption in metropolis.....tons.	1861 ave 3,427,317	1861 ave 4,537,671	1863 4,479,896	1864 4,727,301	1866 ave 5,240,747
Prices.....	16s. 7d.	19s.	18s. 2d.	20s. 1d.	20s. 4d.

NOTE.—Quantity increase in sixteen years, 50 per cent., p ice 30 per cent.

B.—IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE OF UNITED KINGDOM, HOME CONSUMPTION, AND RATIO TO POPULATION.

[000's omitted from amounts.]

	1851.	1861.	1863.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Real value, imports.	110,485	217,485	225,717	248,919	274,952	271,135	298,392
Exports.....	74,449	125,103	123,992	146,602	160,449	165,562	188,323
Total trade.....	184,934	342,588	349,709	395,521	435,401	436,697	487,220
Proportion of total trade to population.....	6.8	11.8	12.0	13.5	14.7	14.7	16.2

Quantities of some of the Principal Articles of food retained for Home Consumption

Cocoa, lbs.....	2,978	3,408	3,622	3,712	3,862	3,876	4,607
Coffee, lbs.....	32,505	35,202	34,452	32,763	31,860	30,511	30,944
Sugar, cwt.....	6,234	8,937	9,112	9,203	8,937	9,377	10,600
Tea, lbs.....	53,949	77,928	78,794	85,183	88,599	97,835	102,325
Malt, bush ...	40,337	46,650	43,689	49,073	51,797	59,746	54,445
Spirits, gals.....	23,977	19,699	19,123	19,383	20,496	21,006	22,516

Proportion of each Article to Population.

Cocoa, lbs.....	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Coffee, lbs.....	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
Sugar, cwt.....	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Tea, lbs.....	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.4
Malt, bush.....	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8
Spirits, gals....	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Average price of British	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
wheat per quarter...	0 38 6	0 55 4	0 55 5	0 44 9	0 40 2	0 41 10	0 49 11
Gross revenue per head							
of population.....	2 20	2 90	2 80	2 80	2 70	2 70	2 50

C.—AMOUNT AND PROPORTION TO POPULATION OF DEPOSITS IN THE SAVINGS BANKS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

[000's omitted.]		Amount of deposits.	Rate of deposits per individual.
Years.	Population.	£	£ s. d.
1851—England and Wales.....	17,928,	27,480,	1 10 7
“ —Scotland.....	2,889,	1,489,	0 10 4
“ —Ireland.....	6,552,	1,359,	0 4 2
Total United Kingdom.....	27,869,	30,278,	1 2 2
1861—England and Wales.....	20,662,	36,856,	1 16 9
“ —Scotland.....	3,062,	2,538,	0 16 7
“ —Ireland.....	5,799,	2,153,	0 7 5
Total United Kingdom.....	28,923,	41,547,	1 8 9
1862—.....	20,228,	36,797,	1 15 5
“ —Scotland.....	3,079,	2,677,	0 17 5
“ —Ireland.....	5,799,	2,089,	0 7 2
Total United Kingdom.....	29,106,	40,562,	1 7 10
1863—England and Wales.....	26,445,	39,134,	1 18 3
“ —Scotland.....	3,101,	2,977,	0 19 2
“ —Ireland.....	5,799,	2,217,	0 7 8
Total United Kingdom.....	29,345,	44,328,	1 10 3
1864—England and Wales.....	20,663,	39,416,	1 18 2
“ —Scotland.....	3,118,	2,943,	0 18 11
“ —Ireland.....	5,799,	2,155,	0 7 5
Total United Kingdom.....	29,580,	44,514,	1 10 0
1865—England and Wales.....	20,881,	40,171,	1 18 6
“ —Scotland.....	3,186,	3,005,	0 19 2
“ —Ireland.....	5,799,	2,052,	0 7 1
Total United Kingdom.....	29,816,	45,228,	1 10 4
1866—England and Wales.....	21,100,	39,797,	1 17 2
“ —Scotland.....	3,153,	2,916,	0 18 6
“ —Ireland.....	5,799,	1,791,	0 6 2
Total United Kingdom.....	30,052,	44,504,	1 9 7

D.—EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION, AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN EDUCATED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Years.	Expenditure from all sources.	Average No. of children at School.	Average cost for each Child.	Rate per head of population.	Pro to Pop. of average Scholars.
	£		£ s.	s. d.	
1854.. England and Wales }	717,248	{ 892,555*	{ 1 11	.. 8	{ 1 in 46
“ .. Scotland..... }		{ 67,890†	.. 16	.. 8	{ 43
“ .. Ireland.....	208,650	253,726	.. 16	.. 8	26
“ .. Total U'd Kingdom..	925,898	715,171	1 6	.. 8	38

1861..England and Wales }	1,664,588	{ 773,881*	{ 1 16	1 5	{ 26
" ..Scotland..... }		{ 146,104†			{ 21
" ..Ireland	806,648	984,726	1 2	1 1	20
" ..Total U'd Kingdom..	1,971,906	1,204,661	1 18	1 4	24
1862..England and Wales }	1,645,129	{ 799,036*	{ 1 15	1 5	{ 25
" ..Scotland..... }		{ 143,578†			{ 21
" ..Ireland	812,889	284,912	1 2	1 1	20
" ..Total U'd Kingdom..	1,957,518	1,233,541	1 12	1 4	24
1863..England and Wales }	1,633,462	{ 839,764*	{ 1 12	1 5	{ 24
" ..Scotland..... }		{ 169,161†	{ 1 2	1 1	{ 18
" ..Ireland	826,152	296,986	20
" ..Total U'd Kingdom..	1,959,614	1,305,911	1 10	1 4	22
1864..England and Wales }	1,662,855	{ 854,950*	{ 1 13	1 5	{ 24
" ..Scotland..... }		{ 156,184†			{ 20
" ..Ireland.....	322,860	315,108	1 ..	1 1	18
" ..Total U'd Kingdom .	1,985,715	1,326,242	1 10	1 4	22
1865..England and Wales }	1,927,208	{ 901,750*	{ 1 16	1 7	{ 23
" ..Scotland..... }		{ 153,996†			{ 20
" ..Ireland.....	326,770	311,406	1 1	1 1	19
" ..Total U'd Kingdom..	2,253,978	1,369,151	1 13	1 6	23
1866..England and Wales }	1,993,657	{ 911,450*	{ 1 17	1 8	{ 23
" ..Scotland..... }		{ 170,60.†			{ 18

E—PAUPERISM.
England and Wales.

	Population.	Number of paupers.	Per cent to population.	Cost. £	Cost per indiv. of population. s. d.
1851 (average 3 years).	17,965,000	955,227	5.3	5,085,166	5 8
1861 (average 3 years).	20,044,000	881,899	4.4	5,770,477	5 8
1863.....	20,455,000	1,079,382	5.3	6,627,086	6 4½
1864	20,663,000	1,014,978	4.9	6,423,283	6 2½
1865.....	20,881,000	951,899	4.6	6,264,961	6 ..
1866.....	21,100,000	916,152	4.3	6,439,517	6 1½
1867.....	21,320,000	631,000	4.4	6,959,841	6 6½

The Metropolis.

1851† (average 3 years)
1860 (average 3 years).	2,802,000	91,593	3.28	833,549	5 11½
1863.....	2,802,000	99,568	3.55	838,198	6 2½
1864.....	2,802,000	99,097	3.50	876,290	6 3
1865.....	2,802,000	99,981	3.56	905,639	6 5½
1866.....	2,802,000	104,499	3.50	976,263	6 11
1867.....	2,802,000	122,454	4.37	1,175,863	8 4½

F.—NUMBER OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS OF CERTAIN CLASSES CONVICTED IN ENGLAND AND WALES.

Offences.	Increase(+) or Decrease(—) per cent. in 40 years.	Per cent. to population.	Executed in 40 years.	Transferred to penal servitude.	Imprisonment above 12 months.
Shooting at, stabbing, wounding, &c. :					
1817.....	26	{ 26	{ 12
1827.....	35	{ 35	{ 6
1837.....	41	{ 36	{ ..	2	3
1847.....	113	{ 4	{ ..	42	72
1857.....	208	{ 9	{ ..	11	58

* Including Roman Catholic School for Great Britain.

† Exclusive of Roman Catholics.

‡ No return of pauperism in these years for the metropolis alone; the statistics were then given in the ordinary county form.

Robbery:

1817.....	154	+145	{ 154 201 146 9 7	94	{ 19 17
1827.....	201				
1837.....	184					..	18	20
1847.....	205					..	186	90
1857.....	385					..	28	161

Burglary:

1817.....	374	+23 7	{ 374 368 228 5 6	98	{ 18 10
1827.....	368				
1837.....	232					..	8	1
1847.....	346					..	227	164
1857.....	463					..	14	188

Housebreaking:

1817.....	152	+273	{ 152 240	{
1827.....	240				
1837.....	408					..	294	109
1847.....	506					..	173	384
1857.....	568					..	10	171

Larceny in a dwelling house:

1817.....	148	+72.0	{ 148 228	{ 1 4
1827.....	228				
1837.....	159					..	144	15
1847.....	172					..	75	97
1857.....	246					..	59	180

Simple larceny:

1817.....	6,420	-98	{	{ 1,800 1,897 1,611 991	4,982
1827.....	8,358					..	6,293
1837.....	10,409					..	8,462
1847.....	12,778					..	11,569
1857*.....	5,783					788	4,846

Forgery, and uttering forged instruments;

1817.....	62	+196	{ 62 46	{ 18 4
1827.....	46				
1837.....	42					..	81	11
1847.....	121					..	40	81
1857.....	134					..	6	80

G.—INDICTABLE OFFENCES COMMITTED IN ENGLAND AND WALES, SO FAR AS KNOWN TO THE POLICE; ALSO THE NUMBER OF CASES SUMMARILY DISPOSED OF UNDER THE HEAD OF "DRUNKENNESS," AND THE NUMBER AND COST OF THE POLICE.

	1857.	Average 1860-62.	1868.	1864	1865.	1866.
1. No. of indictable offences known.	57,273	51,480	52,311	51,058	52,250	50,540
2. " persons apprehended.....	32,031	27,005	30,410	28,734	29,049	27,199
3. Class of known offences—						
A. Offences against the person...	2,787	2,408	2,966	3,091	3,123	2,861
B. " property with violence.....	6,471	4,593	5,483	5,022	5,160	5,083
C. Offences against property, without violence.....	43,397	40,361	39,801	39,451	40,383	39,781
D. Malicious offences against property.....	406	530	763	774	669	465
E. Forgery and offences against the currency.....	2,839	1,737	1,869	1,364	1,410	1,199
F. Other offences.....	1,373	951	1,380	1,326	1,503	1,905

* Summary Jurisdiction Act passed in 1835.

4. Special offences of violence against the person, included in Class A—						
I. Murder	99	110	121	134	135	131
II. Manslaughter and murderous assault	799	817	998	1,033	1,102	983
III. Assaults and inflicting bodily harm	239	198	241	306	295	272
IV. Common assaults	453	156	163	214	229	207
V. Assaults on peace officers	369	196	311	249	228	164
VI. Rapes, and attempts at	471	497	552	598	583	579
5. Drunkenness, and drunk and disorderly, summarily determined	75,869	88,488	94,745	100,067	105,310	101,363
Ratio to population	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.8	5.0	4.9
Number of police	19,187	21,445	22,632	22,849	23,250	23,728
Proportion to population of 1,000	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Cost of the police	1,265,580	1,569,109	1,658,265	1,700,312	1,748,738	1,827,106

NOTE.—This table includes the metropolitan district.

H.—INDICTABLE OFFENCES COMMITTED IN THE METROPOLIS SO FAR AS KNOWN TO THE POLICE; ALSO THE NUMBER OF CASES SUMMARILY DISPOSED OF UNDER THE HEAD OF "DRUNKENNESS," AND THE NUMBER AND COST OF THE POLICE.

	Average, 1860-62.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.
1. Number of indictable offences known	12,331	14,044	13,534	13,839	14,767
2. Number of persons apprehended	4,617	5,776	5,210	5,747	5,823
3. Class of known offences—					
A. Offences against the person	257	572	663	643	670
B. Offences against property with violence	479	609	525	646	657
C. Offences against property without violence	10,804	11,703	11,196	11,577	12,550
D. Malicious offences against property	28	60	43	38	48
E. Forgery and offences against the currency	632	623	562	444	411
F. Other offences	231	468	495	512	451
4. Special offences of violence against the person, included in Class A—					
I. Murder	8	11	14	8	9
II. Manslaughter and murderous assault	121	203	189	200	186
III. Assaults and inflicting bodily harm	5	8	2	5	35
IV. Common assaults	58	71	145	150	156
V. Assaults on peace officers	43	73	79	87	59
VI. Rapes, and attempts at	44	64	85	61	76
5. Drunkenness, and drunk and disorderly, summarily determined	19,731	19,099	13,940	21,105	20,789
Number of police (metropolitan)	7,424	7,961	8,056	8,156	8,277
Proportion to population of 1,000	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0
£	£	£	£	£	£
Cost of the police	566,679	611,639	626,239	659,765	685,375

J.—NUMBER OF PERSONS COMMITTED FOR TRIAL IN ENGLAND AND WALES.

	No.		Population.	Ratio per 1,000
1848	30,849	Average of 7 years	17,357,000	1.6
1849	27,816		17,565,000	
1850	26,813		17,773,000	
1851	27,960		17,983,000	
1852	27,510	Average of 7 years	18,93,000	1.4
1853	27,057		18,404,000	
1854	29,359		18,616,000	
1855*	25,972		18,829,000	
1856	19,427	Average of 7 years	19,042,000	0.9
1857	29,269		19,257,000	
1858	17,355		19,471,000	
1859	16,674		19,687,000	
1860	15,999	Average of 4 years	19,902,000	0.9
1861	18,326		20,120,000	
1862	20,011		20,336,000	
1863	20,818		20,554,000	
1864	19,506	Average of 4 years	20,772,000	0.9
1865	19,614		20,991,000	
1866	18,849		21,210,000	

* Year of the Criminal Justices Act.

K.—FIRES AS KNOWN TO THE POLICE IN LONDON, LIVERPOOL, MANCHESTER AND DUBLIN.

	Reported to the Metropolitan Fire Brigade.	London.	Liverpool, year ending 29th Sept.	Man- chester.	Dublin.
1857.....	1,115	561	202	191	28
1858.....	1,114	608	189	174	43
1859.....	1,084	561	185	205	43
1860.....	1,056	568	241	223	32
1861.....	1,188	647	263	261	63
1862.....	1,303	660	242	206	54
1863.....	1,404	742	244	223	49
1864.....	1,487	748	206	275	43
1865.....	1,502	805
1866.....	1,338	661

Note.—Average of first three years 576½, and of the last three years 733, in London.

L.—TABLE SHOWING THAT FIRES HAVE INCREASED IN LONDON IN AN UNDUE RATIO TO THE INCREASE OF POPULATION AND OF HOUSES.

In 1845 there was 1 fire to every 2,990 of population, and 1 to every 395 houses					
" 1850	"	2,673	"	"	347
" 1855	"	2,585	"	"	333
" 1860	"	2,613	"	"	335
" 1861	"	2,370	"	"	303
" 1862	"	2,188	"	"	280
" 1863	"	2,064	"	"	265
" 1864	"	1,980	"	"	255
" 1865	"	1,900	"	"	250

Note.—Increase from 1845 to 1865, nearly 50 per cent.

TABLE SHOWING THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FIRES RECORDED AS OF "SUSPICIOUS, DOUBTFUL OR UNACCOUNTED FOR" ORIGIN.

In 1852 there were 923 fires, of which 318 or 34½ per cent were "suspicious," &c.

" 1853	"	910	"	324	"	36	"	"
" 1862	"	1,308	"	507	"	38	"	"
" 1863	"	1,401	"	501	"	36	"	"
" 1865	"	1,502	"	618	"	40½	"	"
" 1866	"	1,338	"	700	"	52½	"	"

Note.—Average of first three years 36; after three years 43, or as 6 is to 7 1-6.

THE CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION OF COTTON.

In view of the condition of labor in the South, both present and prospective, it is evident that, if the supply of cotton from this country is to be materially increased within the next few years, this result must be accomplished through greater carefulness and economy in the management of labor and the cultivation of the land. In a former paper we discussed the labor question; but the importance of thoroughly and properly preparing the soil is no less evident.

Before the war the upland cotton fields were year after year "cropped" under a system of superficial cultivation, and it is only because of the slow exhaustive nature of the cotton plant and the great natural fertility of the cotton belt, that these lands were not completely exhausted

long ago. Fortunately, however, the cotton fibre, which should alone be removed from the plantation on which it grows, absorbs but six and one-half pounds per acre of the mineral properties of the soil, calculating the yield at one bale to the acre. In comparison with wheat, which absorbs 17.65 pounds to the acre, potatoes, which absorb 163 pounds, or beets, which require 458 pounds of the most valuable properties of the soil, it will be seen that the amount taken up by the cotton fibre is small; but even with this slow exhaustion of these necessary mineral elements, the time has come when the use of fertilizers to restore the land to its original fertility is imperatively required. Even in the rich bottom lands, where as much as two or two and one-half bales have been raised to the acre, and with little or no cultivation, the custom of forever taking away from and never returning anything to the soil, must ultimately impoverish it. These facts are becoming more and more evident to planters throughout the South, and during the past year fertilizers have been more extensively used than ever before. On account of the peculiar properties of some of these manures, however, it is said that, during the excessively dry summer we have had, injury has resulted rather than benefit. But where this has happened, we think it may be traced to the properties of the fertilizer, and is certainly no argument against the scientific cultivation of the soil. To understand then what are the best fertilizers, requires a careful study of the nature of the cotton plant and of the manures generally in use obtainable at a price which will enable the planter to apply them freely to his land.

The requirements of cotton may, of course, be correctly determined by ascertaining what are its constituent parts. An analysis of the fibre shows that 100 pounds of cotton lint contain one and three-quarter pounds of mineral matter in the following proportions: Potash, 41.8 per cent; Lime, 19.8; Magnesia, 11.2; Chlorine, 7.8; Phosphoric Acid, 6.4; Soda, 6.1; Sulphuric Acid, 4.2; Oxide of Iron, 2.4; Silica, .3. It is evident, therefore, that manure, to be thoroughly adapted to cotton, must contain these properties in a soluble condition. The most important are potash, lime, magnesia, phosphoric and sulphuric acids, all of which are essential, and, when lacking, must be supplied to the soil. These necessary ingredients may be found most readily in the following available manures: cotton seed, natural phosphates, guano, super-phosphate, bone dust, ashes, salt, stable manure, lime, and land plaster. By far the most valuable of these is cotton seed, which contains the same mineral properties as the lint, and in much larger quantities. As there are 300 pounds of seed to 100 of the lint, the mineral matter abstracted by the plant can be returned to it through the seed, which contains the bulk of that taken up during the growth. The usual mode of preparing the seed for manure is to put

it in a water-tight basin prepared in the ground and leave it to rot in the weather. After it is thoroughly decomposed it can be used for grain, corn, or cotton, and if mixed with bone dust, gypsum, or any good mineral fertilizer, it becomes very rich. This manure is in general use through the uplands, but the modes of preparing it are often so wasteful and injurious as to deprive the planter of much of the profit and advantage that would otherwise result. Experience has proved, however, that cotton seed, mixed with bone dust, stable manure, muck, or gypsum, will greatly improve the soil and increase the yield of cotton. It is essential, also, that the planters take better care of stable manure, which is valuable on any kind of soil and for any kind of crop. The barnyard is a thing hitherto almost unknown in the South, and the rich beds of manure which the Northern farmer accumulates from year to year, are seldom or never seen on the Southern plantations. It is also essential that the black muck from the swamps shall be more generally employed. The character of the soil of the cotton belt is, in great part, light and sandy, and, with but few exceptions, needs stiffening. Many sections abound in swamps, where the richest kind of vegetable mould can be procured in unlimited quantities, and a few enterprising planters are already beginning to avail themselves of this cheap fertilizer with profit to themselves and advantage to the soil under cultivation.

Among the available mineral fertilizers, the cheapest and, in some respects, the best are the natural phosphates from the Ashley, Cooper and Wando river regions of South Carolina. The Ashley beds, which were the first discovered, are the most extensive and valuable. These deposits extend over a surface of several miles square; the strata generally lying within two feet of the surface in a light soil, and being quite accessible from their proximity to the Ashley river and the Charleston market. The analysis of these phosphates show them to contain lime, sulphuric and phosphoric acids, but no alkali, which must be supplied when used on land not already containing it in sufficient quantities. In this respect it resembles guano, and should, therefore, be mixed with other fertilizers supplying silica and potash, which are rapidly exhausted from the soil when guano is used alone. The alkali and chlorine may be imparted to the soil by the use of common salt and ashes, thus making a fertilizer as nearly perfect as possible; but owing to the present high price of salt, it is in most instances placed beyond the reach of the planter. It is possible that the lately discovered "potash-salts" of Germany will soon be introduced into this country, and as we suppose it is not covered by the tariff, it may be obtained at a price which will place them within reach of every Southern planter.

In treating of the subject of manures and fertilizers, however, it is

necessary to bear in mind the difficulties in the way of generally distributing phosphates, guano and other commercial fertilizers throughout the cotton country. The railroads are comparatively few in number, and on such as are now in operation the rates are high and facilities for freight transportation extremely limited. In view of this fact, it is necessary that a large proportion of the planters, whose lands are distant from railroads or navigable rivers, should depend mainly on such manure as they can make on their farms or procure from the swamps. Both of these have been in former years quite generally neglected, although they should be regarded as a main dependence. An eminent chemist, of extensive experience and observation in the cotton States, has given it as his opinion that the black muck of the swamps, which can be procured anywhere in the South for the cost of carting it a short distance, possesses many of the elements most needed to improve the character and stimulate the fertility of the light Southern soil. With a proper system of drainage, thousands of acres of this rich mould might be made available for fertilizing purposes.

Under the old system of labor existing before the war, the method of cultivation adopted was, as a general rule, wasteful and ineffective. In but few instances did the proprietors of the soil know or care much about the practical management of the plantation, preferring to leave it to irresponsible overseers, whose interest it was to get the largest possible crops with the least trouble to themselves. As a consequence, but few improvements were made in farming implements or machinery, and everything was of the most primitive and inferior description. A wretched system of surface culture was followed year after year, and the land, rapidly exhausted, was abandoned for new soil as soon as it ceased to yield profitably; Manuring was seldom resorted to; subsoil plows were unknown; and little effort was made to improve the quality of the lint by experiments with seed imported from foreign countries or procured from other sections of the South, as has been done with wheat and other cereals in the Northern States. Under the present condition of affairs, however, the necessity of economizing labor has compelled the planters to farm on very different principles, and to make the yield as large as possible from the limited acreage now under cultivation. Experience has shown that cotton, like all other products of the soil, thrives best when cultivated most carefully. All lands in which it is planted must be sub-soiled to the depth of eighteen inches, at least. By furrow planting and careful cultivation it has been found that the fruit on the plant can be largely increased. In a word, experience has shown that the size of the cotton plant and the number of pods it holds are in direct proportion to the richness of the soil and the care with which it is cultivated, and hence with our limited labor supply the extent of our crop for the next few years must depend very much upon careful cultivation.

NORTH CAROLINA BONDS.

The following information and opinions are of much interest upon the subject of the North Carolina debt. A despatch from Raleigh states :

"The public Treasurer gives notice that the interest on the bonds issued in aid of the new railroads, due April 1, will be paid on the presentation of the coupons at the Treasurer's office, or the Raleigh National Bank. He also gives notice that similar future interest will be paid at either of the same places."

In regard to this the New York *Commercial Advertiser* remarks :

A North Carolina Senator communicates the following information relative to the bonds of North Carolina known as "the Special Tax Bonds," respecting which there is some mystification in the public mind :

Section 5, article 5, Constitution State of North Carolina, ratified April, 1868, says :

Until the bonds of the State shall be at par, the General Assembly shall have no power to contract any new debt or pecuniary obligation in behalf of the State, except to supply a casual deficit, or for suppressing an invasion or insurrection, *unless it shall in the same bill lay a special tax to pay the interest annually*, and the General Assembly shall have no power to give or lend the credit of the State in aid of any person, association, or corporation, except to aid the completion of such railroads as may be unfinished at the time of the adoption of this Constitution."

At the last session of the Legislature, appropriations and amendments to the charters of the following railroads were made, to wit :

Wilmington, Charlotte, and Rutherford Railroad, Western (N. C.) Railroad, Western Railroad, and to several others ; but the above are the only ones declared by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in July last, to be in accordance with the Constitution. The appropriations, in all amounting to some \$10,000,000, were, with the amendments to the different charters submitted to a general meeting of the stockholders of the several roads, and by them accepted, hence becoming a part and parcel of their charters, and a vested right which no future Legislature can repeal.

In each of the bills making these appropriations "*a special tax to pay the interest annually*," was levied, which levy is good and binding as a first lien on all the real and personal property of the State until the especial tax bonds are paid.

The tax levy to pay the interest on such bonds having been made under the above section of the Constitution, has no need of further legislation to pay its interest, and cannot under the Constitution, be diverted for any other purpose, while the payments of interest on the "old and new" bonds are dependent on the annual tax levy of each Legislature.

The above is briefly but correctly the reason why those bonds are called the "special tax bonds."

The *Times* (financial article) says, in reference to the same matter :

A Raleigh announcement by telegraph is to the effect that the April interest will be paid in that city on such of these "Special Tax" issues as may be in the hands of the public—the amount said to be two or three millions out of \$16,240,000 designed to be marked in New York, if practicable, to build certain new railways, in preference of \$18,049,945 including back interest, heretofore issued for the old railways and other State purposes. These latter are acknowledged to hold the same rank as a charge upon the general revenues and public faith of the State. The pretext of special tax security on the new bonds rests upon the provision of the amended Constitution requiring additional taxes to be levied by the Legislature whenever the State debt is increased. But we discover nothing more forcible in the new than in the old fundamental law for the preservation of the entire public faith. And, if the State holds \$11,241,000 stock and mortgage in the old railways (most of them anti-war), which cannot be made available with the help of the ordinary state revenues to pay the interest on \$18,000,000—even after the arrearages of interest up to 1866 had been funded promise of a general resumption of payments, and the funding bonds, to the amount of \$2,189,900, now known as "New North Carolinas," sold in the New York market at 65@70 cents on the dollar—it is scarcely to be credited that new railways, some of them barely commenced, can be implicitly relied upon to help the State pay the interest on \$16,240,000—much longer, at least, than it will take to market the whole amount. We make these suggestions by way of caution to the public against buying the bonds upon the mere announcement of one or two installments of interest to be paid on a few millions already in second hands as sold for cash or exchanged for railroad iron, but in no hostility to North Carolina credit properly administered.

LABOR IN THE SOUTH.

Within the past three years the question of labor in the cotton producing States of the South has become one of great interest and importance to the entire country. In a few localities the supply is comparatively abundant, and employers are enabled to select good workmen and reject those that are incompetent or untractable; but throughout the greater part of the cotton belt it is becoming more and more difficult each year to obtain a sufficient force of field hands to work the comparatively small proportion of land now under cultivation. Instead of increasing the acreage devoted to cotton, as has been urged by Northern journals, the planters declare themselves unable to properly cultivate and gather even the crops they have planted. This is a serious condition of affairs, and one which it is the interest of the whole country to seek to relieve. Most planters, however, are looking to immigration as the solution of the difficulty, and the Chinaman is now supposed to be the "coming man" who is to solve the problem and make the whole South blossom. But it should be remembered that for years the main reliance of the South must be upon the freedmen, and the great question is, how can their labor be made most effective?

We admit that since the close of the war idleness, and the vicious habits of life engendered by it, have demoralized a large proportion of the black population and greatly impaired their usefulness as laborers; thousands have left the agricultural districts and flocked to the cities and towns, where they remain engaged in whatever occupation offers them employment; many more settle in the woods, or on small patches of land, from which they raise only enough to afford them a bare subsistence. Those remaining in the cotton fields are frequently unreliable, and attempts to control them are followed by the abandonment of their work and the violation of whatever contract they may have made with their employer. In addition to this, the women and children have abandoned field work, and cannot be induced to return to it permanently. From these causes, as well as from the alarming mortality among the blacks during and since the war, the number of laborers available for the culture of cotton has been reduced one half since 1860.

All these difficulties we admit exist; but still the fact remains that the freedmen are now the sole reliance, and must for a long time continue to be the main reliance of the South. How can the planters best use them? At present in employing field hands two systems of payments are adopted, one by giving a share of the crop, and the other by wages. Under existing circumstances neither of these plans have been found to work satisfactorily. In the share system the laborer usually receives one

half the cotton and corn he raises, provided he "finds" himself. If rations are given him his share of the crops is usually one-third or one-quarter. In some instances the laborer is given the use of a certain amount of land in consideration of his services, by which he becomes practically a tenant, paying one quarter or one-third of his crop as rent, and finding his own teams, tools and seed. In the wages system the pay is from ten to fifteen dollars per month, according to circumstances—an experienced and industrious hand being worth more than one who is ignorant or indolent. Both of these systems have, as related above, been found to work favorably only in certain instances. The payment of wages gives the planter a greater control over the daily labor of the workmen, and enables him to carry out a general system of improvement on his farm, but he gains no such control over the laborer as will secure him his assistance all through the crop season. In case of any attraction away from the plantation, or any election or other excitement, or sometimes from a simple desire to spend the wages already earned, the freedman will leave his work even at the most critical period of the season. There are, however, instances in which the wages system has been satisfactorily tried. On the plantation of Col. Lockett, of Georgia it has been found to work well; and, if the statements of correspondents are trustworthy, the results of its adoption have proved satisfactory in a remarkable degree. Col. Lockett hires his laborers by the year, and pays quarterly in currency. Field hands are classified according to the amount of work they are capable of performing, and the wages for each class is stipulated by the employer, to which is added one ration, consisting of four pounds of bacon and one peck of cornmeal to each laborer per week. We are inclined to believe, however, that the success which has attended the practical workings of the wages system in this instance is mainly due to the personal energy and executive ability of Col. Lockett, whose management of his estate evinces a degree of judgment and perception rarely manifested even by the most intelligent planters; and hence we find that under less able and energetic management, the adoption of this system has led to very different results. In fact the freedmen are not like other laborers. Their long life spent in slavery has given them their unstable characters, making them in many respects like overgrown children, caring only to supply present wants and having little thought for the future. To keep them up then to their work it has been generally found that some interest in the result of the crop was a great assistance, and hence it is our opinion, based on the results of inquiry and observation, that, in most instances, planters in the cotton belt would find it greatly to their advantage to adopt a system embodying the best features of both the systems now being tried with but

indifferent success. We believe the share system to be, on the whole, much the better of the two, but we see no reason why it should be adopted by the planters to the exclusion of the other, which unquestionably possesses some good features. By giving the laborer an interest and a pride in the crop, the share system certainly stimulates him to greater industry, increases his self-respect, develops his individuality and quickens both his mental and physical powers, helping to make him in some degree, at least, a responsible member of society. This is, above all things, the kind of education the freedmen need to make them good laborers; compel them to look into the future—not to live on the present alone—and you have at once made them provident and reliable. This system also gives the laborer the strongest of all motives to increase, improve and protect the crop by every means in his power, for his interests are identical with those of his employer; and in the end we think it will actually increase the amount of labor, as the man who is cultivating a number of acres for himself, in part, will command the services of his wife and children in case of need. In this way a large force of laborers, now withdrawn from this department of industry, will be returned to it again, and the effect be seen in fuller crops and greater prosperity.

In making contracts, however, the planter must, of course, exercise an intelligent judgment and a keen discrimination. It could in no way result to his advantage to entrust his land to the care of indolent and improvident negroes, who would be content with a bare subsistence as the result of their year's labor. Due allowance must also be made for the ignorance which is the legitimate result of their former condition, as well as for the demoralizing and intoxicating effects of a sudden elevation to their present social and political status. Whether agreeable or otherwise, the Southern people must recognize the existence of a new order of things and make themselves conformable to it. Where the planter finds his tenants ignorant, it is his duty and his interest to instruct and counsel them, and by his greater knowledge and experience teach them to farm on correct and economical principles. This may not have an immediately perceptible influence, but the good accomplished will tell powerfully in the future. More than this, a system of free schools for the children of the freedmen should be established and encouraged in every State and supported by a general school tax, as in the North. Under such instruction, and with such substantial encouragements to honest industry, the negro would soon become more intelligent, self-reliant and capable, and the labor problem would sooner or later work out its own solution.

There are, it is true, certain disadvantages in the share system that has heretofore prevented its more general adoption in the Cotton States.

The most important of these is the difficulty of carrying on the general work of the farm, such as ditching where drainage is necessary, repairing buildings, machinery, fences &c., clearing new lands and preparing it for cultivation, and other important matters incident to the proper care of a plantation, that would not belong to the laborer hired by contract to cultivate a certain number of acres on shares. For this kind of work the planter will find it for his interest to make separate arrangements, employing a number of laborers during part of the year, which leaves him free to engage, control and discharge supernumeraries as he may see fit. Thus the two systems can be made to work together advantageously and profitably, by paying the freedmen first with a smaller share in the crop than has heretofore been customary, and second with a limited amount of money per month; while the general work on the plantation, after the crops are gathered, can be kept up by continuing on wages such hands as are required for that purpose.

It is, of course, both desirable and necessary that labor in the cotton districts should be more abundant, but until it is so the planters must make the best of the present condition of affairs. Coolie labor and immigration from Europe or the Northern and Western States, may ultimately furnish an abundant supply; but these are matters of the future; at best, many years will elapse during which the labor of the blacks must be the main reliance. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, that in the organization of industry in the South, the labor of the freedmen should be treated practically, aside from any speculative theorizing over possible immigration in the future. Whether the blacks become more and more valuable each year, or whether they deteriorate in a proportionate ratio, depends mainly on whether the landed proprietors of the South are willing to accept and master the situation as they find it, or whether they prefer to devote themselves mainly to the discussion of vast schemes of immigration depending for their success on innumerable unforeseen contingencies.

BREADSTUFFS.

The present position and future prospects of our market for Breadstuffs, are subjects of unusual importance in various relations. The resources of the agricultural community and their capacity to purchase the products of our manufacturers and the goods of our importers, are involved on the one hand; while public finances are subject largely to the influence their exportation may exert upon the foreign exchanges.

It may be premised, that we have a magnificent crop of wheat, unsurpassed if ever equalled in quantity, and wholly acceptable on the average

in quality. Of Indian corn, there is undoubtedly a deficiency from the average crop of from fifteen to twenty per cent. But in proportion to the quantity grown, corn does not possess the mercantile importance of wheat. A much larger proportion is consumed or fed near where it is grown. Of course, it enters finally into the aggregate value of the products of the country. Our supply of pork, lard, bacon, &c., depends upon it, and they are largely exported. But it is, of itself, not of first importance as a "cash article." Of oats, the yield is very large and the quality good, but they are seldom exported to any extent. Rye is a fair crop, and unless maintained at a high figure by a distilling demand, in lieu of corn, it may be exported to Germany to some extent. Barley is a full crop, but not of prime quality, and will probably not be exported.

It will be seen from this brief review, that so far as foreign markets, and consequently the state of exchanges, are concerned, we are limited in our observations to the single staple of wheat.

We have, as we have said, a crop unprecedented in quantity and excellent in quality. What shall be done with it? Reducing flour to wheat, our exports for the year ending the first September may be set down at thirty million (30,000,000) bushels, against twenty-two million (22,000,000) bushels for the preceding crop year. The United Kingdom last year had a very fine crop of wheat; so that, notwithstanding the increased consumption incident to a material decline in prices and relatively high prices of roots and coarse grains, she did not import more than fifty million (50,000,000) bushels of wheat, (including flour reduced to wheat,) against about sixty-five million (65,000,000) bushels the preceding year. And yet, with this decreased importation from all points, she increased her draft upon the United States, taking from us about twenty-two million (22,000,000) bushels, as against fifteen million (15,000,000) bushels in the preceding year.

What these statistics indicate, respecting the supplies of wheat in other countries from which England has been accustomed to make good her deficiencies, must be in good part conjectured. Whether the lower prices caused growers to withhold their wheat from market, or induced such increase of consumption as to curtail the supply for export; or whether other countries competed for their surplus; or whether there was a deficiency in the growth equal to the falling off in the export to Great Britain, cannot be accurately determined. It seems probable, however, from such reports as we have been able to gather, that while England had some new competitors in buying, the yield in the aggregate was not so large as in former years, nor does it appear probable that the coming year will be any improvement on the last. If, therefore, Great Britain is to increase her supplies for the present crop year from countries other

than the United States, it must evidently be by means of a considerable advance in prices.

Great Britain admits a deficiency in her crop just gathered of 13 per cent. Her necessary importation for the next twelve months is set down as high as ten million quarters, or eighty million bushels, and is rarely stated at less than eight million quarters, or sixty four million bushels. Can she secure this large quantity at current prices? We have already stated that she took from us in the past year twenty-two million bushels. Can we send her for the current year thirty million bushels? And if we can, whence shall she draw the remaining forty million bushels, adopting seventy millions as an estimate of her needs? There is nothing in the aggregate reports of the yield on the Continent of Europe to indicate any increase of shipments to Great Britain from those markets. Indeed, occasional shipments from this market, both to the south and to the north of Europe, are a significant fact bearing upon this point.

There can be no doubt that we shall be able, without serious inconvenience, to increase our shipments to Great Britain for the coming year to the extent of eight million bushels. Its transportation to the seaboard will be an item of some consequence. Thirty million bushels to Great Britain mean about forty million bushels to all foreign markets, of which California may be reckoned upon to contribute one quarter. The whole indicates active employment for shipping, and, in connection with the export of cotton and other staples, an abundant supply of mercantile bills on the market for exchange.

The present movement of wheat and flour at the West is somewhat abnormal. Notwithstanding the admitted increase in the yield, the receipts at the lake ports, both of flour and wheat, and the quantity moving Eastward, are smaller than last year, as will be seen by reference to the statistics which we publish in our regular report of the market on another page. This is caused by the fact that the crop of spring wheat is fully twenty days later than last year, and that the movement embraced in the figures which we have printed for some three weeks or more, has been made up almost entirely of the new crop of winter wheat. As we write, however, the new spring wheat begins to move, and will soon show in our statistics.

LOUISVILLE, CINCINNATI AND LEXINGTON RAILROADS.

The Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroads, as now existing and being operated, comprise the two railroads, which together extend from Louisville to Lexington, Ky., as follows: Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, Louisville, Ky., to Frankfort, Ky., 65 miles; Lexington and Frank-

fort Railroad, Frankfort, Ky., to Lexington, Ky., 29 miles; and the Cincinnati branch, from Lagrange to Cincinnati, 81 miles, making a total of 175 miles operated.

It thus appears that while each company retains its separate organization, the two companies under the firm of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroads, are partners in operating the railroad between Louisville and Lexington, and joint owners of the Cincinnati branch to be built with moneys raised on their joint credit. It is easy to see that this organization is cumbersome, and would be greatly simplified by a consolidation of stocks; and the President remarks in his report that a proposition looking to this end would be submitted at the annual meeting, which it was hoped would be adopted, and the two companies be made one corporation.

The following comparative statement of the financial affairs of the two companies shows the present condition :

	Lou. & Frank.	Lex. & Frank.	Total.
Capital stock.....	\$1,109,594 40	\$514,716 03	\$1,624,310 43
Debt secured by mortgage....	183,000 00	25,000 00	213,000 00
Debt unsecured.....	74,519 50	74,519 50
Total liabilities.....	\$1,372,113 90	\$539,716 03	\$1,911,829 93

The joint liabilities on account of the Cincinnati Branch are borne by the two companies, as between themselves, in the same ratio in which their profits are divided, and do not therefore constitute an element in considering the terms of consolidation.

In regard to the Cincinnati Branch the President remarks, "that the end of the fiscal year witnessed the opening of the Cincinnati line for passenger business. It was a month later before the completion of our temporary station buildings at Covington enabled us to advertise our readiness to carry freights. The total expenditures, exclusive of discounts and interest paid, is \$3,827,998 42. The Auditor's general balance-sheet indicates the mode by which these means have been provided. The item of bills payable in the sheet includes the sum of \$60,393 24 for interest yet to accrue on notes given for rails and equipment. The floating debt is provided for by the deposit as collateral security of 372 mortgage bonds and 6,517 shares of preferred stock. The larger portion of the debt for which they are pledged will not mature for nearly two years to come, so that ample time will be afforded to realize the hypothecated securities for its payment."

"The brief experience which we have had from the opening of the road to the time of writing this report is very far from discouraging. We have been carrying passengers but six weeks, and the public are just beginning to understand the advantages which we offer them. The passenger receipts for the month of August will very closely approximate, if they

do not exceed, those of the old road, which has been in successful operation for nearly twenty years. As it is only a fortnight since we advertised our readiness to carry freight, we can not be said to have had any actual experience of the business; but I may add that it is already evident that the freight traffic from the eastern end of the Lexington Line will receive large accessions from the use of the Cincinnati Branch, and that the business between Cincinnati and Louisville is beginning to develop itself very encouragingly. There can be no doubt of a steady increase of both passengers and freight even while matters remain as they are; and if, as there is every reason to hope, we shall be able next year to complete our connections at both Louisville and Cincinnati, the increase can not fail to be immediate and very great."

The earnings and expenses for the year ending June 30 were as follows:

EARNINGS FOR THREE YEARS PAST.				EXPENSES.	
	1868-9.	1867-8.	1866-7.		1869. 1868.
Passengers.....	\$257,553	\$277,702	\$283,812	Conducting Transp'n.....	\$71,628 \$71,610
Freight.....	220,398	187,247	202,137	Motive power.....	77,709 77,641
Express.....	14,868			Maintenance of way.....	186,518 119,366
Telegraph.....	1,343			Maintenance of cars.....	42,223 33,977
Mail.....	9,469			General expenses.....	13,041 13,173
Miscellaneous.....	313				
		223,63	24,368	Total.....	\$341,115 \$335,971
Total.....	\$503,871	\$493,218	\$510,319	Net earnings.....	\$162,756 \$157,347

GENERAL STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES FROM ALL SOURCES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1869.

Operating expenses for year.....	\$341,115	Transp'n receipts for year.....	\$503,871
Construction Cincinnati Branch.....	1,731,193	Sales of bond.....	\$512,000
Interest on bonds, etc.....	170,674	Less discount.....	76,800
Dividends on pref. stock.....	52,128		435,200
Real estate.....	5,805	Sales of preferred stock.....	637,194
Paid to sundry individuals.....	73,252	Bills payable.....	564,287
Louisville & Frankfort R.R.....	74,073	Decrease of cash on hand.....	875,450
Lexington & Frankfort R.R.....	23,439	Dec. in stock of supplies.....	15,655
	\$2,531,688		\$2,531,688

The following table, compiled from the annual reports, shows the results of operations for a series of ten years:

Fiscal years.	Gross earnings				Car- rent ex- penses.	Net Earnings		Ex- penses p. c.
	Passen- gers.	Freight.	Other.	Total.		Gross.	Net.	
1859-60.....	\$212,134	\$165,982	\$12,261	\$390,377	\$211,234	\$179,143	\$1,153	\$1,906 14.11
1860-61.....	153,897	161,304	49,654	364,855	212,908	141,947	3,775	1,510 59.99
1861-62.....	97,776	141,489	19,022	258,287	161,622	89,215	2,747	949 65.45
1862-63.....	101,899	201,132	19,198	322,229	188,272	133,917	3,438	1,425 58.43
1863-64.....	142,928	277,242	19,170	439,340	281,609	104,731	4,674	2,178 53.49
1864-65.....	374,985	204,746	29,794	609,525	411,186	118,339	6,484	2,110 67.46
1865-66.....	374,492	165,308	26,102	565,902	403,696	159,166	5,987	1,693 72.73
1866-67.....	282,813	202,138	21,858	510,819	357,102	133,217	5,429	1,930 70.10
1867-68.....	277,703	187,948	28,264	493,919	335,972	157,247	5,246	1,673 68.14
1868-69.....	257,553	220,398	25,919	503,871	341,115	162,756	5,360	1,731 67.69
Average.....	\$118,447	\$188,892	\$18,763	\$326,102	\$260,291	\$160,720	\$1,478	\$1,709 61.82

The financial condition of the Company at the close of the last two years ending June 30, 1868 and 1869, is shown in the following abstract from the general account:

	1868.	1869.
Preferred stock, 9 per cent.....	\$211,131	\$248,315
First mortgage bonds, 6 per cent, due 1897.....	2,116,000	2,623,000
Reservation on contracts.....	102,349	
Due other companies.....	212	693
Bills payable for rails, &c.....	419,314	1,012,602
Unpaid coupons.....	12,110	4,625
Unpaid dividends.....	7,573	4,485
Due sundry individuals.....	1,330	28,152
Balance to credit of income account.....	95,278	155,110
Total.....	\$2,995,845	\$4,633,351

Per contra, the following charges :

Cincinnati Branch.....	\$2,107,196	3,827,998
Discount on bonds.....	317,400	394,300
Interest on bonds.....	71,691	242,265
Dividend on preferred stock.....		62,128
Total construction account.....	\$2,496,287	\$4,576,985
Due from sundry individuals.....	26,898	19,087
Real estate.....	23,250	29,085
Stock of supplies for current operations.....	58,466	43,770
Cash on hand.....	389,952	14,502
Total.....	\$2,993,945	\$4,688,351

BRIDGING THE MISSISSIPPI AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR INTERNAL COMMERCE.

On the 7th inst. an important convention was held at Keokuk, Iowa. The call invited all the States and communities of the Mississippi Valley, who desired to see the Great River and its branches freed from the fetters, natural or artificial, that obstruct its navigation or retard its commerce, to be represented by delegates. It was understood that the Convention, in addition to affirming the necessity of government appropriations for freeing the water way and deepening the channel of the rivers designated, professed also to take action with regard to the bridges which railroad companies have constructed over these great western water courses. The leading purpose was to free the Mississippi and to utilize, in the highest degree, the splendid natural lines of communication which are found in our western States, connecting communities removed from each other by many degrees of longitude or latitude. It represented another effort in the contest for the transportation of products which is in progress between the railroads and the water routes.

So far as the question of bridging navigable rivers is concerned, the point is settled by our highest courts. The old doctrine of the Common Law, whose roots are found far back in the history of the people from which we largely derive our law and our tradition, threw its amplest protection around the lines of natural communication. Rivers, and bays and estuaries were sacred, and the iron rule of prescription came in to ratify what the law had conceded. With the growth of new interests, the demands of an expanding commerce, the competition of new methods of transportation, there was inevitably to be a conflict between these ancient rights and claims and the exactions of the new method. The contest was confined to the courts, and out of dangerous litigation came the safe compromise on which the modern relation of steam by land and steam or sail by water is adjusted. The navigable river is bridged, but the bridge must sufficiently clear the main water way and must offer no insuperable or difficult obstacle to navigation. The question of bridging the Ohio, the

Susquehanna, the Hudson, the Mississippi, the Missouri, is not local. It rises to national importance. In the great sweep of the leading railroad lines, they comprehend the traffic of a continent. They are no longer for a State or for a section of a State; the seaboard cities and the growing towns of the interior being all vitally interested in the crossing of the great rivers, for thereby time is saved, money is saved, the farmer has higher prices, the great commercial houses have quicker returns, products are cheapened to the consumer, emigration is encouraged, the whole country is compacted and so bound by iron bands that a common interest pervades every part. So great has the importance of these bridges become that the value of the commerce which crosses a single one on the Mississippi river is stated to be in excess of all the commerce moved on the waters both of the Ohio and the Mississippi. Commerce cannot delay while the water rises when navigation is low, nor can it wait shivering upon the bank while the icy barrier of nature melts away. The true interest of East and West—the amplest development of the whole country demands that railroads shall have as free passage over our rivers as the claims of the river commerce will allow. Last of all will it admit of any unnecessary exaction or of any obstacles that shall thwart the great design. Every bridge is a triumph over a natural difficulty.

From the Committee of the Convention, two reports on the bridge question were submitted. The majority report was adopted. It included a bill to be presented to the next Congress, of which the important sections are as follows:

That any bridges hereafter erected across the Ohio river shall be made with continuous and unbroken spans, and the span across the main low water channel shall not be at a less elevation than ninety feet above low water mark, nor less than forty feet above the extreme high water mark, as understood at the point of location. Measures for such elevation shall be taken at the bottom chord of the bridge. All the spans, other than the one over the main low water channel, shall be at least 300 feet in length in the clear, and the span covering the main low water channel of the river shall be of such length as to leave at least 400 feet of unobstructed passage way for navigation at all stages.

That any bridge built under the provisions of this act shall be located in such places and in such manner as to be at right angles with the direction of the current in the main channel of the river at all stages, so that the piers of said bridge may be always parallel to the current in the main channel, and the location of the bridge shall always be such that the current of the main channel shall move in a straight line from a point at least 1,000 feet above the bridge to a point 500 feet below the bridge, and no rip rap or other material shall be placed round the base of the piers or abutments to compensate for inadequate foundations, which material shall contract the passage way hereinbefore provided or which shall injuriously affect the regimen of the river.

That all bridges hereafter to be built on the Mississippi, below the mouth of the Missouri, shall be constructed under the foregoing conditions and restrictions, with the exception that the main span shall be at least five hundred feet in the clear.

That all bridges hereafter built on the Missouri river and Mississippi river, above the mouth of the Missouri, shall be built under the foregoing conditions and restrictions, with the following exceptions, viz.: If constructed with continuous spans, said bridge shall have one span over the main channel of not less than 300 feet clear

water way, and the bottom chord of said bridge shall not be less than fifty feet above extreme high water mark, and if built as a draw bridge, it may be constructed with a pivot or counterbalance draw over the main channel of not less than 300 feet of clear water, and that the draw shall be promptly opened upon signal, that no delay be caused to any steamboat or barge, tow or other craft.

That the right to alter or amend this act so as to prevent or remove all material obstructions to the navigation of said river by the construction of bridges is hereby reserved.

Another clause provided for the reference of plans for bridges to the Secretary of War and the designation by him of a board of officers to examine the plan.

The objection to this bill is that the span required is of too great a length. In the case of the span where the revolving draw would be, some seven or eight hundred feet of continuous span supported at the centre would be required. The height, too, above the water way would be excessive where the river banks did not offer a suitable elevation. It is not probable that Congress will look at this matter precisely as the Convention, which was largely composed of river men, regarded it, and as we have shown before, the highest interests of the whole country require a large and comprehensive plan in accordance with the era of progress and development upon which we have entered.

So far as the Convention evinced a disposition to enter upon a scheme for expanding the commerce of the Mississippi and its tributaries, it meets the approval of all who are interested in the growth of the country. Action of this kind was taken, and a report and resolutions upon the subject submitted and adopted, with the following estimate showing the cost of improving the rapids of the Mississippi :

Des Moines Rapids.....	\$1,479,647
Rock Island Rapids.....	811,601
Upper Mississippi, estimates by General G. K. Warren.....	331,485
Mouth of the Mississippi, estimate by General McAllister.....	875,000
Removal of snags and wrecks and dredging.....	1,000,000
Ohio River, Falls of the Ohio, estimates by General Godfrey Weltzel—Extension of old canal.....	933,500
New canal, Indiana shore.....	3,470,000
Two dams.....	225,000
Total.....	\$8,678,213
Above the falls, W. Milner Roberts' estimates.....	473,000
Below the falls, W. Milner Roberts.....	333,000
Grand total.....	\$9,514,213

The resolutions asked for the completion of the improvements at Des Moines, at Rock Island and at the Falls of the Ohio, and also asked Congress for further expenditure on the improvements in progress at the Balize, the removal of snags and sand bars on the Lower Mississippi, the Arkansas and the Missouri Rivers, and of obstructions in the Ohio, Illinois, Tennessee and Red Rivers.

Whether Congress will consider it a fit moment for furnishing the necessary funds is of course questionable. The growth and development

however of the immense region drained by the Mississippi and its tributaries is of the highest importance. Here is a population of nearly 20,000,000 of souls. In 1865 the total value of the grain crop of the United States, as estimated by the Commissioner of Agriculture, was \$1,118,904,376, in which estimate the crop of Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, and Wisconsin, having less than one-sixth of the population of the Union, is put down at one-third of the whole crop, or \$391,596,000. To these returns add the increased product of the same States since that date and the product of Kansas, Nebraska, and large portions of Ohio and Indiana, add Kentucky and the States below the mouth of the Ohio and the imagination finds it difficult to conceive the reality. Here are 13,000 miles of navigable river; improve the facilities of this navigation, lower the rates of charges, and the business now done would necessarily be largely increased.

We thus see that as the country grows there is enough traffic for all routes. The mad competition of business interests adjusts itself, so that the wants of the community are regularly met, and with a uniformity that is susceptible of calculation. The natural conflict of rival interests must be peaceful and their settlement must be upon broad, comprehensive principles. The Keokuk Convention does good, for it stimulates enterprise and promotes development. The opposing forces that are represented in such bodies learn to estimate each other more truly, and compromise and adjustment dull the edge of competition, whose hot and earnest zeal is ever seeking new fields for its exercise.

RAILROAD PROGRESS.

Between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts three great mountain ranges and one of the largest rivers of the world intervene; no small portion of the interior is an undeveloped wilderness. These formidable obstructions paralyzed progress for a long time, so that the whole district was wholly shut out from the seaboard. This was the exact position of affairs previous to the opening of the New York Canal in 1825. The West was then unsettled in the proper meaning of the term. Now, however, the engineer has leveled the mountains and spanned the stream, so that the traveler can at present leave Portland, in Maine, and reach the Pacific in less than ten days thereafter. Many now living considered it the extent of speed to travel from New York to Buffalo in the same time. Before the canal was dug a ton of wheat in Buffalo was commercially worthless in New York, the cost of transportation to the latter port then being \$100 per ton. The same service is now obtained for a comparatively trifling addition to the prime cost at the port of supply.

This great revolution has been effected by the combined agency of canal and railroad. In all countries into which these powers have been introduced the same results have been gained, commerce, agriculture and manufactures having thus attained proportions surpassing the dreams of the slow races of old.

In no country, however, were these means more necessary or have they been more perseveringly pressed into service than in the United States. In the older countries, the mileage of canal and railroad is, indeed, in greater proportion to the extent of the country and population than in America. But in the magnitude of the works constructed and in their bearings on the commerce of the world, those of the United States present a proof of enterprise unequalled. At the commencement of the current year, there were in the United States 42,255 miles of railroad. In all other parts of the world the mileage aggregated only 56,939 miles. It thus appears that the United States has $42\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of all the miles of railroad in existence at present.

Yet this proportion is rapidly gaining, and before the year closes we shall certainly have at least 50,000 miles of iron-way. In whatever direction we go we find the people at work laying the foundations for future railroads. In Illinois at least a dozen lines are in progress, and the same may be said of Indiana, Michigan, Iowa and Missouri. Never before was such activity exhibited in this direction. Undoubtedly the completion of the first trans-Continental Railroad has stimulated States and associated capital to action, and the final result must be an enlarged internal commerce, with increased prosperity. When the Northern and Southern Pacific Railroads are completed other enterprises will succeed and become as necessary to them as arteries and veins are to animal existence.

In proof of the present activity in railroad construction, it is only necessary to recite a few facts, which will show that on an average each State of the Union has in progress at least seven or eight separate enterprises. Maine is now building eight railroads, New Hampshire, four; Vermont, six; Massachusetts, five; Rhode Island (?); Connecticut, seven; New York, eleven; New Jersey, seven; Pennsylvania, thirty-two; Delaware, five; Maryland, seven; West Virginia, one, the Chesapeake and Ohio, and probably others; Ohio, at least a dozen; Indiana, Illinois and Michigan, each about the same number; Wisconsin, five; Minnesota seven; Iowa and Missouri, each a dozen; Nebraska, two or three; Kansas, nine; Arkansas, three; Texas, three or four; Louisiana, four; Mississippi, three; Alabama, six, and in the Southern Atlantic States, there are at least twenty great works on which progress is being made with unparalleled rapidity. In a short resumé it is impossible even to

name these enterprises; but any one acquainted with facts as they really exist, will readily admit that our estimates are moderate, and that we have now under construction at least 300 separate lines. Startling as this assertion may appear, it is nevertheless an incontrovertible fact. Many of these are hundreds of miles in length, and probably the average length, is not less than 50 miles. This calculation gives a total of 15,000 miles as the length of railroad now in progress, and which will be completed within the next three years.

To the facts here related, and the raising of the necessary funds for carrying forward these projects, may be attributed in great part the spasms in the money market during late months, but we shall discuss this more at large on a future occasion.

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR AUGUST AND FOR THE NINE MONTHS FROM JANUARY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 1.

Our usual table of monthly railroad earnings is now complete and given below.

It will be observed on reference to the table following, that there is now for the first time since the beginning of the year a decided decrease in the earnings of several of the principal roads for the month, compared with the same month in 1868. The monthly statements have heretofore shown an almost uniform increase over the corresponding months of the previous year, and there seem to be special reasons, why this steady improvement has given place in the month of August, to a falling off in earnings compared with August 1868.

There have been two principal causes for this decrease in earnings: first, the ruinous competition in freights among the several through lines to the West, which has carried prices of transportation down to figures which did not pay the cost of the service; and, secondly, the smaller grain movement at the West in August, which has had an important effect upon the traffic of the Western roads. These causes are evidently temporary, as the freight war can not be long continued, and the grain crop at the West is large and must come to market sooner or later.

In the case of the Chicago and Northwestern road, which shows a very considerable decrease in earnings, there has been the additional circumstance, that, with the completion of the Union Pacific Road, the transportation of material for construction has ceased, and as immense quantities of that material were carried over the Northwest roads, a very large item of the freight traffic of the latter in 1868 has been discontinued.

As regards the report of the Chicago and Rock Island Road for August, 1868, the figures issued from the office, for comparison, are \$478,-

660, while the total earnings for August, 1868, as published officially in the last annual report, were \$568,880, we assume that the official figures must be correct, and therefore use them in the table below.

Of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway earnings two statements are published, one in a Chicago paper as follows:

"The comparative earnings for the month of August were:

(ERIE TO CHICAGO.)

	1869.	1868.
Passengers.....	\$292,493 22	\$303,520 07
Freight.....	497,193 49	473,837 06
Miscellaneous.....	48,120 77	41,400 00
Total.....	\$837,827 48	\$818,777 13*

—The other, published in New York, gives the figures for 1868, as \$971,772. This discrepancy probably arises from some confusion in reports incident to the late consolidation; and we take the Chicago statement, as it is given in detail and therefore less likely to be erroneous.

The Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati and Indianapolis Company now report their earnings for the first time.

EARNINGS FOR AUGUST.

	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago & Alton.....	\$501,696	\$558,100	\$....	\$56,404
Chicago & Northwestern.....	1,032,413	1,251,940	219,527
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	440,601	568,860	128,259
Cleveland, Col., Cinn & Indianapolis.....	341,788	271,425	70,363
Illinois Central.....	790,328	763,779	26,549
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern.....	888,777	837,827	50,950
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	129,383	136,566	7,183
Michigan Central.....	313,569	392,943	79,374
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	525,363	522,638	2,725
Ohio & Mississippi.....	275,220	267,557	7,663
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	178,028	201,506	23,478
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	450,246	484,208	33,962
Total.....	\$5,898,581	\$6,267,763	\$369,182	\$474,281

The total earnings for the nine months from January 1 to August 31, for the current and previous years were as follows; the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Road is necessarily omitted, as no comparison with the previous year can be made since the consolidation:

EARNINGS FROM JANUARY 1 TO AUGUST 31.

	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago and Alton.....	\$2,962,028	\$2,747,430	\$214,598
Chicago & Northwestern.....	8,668,294	8,194,903	473,391
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	3,751,809	2,797,844	953,965
Illinois Central.....	5,219,702	4,649,145	570,557
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	876,832	800,952	75,880
Michigan Central.....	2,961,884	2,799,524	162,360
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	4,087,702	3,430,340	657,362
Ohio & Mississippi.....	1,741,718	1,856,091	114,373
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	1,942,478	1,185,074	757,404
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	2,636,830	2,410,836	225,994
Total.....	\$33,643,332	\$30,880,689	\$2,762,643	\$23,818

* Erie to Chicago.

CURRENCY—RESUMPTION.

BY VICTOR CONSIDERANT.

In 1839, Russia suffered, as the United States is now suffering, from the evils of a depreciated and unstable paper currency, the value of which, as compared with specie, was as 350 to 100; that is, it required $3\frac{1}{2}$ paper roubles to buy one of specie. Notwithstanding this great depreciation, Russia effected a reform in her debased currency, returning to a regular and fixed monetary system in twenty-four hours, and that without wronging any one in or out of the Empire. This is a fact of history. To effect this financial operation, Russia was obliged to borrow ten or twelve million dollars in specie of the Bank of France. The government of the United States has had for two years past, from six to eight times that amount lying idle in its vaults; and during all this time, with all the discussions on resumption, nothing has been accomplished, and no one single point has been agreed upon. I will not undertake to criticise the financial wisdom of the American people: but I, as an adopted citizen—which authorizes me to speak as one of the people—must confess that we have shown no great wisdom in this particular conjuncture.

The present currency is a scourge. It operates as a monetary disease, affecting all the commercial and industrial interests of the country. The whole economic mechanism is subject to the greatest uncertainty. No one can foresee what will be the result in four, six, or eight months, of investments made to-day, or of enterprises undertaken. And no safe calculations can be made without stability and fixedness in the unit of value called the dollar. If the dollar is not a fixed value, no one can know what real value a given amount of capital will represent six months hence. I may realize an apparent profit on my investments, or from my business, but it may turn out to be a loss instead of a gain.

Owing to this instability of the money value, which measures all others—an instability which prevents any one foreseeing what \$100 will be worth in six months, or even six weeks—regular business suffers, while a wide field is thrown open to speculation, and financial and commercial gambling.

The sole remedy is the return to a regular and stable monetary system. Let the example of Russia be followed, unless something better can be done. Can anything better be done? I answer, Yes; and something far better. As we can improve on her processes, I will not enter into an explanation of them.

I affirm that by a simple act of Congress the following results may be obtained: 1. Return without wronging any interest to a regular monetary system; that is to say, to a fixed and stable currency. 2. Effect a

beneficent reform, which will economize, and hence save to the country the expense of the hundreds of millions of gold and silver which it would be necessary to use to return to and re-establish the specie currency.

If it could be clearly demonstrated to our legislators that the greenback dollar could be raised in value to that of the specie dollar, or to par, and maintained invariably at this value, provided that they, on their side, would pass a law abolishing the use of gold and silver, as a currency, and the circulation of these metals as money, I ask, would they consent to such a measure and take the initiative in a fundamental monetary reform?

Let us remark that if the country, wishing to return to a regular and stable currency, imagine that it is necessary to go back to the old specie money, this fancy will cost it the several hundreds of millions of gold and silver which it will be necessary for the metallic currency that is to replace the greenback circulation. It is hardly probable that it will return to the old State Bank system, with its alternately expanding and contracting issues of paper money, so that but three alternatives are open before it; 1. To retain the present greenback currency as it is, with its fluctuations. 2. To return to a pure metallic currency. 3. To discover some new principle on which to base the national currency, and adopt it. It is this latter alternative which I propose, and I explain the principle which is to serve as a basis for it:

It would require at least \$600,000,000 in gold and silver to establish a specie currency. How is this vast sum to be obtained but by taxation, by adding new burdens to those already imposed on the people? If a dollar of the currency I propose will always be worth a dollar in gold, in what respect is a bit of metal preferable—to effect the exchange of values—to paper? I will remark here that the material for the new currency will be paper; it is easy to handle and costs nothing. Externally, this currency will resemble the greenbacks; but, based as it will be on a different principle, it will be intrinsically a new and different monetary system. For the purpose of a circulating medium, the metals are far inferior to paper; this is so well known that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it.

If then, the permanency in value of the paper dollar can be secured, there can be no objection whatever to using paper as the material out of which to make the national currency. To attain the great end in view—namely, to create a fixed and stable currency, using the cheapest and best material—Congress has but to pass the following law, comprising three articles: 1st. Hereafter, gold and silver will not be used for money; and coin made of these metals will not be recognized as a legal tender. The national currency will be of paper (or any cheaper and better material that

can be discovered) 2d. The National Government will alone create and issue the currency of the country. No individual or corporation will be permitted to create or issue a circulating medium, or any representative of it, like our bank notes. 3d. The Secretary of the Treasury will at all times, first, deliver to any person wishing the national currency a dollar of the same, on his depositing 23 8-10 Troy grains of gold (the amount now contained in a dollar) or its equivalent in silver; second, withdraw from circulation an amount of national currency necessary to keep it at all times at par—that is, diminish it whenever the metals rise in value above the point fixed as their standard price.

If this simple law is passed, a monetary reform will be effected, and a regular and stable currency will be established. The country will be delivered from the evils of an ever-fluctuating and uncertain circulating medium—in other words, from a measure of value which has no fixedness of value of its own. As soon as this law is promulgated, and gold, in consequence, is refused at the Custom House and in payment of all national dues—the issues of the national currency being in the hands of the Government alone, and withdrawn from the banks—it would at once rise in value, and the dollar would attain to par for 23 8-10 Troy grains of gold, at which point it could be maintained with very slight fluctuations.

There is a question which will probably be asked by the reader, and which I must answer before going further; “How is it that you take gold as the standard of value of your currency, and the regulating principle of its issues, and yet reject it as a circulating medium? This appears a strange anomaly.” I answer: There must be some standard and guide by which to regulate the issues of the new currency—of the amount to be put and kept in circulation. A paper currency can be increased indefinitely in amount; there is nothing to prevent it, as there is with gold; while the wisdom of legislators, however great, cannot determine so complex a question as the amount of currency to be issued and kept in circulation. As a consequence, some product or article which is universally in demand, and the value of which does not fluctuate, or at least but slightly, must be taken and used as this standard and guide. Gold is the article. Iron or lead, wheat or cotton, would answer the same purpose, provided they existed permanently in nearly the same quantities, and there was the same uniform demand for them as for gold over the earth, so that their value was everywhere as regular and stable. If too much currency were put in circulation, gold would rise in price, as do all articles—flour, cotton, land, &c—but more promptly, as it feels at once all change in the market. The rise, even of $\frac{1}{2}$ per 100, would be an indication to the Secretary of the Treasury to contract. On the other hand, if too little currency were in circulation, the price of gold would fall below the

par value of the same, which would indicate the necessity of increasing the currency. By this means, instead of using vast quantities of the most expensive metals for a circulating medium, the same result could be obtained by taking its value in the markets of the country, and using it as a gauge and indicator—as a standard to which to conform.

The economic principle on which this reform is based, may be comprehended by any market-man. He knows that the scarcity of any product in the market renders it dear, while its abundance causes it to fall in price. He can deduce the conclusion that if some one can monopolize and hold any one product, he can raise or lower its price at will, and as a consequence, regulate and fix it at any given point he pleases. Now, under the power conferred by the above law, the Government, being alone invested with the right of creating and issuing the currency, is in the position of the monopolist of some product. The Government can regulate the currency at will, expanding or contracting it, and in so doing, raise or lower the price of all things, gold included. It could make one dollar in paper worth two in gold—that is worth 47 6-10 Troy grains of this metal, or it could make it worth but fifty cents in gold. To do this, it would, in the former case, have only to contract the currency one-half, and in the latter to double it.

To form a clear idea on the subject, let us suppose that the business of this country requires a circulating medium of five hundred millions, and that this amount of currency is in circulation. In this case, the dollar of currency will be at par; that is, will be worth, or will buy, 23 8-10 Troy grains of gold. Now, if the amount is increased or diminished, the currency will rise or fall. If increased five millions, it will fall 1 per 100; if diminished, five millions, it will rise 1 per 100. This will be the inevitable effect of expansion and contraction.

The Government can, consequently, regulate the value of the currency by determining the amount put in circulation; and hence, can secure the regularity and stability of the value of its dollar, or the monetary unit. If the business of the country requires more money than there is in circulation, the paper dollar will begin to be worth more than the amount of gold fixed as its legal value. As an effect gold and silver bullion will flow into the Treasury to be exchanged for currency. The difference in price being in favor of the latter, bullion will be exchanged for it, exactly as it now is for coined money at the mints. If on the other hand, a falling off in the business of the country requires less currency, causing it to decline below par—there being a redundancy—the percentage of the decline would indicate infallibly to the Treasury the amount of currency which it should withdraw from circulation in order to bring it up again to par and maintain it there.

Gold and silver are, under absolute and despotic Governments, the best materials for a currency, and for the reason that the employment of these metals prevents kings and other rulers from increasing or diminishing arbitrarily the amount of currency in circulation, and thereby debasing it, and taking from it its stability and fixedness. Gold and silver furnished by nature, take from absolute rulers the power of creating money, and leave them only that of coining it—of putting the Government stamp upon it.

When the opinions and business habits of a nation require that money should have an intrinsic value in itself (which is the case with gold and silver which are valuable metals), kings and princes are restrained from creating a currency out of materials of no or very little value. Coinage is not the creation of a monetary value, but the authentication simply of the weight and alloy of the metals used—that is of the intrinsic value of the piece of gold or silver of which the money is made. By this means, the monetary value of the currency is combined with the material of which it is composed, and finds in its metallic substance the measure of its value.

It is easy to see that the guaranty thus offered to the people against the rapacity of rulers is based wholly on the principle of the equality of the cost of money with its value. But, so soon as a people is free, and has the wisdom requisite to govern itself, who should it pay the cost of this guaranty—a guaranty against itself—of which there is no longer any need? To continue to employ, under such circumstances, a currency which costs the entire value it represents, can only be the effect of the influence of old ideas, the falseness of which has not been discovered and exploded, and which, in consequence are retained. When a people governs itself, all it has to do is to acquire knowledge sufficient to adapt its laws and institutions to its true interests. If, instead of employing for its currency a material as cheap as paper, and which is more convenient than gold or silver, it keeps in the rut of routine, and uses those expensive metals, it confesses tacitly its ignorance in economic matters. The American people will be rightly accused of this ignorance, if, with the experience it has had in the greenback currency, it does not comprehend the theory of a cheap circulating medium, made of paper, and based on principles which will secure entire stability and regularity to it.

"Agreed, it may be said; let us accept the idea of a cheap national currency, costing, so to say, nothing, which is kept at par and its stability secured. The sudden return to such a currency, however desirable in itself, would be a severe blow to all having debts, contracted under the old system to pay." I answer: Nothing is more true; but what would prevent the introduction of a clause into the law which would protect the

interests of debtors and serve the cause of strict justice? When Russia bridged over the gulf which separated the paper from the silver rouble—the difference between 350 and 100—she decreed that all debts anteriorly contracted should be paid at their real, not nominal, value—that is, in paper, not silver, roubles. The United States could follow the same policy. All debts contracted in Greenbacks prior to the passage of the law in question would be paid in Greenbacks, or their average value during the year preceding the passage of the law. No one could complain of the equity of such a provision.

As regards financial reform, and a true financial policy, the American mind has been led astray by a false conception of the meaning of a single word—the word Dollar. The word, in its old, its true and exact meaning, expressed the value of a certain amount of gold (that contained in a dollar). The Dollar signified, and still signifies this, and nothing more. At the present day, the American people have contracted, by the use of greenbacks, the habit of giving the name Dollar to the value of a constantly fluctuating piece of paper, which has never been a Dollar, and never will be one until it is brought up to par with gold: that is, is made worth 23 8-10 Troy grains of gold, and kept there.

If this distinction had been clearly established between a name and a thing, much of the confusion which reigns in the public mind on currency questions would have been prevented. It would have been said: "If Congress by wise legislation could bring the country back from a currency worth but about 75 per 100 of gold, to one at par, making a greenback dollar worth a real dollar, natural debts contracted in greenbacks should be paid at the value of greenbacks, that is, three real dollars would pay four greenback dollars. The same principle would regulate the payment of our National Debt, and put an end to the controversies respecting its payment in gold or in greenbacks."

Whatever may be the terms of the law relating to the loans contracted by the United States, it is clear that whenever the Government sold a bond of \$1,000, with the stipulation of its payment at maturity, it was 1,000 dollars that it expected to pay, promised to pay, and, in common honesty, is bound to pay. Whether the \$1,000 are made of gold, of paper, or of any other substance, is of no consequence. The essential point is that the value which it is to give to pay off a bond of \$1,000 be really 1,000 dollars. The material, no more than the name of the thing to be given to settle the contract, is of any legal importance; the legality consists in the value of the thing given. When a dollar is promised, a dollar must be paid, whether made of gold, silver, or paper. There is no alternative between this and a breach of faith.

It is a piece of knavery to pretend that the National Debt can be

justly paid in a depreciated currency—in greenbacks, which may not be worth 50 cents on the dollar—under the pretext that the greenback bears on its face the word dollar, printed in large letters. On the other hand, it is sheer nonsense to oppose the payment of a debt in a national paper currency, provided the currency is raised to, and kept at, the standard value of specie.

Another fallacy is to suppose that the monetary capital or monetary total of a country can be increased by new emissions of currency. Let us suppose that the amount in circulation is such that the paper dollar answers to its name, and is worth a dollar. If, under such circumstances, the amount of currency is doubled, the prices of things will augment until they are doubled; or, in other words, the paper dollar will cease to be a dollar, and fall really to the value of fifty cents. It is consequently impossible to increase, by new issues of currency, the real value and volume of the monetary capital, and the effectual means of facilitating the exchange of products.

It must be clearly understood, once for all, that the monetary unit—called with us a dollar, in France a franc, in Prussia a thaler—will always be worth the value of the labor or effort which, on an average, it costs to obtain it; and that by doubling, trebling or quadrupling the amount of circulating medium, the real value of the monetary circulation—of what is the dollar, franc, or thaler—cannot be increased in like proportion. On the contrary, the value of the monetary unit will be reduced in proportion to the increase of the currency.

Until these elementary and simple truths are understood and admitted as the basis of the monetary question, the theory of the science of money, in its application to the present industrial and commercial state of society, cannot be comprehended. Before leaving my adopted country, I hold it to be a duty which I owe to it—to the noble pioneer in political justice, equality and liberty on the earth—to present briefly what I believe to be the primary principles of a true monetary system, and the means by which—transforming its greenback currency into a permanent money—it will secure for itself a stable currency, and liquidate so much of its national debt as is represented by its greenbacks.

The leading points to be borne in mind are: 1. That a paper currency, resting on a true basis, is the best circulating medium for a free people who possess the capacity of self-government. 2. That nothing is easier than to fix the value of the paper dollar and maintain it at par value with specie. 3. That there is for the people of the United States a saving or a gain of \$500,000,000 or \$600,000,000 to be made, and at the outset, by adopting the reform proposed.

On these three points I challenge contradiction. If any one will undertake to invalidate the second point—which, if sustained, sustains the other two—I stand ready to reply.

P. S.—Some friends, to whom I have read the above, have said : “You lose your time ; nothing will be done as regards the currency. The public is satisfied with the greenback ; it answers the purpose of a circulating medium very well ; it is not the greenback that varies when it appears to fall in comparison with gold ; it is gold, which the wants of foreign trade, or manœuvres of the Exchange, cause to fluctuate ; the price of things is not affected thereby. No desire is felt to bring paper up to the price of the old dollar, and there are powerful interests involved which are entirely opposed to any such policy.”

Well, agreed. It is not absolutely necessary to bring the paper dollar back to the value of the old dollar to raise it to par. Let us leave it as it is, provided its present value is adopted and is maintained fixedly at its actual rate, say 100-133, or about three-quarters of its former value. If gold and silver are, once for all, set aside as money, reduced to the rank of ordinary metals, and left to be dealt with as such ; if the privilege of creating or issuing money is taken from all corporations and individuals, and reserved exclusively to the Government ; and if the value of the greenback is fixed at its present rate of value, and kept at it, the reform which I propose will be effected.

The all-important end to be attained is to bring to a close—and without expense to the Government, but a saving to it—an unstable and fluctuating monetary state, an ever-changing currency, which paralyzes the business of the country by rendering unstable and uncertain the value of its circulating medium. So long as the question of the resumption of specie payments continues to be agitated in the confused manner which it thus far has been, the fear, either of the rise or the fall in value of the greenback, will be suspended, like the sword of Damocles, over the heads of debtors and creditors, and will continue to offer a serious obstacle to all regular business and to a stable credit system. The advocates of a return to specie payments ought to be able to understand that what is right and legitimate in their demand is not specie in itself, but the regularity and fixedness of value, which are secured by the metallic currency. On the other hand, the advocates of the greenback currency should comprehend that they cannot hope to see their ideas triumph until the greenback (that is, a system of paper money whose value is fixed and determined) is declared by law to be the currency of the nation, and gold and silver are set definitely aside as money.

In a word, the real issue is not Specie versus Paper, but Stability versus Instability in the value of the currency of the country. Let this be clearly understood on both sides, and all differences of opinion, all controversies relating to the vexed question of the currency, will be promptly settled, even that of the payment of the National Debt, which can admit of but two solutions : Integral Payment, or National Defalcation.

COTTON MOVEMENT AND CROP FOR 1868-9.

[From the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, of September 18.]

We furnish our readers to-day with our annual statement of the cotton crop of the United States for the year ending September 1, 1869. The figures will be found very complete, as our returns have been fuller than ever before. It appears that the total crop reaches 2,439,039 bales, while the exports have been 1,448,020 bales, and the home consumption 998,806 bales, leaving a stock on hand at the close of the year of 12,343 bales. The stock of cotton at the interior towns, September 1, 1869, not included in the receipts, is 613 bales, against 1,985 bales last season. We have also revised our statement of the overland movement for last year, having discovered an inaccuracy in the published returns, as fully explained in the CHRONICLE of April 10 (vol. 8, page 455). The corrected figures will be found below.

We now bring forward our tables showing the whole movement for the year. The first table indicates the stock at each port, September 1 of 1868 and 1869, the receipts at the ports for each of the last two years, and the export movement for the past year (1868-9) in detail, and the totals for 1867-8.

PORTS.	Receipts, year ending		Exported, year ending Sept. 1, 1869, to				Stock.	
	Sept 1, 1869.	Sept. 1, 1868.	Great Britaln.	Fran'ce	Other For'gn	Total.	Sept. 1, 1869.	Sept 1, 1868.
New Orleans....	794,305	564,240	342,249	165,282	117,008	619,534	770	1,989
Alabama.....	230,621	366,193	137,484	16,138	9,537	163,154	1,064	2,161
South Carolina.....	199,072	240,431	63,753	3,056	66,809	250	1,945
Georgia.....	867,253	495,959	133,671	20,309	12,990	167,537	863	696
Texas.....	147,517	114,666	67,582	25,794	83,376	202	166
Florida.....	18,392	38,594	810	13
North Carolina.....	85,908	38,643
Virginia.....	160,971	166,587	6,253	6,253	140	1,000
New York*.....	104,584*	106,973*	246,284	21,438	60,121	327,839	7,867	23,440
Boston*.....	85,033*	84,262*	1,806	185	1,491	1,756	2,500
Philadelphia*.....	20,114*	24,272*	99	99	160	1,768
Baltimore*.....	19,467*	26,610*	9,082	10,180	19,212	235	2,500
Portland, Me.....	1,991*	2,304*	1,907	1,907
Total this year.....	2,120,428	999,677	224,527	233,816	1,448,020	12,343
Total last year.....	2,240,282	1,226,890	194,895	219,780	1,657,015	35,180

* These figures are only the portion of the receipts at these ports which arrive overland from Tennessee, &c. The total receipts at New York, Baltimore, Boston and Philadelphia, for the year ending August 31, 1869, are given in a subsequent part of this report.

By the above it will be seen that the *total receipts at the Atlantic and Gulf Shipping ports* this year have been 2,120,428 bales, against 2,240,282 bales last year. If now we add the shipments from Tennessee and elsewhere direct to manufacturers, we have the following as the crop statement for the two years:

	—Year ending Sept 1—	
	1869.	1868.
Receipts at the shipping ports.....bales.	2,120,428	2,240,282
Add shipments from Tennessee, &c., direct to manufacturers.....	258,611	271,711
Total.....	2,379,039	2,511,993
Manufactured South, not included in above.....	*60,000	82,000
Total cotton crop for the year, bales.....	2,439,039	2,593,993

* In the Virginia receipts are included 20,000 bales taken from Petersburg for manufacturing purposes, so that the total consumed in the South this year is 80,000 bales against 82,000 bales last year.

The result of these figures is a total of 2,439,039 bales as the crop of the United States for the year ending August 31, 1869, against 2,593,993 bales

as the crop for the previous year. It was thought, early in the crop year, that the overland movement direct to the mills this season was to be largely in excess of last season; in fact, the returns which we obtained and made up on the 1st of January, showed that up to that time such was the case. Since then, however, the receipts of this description have been comparatively small. The movement for each four months of the two years has been as follows:

	From Sept. 1 to Jan. 1.	From Jan. 1 to April 20.	From April 20 to Sept. 1.	Total the year.
Overland shipments direct to mills in 1868-9.....	193,000	48,000	17,000	238,000
Overland shipments direct to mills in 1867-8.....	109,000	151,000	11,000	271,000

As stated above, and as the foregoing figures indicate, we have revised our overland shipments of last year by new returns obtained, and are able, therefore, to give with accuracy the relative takings of our mills for the two years, which will be found in a subsequent part of this report. Below we give the details of the crop for the two years:

Louisiana.

	1868-9.	1867-8.
Exported from New Orleans:		
To foreign ports.....	619,534	561,477
To coastwise ports.....	222,871	100,215
Stock at close of year.....	770	1,959
Deduct:		
Received from Mobile.....	36,515	67,043
Received from Montgomery.....	2,373	3,630
Received from Florida.....	747	5,770
Received from Texas.....	7,378	7,692
Stock beginning of year.....	1,959	48,970
Total product for the year.....	794,205	584,240

Alabama.

Exported from Mobile:		
To foreign ports.....	163,154	236,511
To coastwise ports.....	81,821	127,243
To New Orleans from Montgomery.....	2,373	3,650
Burnt at Mobile.....	342
Stock at close of year.....	1,064	2,161
Deduct:		
Receipts from New Orleans.....	15,630
Stock at beginning of year.....	2,161	17,791
Total product for the year.....	230,621	366,193

Texas.

Exported from Galveston, &c.:		
To foreign ports.....	83,376	68,595
To coastwise ports.....	64,505	49,138
Stock at close of year.....	202	166
Deduct:		
Received from New Orleans.....	100
Stock at beginning of year.....	111	266
Total product for the year.....	147,817	114,666

Florida.

Exported from Fernandina, St. Marks, &c.:		
To foreign ports.....	810
To coastwise ports.....	12,264	38,598
Stock at close of year.....	18
Deduct stock at beginning of year.....	38,598
Total product for year.....	38,598

Georgia.

Exported from Savannah:		
To foreign ports—Uplands.....	161,516	253,556
Sea Islands.....	6,021	6,048
To coastwise ports—Uplands.....	189,989	235,708
Sea Islands.....	5,174	5,245
Exported from Darien, etc., to Northern ports.....	2
Stock at Savannah at close of year.....	313	963
Deduct:		
Received from Florida—Uplands.....	240	4,997
Sea Islands.....	4,824	666
Stock at beginning of year.....	696	5,760
Total product for year.....	357,233	495,959

South Carolina.

Exported from Charleston:			
To foreign ports—Uplands.....	52,814		99,847
Sea Islands.....	8,965		5,966
To coastwise ports—Uplands.....	142,024		135,031
Sea Islands.....	3,313		3,328
Exported from Georgetown.....	477		839
Stock at Charleston at end of year—Uplands.....	208		1,849
Sea Is.'ds.....	42—	202,373	96—
Deduct:			
Received from Florida—Uplands.....	156		190
Sea Islands.....	1,700		4,517
Stock at Charleston beginning of year—Uplands.....	1,849		1,084
Sea Islands.....	96—	8,901	194—
Total product for year.....		199,072	240,431

North Carolina.

Exported:			
To foreign ports.....			
To coastwise ports.....	35,908—	35,908	38,643—
Total product for the year.....		35,908	38,643

Virginia.

Exported:			
To foreign ports.....	6,253		8,283
To domestic ports.....	134,747		159,723
Manufactured, taken from Petersburg, &c.....	20,000		—
Stock at end of year at Petersburg, &c.....	141—	161,141	170—
Deduct stock beginning of year.....	170—	170	1,589—
Total product for the year.....		160,971	166,587

Tennessee, &c.

Shipments:			
From Memphis.....	247,651		254,240
From Nashville.....	65,825		79,193
From other places in Tenn., Kentucky, &c.....	194,172		189,086
Crop of Illinois.....	—		15,000
Stock in Memphis and Nashville end of year.....	94—	507,742	107—
Deduct:			
Shipped to New Orleans.....	30,767		69,355
Shipped to Charleston and Norfolk.....	35,666		—
Shipped direct to manufacturers.....	258,611		271,711
Received from New Orleans.....	1,402		—
Stock in Memphis and Nashville beginning of year.....	107—	326,553	1,602—
Total shipments to New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Portland.....		181,189	194,970
Add shipments to manufacturers, as above.....		258,611	271,711
Total product for the year, of Tenn., &c.*.....		439,800	466,651

* Except the shipments to New Orleans, which are included in the New Orleans receipts, and to Norfolk, which are included in the Virginia receipts.

Total product detailed above by States for the year ending Sept. 1, 1869..... bales. 2,379,039

Consumed in the South, not included (in addition to the 20,000 taken from Petersburg)..... 60,000

Total crop of the United States for year ending Sept. 1, 1869..... 2,439,039

Below we give the total crop each year since 1821:

Years.	Bales.	Years.	Bales.	Years.	Bales.
1869-69.....	2,439,039	1850-51.....	2,355,257	1832-33.....	1,360,752
1867-68.....	2,593,993	1849-50.....	2,096,706	1834-35.....	1,254,328
1866-67.....	2,019,774	1848-49.....	2,728,596	1835-36.....	1,245,324
1865-66.....	2,190,987	1847-48.....	2,347,634	1836-37.....	1,070,438
1861-65.....	no record	1846-47.....	1,778,651	1811-32.....	967,487
1860-61.....	3,659,086	1845-46.....	2,100,537	1830-31.....	1,384,848
1859-60.....	4,669,770	1844-45.....	2,384,508	1829-30.....	976,245
1858-59.....	3,851,481	1843-44.....	2,080,409	1828-29.....	870,415
1857-58.....	3,113,962	1842-43.....	2,378,875	1827-28.....	727,593
1856-57.....	2,339,519	1841-42.....	1,638,574	1826-27.....	957,231
1855-56.....	3,527,845	1840-41.....	1,634,945	1825-26.....	720,217
1854-55.....	2,817,839	1839-40.....	2,177,833	1824-25.....	869,249
1853-54.....	2,930,027	1838-39.....	1,360,532	1823-24.....	509,158
1852-53.....	3,262,832	1837-38.....	1,801,497	1822-23.....	493,000
1851-52.....	3,015,029	1836-37.....	1,422,980	1821-22.....	455,000

The crop of Sea Island the past year has been as follows: Florida, 6,748 bales; Georgia, 6,480 bales; South Carolina, 5,454 bales—total, 18,682 bales, the particulars of which are set out below:

FLORIDA—Bales.....		6,748
GEORGIA—Exported Foreign.....	6,021	
Domestic ports.....	5,174	
Stock end of year.....	160—	11,361
Deduct received from Florida.....	4,524	
Stock beginning of year.....	60—	4,854
Total Sea Island and Georgia.....		6,480

SOUTH CAROLINA—Exported foreign.....	8,993		
Exported domestic ports.....	3,315		
Stock end of year.....	42—	7,360	
Deduct received from Florida.....	1,700		
Stock beginning of year.....	96—	1,796	5,454
Total Crop of Sea Islands			18,682

The crop of Sea Island during former years has been as follows :

1855-56.....bales. 44,512	1858-59.....bales. 47,592	1865-67.....bales. 32,228
1856-57.....45,314	1859-60.....46,649	1867-68.....21,275
1857-58.....40,566	1860-61.....No record.	1868-69.....13,683

Consumption.

The consumption the past year shows a slight falling off, notwithstanding the mills have increased their stock about 30,000 bales. Our usual summary, showing the result for the year, North and South, is as follows :

Total crop of the United States as above stated	2,439,089
Stock on hand commencement of year (September 1, 1868) :	
At Northern ports	30,208
At Southern ports	7,927—
Total supply during year ending September 1, 1869	2,477,169
Of this supply there has been	
Exported to foreign ports during the year	1,448,020
Sent to Canada by railroad direct from the West	18,000
Now on hand (September 1, 1869) :	
At Northern ports	9,536
At Southern ports	2,907—
Total consumption in United States year ending Sept. 1, 1869	bales. 998,806
Consumption in Southern States	80,000
Leaving consumption in Northern States	bales. 918,806

We have been at considerable trouble to obtain a correct idea of the stock now held by the mills, and find that, although several of the largest corporations are holding six, seven or eight weeks' supply, the great body of the spinners are lightly stocked. The total held by them, therefore, on the 1st of September was less than we supposed, being about 60,000 bales, against 30,000 bales last year. Taking the stock, then, on the 1st of September at these figures, we see that the actual consumption of all the mills, after deducting the increase held this year over last year (30,000 bales), would be about 968,000 bales, against 982,000 bales last year, leaving for the Northern mills about 888,000 bales against 900,000 bales last year.

The new year begins with a deficiency in the visible supply of cotton for this country and Europe to the extent of 330,000 bales compared with the amount on hand at the same period of last year. Hence to permit of the same consumption the coming season as during the season which has just closed, the cotton production of the world must be increased to that extent. But this year the average weekly consumption of Great Britain has been about 3,000 bales less than during the same period of 1867-8, while the Continent and the United States have probably together also consumed about 3,000 bales less per week. If, therefore, the mills this season return to the consumption of 1867-8, 300,000 bales additional will be needed, or in all an increased production of 630,000 bales, without allowing any accumulation of stock. We shall undoubtedly be able to make good a part of this deficiency ; but the extent of our crop cannot yet be definitely stated.

Exports.

In the first table given in this report will be found the foreign exports the past year from each port to Great Britain, France and other ports, stated sepa-

rately, as well as the total to all the ports. Below we give the total foreign exports for six years for comparison :

Total Exports of Cotton to Foreign Ports for Six Years.

From—	Exports to foreign ports for year ending August 31—					
	1860.	1861.	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.
New Orleans.....bales	2,005,662	1,783,673	516,138	618,940	581,477	619,534
Mobile.....	619,481	456,421	270,934	159,474	236,511	163,134
South Carolina.....	886,770	214,388	53,824	80,806	105,813	56,800
Georgia.....	337,735	302,187	92,905	114,101	239,604	167,537
Texas.....	111,967	63,209	64,388	76,916	66,595	83,576
Florida.....	53,108	25,173	37,977	8,009	510
North Carolina.....	195	21	534
Virginia.....	2,359	810	13,111	8,213	6,353
New York.....	203,023	248,049	495,462	469,668	374,734	327,538
Boston.....	9,614	28,225	12,014	17,014	1,441	1,491
Philadelphia.....	292	3,798	2,015	3,155	1,140	99
Baltimore.....	257	8,515	6,709	7,975	16,319	19,212
Portland, Maine.....	103	2,807	1,907
San Francisco.....	82	1
Total from the U. S.....	3,774,173	3,127,568	1,552,457	1,568,787	1,657,015	1,448,020

A wish has been expressed by some of our readers that we should give a detailed statement of the exports from each port during the past year, and we have therefore prepared the following :

Exported to—	Exported from—							
	New Orleans.	Mo- bile.	Gal- veston.	Flor- ida.	Char- leston.	Sava- nah.	New York.	All Others.*
Liverpool.....	339,831	130,81	57,582	53,733	133,673	243,214	18,547
London.....	985
Queenstown.....	2,418	2,418
Glasgow.....	7,203	2,085	2,085
Cork.....	164,853	16,133	810	20,969	21,433	7,203
Havre.....	218	224,101
Marseilles.....	208	218
Rouen.....	1,294	8,645	76
Amsterdam.....	41,595	22,629	8,626	33,399	9,573
Bremen.....	100	2,961	351	8,432
Antwerp.....	9,782	1,771	20,308	31,841
Hamburg.....	200	481
Rotterdam.....	6,176	6,176
Pilau-Prussia.....	26,051	5,556	2,404	34,011
Malaga.....	8,695	8,695
Mexico.....	2,376	3,165	5,541
Genoa.....	6,138	1,000	1,298	8,436
Salerno.....	1,802	1,932
St. Petersburg.....	9,573	9,573
Narva.....	3,323	970	4,293
Helmsfors.....	750	750
Cronstadt.....	765	652	2,973	2,435	6,830
New Granada.....	228	328
Brit. Provinces.....	185	185
Total.....	619,534	163,154	83,376	810	56,809	167,557	327,838	23,962

* Under this head, "Other Ports," we have included as follows:—From Boston—1,306 bales to Liverpool and 185 bales to British Provinces. From Philadelphia—99 bales to Liverpool. From Portland—1,907 bales to Liverpool. From Baltimore—9,082 bales to Liverpool, 481 bales to Rotterdam, 9,573 bales to Bremen, and 76 bales to Amsterdam.

The following are the total gross receipts of cotton at New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore for each of the last two years ending September 1 :

RECEIPTS FROM—	NEW YORK.		BOSTON.		PHILADELPHIA.		BALTIMORE.	
	1868-9.	1867-8.	1868-9.	1867-8.	1868-9.	1867-8.	1868-9.	1867-8.
New Orleans.....	125,807	51,862	73,008	45,514	6,929	7,310	1,594	417
Texas.....	41,191	29,011	19,661	5,846	216	188
Savannah.....	145,364	177,574	2,656	18,737	16,781	22,147	15,754	13,511
Mobile.....	17,610	12,776	6,919	22,066	333	1,870	50
Florida.....	1,405	14,482	6,069	238
North Carolina.....	106,500	14,336	10,811	8,496	19,221	14,111
Virginia.....	27,814	132	370	1,313	1,714	2,871	2,974
Northern Ports.....	70,774	101,327	25,713	21,403	23,490	28,841
Tennessee, &c.....	12,640	27,898	76,263	66,214	5,018	134	404
Foreign.....	104,584	100,788	85,083	81,962	20,114	24,221	19,467	20,845
.....	8,031	117,640	931	28	4
Total this year.....	662,790	632,328	246,433	229,633	55,811	65,951	62,425	81,293

To complete our record, we give below a table showing the price of middling uplands at New York and Liverpool on Friday of each week during the last two years :

Prices of Cotton at New York and Liverpool two Years.

		1868-9		1867-8				1868-9		1867-8	
		New York.	Liverpool.	New York.	Liverpool.			New York.	Liverpool.	New York.	Liverpool.
		cts.	d.	cts.	d.			cts.	d.	cts.	d.
Sept. 4	6	29½	10½	27	10	Feb. 26	28	29½	11½	22	9½
" 11	13	29½	10½	25	8½	Mar. 5	6	29	12	25	8½
" 18	20	26½	10½	24½	8½	" 12	18	28½	12	24½	10½
" 25	27	26½	10½	24	8½	" 19	20	28½	12	24½	10½
Oct. 2	4	26½	9½	20	8½	" 26	27	28½	12½	26	10½
" 9	11	26	10½	18	8½	Apr. 3	3	28½	12½	29	12½
" 16	18	25½	10½	19	8½	" 9	10	28½	12½	30	12½
" 23	25	25	10½	20	8½	" 16	17	28½	12½	30½	12½
" 30	—	25½	11	—	—	" 23	24	28½	12	32½	12½
Nov. 6	8	25½	11½	19	8½	" 30	—	28½	11½	—	—
" 13	15	24½	10½	18	8½	May 1	—	28½	11½	32½	12½
" 20	22	24½	10½	17½	8½	" 7	8	28½	11½	32	12½
" 27	29	25½	11½	16	7½	" 14	15	28½	11½	32	12½
Dec. 4	6	24½	11½	17	7½	" 21	22	28½	11½	31	11½
" 11	13	25	10½	15½	7½	" 28	29	28½	11½	31	11½
" 18	20	25½	10½	15½	7½	June 4	5	30½	11½	30½	11½
" 24	27	25	10½	15½	7½	" 11	12	31½	11½	29	11
" 31	—	28	10½	—	—	" 18	19	33½	12½	31	11½
1869. '68.	—	—	—	—	—	" 25	26	33½	12½	31½	11½
Jan. 3	8	—	—	15½	7½	July 2	8	34½	12½	32	11½
" 8	10	28	11	16	7½	" 9	10	34½	12½	32½	11½
" 15	17	29½	11½	17½	7½	" 16	17	34½	12½	33	11½
" 22	24	29½	11½	18	7½	" 23	24	34	12½	31	10½
" 29	31	29	11½	18½	7½	" 30	31	33½	12½	30	9½
Feb. 5	7	30½	12½	20	8½	Aug. 6	7	33½	12½	29	10
" 12	14	30	12½	20½	8½	" 13	14	33½	12½	29½	10
" 19	21	28½	11½	22½	10½	" 20	21	35	13½	30	10½
						" 27	28	34½	13½	30½	11

THE WHEAT TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

[From the London Correspondence of the "Commercial and Financial Chronicle."]

We have now reached the close of a protracted and remarkable wheat season, and a brief retrospect may not be inappropriate or uninteresting. The season commenced at an unusually early period, owing to the forward state of the crops in 1868. In the early part of May, last year, the average price of English wheat was as high as 74s. 7d. per quarter; but the prospect of an early and abundant crop, produced, from that period to the time when the harvest had commenced, a steady downward movement in prices. The result was that by the 17th of July, there had been a decline of 9s. 4d., or to 65s. per quarter. When the unexampled abundance of the harvest of 1868 had, however, become a matter of general knowledge, the fall in prices became more rapid, and there was an almost uninterrupted decline until the 19th of December, when 49s. 5d. was the average quotation. From that point, there was a recovery of from 2s. to 8s. per quarter; but in April, May and June, there was much heaviness in the trade, and on the 8th of May the average price of English wheat was only 44s. 4d. per quarter. Towards the close of the season, arising from causes which are too recent to require recapitulation, there was a rise to 54s. 2d., which is the closing price of the season, and which is 2s. 9d. lower than at the termination of 1867-8.

The table which follows shows the average price of English wheat in England and Wales each week since the commencement of the season 1864-5. From this it will be seen that notwithstanding the abundant crop of last year, the price was never at so low a point as in 1864-5. This, however, is easily explained. The crops of cereal produce in 1864 were very large, and had been preceded by an abundant harvest in 1863. The result was that at the commencement of 1864-5 there was a large supply of old wheat in stock, while, at the same time new produce came freely to market. Even from the low average of 42s. 3d., there was an almost uninterrupted fall until the close of the year, when the average quotation was only

87s. 10d.; and although wheat became a little dearer during the latter part of the season, the average price for 1864-5 was only 40s. 8d. per quarter. The abundance of the crop of 1868 has had an important effect upon prices; but it has not forced them down to so low a point. The lowest official average was 44s. 4d., which is 6s. 6d. above that of 1864-5. But at the close of 1867-8 the supplies of old wheat were exhausted, and the new crop came rapidly into consumption at an early period. A very important fall, however, took place, and the satisfactory result is ascertained that English wheat was just 20s. per quarter cheaper than in 1867-8. That result not only benefited the consumer but the grower also, for it is evident that an abundant crop producing 38s. 3d. per quarter is far more remunerative than a scanty crop yielding 68s. 5d. per quarter. With regard to the future, it does not appear probable that any great variation from the prices now current will take place. The abundant harvest of last year has been succeeded by a crop which is believed to be under an average, but which has been harvested in excellent condition, and which, taken as a whole, is not unsatisfactory. We have, however, by the lateness of the season, saved a months' consumption, owing to the circumstance that thirteen months' consumption has been thrown on to last year's crop. If, however, it should be found when the season is more advanced, and when a better knowledge has been gained respecting the actual yield that the crop is deficient in quantity, there are ample supplies ready to come forward from nearly all the leading grain-growing countries of the world to make up for the deficiency here:—

		1864.	1867.	1866.	1865.	1864.
September	5.....	55.3	62.5	47.3	46.0	43.3
"	13.....	55.5	61.8	47.0	44.7	42.4
"	19.....	54.4	62.11	49.8	49.0	47.0
"	26.....	53.7	64.1	51.5	40.10	40.11
October	3.....	54.4	63.5	52.2	41.1	39.8
"	10.....	51.8	64.10	52.7	41.11	38.9
"	17.....	53.8	67.5	52.2	41.1	38.1
"	24.....	53.4	70.5	52.2	42.4	37.6
"	31.....	52.11	69.11	54.9	43.4	38.9
November	7.....	52.3	70.1	57.2	45.3	38.11
"	14.....	52.0	70.1	56.7	46.11	38.9
"	21.....	51.6	68.11	57.6	46.10	38.9
"	28.....	51.0	68.5	60.0	46.6	38.8
December	5.....	50.1	68.1	61.7	46.5	38.5
"	12.....	49.8	67.8	60.3	46.8	38.4
"	19.....	49.5	66.9	59.6	46.8	38.1
"	26.....	50.7	67.4	60.0	46.11	37.10
		1869.	1868.	1867.	1866.	1865.
January	2.....	50.11	67.10	60.2	46.3	38.2
"	9.....	51.5	69.6	61.0	46.1	38.7
"	16.....	52.8	71.6	62.3	45.7	38.10
"	23.....	52.4	72.4	62.2	45.6	38.6
"	30.....	51.5	72.6	62.6	45.10	38.4
February	6.....	51.0	73.4	61.4	45.5	38.4
"	13.....	50.9	74.0	59.10	45.0	38.4
"	20.....	50.3	72.11	59.11	45.5	38.2
"	27.....	49.7	73.4	59.5	45.7	38.6
March	6.....	49.4	73.8	59.3	45.4	38.4
"	13.....	48.10	73.1	59.4	45.6	38.3
"	20.....	47.9	72.5	59.9	45.3	38.4
"	27.....	46.5	72.10	60.11	44.11	38.11
April	3.....	46.4	72.6	61.2	44.9	38.3
"	10.....	47.0	73.2	60.9	44.5	40.1
"	17.....	46.8	73.8	61.4	44.9	39.7
"	24.....	45.5	73.11	62.11	46.5	39.5
May	1.....	44.0	74.2	61.10	45.9	39.10
"	8.....	44.4	74.7	64.0	45.9	40.11
"	15.....	44.6	74.3	64.11	46.1	41.8
"	22.....	45.2	73.10	65.3	47.4	41.9
"	29.....	45.2	72.8	65.5	47.5	41.11
June	5.....	45.5	70.8	65.4	47.1	41.5
"	12.....	46.0	67.6	65.9	47.4	41.1
"	19.....	46.2	66.1	65.8	48.5	41.3
"	26.....	46.4	67.5	64.10	51.0	41.6
July	3.....	47.9	67.7	64.11	54.6	42.5
"	10.....	48.11	66.7	64.7	55.10	43.1
"	17.....	50.2	65.0	65.1	54.0	43.0
"	24.....	50.11	62.9	65.8	52.0	42.10
"	31.....	51.9	61.1	67.5	41.1	42.6
August	7.....	51.6	57.11	58.2	50.2	42.0
"	14.....	50.0	55.0	68.4	50.2	42.1
"	21.....	53.1	57.1	68.2	50.10	45.4
"	28.....	54.2	56.11	66.7	49.7	46.7
Average.....		48.3	68.4%	60.8%	46.5	40.3%

During the season, our imports have of wheat been as much as 28,865,123 cwt., against 35,553,725 cwt., being a diminution of 6,688,602 cwt. as compared with 1867-8. Owing to the firmness that prevailed in the trade shortly before the close of the season, and to the rapidity with which communication can now be effected with the producing countries, our imports in July and August were very large. In August, they were as much as 4,000,000 cwt., against 1,850,000 cwt. in the corresponding month last year. Of flour, there was an import of 3,927,051 cwt., against 3,143,260 cwt. The exports of wheat were only 150,841 cwt., against 787,881 cwt.; and of flour, 33,545 cwt., against 53,504 cwt.

RAILROAD ITEMS.

—COMPANY REPORTS—BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.—The earnings of this road for the years ending May 31, 1868 and 1869, were as follows:

	1868.	1869.
From passengers.....	\$907,131 23	\$997,397 09
“ freight.....	603,355 62	689,913 65
“ rents.....	28,909 01	27,563 60
“ mails.....	13,671 58	14,139 51
“ interest, premium on stock sold, etc..	12,892 94	32,474 50
	\$1,565,462 38	\$1,761,493 55
Expenses.....	\$1,129,689 39	\$1,304,503 28
Earnings less expenses.....	435,790 08	556,990 27
Deduct tax on dividends and surplus.....	21,786 67	24,806 51
Net revenue.....	\$413,993 39	\$532,183 76
Reserved for the purchase of rails, and unadjusted liabilities, etc.....		60,000 00
Leaving.....		\$472,183 76
From which two dividends of five per cent each have been paid.....		455,000 00
Balance.....		\$17,183 76
Add balance from previous year.....		976,017 10
Total as in general balance sheet.....		\$993,200 86

The above balance of \$993,200 86, is invested as follows: in Newburyport railroad bonds \$300,000; in Danvers railroad bonds (guaranteed by this corporation) 73,000; in the Danvers railroad contract and stock \$27,430; in the Dover and Winnipisaukee railroad stock, \$258,461 14—and the remainder in expenditures on the road, rolling stock, etc., in addition to the capital received from the sale of stock. It is, therefore, only an element indicating in some measure, the value of the stock above par; but it is not available for the payment of debts or dividends.

—PORTLAND, SACO AND PORTSMOUTH RAILROAD.—The report for year ending May 31, 1869, shows the following:

INCOME RECEIPTS.

Year end'g	Year end'g		1869.	1868.
May 31,	May 31,			
1869.	1868.	Mails.....	7,837	7,837
Passengers.....	\$307,736	Rents and miscellaneous.....	8,096	4,864
Freight.....	\$301,574			
Freight.....	237,238		\$575,036	\$530,389
Express.....	13,877			
Extra Baggage.....	253			

EXPENDITURES.

1869.	1868.		1869.	1868.
Machine Shop.....	\$6,732	Damages and Law Expenses	\$4,062	\$5,980
Maintenance of Way.....	142,847			
Locomotive Power.....	134,578		399,449	320,011
Train Expenses.....	46,491		10,000	19,000
Station.....	27,346			
Office Establishment.....	23,090		409,449	330,011
Taxes and Insurance.....	13,533			
		Net Earnings.....	165,586	200,378

Payments, including interest, dividends, taxes, &c.....141,807
Surplus this year.....23,779

The claims of this company upon the Boston and Maine and Eastern railroad companies, for the payment of dividends in gold, has been settled as follows: The company receives \$180,000 for claims on back dividends, and the June (1869) dividend and all subsequent ones to be paid in gold.

—ATLANTA AND WEST POINT RAILROAD.—A condensed comparative statement of items of income for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and June 30, 1869, gives general results, as follows:

	1868.	1869.
Passengers	\$122,390	\$130,966
Freight	205,738	201,231
Mail	7,028	8,649
Express	8,763	6,340
United States government and miscellaneous	7,157	13,556
	\$361,071	\$362,655
Expenses		241,503
Net earnings		\$119,151

The percentage of ordinary expenses to gross earnings is 63.10 against 61 last year. The President remarks in his report:

"The uncertainty of all railroad investments is much increased by the growing policy of 'State aid' in neighboring States, as well as our own. No railroad built with the capital of the shareholders, to satisfy the real wants of the country, can be long secure against a rivalry and competition under the patronage of the State. No policy could be more unjust and oppressive than the policy of 'State aid.' It is a distinguishing feature in this policy that the citizen who has built his own enterprise with his own means, is taxed to build up rival enterprises, by which his own may be ruined. In other words, he is forced to contribute money for the destruction of his own property! The effects of this policy are no longer left to theory. Proof is abundant that roads will be built with little regard to the wants of the public, if men can organize and build them at the expense of the State. Hence vast amounts of capital are wasted that might have been better employed; too apt to be followed by loss of credit, and the bankruptcy of the State, and general financial paralysis. Our road has suffered, and will suffer, perhaps, more from the effects of this pernicious policy in a neighboring State than in our own; though, to some extent, we shall suffer in both."

—THE SOUTHWESTERN RAILROAD OF GEORGIA reports its gross earnings for the year ending July 31, 1869, at \$910,116 16, and its operating expenses, including taxes, as \$549,729 89, or about 60 per cent, leaving as net earnings the sum of \$360,386 18. Two four per cent dividends were paid out of the year's earnings, leaving a trifling surplus. The receipts were \$10,000 less, and the operating expenses \$28,000 less than during the previous year. The shipments of cotton were less by 75,000 bales than those of the previous year.

The Southwestern Railroad consists of a main line from Macon southward to Albany, 107½ miles; a branch from Fort Valley, 28 miles south of Macon, west to Columbus, 72 miles; a branch from Smithville, 83 miles south of Macon, west to the Chattahoochee, opposite Esfala, Ala., 59½ miles; and a branch of this last named branch, from Cuthbert 37 miles west of Smithville, in a southwesterly direction to Fort Gaines on the Chattahoochee, 19½ miles. Of the Columbus branch, the 51 miles east of Columbus was the old Muscogee Railroad, formerly leased by the Southwestern, but consolidated with it last October. The total mileage of the road is 258½ miles. It affords the only railroad route to southwestern Georgia, except to the few counties in the extreme south which are reached by the Savannah & Gulf Railroad.

The Southwestern Railroad was leased on the 24th of June last to the Central Railroad and Banking Company, which owns the railroad from Savannah to Macon, with a branch to Augusta, and several less important branches. By the terms of this lease, a dividend of 7 per cent annually is guaranteed on Southwestern stock, and when a dividend of 10 per cent is declared on Central stock, there must be a dividend of eight per cent on Southwestern, and in that proportion for larger dividends. The dividends of the Central have usually been 10 per cent, of the Southwestern 8 per cent. In order to make the fiscal year of the Southwestern (which maintains its organization) correspond with that of the Central beginning December 1st, a fractional dividend of \$2 50 per share will be made for the time between

August 1 and December 1. Thereafter dividends on both stocks will be made regularly in June and December.

It is now reported that the Central Company will purchase or lease the Macon and Western Railroad, which extends from Macon to Atlanta. The people of Macon are very much opposed to these consolidations, believing that they will make their town a mere way station instead of the terminus of several roads. There can be no doubt, however, that there will be great economy in operating the roads together; and if Macon suffers it will be because the surrounding country finds it more profitable to ship through to the seaboard than to make an exchange at Macon. The strongest objection made to the consolidation is on account of new roads from Brunswick to Macon and Albany, which could have obtained a heavy business from these roads if they had remained independent corporations.—*Western Railroad Gazette*.

THE NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA RAILROAD.—The stockholders of this company held their annual meeting on August 11th, at the Chattanooga depot, when the following report of operations for the year was submitted:

The receipts were \$1,685,594 52. Operating expenses, \$854,018 71. Net earnings, \$281,575 81.

Expenditures 78 per cent. Net earnings 22 per cent of gross earnings.

Comparing this with the result of the preceding year we find:

Increase of gross earnings, \$125,094 79.

Decrease in operating expenses, \$172,921 56. Total increase, \$298,016 35.

The decrease in the revenue derived from rents and privileges is owing to the fact, that previously some \$15,000 per annum was received from the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, for rent of offices, roundhouse, shops, yard, room, etc., but by the terms of the lease under which the Nashville and Chattanooga Company are now operating that road, no compensation is allowed for those privileges.

Mr. Cole offered the following resolutions, which were adopted:

Resolved, by the stockholders in meeting assembled, That the Board of Directors this day elected are authorized to lease for a term of years the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, the terms of the lease to be fixed by said Directors.

Resolved furthermore, That said Board of Directors be authorized to make any such arrangements with the Tennessee and Pacific Railroad, in reference to depot connection or rail communication, that they may deem advantageous to the company for a term of years.

ERIE RAILWAY.—

OFFICE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY,
NEW YORK, Sept. 9, 1869. }

To the President of the New York Stock Exchange:

Dear Sir: In compliance with the request of several of your members, this company has just registered in the office of the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company common stock representing \$70,000,000; preferred stock, \$8,586,900.

The earnings of the road during the eleven months ending September 1, not including receipts of the Atlantic and Great Western Railroad, have been \$17,348,335.

We have pleasure in stating that the road and equipments were never in better condition.

(Signed)

JAY GOULD, President.

—The suit against the Greenville & Columbia Railroad Company of South Carolina, for the foreclosure of the mortgage upon their road, brought by certain holders of their first mortgage bonds, has been settled to the mutual satisfaction of all parties concerned, and an order has been made by the court, now in session (at the suggestion of the suing creditors), dismissing the bill.

—At the annual meeting of the stockholders of the Boston and Maine Railroad, at Lawrence, Mass., recently held, the Portland, Saco and Portsmouth Railroad was authorized to increase its capital stock, and fully equip itself as a first-class railroad.

COMPLETION OF THE LEAVENWORTH AND ATCHISON RAILROAD.—The last rail of this road, connecting the Central branch of the Pacific Railroad with Leavenworth and St. Louis, via the Missouri Pacific Railroad, was laid on September 2d, and the first train passed over it to Atchison.

LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN.—The following statement for the first week

of September, like all statements of earnings hereafter, gives the earnings of the lines between Chicago and Buffalo:

Sept. 1 to Sept. 7, 1869.....	\$278,418 37
Sept. 1 to Sept. 7, 1868.....	263,137 73

Increase \$10,280 64

Travel over the road is very satisfactory. The fast train gains continually in popularity, as might be expected from its excellent accommodations and perfect regularity in making time.

—Messrs. S. W. Hopkins & Co., 58 Old Broad street, London, and 69 Broadway, New York, furnish the following official statement of the export of rails from Great Britain:

	—Month end'g July 31—			—6 months end'g July 31—		
	1867.	1868.	1869.	1867.	1868.	1869.
America—						
United States..... tons.	15,558	16,936	16,249	112,661	165,480	203,597
British.....	3,622	2,135	1,648	9,439	10,803	19,358
Cuba.....	470	326	...	3,077	1,999	319
Braz l.....	1	23	311	779	1,062	573
Chili.....	19	967	85	2,674	1,393	2,636
Peru.....	...	153	3,315	168	923	14,624
Europe—						
Russia.....	19,778	7,886	83,781	43,433	28,100	122,517
Sweden.....	73	389	244	606	1,423	2,139
Prussia.....	290	128	2,428	4,730	4,099	6,972
Illyria, Croatia and Dalmatia.....	...	1,031	2,729	...	4,840	19,457
France.....	50	16	279	80	96	3,963
Holland.....	1,130	2,561	1,591	8,245	19,343	767
Spain and Canaries.....	1,531	443	910	6,470	4,593	7,603
Asia—						
British India.....	18,975	1,533	8,333	83,473	51,026	46,082
Australia.....	736	223	1,845	10,436	5,749	14,141
Africa—						
Egypt.....	1,615	8,668	10,512	5,355
Other countries.....	3,819	2,779	7,325	18,050	21,412	42,170
Total.....	68,101	37,516	103,938	318,038	334,053	519,723

Old iron to all countries..... 4,034 7,888 8,933 26,749 42,587 57,399

—The Western Union Telegraph Company have purchased the lines of the Atlantic and Pacific States Telegraph Company for about 60 per cent of their actual cost of construction. By this arrangement the old Company is enabled to increase its facilities for doing business at once, instead of waiting for the construction of new lines over the same territory, which they had in contemplation. The purchased property was all new and in excellent condition. The Western Union Company will announce a material reduction in rates to all points on the first of October prox.

DISTANCES VIA CHICAGO AND NEW YORK TRUNK LINE.—A correspondent of the *Chicago Railway Review* gives the following: I have compared the tables of distances (the authority is *Appleton's Railway Guide*) by the various routes, with the following results:

North Shore Line.			Miles	
New York to Albany.....	144	448	} 961	
Albany to Suspension Bridge.....	301	301		
Bridge to Detroit.....	229	229		
Detroit to Chicago.....	284	513		
New York Central and South Shore Line.				
New York to Albany.....	144	442	} 960	
Albany to Buffalo.....	238	238		
Buffalo to Chicago.....	538	538		
Erie and South Shore Line.—(via Buffalo.)				
New York to Buffalo.....	423	423	} 961	
Buffalo to Chicago.....	538	538		
Erie and South Shore Line.—(via Dunkirk.)				
New York to Dunkirk.....	460	460	} 938	
Dunkirk to Chicago.....	478	478		
Pennsylvania Railroad Line.—(via Philadelphia.)				
New York to Philadelphia.....	90	90	} 913	
Philadelphia to Pittsburg.....	355	355		
Pittsburg to Chicago.....	468	468		
Pennsylvania Railroad Line.—(via Allentown.)				
New York to Harrisburg.....	132	132	} 899	
Harrisburg to Pittsburg.....	249	249		
Pittsburg to Chicago.....	468	468		

BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD.—At the recent monthly meeting of the Board of Directors of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, President Garrett made the following statement in reference to the business of the roads: The Board will remember that on the 1st of July the contract with the Sandusky, Mansfield and Newark Railroad Company went into operation. That line is 116 miles in length, extending from Newark, on the Central Ohio division, to the city of Sandusky, on Lake Erie. Passing under the charge of this company permanently, it is now known as the Lake Erie Division of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. The relations of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, through the Marietta and Cincinnati road, under the contract which has been recently made with the Cincinnati, Indianapolis and Lafayette Railroad Company, are also proving of a highly interesting character. Amidst the tremendous efforts and conflicts of the past few months of the great Trunk lines, in connection with western business, the power and capacity of the Baltimore and Ohio road to maintain satisfactory results under its enlarged arrangements have been exhibited. It is interesting to note that the revenues of the main stem and branches—which in the corresponding month in 1868, were in the aggregate \$790,59 99, in the past month of August, notwithstanding the unprecedented difficulties in rates, amounted to \$1,036,244. 29, exhibiting an increase of \$246,184 30. Of this amount, however, \$40,889 21 was derived from the Lake Erie division. Deducting this sum, an increase of \$205,295 09 is shown in the general business of the company.

ERIE RAILWAY.—

OFFICE ERIE RAILWAY Co., }
NEW YORK, Sept. 11, 1869. }

R. G. Rolston, Esq., President Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.:

DEAR SIR—The following is a statement of the stock, debt and leasehold estates, in answer to your inquiries of this date. The amount of common stock issued is \$70,000,000, and the amount of common scrip none. The amount of preferred stock, including scrip, \$8,636,910. The amount of mortgage debts (7 per cent) authorized and issued is as follows:

First mortgage, \$3,000,000, extended May, 1867, due 1897.

Second mortgage, \$4,000,000, date of issue March 1, 1849, due 1879.

Third mortgage, \$6,000,000, date of issue March 15, 1853, due 1883.

Fourth mortgage, \$4,441,000, date of issue October, 1857, due 1880.

Fifth mortgage, \$926,500, date of issue June 1, 1859, due 1888.

Buffalo Branch mortgage, \$186,400, date of issue July 1, 1861, due 1891.

The amount of sterling bonds £1,000,000, equivalent to \$4,844,400, date of issue September 1, 1865, due 1875.

Under a statute of the State the mortgage debt is convertible into stock only within ten years from date of issue. The ten years have expired on all but the sterling loan, and, as that is selling at par in London, there is no danger of conversion. There is no leased road that can be converted into the stock of this company, except in compliance with the rules of the Stock Exchange by giving thirty days notice, nor will any increase be made in any form except in compliance with aforesaid rule.

H. N. Otis, Secretary.

JAY GOULD, President.

THE LOUISVILLE, CINCINNATI AND LEXINGTON ROAD.—The consolidation, which has been anticipated, has at length been completed, as appears from the following despatch:—"Louisville, Ky., Sept. 11.—Articles of consolidation were signed to-day by the Louisville and Frankfort, and the Frankfort and Lexington Railroad companies. The road will hereafter be known as the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company. They have now in successful operation 175 miles of the road."

—The last rail on the Fort Wayne, Muncie and Cincinnati Railroad, connecting Muncie with Cincinnati, was laid at Muncie on the 4th inst., and at 5 o'clock, P. M., the construction train passed from the road to the Bellefontaine.

THE RICHMOND AND YORK RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY have resolved at last to extend their road to some point on the Chesapeake Bay. They have authorized for the purpose the issue of \$450,000 in bonds and \$10,000 in eight per cent preferred stock, making a total of \$550,000. The extension from West Point to the Bay will be twenty-two or twenty-five miles long, depending on the terminus selected.

FAILURE OF VIRGINIA RAILROAD COMPANIES TO PAY INTEREST DUE ON STATE LOANS.—The following has been received from Richmond: Major Staunton, the Acting First Auditor of the State, states that the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company have paid into the State Treasury one-half of the interest due the State on its loans, and the remainder is to be paid December 15th, under instruction from General Canby. The Orange & Alexandria Railroad is yet behind. The annual interest due from that corporation is about \$18,000, while the Southside Railroad owes the large sum of \$252,000. The Virginia & Tennessee Railroad owes about \$420,000 interest to the State, and neither of the last mentioned roads appears to be in a condition to meet its liabilities at present. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad is negotiating a loan with which it expects to liquidate its entire indebtedness to the State, principal and interest, in all about \$350,000.

"I learn that the receipts of the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad within the past month amount to \$100,000."

RARITAN AND DELAWARE BAY RAILROAD.—The sale of this road took place on the 13th inst., at the depot of the company, Manchester, N. J. The sale was under a writ of *feri facias*, issued to Robert S. Green, a Master in Chancery of New Jersey, by the bondholders of the line, for non-payment of a mortgage on the line and stock of \$1,000,000 and accumulated interest to the amount of \$1,700,000.

The property was sold in two lots, the first comprising the railroad and its corporate franchises and rights. The second consisted of the entire rolling stock of the company, the locomotives, cars and the steamboat Jessie Hoyt. Both lots were knocked down to the bondholders of the company after a very feeble competition, the first for \$50,000 and the second for \$74,000. These prices were only nominal, it being understood that the bondholders were determined to buy in the line, and no opposition was offered.

The new proprietors will have a fresh board of directors, of which Charles Gould, of New York, is proposed as President, and intend issuing \$3,500,000 worth of new stock and raising \$2,000,000 on fresh mortgage bonds, the majority of which is to be expended in putting the road into better working order and improving the stock.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD, for the year ending June 30, 1869.—The receipts and expenses have been as follows:

RECEIPTS.		OPERATING EXPENSES.	
From passengers.....	\$600,544 37	Conducting transportation.....	\$251,125 91
From freight.....	478,183 95	Motive power.....	241,357 22
From mail.....	84,371 53	Maintenance of way.....	200,001 45
From express and other sources.....	69,710 07	Maintenance of cars.....	86,149 88
	\$1,182,759 22		\$781,546 27
The receipts for the first six months of the past fiscal year were.....		Leaving net earnings.....	\$401,212 95
And for the corresponding period of the previous fiscal year.....			\$554,354 27
Showing a decrease in receipts of.....			653,499 25
While for the last six months of past fiscal year the receipts were.....			98,744 99
And for the corresponding period of the previous fiscal year.....			627,904 95
Showing an increase in receipts of.....			\$104,490 07
Deducting decreased receipts of the first six months.....			98,644 98
Shows an increase in receipts over previous fiscal year.....			\$7,845 09
Although the receipts of the whole year show but small gain, the results of the past six months promise well for the future, it being a gain of \$106,490 07 in receipts over the corresponding period of the previous fiscal year. The reduction of expense has been as follows:			
Total for 1867-8.....	\$830,107 68		
Total for 1868-9.....	781,546 27		
Reduction.....	\$48,561 59		
Increase in gross receipts added.....	7,845 09		
Makes an increase in net earnings of.....	\$56,406 69		

FINANCIAL CONDITION.

As stated in the previous annual report, the finances are easy, the roadway and rolling stock in fine condition. All that is now needed to produce increased net earnings is an improvement in the general business of the country, and consequently an

increase in the receipts. Out of a gross receipt of \$1,182,759 22 during the past year the net earnings were but \$401,212 95.

The receipts of the road may greatly increase without adding proportionally to the expense.

If the receipts were increased 25 per cent, reaching \$1,478,000 00
Your expenses could not, we believe, increase more than 5 per
cent, reaching 820,000 00

Leaving your net earnings \$658,000 00

This amount of receipts is nearly \$200,000 less than we obtained during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, and when the country fully recovers, our receipts should again be as great as then, in which event your net earnings would not be much under \$800,000 per annum.

CONNECTIONS.

In the last report reference was made to the future connections, the most important of which is from some point on our road to Atlanta, Ga. The prospects are now favorable to an early beginning of the work of building this line, as it is reported the contract has been let for that portion of the road between Gunterville and Jacksonville, Ala. The road from Decatur to Montgomery, Ala., is now under contract, to be completed by the first of January, 1872. These two southerly lines, taken in connection with the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Road via Columbus, Ky., and Corinth on the one hand, and via Memphis on the other, will give us a short line from the grain markets of the West to the cotton regions of the Southeast, which must add materially to the traffic of your road. Besides this, it would give St. Louis a line shorter by one hundred and fifty miles to the Atlantic seaboard at Charleston or Savannah, than to the seaboard at New York, which must ultimately prove beneficial to the interests of the road.

Negotiations are now pending between those representing the Winchester and Alabama Railroad and ourselves for the lease of that road for a term of years. Should the conditions be confirmed by the Legislature of Tennessee, it will be our interest to build, at once, a branch road from Fearo's Switch, six miles east of Huntsville, to the Alabama and Tennessee State line, there connecting with the Winchester and Alabama Railroad. This will not only give us the trade of several large counties in Tennessee, but also a connection via Decatur and the Southwestern Railroad with the line of road to be built from Cincinnati south, by which we will have as short a line from Grand Junction to Cincinnati as by any other route, and from any point east of Grand Junction on our road a much shorter line than any other to Cincinnati. This we regard as promising to become one of our most valuable connections.

The Memphis and Little Rock Railroad is progressing, with indications of a completion within twelve months. This road is on the proposed line of the Southern Pacific route, and in connection with our line, will form the shortest and best great thoroughfare from the eastern Atlantic seaboard cities to the Pacific coast, and its importance to us cannot be over estimated.

There is a line projected and being surveyed from Memphis via Jacksonport, Ark., Springfield, Mo., and Fort Scott, Kan., to Junction City, Kan., on the Union Pacific Railroad, Eastern Division, the distance being 420 miles. This would, with the completion of the road from Atlanta, before mentioned, form a line of about 1,000 miles in length from Charleston or Savannah to Junction City, which is less than the distance from St. Louis to New York, and places Junction City 425 miles nearer the seaboard by this line than via St. Louis to New York.

On the 6th of May Col. Wm. Dickson, for many years a Director in the company, and a pioneer in the enterprise of building the road, tendered his resignation as a member of the Board, the duties of which he had so faithfully and creditably performed.

At the annual meeting the following resolution was passed:

Resolved, That the President and Directors of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company are hereby authorized to lease or purchase, as they may deem best, the Decherd, Winchester and Fayetteville Railroad, in Tennessee; and in the event they cannot lease or purchase said Decherd, Winchester and Fayetteville Railroad, they be authorized to build a branch road from or near Huntsville, Ala., to or near Decherd, in Tennessee; and if under the authority we hereby grant to the President and Directors of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company to lease or

purchase the Decherd, Winchester and Fayetteville Railroad, and if they succeed in doing so, we authorize them to build a branch road from or near Huntsville, Ala., to intercept the same at such a point as the President and Directors may consider for the best interests of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

The Board take pleasure in acknowledging the fidelity and capacity with which the business of the various departments of the company have been managed during the year.

CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET.

DR.		CR.	
Construction proper:	\$	Capital:	\$
Construction	6,384,913	Capital stock	5,312,725 09
Incidental to construction	1,025,318		
Equipment	1,302,970	Funded debt:	
	\$3,583,733	State of Tennessee	1,917,937 45
Stocks and property:		First mortgage bonds	1,298,000 00
Stock in—		Second mortgage bonds	1,000,000 00
Miss. Central Railroad	141,600		4,110,937 45
South and North Ala. R.R.	87,300	Floating debt:	
Southern Express Co.	27,300	Bills payable	137,886 65
Memphis & Ft. Lou's R.R.	600	Pass due coupons	32,690 00
Stebby Iron Company	25,000	Pay rolls	55,843 21
Mobile & Montgomery R.R.	29,200	Dividends	88,294 23
National Bank at Huntsville ..	9,000	Unpaid State interest	54,538 12
Nashville & Decatur Railroad ..	26,000	Unpaid United States taxes ..	3,867 52
Railroad Hotel at Huntsville ..	6,083	Due to railroads	12,634 91
Telegraph	2,684	Due to individuals	132,550 64
Road material	173,787		513,355 38
	527,908	Profit and loss	99,167 04
Interest and expenses:		Surplus account	1,505 87
Road expenses	781,546		110,173 90
Interest on State bonds	88,437	Receipts:	
Interest and exchange	8,896	Passage	600,544 87
Interest on Company bonds	156,553	Freight	478,133 25
Tax account	28,032	Mail service	34,371 53
	1,066,278	Express service	87,989 89
Assets:		Rents and privileges	31,723 27
Bills receivable	39,584		1,122,739 22
Coupon bonds	596,500	Total	\$11,229,949 90
Due from railroads	135,082		
Due from individuals	68,539		
Due from agents	6,344		
Sam Tate, Receiver	26,583		
United States	12,319		
Post-office Department	20,897		
People's Bank of S. Carolina ..	16,555		
Georgia Railroad Bank	25,551		
Cash	66,040		
	1,062,039		
Total	\$11,229,949		

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.—The President of the Union Pacific Railroad Company has addressed the following circular to the stockholders:

OFFICE OF THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., }
Boston, Mass., Sept. 15th, 1869. }

To the Stockholders of the Union Pacific Railroad:

It is well known that malicious attacks have been made upon your company, upon its credit, and upon the character of the work itself. While all persons who knew the real causes of these attacks were well aware that they were without foundation and only vindictive, it cannot be denied that they were a source of grave embarrassment and difficulty. There is nothing so sensitive as credit: It may receive almost as great a temporary injury from false rumors as from damaging statements of fact.

The natural result of these assaults upon the company's credit was the arrest of the public sale of its securities, and a threatened danger of stopping the work, when two millions a month were required to continue it. It was fortunate for the country, as well as yourselves, that you had the ability, as well as the courage, to advance the millions from your private means that were required to finish the road. I believe that no private corporation ever before made so large a call, or one that was more promptly responded to. The work upon the line was continued during the winter at

a very heavy extra cost, but nearly all the obligations incurred have now been adjusted.

The earnings of the road since its opening have been :

From May 10 to May 31.....	\$391,420 12
" June 1 to June 30.....	7,602 29
" July 1 to July 31.....	623,559 96

This is at the rate of about eight millions a year, which will be steadily augmented by the development of the Pacific coast and by settlement along the line.

The company own over 8,000,000 acres of land in the Platte Valley, in Nebraska, which competent judges pronounce equal to any in the West. The lands were offered for sale at Omaha July 27th, and 40,000 acres were sold in one month thereafter, at an average of over \$5 per acre. The company also own over ten million acres in addition, some of which is of little value, but there are portions from which a considerable sum will eventually be realized.

You will perceive that the income of the company is now ample to meet the interest on its first mortgage and land grant bonds, and we have every reason to expect that the natural growth of its business will soon give it a value that will make a suitable return for the risk you have taken in building the longest railroad line in the country, through a wilderness which most persons pronounced impassable for a locomotive.

OLIVER AMES, President.

SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 12.—The Western Union, and Atlantic and Pacific States Telegraph Companies have consolidated.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

The annual report to the stockholders of this Company for the year ending June 30, 1869, has just been issued, and is a very complete document, not alone interesting to stockholders of the Company, but to the public generally, as a brief history of the Telegraph in the United States.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY.

The Western Union Telegraph Company was originally organized as the New York and Mississippi Valley Printing Telegraph Company, on the 1st of April, 1851, for the purpose of building a line from Buffalo, N. Y. to St. Louis, Mo.

By numerous purchases and consolidations of lines throughout the country which have been going on almost uninterruptedly for nearly a score of years, a complete unification of the great majority of the telegraph lines in the United States has been the result, and rendered the system the most extensive and efficient in the world.

THE EXTENT OF THE WESTERN UNION LINES.

The territory now occupied by the lines of this company embraces almost the entire civilized portion of the continent of North America. On the eastern coast our lines extend from Plaister Cove, on the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, to Indianola, on the Gulf of Mexico; and on the western coast from Los Angeles, California, to the fisheries on the Kishyox River, 800 miles north of New Westminster, British Columbia. They reach across the continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and embrace every State and Territory in the Union but Minnesota, New Mexico and Arizona, and include the British Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Our lines also have an exclusive connection with those in Newfoundland, Canada, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New Mexico, and with the Atlantic and Cuba Cables.

[We are informed that since the preparation of this report the Company has purchased the lines and property of the "*Atlantic and Pacific States Telegraph Company*" of California, for which it paid \$115,000. This purchase was made because the Company needed the material to enable it to meet the demands for telegraph

facilities on the Pacific coast, and because it could be acquired at what was regarded a fair value, being about 40 per cent less than the original cost. By this purchase the Western Union Company have acquired about 500 miles additional of line, and about 1,000 miles of additional wire.

The Atlantic and Pacific States Company, we believe, was organized about two years since, and had expended in the construction of lines about \$200,000 in gold.—*Ed. MAGAZINE.*]

RE ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM.

Among the more important lines which have been or are now being rebuilt, is that extending from Omaha to San Francisco.

The opening of the Pacific Railroads has fortunately remedied the difficulties from Indians, and the lines have been transferred from the old route to the railroads as fast as possible. Within the past year the new lines have been completed over the entire length of the Union Pacific road from Omaha, Nebraska, to Promontory Summit, Utah, a distance of 1,200 miles; and over the Central Pacific road from Sacramento, California, to Elko, Nevada, a distance of 468 miles. Nearly all the poles are distributed for the construction of the line over the intervening section between Promontory Summit and Elko, a distance of 220 miles, and it will be completed during the present season.

The following table gives the aggregate amount of line which has been constructed and reconstructed during the past three years, showing it to be more than 80 per cent of the entire extent of line belonging to the company :

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF MILES OF POLES AND WIRE CONSTRUCTED AND RECONSTRUCTED FROM JULY 1, 1866, TO JULY 1, 1869.

	— Constructed —		— Re-constructed —	
	Miles of poles.	Miles of wire.	Miles of poles.	Miles of wire.
From July 1, 1866, to Dec. 31, 1866.....	1,634	2,743	3,253	6,490
" Dec. 31, 1866, to Dec. 31, 1867.....	2,618	4,443	2,354	4,751
" Dec. 31, 1867, to Dec. 31, 1868.....	2,203	6,036	2,032	4,604
" Dec. 31, 1868, to July 1, 1869.....	1,624	4,900	430	1,735
Total.....	7,968	18,127	8,073	17,580

EXTENT OF RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS.

The following statistics will show the comparative extent of the lines, wire and offices belonging to the Western Union Company, and those working in exclusive connection therewith, and of those of all the rival organizations :

Number of miles of line belonging to W. U. system.....	66,363
" " " wire " " "	121,593
" " stations " " "	4,692
Number of miles of line belonging to Rival Companies.....	6,773
" " " wire " " "	9,107
" " stations " " "	830

Thus it will be seen that, of the total number of miles of line in the United States and the British Provinces, the proportion belonging to all rival organizations is about ten per cent and of wire and stations about seven per cent.

The increase of the lines of the Western Union Company by construction alone, during the past three years, exceeds by 1,195 miles the total amount of lines belonging to all the rival organizations in the United States and Canada; while the amount of wire erected by this company during the same time is 9,000 miles more than that owned by all the rival companies combined.

FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF THE COMPANY.

Capital Stock.

The capital of the company at its organization in April, 1851, was \$260,000. For more than seven years thereafter no dividends were made, the surplus earnings being devoted to the construction and purchase of additional lines. On the 23d of December, 1863, the amount of stock outstanding was \$7,950,700, the increase in the eleven years which had intervened being due to consolidations of other lines and the

capitalization of profits. The united capital of the various companies whose lines were consolidated with ours during this period amounted to over \$7,000,000. The company subsequently issued its stock upon favorable terms in the acquisition of other telegraph lines to the extent of \$2,116,200, and on the 11th of May, 1864, made a stock dividend of \$100 per share, thus increasing the capital to \$20,13,8800.

It has since been increased as follows:

For A. & O. Trl. stock.....	\$833,400	For Fractions.....	\$55,100
E. & M. " ".....	68,000	Truemanb'g and Seneca Falls	
Housa " ".....	5,700	stock.....	8,500
Pemb'n & Gold. Trust's.....	3,800	Hick & Wright repeat.....	1,500
Cash.....	77,000	Lodi Telegraph sto k.....	500
Western Union bonds.....	91,500	American " ".....	11,833,100
Ithaca telegraph stock.....	14,500	Pitta., Cin. & Lou. st'k.....	4,100
Cal. State " ".....	184,800		
Syria & B. " ".....	4,800	Total capital stock.....	\$41,063,100
Mo. & Kan. " stocks.....	80,400	Owned by company exclusive of	
U. States " stock.....	3,395,200	the sinking fund.....	494,900
" " Pac" " stock.....	3,333,300		
Equalization of stock, as.....		Balance on which dividends of July,	
per consolidation ag'm't.....	468,000	1869, was paid..	\$40,568,200

THE BONDED DEBT.

The bonded debt of the Western Union Company was begun in 1864, by the issue of \$2,000,000 of seven per cent bonds, for the purpose of buying the control of the stock of the California State Telegraph Company, and for the construction of new lines. These bonds were convertible into the stock of the company at par, and \$91,500 were subsequently so converted, leaving the balance outstanding January 1st, 1866, \$1,918,500.

The amount since issued is as follows:

For Rus'n Extes. tel. stock.....	\$3,170,392	American telegraph bonds.....	\$81,501
Cal. State " ".....	218,940		
West. Union " ".....	10,000	Bonds paid and cancelled.....	\$8,071,085
Wash. & N. O. " ".....	54,175		1,436,995
Real estate.....	50,000		
For cash.....	570,688	Am't of bond. debt July 1, '69.....	\$4,834,100

These bonds mature as follows:

In 1873.....	\$89,501
In 1875.....	4,544,600
	\$4,634,100

The bonds issued in 1864 became due in May, 1866, and May, 1867, and were paid partly from the net earnings of the company. One dividend was passed because it was deemed prudent, in the then existing state of financial affairs, to appropriate the earnings to the payment of the \$540,695 of bonds maturing in May, 1867, rather than to divide them among the stockholders, and thereby compel the negotiation of a new loan with which to meet the maturing debt.

The greater portion of the debt of the company was incurred in the grand attempt to build a line on the northwest coast and across Behring's Straits, to connect with the Russian line at the mouth of the Amoor River, known as Collins' Over and Line to Europe, which was abandoned after the successful submergence and operation of the Atlantic Cable.

In May, 1867, it was decided to establish a sinking fund to provide for the bonded debt, and the sum of \$20,000 per month has since been appropriated to that object.

Up to December, 1868, the sinking fund was invested in the bonds of the company, which, as fast as they were purchased for that account, were cancelled. Since that date the Executive Committee have been authorized by the Board of Directors to invest the sinking fund in the stock of the company, when it can be purchased for one half the market price of the bonds.

STATEMENT OF SINKING FUND ACCOUNT.

\$498,500 Western Union bonds of 1875, purchased and cancelled.....	\$418,971 80
2,008 shares Western Union stock.....	73,251 75
balance uninvested.....	29,776 54
	\$521,900 00

At the annual meeting of the stockholders, held July 8, 1868, the following by-law was adopted:

"The Board of Directors may hire or purchase the lines, or purchase stock of any other telegraph company; but neither the capital stock nor the bonded debt of the company shall be increased beyond the amount now authorized, except by the written consent of two-thirds of the directors, entered in the secretary's records of proceedings of the board, and by a vote of the stockholders holding a majority of the capital stock, at an annual meeting, or at a special meeting called for that purpose."

STATEMENT OF NET INCOME FROM JULY 1, 1866, TO JULY 1, 1869.

	1866.	1867.	1868.
July.....	\$151,910 57	\$175,239 36	\$205,566 95
August.....	201,974 05	194,706 68	225,252 70
September.....	228,923 96	225,907 29	254,467 86
October.....	279,223 24	235,876 83	269,707 64
November.....	248,527 26	212,294 09	227,708 50
December.....	249,274 99	190,843 64	226,237 1
	1867.	1868.	1869.
January.....	239,455 82	178,347 98	256,478 20
February.....	168,824 51	254,327 80	220,393 35
March.....	233,556 07	252,014 53	220,684 75
April.....	224,716 69	245,907 87	218,983 13
May.....	198,608 11	243,209 06	202,283 67
June.....	170,653 66	226,535 50	209,417 48
Total.....	\$2,624,919 73	\$2,641,710 38	\$2,801,457 48
Net profits for three years, ending July 1, 1869.....			\$8,015,432 08
Miscellaneous profits.....			116,713 41
Balance on hand July 1, 1866.....			17,823 94
Total.....			\$8,179,474 44

DISBURSEMENTS OF NET PROFITS.

Of the above net earnings there has been disbursed for

Construction of new lines.....	\$1,238,870 11
Purchase of telegraph property.....	294,621 52
Redemption of bonds.....	616,353 00
Purchase of real estate.....	44,581 69
Interest on bonds.....	940,243 98
Sinking fund.....	520,000 00
Dividends.....	4,044,525 84
Miscellaneous.....	24,970 43

Balance on hand July 1, 1869, as follows:

Due from Russian Extension Company.....	\$297,839 64
Supplies on hand undistributed.....	172,097 69
Cash.....	35,768 03
	\$455,215 36
Total.....	\$8,179,474 44

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW

Monetary Affairs—Rates of Loans and Discounts—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Price of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at New York—Opening, Highest, Lowest and Closing Prices at the New York Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

September was distinguished chiefly by derangements in the money, stock and gold markets, attendant upon the gold panic. Very fortunately, the crisis, though convulsing every Wall street interest, was felt comparatively little outside. In the local grain market, there was a brief partial interruption of business, with which the Western markets sympathized; and in the merchandise markets there was naturally a brief halt among buyers, to see what might be the result upon holders of goods; but no cases of embarrassment occurred in any of these branches of trade; but, on the contrary, the merchants were found to be the first to come to the relief of the distressed financial interests, by the free pur-

chase of securities; their intervention having checked the panic and prevented it from spreading disastrously over the general commerce of the country. No stronger evidence than this could be afforded that the commercial interests are in a sound and healthy condition and that the panic was purely speculative in its origin, scope and bearings.

The money market has naturally sympathized with the bold and demoralizing speculation in the Gold Room. At the beginning of the month the scope of the clique movement in gold was understood, and the apprehension that it might result in great excitement and derangement kept the money market in a constantly feverish state, with much irregularity in the rates of interest. This feeling was intensified by the efforts of brokers to break down the price of stocks and, if possible, accomplish the failure of a large stock house, whose suspension, it was calculated, would materially help their scheme; and this attempt, no doubt, contributed very much to the weakness of Lockwood & Co. in the panic under which they succumbed at the close of the month. The crisis was attended with the failure of six or eight stock houses, most of them in good standing; while, in the Gold Room, several failures have been reported, and many firms have been thrown into a condition of temporary suspension, until the immense gold transactions of Friday, the 24th ult., can be settled. The rates of interest have been determined less by the supply of money than by the degree of distrust both in securities and borrowers. To the class of borrowers upon Government collaterals money has been accessible at 7 per cent in currency to 7 per cent in gold; but, for the last week of the month, ordinary borrowers have had to pay upon stocks rates ranging from $\frac{1}{2}$ @1 per day upon low-priced shares, to 1@4 per day upon high-priced. There has been a considerable demand for money from the West, and at the opening of the month some liberal amounts were sent also to the South. The excessive scarcity of small notes, owing to the Treasury having taken them in preparatory to a new issue, has, however, prevented this demand being fully met, the result being favorable to the reserve of the city banks.

The market for Government bonds has been less affected by the crisis than might have been expected. The remarkable steadiness of bonds abroad has helped to sustain prices here, although at brief periods there has been a margin or 3@4 per cent in favor of the shipment of bonds to Europe. Prices fell at one time 4@5 per cent below the opening quotations; but this was no more than was naturally required by a fall in gold to 130@133. Some considerable amounts of bonds were thrown on the market during the panic, to employ the proceeds in the purchase of stocks at the very low figures; but this supply has perhaps not been more than sufficient to cover the liberal purchases of the Government, which were increased to \$3,000,000 on the 25th and \$3,000,000 on the 29th, as a means of checking the panic in the money market.

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds.....	\$23,892,150	\$15,334,970	\$	\$8,557,250
State & city bonds.....	10,054,000	5,165,500	4,882,500
Company bonds.....	1,658,300	1,800,000	853,800
Total—September.	\$35,603,450	\$21,800,400	\$13,803,050
Since January 1.....	153,863,440	256,415,109	\$97,549,869

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of September, as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of month.	4's, 1881.	Reg. Coup.	1863.	1864.	1865.	Coupon new.	67.	68.	10-40.
1.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
2.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
3.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
4.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
5.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
6.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
7.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
8.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
9.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
10.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
11.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
12.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
13.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
14.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
15.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
16.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
17.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
18.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
19.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
20.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
21.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
22.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
23.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
24.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
25.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
26.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
27.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
28.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
29.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
30.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
First.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
Highest.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
Lowest.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
Last.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities.	U.S. 5-20s.	Ill.C. sh's.	Erie sh's.	Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities.	U.S. 5-20s.	Ill.C. sh's.	Erie sh's.
Wednesday.....	1	94	84	94	24	Wednesday.....	22	94	84	94	24
Thursday.....	2	93	84	94	23	Thursday.....	23	94	84	94	24
Friday.....	3	93	84	94	23	Friday.....	24	94	84	94	24
Saturday.....	4	93	84	94	23	Saturday.....	25	94	84	94	24
Monday.....	6	92	84	94	23	Monday.....	27	92	84	94	25
Tuesday.....	7	93	84	94	23	Tuesday.....	28	93	84	94	23
Wednesday.....	8	92	84	94	23	Wednesday.....	29	94	84	94	23
Thursday.....	9	92	84	94	23	Thursday.....	30	93	84	94	23
Friday.....	10	92	84	94	24						
Saturday.....	11	92	84	94	25	Lowest.....	92	84	94	22	
Monday.....	13	92	84	94	27	Highest.....	93	84	94	28	
Tuesday.....	14	92	84	94	28	Range.....	94	84	94	2	
Wednesday.....	15	92	84	94	28	Last.....	93	84	94	23	
Thursday.....	16	92	84	94	27						
Friday.....	17	92	84	94	27	Low } Since Jan. 1	92	74	94	17	
Saturday.....	18	92	84	94	27	Hig }	94	84	94	23	
Monday.....	20	92	84	94	27	Rng }	94	84	94	11	
Tuesday.....	21	92	84	94	27	Last }	93	84	94	23	

The excitement in the stock market has amounted to absolute panic. Speculative brokers, seeing a timid feeling among the banks and in the market generally, growing out of the prospect of a threatening corner in gold, began early in the month to assault the stock market with much vigor, and, there being none who cared to resist them, stocks declined heavily throughout the list. Some of the large holders being thus weakened, the market the more readily yielded under the general wreck of confidence growing out of the culmination of the great gold speculation on the 24th, and prices fell to an extent ranging between 6 per cent

on Reading and 53 per cent on New York Central. The extent of the fall may be judged from the following comparison of the highest and lowest prices of some leading stocks:

	High- est.	Low- est.		High- est.	Low est.
Pacific Mail.....	80½	59½	Chicago & Northwest'n.....	86½	63
New York Central.....	206	153	do do pref.....
Erie.....	42	27	Pitts. & Fort Wayne.....	89½	79
Hudson River.....	186½	134	St. Paul.....	80½	61
Reading.....	97	91	do pref.....
Michigan Southern.....	106½	76	Ohio & Mississippi.....	32½	24
Cleveland & Pittsburgh.....	112	82	Toledo & Wabash.....	87	59

STOCKS SOLD AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Dec.
Bank shares.....	2,189	1,533	655
Railroad.....	1,461,484	723,644	737,820
Coal.....	3,772	1,248	2,525
Mining.....	8,317	11,750	29,867
Improv't.....	13,700	2,100	11,600
Telegraph.....	19,615	14,121	5,494
Steamship.....	81,498	24,915	56,583
Expr's&c.....	110,074	24,103	85,971
Total—September.....	1,730,829	803,414	927,215
Since January 1.....	14,544,018	9,459,345	5,114,173

The great feature of the month has been the extraordinary speculation in gold, under which the price was run up from 133½ at the opening to 162½ on the 24th. On the latter date the Treasury came in to the market with proposals to sell on the following day \$4,000,000 of coin; with the result of breaking down the price, within a few minutes, to 133. Amid the excitement of the enormous transactions of the 24th, transactions were made involving enormous losses to dealers. Some of these were repudiated; upon others the parties failed; and of the remainder, covering many millions, there remained at the close of the month a large amount unsettled. Amid the confusion resulting from the culmination of the speculation, the Gold Exchange Bank became involved suspended, and was thrown into the hands of a receiver, large amounts of the funds of dealers being in that way tied up. The experience of the month teaches a sad lesson of the demoralization of gold speculation, and is likely to tell hereafter upon the excesses of Gold Room operations.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing	Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing
Wednesday.....	1 133½	133½	133½	133½	Thursday.....	23 14½	141½	143½	143½
Thursday.....	2 133½	133½	133½	133½	Friday.....	24 150	138	162½	133
Friday.....	3 133½	133½	136	136	Saturday.....	25
Saturday.....	4 136½	135½	137½	137	Monday.....	27
Sunday.....	6 137	137	137½	137½	Tuesday.....	28
Tuesday.....	7 137	136½	137	136½	Wednesday.....	29
Wednesday.....	8 136	131½	136	135½	Thursday.....	30 131½	120½	133	120½
Thursday.....	9 135½	135½	135½	135½	Sept., 1869.....	131½	127½	162½	129½
Friday.....	10 135½	135	135½	135½	" 1869.....	144½	141½	145½	141½
Saturday.....	11 135½	135½	135½	135½	" 1867.....	141½	141	146½	143½
Sunday.....	12 135½	135½	135½	135½	" 1866.....	141½	143½	147½	146½
Tuesday.....	13 135½	135½	136½	136½	" 1865.....	144½	142½	145	144
Wednesday.....	14 135½	136½	136½	136½	" 1864.....	215	191	254½	193
Thursday.....	15 135½	136½	136½	136½	" 1863.....	127	126½	143½	141½
Friday.....	16 135½	136½	136½	136½	" 1862.....	116½	116½	124	122½
Saturday.....	17 136½	136½	136½	136½	Since Jan 1, 1869.....	134½	129½	162½	129½
Sunday.....	18 136½	136½	136½	136½					
Tuesday.....	19 136½	136½	136½	136½					
Wednesday.....	20 136½	136½	136½	136½					
Thursday.....	21 137½	137½	137½	137½					
Friday.....	22 137½	137½	141½	141½					

* No transactions.

† Called at the Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange.

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities sold at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of August and September, 1869 :

	August				September			
	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.
Railroad Stocks—								
Alton & Terre Haute.....	83	86	83	85½	85	89	84	84
do do pref.....	59	59	58	59	59	59	58	58
Chicago & Alton.....	168	168	158	155	154½	154½	135	145
do do pref.....	162½	162½	155	156	156	156	135	135
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	100	100	194½	194½	170	170	160	165
do do Northwest'n.....	84	92½	83½	83½	84½	86½	68	70½
do do pref.....	96½	101	93½	93½	94½	96	79	85
do do Rock Island.....	114½	114½	114½	114½	115	115½	102	106½
Columb., Chic. & Ind. C.....	87	87	81	85	83½	84	24	25
Clev. & Pittsburg.....	107½	108½	104	106½	109	112	82	93
do Col., Cin. & Ind.....	73½	82	73½	79	78	79	73	74½
Del., Lack. & Western.....	112	113	111½	112½	112½	113	103½	115½
Dubuque & Sioux city.....	104½	113	104½	112	111	111	104	106
Erie.....	87	42	27	32
do preferred.....	70	71	57½	57½
Harlem.....	161	167	160	160	160	160	12½	127
Hannibal & St. Joseph.....	126½	131	123	125	125	125	92	107
do do pref.....	125	123½	120	121	123	123	97	97
Hudson River.....	187	188½	179½	184	186½	186½	184	184½
Illinois Central.....	142	142	132½	139½	139	139½	134	134
Lake Sho. & Mich. South.....	106	109½	104½	105½	103	106½	79½	82½
Mar. & Cinclin., 1st.....	22	22	22	22	20	20	20	20
do do 2d.....	9	9	9	9	8½	8½	8	8
Michigan Central.....	132½	132½	128	129	129	131	116	118
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	79	84½	78	79½	79½	80½	61	68
do do pref.....	89½	92½	86½	87½	87½	89½	75	80
Morris & Essex.....	88½	89½	87½	88½	83	88½	57½	50
New Jersey.....	123	123	123	123	123½	123½	120	120
do Central.....	102	109½	102	107½	103	107½	97	100
New Haven & Hartford.....	232	232	232	232
New York Central.....	200	212½	197	199	203½	206½	153	163½
do do N. Haven.....	132½	145	131½	140	140	140	135	130
do do scrip.....	128	140	128	135	130	130	130	130
Norwich & Worcester.....	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
Ohio & Mississippi.....	82½	82½	81½	82½	82½	82½	84	86½
Panama.....	270	270	280	290	240	251	240	250
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica.....	153½	154½	151½	151½
do do guar.....	89½	90	88½	88½	89½	89½	79	81½
Reading.....	97	98	95½	96½	97½	97½	91	9½
Rome, W. & Ogdensburg.....	100½	100½	100½	100½	100	110	105	109
Third Avenue.....	185	185	185	185
Toledo, Wab. & Western.....	74	83	74	83	83½	83½	60	65½
do do do pref.....	74	87½	74	85	83	83	60	50
Miscellaneous—								
American Coal.....	40	40	40	40
Central Coal.....	60	60	60	60
Cumberland Coal.....	34	35½	33	33	31½	31½	28	28
Wilkesbarre Coal.....	65	65	65	65
Del. & Hud. Canal.....	127	128	126	126	125½	126	122	122
Atlantic Mail.....	29½	29½	29½	29½
Pacific Mail.....	64½	87	79	60	60	80½	59½	63½
Boston Water Power.....	15	15	13½	13½	15½	16	18	18
Canton.....	58½	68½	58	58	56	56	50	54
Mariposa.....	8	8	8	8	8	10½	8	9
do prof.....	16	16	10½	12	12½	19	12½	14
Quicksilver.....	16	16	14	15	15½	15½	12	12
West. Union Telegraph.....	39	39	37	37½	37½	37½	35	36
Citizens Gas.....	160	150	150	150	160	150	160	160
Bankers & Brokers Ass.....	109	110	108½	108½
Union Trust.....	150	160	150	150
Express—								
American M. Union.....	41½	42½	35½	36	35	38	30	30½
Adams.....	59½	59½	56	56½	56½	57½	49½	51½
United States.....	60½	60½	62½	63½	63	63	50	50
Merchant's Union.....	10	11	10	11	11½	11½	11	11
Wells, Fargo & Co.....	21	22	19½	19	18	19	16	17

Foreign exchange has been very irregular, owing to the demoralizing speculations in gold. At one time, prime bankers' 60-days' sterling bills could not be sold on the street at better than 102; on the breaking up of the speculation, the price quickly advanced to 107½.

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

Days.	London. cents for 54 pence.	Paris. centimes for dollar.	Amsterdam. cents for florin.	Bremen. cents for rix daler.	Hamburg. cents for M. banco.	Berlin cents for thaler.
1.....	108½ @ 109½	517½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	79 @ 79½	35½ @ 36	71 @ 71½
2.....	109 @ 109½	517½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	79 @ 79½	35½ @ 36	71 @ 71½
3.....	108½ @ 109	517½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	79 @ 79½	35½ @ 36	71 @ 71½
4.....	109½ @ 109	521½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 36½	70½ @ 70½
5.....	108½ @ 108½	520 @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
6.....	108½ @ 108½	520 @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
7.....	108½ @ 108½	520 @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
8.....	108½ @ 108½	520 @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
9.....	108½ @ 108½	523½ @ 521½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
10.....	108½ @ 108½	521½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
11.....	108½ @ 108½	521½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
12.....	108½ @ 108½	521½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
13.....	108½ @ 108½	521½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
14.....	108½ @ 108½	521½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
15.....	108½ @ 108½	521½ @ 518½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
16.....	107½ @ 118	521½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
17.....	118 @ ...	521½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
18.....	108 @ ...	521½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
19.....	107½ @ 107½	525 @ 523½	40 @ 40½	77½ @ 77½	35 @ 35½	70 @ 70½
20.....	107½ @ 107½	528½ @ 523½	40 @ 40½	77½ @ 77½	35 @ 35½	70 @ 70½
21.....	107½ @ 107½	528½ @ 525	40 @ 40½	77½ @ 77½	35 @ 35½	70 @ 70½
22.....	107½ @ 107½	528½ @ 525	40 @ 40½	77½ @ 77½	35 @ 35½	70 @ 70½
23.....	107½ @ 107½	532½ @ 530	39½ @ 39½	76½ @ 77½	34½ @ 34½	69 @ 69½
24.....	107½ @ 108	532½ @ 530	39½ @ 39½	76½ @ 77½	34½ @ 34½	69 @ 69½
25.....	108 @ 109½	532½ @ 516½	39½ @ 40½	76½ @ 77½	34½ @ 36	69 @ 71½
26.....	108 @ 109½	520 @ 520	40½ @ 40½	79 @ 79½	35½ @ 35½	71½ @ 71½
27.....	108 @ 109	521½ @ 518½	40 @ 40½	78 @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
28.....	108½ @ 109½	521½ @ 518½	40 @ 40½	78 @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
29.....	108½ @ 109½	521½ @ 518½	40 @ 40½	78 @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
30.....	108 @ 109½	521½ @ 518½	40 @ 40½	78 @ 78½	35½ @ 35½	70½ @ 70½
Sept., 1869.....	106 @ 109½	532½ @ 516½	39½ @ 40½	76½ @ 77½	34½ @ 36	69 @ 71½
Sept., 1868.....	108½ @ 109½	520 @ 520	40½ @ 40½	79 @ 79½	35½ @ 35½	71½ @ 71½

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1 :

NEW YORK CITY BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
January 2.....	\$259,090,037	\$20,736,122	\$24,879,609	\$180,490,445	\$18,596,421	\$555,701,719
January 9.....	258,792,562	27,334,730	24,814,156	187,908,539	61,141,128	707,772,057
January 16.....	262,338,831	29,253,536	34,279,153	195,484,843	52,297,033	675,756,611
January 23.....	264,364,619	28,964,197	31,265,916	197,101,163	51,032,119	671,231,542
January 30.....	265,171,109	27,784,923	31,231,166	196,985,422	54,747,569	669,361,276
February 6.....	266,541,723	27,939,404	24,246,436	196,607,899	53,424,133	670,320,470
February 13.....	264,380,467	35,854,331	31,263,451	192,977,860	52,834,052	690,754,409
February 20.....	263,423,064	38,351,391	34,247,321	187,612,546	50,997,197	70,991,019
February 27.....	261,371,597	30,832,603	34,247,981	186,216,175	50,835,054	629,116,021
March 6.....	262,039,983	19,486,634	34,273,886	184,601,437	49,146,269	727,118,131
March 13.....	261,669,693	17,353,671	34,600,445	182,492,458	49,639,621	629,975,566
March 20.....	263,093,302	15,313,306	34,741,310	183,501,919	50,774,874	730,710,003
March 27.....	263,909,659	12,073,722	34,777,814	180,113,910	50,555,103	797,978,429
April 3.....	261,933,673	10,767,389	31,816,916	175,325,769	48,496,859	837,233,691
April 10.....	257,130,227	8,731,543	34,609,360	171,495,540	43,644,732	810,051,455
April 17.....	255,184,882	7,811,779	31,436,761	172,203,494	61,001,888	732,365,294
April 24.....	257,463,074	8,530,360	31,060,511	177,310,080	53,677,698	752,905,766
May 1.....	260,425,160	9,267,615	33,972,033	183,948,565	56,495,722	738,763,384
May 8.....	263,436,872	10,081,459	33,984,140	191,818,387	55,103,573	901,174,577
May 15.....	269,498,897	15,374,769	33,977,793	199,392,449	66,501,356	860,720,850
May 22.....	270,275,952	15,429,404	33,927,366	199,414,869	67,818,348	783,747,252
May 29.....	274,935,461	17,871,480	33,920,856	201,035,600	67,610,373	781,646,481
June 5.....	275,919,609	19,051,133	33,982,995	199,124,042	61,239,429	766,231,026
June 12.....	271,963,735	19,053,680	34,144,790	193,886,005	50,569,258	856,006,646
June 19.....	263,341,906	19,025,444	34,198,829	186,214,110	49,612,488	839,224,021
June 26.....	260,431,733	20,217,140	34,214,795	181,774,695	48,163,920	761,170,748
July 3.....	258,368,471	23,520,267	34,217,973	179,929,467	46,737,263	746,763,361
July 10.....	254,942,942	20,266,912	34,277,945	183,197,233	48,792,723	676,030,200
July 17.....	257,008,249	31,055,450	34,173,437	183,431,711	51,859,706	711,323,141
July 24.....	259,641,889	30,079,424	34,110,738	182,622,261	51,271,862	618,835,097
July 31.....	260,580,235	27,311,933	31,663,617	196,416,443	56,101,677	614,465,457
August 7.....	264,879,357	26,003,925	33,917,985	200,224,003	56,056,334	614,825,631
August 14.....	266,505,265	24,154,499	33,992,257	198,952,711	54,730,089	562,891,637
August 21.....	262,741,133	21,594,510	34,024,104	192,024,546	53,070,831	576,550,537
August 28.....	261,012,109	19,469,102	33,999,742	188,754,539	52,792,383	603,801,341
September 4.....	262,549,819	17,411,722	33,960,035	191,101,056	51,829,782	546,829,275
September 11.....	263,864,533	14,942,056	33,961,196	188,821,344	51,487,867	791,763,344
September 18.....	266,496,034	14,538,169	33,972,759	185,390,130	51,259,197	662,419,788
September 25.....	263,441,828	13,963,481	33,996,081	130,230,793	50,025,951	989,274,472

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.....	\$51,176,999	\$352,483	\$13,210,397	\$88,121,023	\$10,593,719
January 11.....	51,642,237	544,691	13,458,108	88,768,511	10,593,372
January 19.....	52,132,793	478,462	13,729,493	89,625,158	10,596,560
January 25.....	52,537,015	411,837	14,054,870	19,555,464	10,593,914
February 1.....	52,632,318	327,011	14,246,570	29,677,943	10,599,351
February 8.....	53,052,716	337,011	13,735,595	40,050,599	10,586,353
February 15.....	52,924,391	204,681	13,573,043	33,711,575	10,582,226
February 22.....	52,416,146	211,307	13,203,607	37,990,986	10,458,546
March 1.....	52,251,851	256,333	13,010,503	37,735,205	10,453,546
March 8.....	52,232,000	297,897	13,358,201	38,292,966	10,458,953
March 15.....	51,911,522	277,517	13,026,307	37,570,582	10,459,181
March 22.....	51,928,419	235,093	12,765,759	36,960,009	10,461,406
March 29.....	50,597,100	210,644	13,021,315	36,863,544	10,472,420
April 5.....	50,497,866	199,003	12,169,221	35,375,854	10,629,596
April 12.....	50,770,193	181,246	12,042,957	36,029,133	10,628,162
April 19.....	51,178,371	167,813	12,941,733	37,031,747	10,629,422
April 26.....	51,294,222	164,261	13,640,063	37,437,225	10,624,407
May 3.....	51,510,983	201,753	14,220,371	37,171,231	10,617,315
May 10.....	51,930,530	270,525	14,623,803	39,478,803	10,617,994
May 17.....	51,168,526	276,167	14,696,365	40,602,742	10,614,612
May 24.....	52,361,764	174,115	15,087,008	41,631,410	10,618,246
May 31.....	52,210,874	185,257	15,484,947	42,477,819	10,618,561
June 7.....	52,826,267	169,316	15,378,288	42,390,830	10,610,930
June 14.....	53,124,800	154,451	15,178,332	42,005,077	10,621,923
June 21.....	53,810,095	143,795	14,972,123	42,068,901	10,617,894
June 28.....	53,901,172	180,684	14,567,837	41,517,716	10,622,704
July 5.....	53,937,521	203,621	14,031,449	41,321,537	10,618,845
July 12.....	53,140,755	485,293	13,415,498	40,140,497	10,618,273
July 19.....	53,128,598	466,751	12,944,896	39,834,869	10,618,763
July 26.....	52,461,100	390,377	13,076,180	36,160,644	10,619,473
August 2.....	51,953,813	384,869	13,618,911	39,717,113	10,610,323
August 9.....	51,022,380	328,216	13,530,061	39,506,425	10,608,381
August 16.....	51,932,911	266,059	13,047,635	39,141,196	10,610,861
August 23.....	52,300,626	344,236	12,977,027	39,010,665	10,608,353
August 30.....	52,013,654	245,515	13,011,213	38,338,414	10,608,834
September 6.....	51,971,372	247,353	13,078,705	39,212,588	10,611,674
September 13.....	51,597,258	149,169	12,900,014	38,915,913	10,612,041
September 20.....	51,708,373	174,555	13,348,598	39,169,326	10,610,035
September 27.....	52,130,402	139,068	13,448,859	39,347,378	10,609,183

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
January 4.....	\$98,422,144	\$4,203,401	\$12,938,331	\$37,535,767	\$5,151,345
January 11.....	100,727,017	5,075,844	12,894,700	38,032,891	55,276,067
January 18.....	102,305,209	2,677,688	12,992,837	39,717,193	55,243,833
January 25.....	102,069,943	2,394,760	13,228,874	39,565,747	55,272,300
February 1.....	103,696,154	2,161,284	12,964,225	40,328,462	55,312,914
February 8.....	104,342,425	2,073,903	12,452,795	39,693,817	55,210,357
February 15.....	103,315,054	1,845,524	11,642,556	37,759,712	55,352,122
February 23.....	102,452,633	1,545,418	11,600,790	36,823,314	55,304,065
March 1.....	101,309,539	1,333,936	11,200,149	35,689,466	55,201,837
March 8.....	101,425,932	1,297,599	10,985,972	36,525,680	55,335,877
March 15.....	100,820,303	1,217,315	10,969,188	34,051,715	55,351,654
March 22.....	99,553,319	1,330,864	10,490,418	32,641,087	54,559,312
March 29.....	99,670,945	937,769	11,616,222	32,980,430	55,254,167
April 5.....	96,969,714	862,276	11,248,384	33,504,099	54,671,716
April 12.....	99,625,473	750,160	11,391,539	34,392,877	55,238,733
April 19.....	101,115,450	639,460	11,429,095	34,257,071	55,351,844
April 26.....	98,971,711	617,435	12,361,837	35,302,203	55,319,751
May 3.....	100,127,411	708,963	12,352,113	36,735,742	55,330,080
May 10.....	100,555,542	1,267,749	12,513,472	37,457,887	55,321,533
May 17.....	101,474,527	1,134,586	12,858,537	38,708,304	55,409,662
May 24.....	102,042,183	934,560	13,191,512	39,347,881	55,220,823
May 31.....	101,753,278	772,397	12,696,857	38,403,624	55,173,323
June 7.....	103,643,849	640,522	13,454,661	38,491,446	55,292,167
June 14.....	104,352,548	601,742	12,648,615	37,405,719	55,347,067
June 21.....	103,691,658	959,796	12,067,305	36,243,995	55,313,661
June 28.....	102,515,825	1,105,662	11,784,202	34,331,417	55,304,868
July 5.....	102,633,948	814,676	9,595,668	34,561,745	55,335,701
July 12.....	101,403,311	825,151	9,541,879	31,520,417	55,395,055
July 26.....	102,704,540	8,024,595	9,793,461	35,211,103	55,251,904
August 9.....	103,904,554	2,865,920	10,719,569	37,308,637	55,514,706
August 16.....	104,811,271	2,154,616	10,438,695	36,117,378	55,279,323
August 23.....	105,988,791	2,127,372	11,310,064	34,933,781	55,244,004
August 30.....	103,063,007	1,871,713	11,908,736	35,229,149	55,200,063
September 6.....	103,904,515	1,715,568	11,792,519	37,041,045	55,312,371
September 13.....	104,437,227	1,258,474	12,571,211	37,362,711	55,337,379
September 20.....	104,478,949	916,631	12,747,367	37,068,497	55,277,734
September 27.....	104,375,531	518,579	12,960,087	36,917,066	55,307,181

THE
MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE
AND
COMMERCIAL REVIEW!

NOVEMBER, 1869.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CANADA.*

BY HON. L. S. HUNTINGTON, Q.C.

In England it is the custom for public men to seize the occasion of great gatherings of the people to address them upon public affairs. I humbly invoke that custom and your kind forbearance while I address to you some observations upon what I consider the great question of the day. I made some remarks in the same sense in Parliament at its last session, and was honored with a great deal of unfriendly criticism, and I am sure you will forgive me, if I improve the first favorable occasion for restating my opinions with some arguments in their support. I may premise that there is neither disloyalty nor indelicacy in bringing to your notice, a subject, which deeply interests this country—which has been discussed both in our own and in the British Parliament—and gener-

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ally by the Press in both countries—and which I firmly believe is the necessary complement of the great scheme of confederation we have accomplished. It is true that in my humble way, I opposed that scheme in great part, because I was timid about the early assumption of sovereignty, which I thought I foresaw, then, must follow. I stated in my place in Parliament, after the coalition of '64, that confederation, if it should really prove, what its promoters pretended, an antidote to annexation, was the first step towards the independence of the country. But opposition was useless, for confederation was the policy of the empire; and imperial influence is always too powerful for Colonial dissent. I have accepted the situation in its fullest sense, as faithfully and loyally as if I originally promoted it. But the first step having been taken, I see dangers in delay, and I believe it is expedient to take measures for the severance of our present relations to the Empire. This is a momentous step and requires grave consideration. It must create difference of opinion and the broadest tolerance should be accorded to discussion. I propose to speak candidly and dispassionately. I have no party battle to fight nor personal preferences to gratify. Holding strong opinions as to the future of this country, I submit them frankly for the verdict of my countrymen. Sooner or later the weight of opinion—the majority—must rule. I am prepared to accept the decision and loyally abide by its consequences. Such service as I can render will be cheerfully rendered, whether my country remains a province or becomes an Independent state. And I profess and feel profound respect for those who honestly dread the great change we are discussing.

Foremost among the barriers to our progress towards a nationality, is that noble sentiment of loyalty to the British Crown, which has so generally and so happily subsisted among the great masses of our people. Can we forget our noble Queen? Can we dissociate ourselves from the glories and the traditions of the Empire? British Citizenship is no idle word, and what could we create for ourselves to surpass it? For a century past the affectionate colonial eye has rested from afar upon the British Throne, as the centre of power, protection and glory. We have venerated the Old Land, with a far off colonial adoration,—we have borrowed her thoughts, leaned upon her opinion, and conscious of the plentitude of her effulgence, we have been proud to shine through her reflected light. England has been the land of our dreams; even distance lent her enchantment and Englishmen to us were a superior race. We have been proud of the Old Flag; not indeed feeling under it an equality with the Sea Kings, but assured of its protection, in the listless life of dependence which colonists lead. We knew if great danger should threaten, that Flag would float over us, stayed by an arm stronger than ours, which

we could not control ; and that ours would be neither the duty or glory of upholding it. But dependence begets trust ; and to confide in a generous people is to admire and love them. Can all this trustfulness, this affection and loyalty be torn ruthlessly away ? It deserves at least respect and tender treatment. But it might not be wise to jeopardize the great future of our young country, for the sake of even so noble a sentiment, as the Hindoo widow sacrificed her life upon the funeral pile. Governments in our time, are ordained for the prosperity of the people, and if it can be shown that the virtues of self reliance and national Manhood—habits of original thought—a condition of equality with the nations of the earth—an immense preponderance of material advantage may be safely and permanently secured by a friendly change in our relations to the Empire ; perhaps loyalty to the Dominion might come to overshadow the wide-spread sentiment of loyalty to the crown. The child nestles with fond dependence to the parental heart ; one by one his habits of self-confidence are acquired as childhood merges into youth or manhood approaches. When at last the age of majority is reached, filial affection is not quenched, because the days of dependence are over. Nor could we plead the tenderness of the tie as an excuse for perpetual childhood. It is from such a point of view that the London "Times" speaks of Canada as "The eldest son of England."

But there are those who believe that the Independence of Canada would conflict with the Colonial policy of the Empire, and who taking their inspirations from the traditions of the past, make England's glory to consist in the vastness of her colonial possessions. The motto of "Ships, Colonies and commerce" belongs to an age that is past. Its mention summons the ghost of the old act of Navigation, and the celebrated 29 Acts of Parliament, for the maintenance of a Commercial Monopoly—"like melancholy ghosts of dead renown." It was a system of obstruction and restriction to Colonial enterprise, in which the Colonists were regarded as mere contributors to the wealth and glory of the parent State. Freedom has made rapid strides in England since those days, political economy has been remodeled, and political arithmetic has achieved new systems of calculation. England did not find that the loss of her original American Colonies dwarfed her industries, crippled her commerce or blighted her prestige as a nation. They have grown to be a greater people and more profitable customers. The young Colonies relieved from the restraints of tutelage espoused great principles and upheld them thus ensuring their own greatness and, incidentally, the elevation of universal mankind. Englishmen have watched with a careful eye the progress of their kinsmen in the untried field of freedom and equality. Slowly and cautiously they have copied what seemed to

be success, and have been warned of the distinctions between liberty and license; and thus for nearly a century the two great nations foremost in their devotions to the principles of popular freedom and constitutional government, have been a constant example and encouragement to each other. Sometimes there have been rivalries and estrangement. Quarrels among kinsmen are oftenest bitter and unreasonable, but the friends of peace and freedom have trusted, not in vain, to that palladium of common principles, which both peoples have cherished; and thus it has happened that the dismemberment of the Empire, which the matchless eloquence of Chatam and Burke foretold and deprecated, and honest old George the Third believed impossible, has proved a great commercial and political blessing to England and the world. The old motto meant after all, nothing more than, "ships, market and commerce." and these, under the new relations of the colonies have been multiplied a hundred fold.

Now let us like men of nerve and comprehension apply this lesson to ourselves. What benefit are we to England? From what we have seen, it is manifest, that our sovereign independence would enhance our own growth and resources, and multiply the advantages she could derive from our trade. The commercial argument therefore from an English point of view is against the connection, and this is why our enemies affect to despise it. But how are we otherwise useful? Are we a source of strength to her in war? Do we recruit her armies, or, failing to supply men, do we pour our means into her military coffers? We do not even afford a field for the political patronage of the British administration of the day, and there remains to England therefore, but the doubtful prestiges of nominal rule over vast American possessions. What wonder, that Englishmen are growing cold to this advantage, when they reflect upon the prodigality of blood and treasure it may one day cost them to maintain it? Faithful to her glorious traditions, England will act no dishonorable part towards us while we remain a portion of the empire. Her oft reiterated promise to defend us in case of war, she will fulfill with the last man and her last dollar. But the obligation is not the less an embarrassment because it is binding. And the more far seeing of her statesmen for the last fifty years, have looked towards a change of the conditions which imposed it. Step by step, in all the noble and unprecedented concessions they have accorded to us, we have been led cautiously, towards the paths of manhood and self-reliance; and they have explained to the British people, as they watched this problem, of a free government, growing out of their colonial jurisdiction, that the Colonial State was not what Burke called it, a "perpetual minority" but must expand into sovereign and independent powers. In the great Confeder-

ation debate of '65, the Hon. John Hilliard Cameron the leader of the high Tories of Upper Canada, declared, in denouncing the doctrines of the Manchester school, that Canada derives no important benefits from her connection with Great Britain, except in the matter of defence.

With this honest declaration of an untainted Conservative chief, I propose to open a brief discussion of the question. What benefit is England to Canada? I speak as to the future, and I am not unmindful of her generosity in the past, and the great heritage of free institutions she has bequeathed to us. These were our birthright, but a less magnanimous provincial policy would have denied them to us as Colonists. Sovereign or dependent, Canada will cherish for all time, a grateful memory of England's gentle and benignant rule over us, while she taught us the lessons of constitutional government. For all time, too, wherever our great populations are descended from her noble stock, we shall cherish the pride of kindred, shall claim our share in the glories of her literature, her martial powers, and her commercial triumphs. But these rights are not to us an exclusive heritage, and we but held them in common with the descendants, all over the world, of the great Foster-mother of nations; and I am enquiring after the special advantages of the connection. These are not to be found in our commercial intercourse for here we are left to compete against the world. It is not that her abundant capital, attracted by our loyalty and affection, flows in upon us because we are a dependency; to develop our resources, and to awaken the hum of industry along our shores; for that capital seeks only a safe return of its investments, and is oftener drawn where it is better rewarded among strangers. It is not that the prestige of the connection gives us a position among the peoples of the earth; for our powers are merely local and municipal, and bear the taint of inferiority and dependence. There remains, therefore, but the one advantage, and we end, as Mr. Cameron began for us,—the advantage of the connection is narrowed to the solitary matter of defence; and we shall see, as we proceed, that even this is of doubtful utility. Defence presupposes attack, which we have only to dread from our republican neighbours. But the difficulties with them, are always of an imperial character. The Trent affair, the Alabama claims, and the Irish Fenian quarrel with England, were all as foreign to us as the China Seas, and interested us only in their consequences. It is not true that the same may be said of Liverpool or Dublin for a hundred reasons; but especially because they are part of the British Isles, and are represented in the British parliament. We have no voice and cannot influence the foreign policy of the empire. There is only for us the duty of waiting till war is declared, and the luxury of becoming the field of blood, the theatre of desolation. Thus England would defend

us, but from what, but the consequences of her own quarrels? We have no occasion for dangerous controversy with our neighbors on our own account. Our interests are blended with theirs, and tend to mutual comity and good will, and the dangers of conflict will be a thousand fold removed when British entanglements are avoided. This fact has been again and again admitted by British Statesmen. During the debate in the House of Commons on the defences in 1865, Mr. S. Fitzgerald declared, that if Canada were independent, there would be no cause of quarrel between her and the United States. That it could be only through a desire to strike at England, that America would attack us. Canadians had not permitted the Alabama to escape or precipitately acknowledged belligerent rights, and there could be no cause of quarrel, except that she was united to England; and his belief was, that if Canada were independent to-morrow, she would not run the slightest danger of a contest. Mr. Cardwell adverted to that speech, as one, against whose tone the Government could make no complaint, and the sentiment was received with the approving hear-hears of the House. In the same debate Mr. Bright, whose views have not changed, and who is a power in England at this moment, declared, that should any occasion to defend us arise, it would not result from anything done by us, but would be a war growing out of the relations between the Cabinets of London and Washington.

It is true that in case of war, we would be no match for the power of our neighbors. But our dependence would be in the right and in the comity of nations. There is no reason to fear that they would be aggressive. Mexico, Cuba, the South American States have maintained their autonomy without molestation. And besides, as Mr. Cameron suggested the other day, there would probably be little difficulty in arranging for a British and American protectorate.

It is to be regretted of course, that a portion of the American press adopt a disagreeable and sensational tone upon this subject, and it suits the views of certain journals here to give these utterances an unnecessary prominence. They preach, of course, the manifest destiny of annexation, and they laugh at our independence, as impossible of maintenance for six months after its achievement. They say it is impossible for two peoples, of the same race and language to live alongside, without the absorption of the smaller by the greater. This is mere vapid assertion. The experiment of course was never tried, because the prescribed conditions were wanting. But what did these people preach about the Southern Confederacy? Did they not prate loudly of her power to sustain a national existence? And though she failed after prodigies of valor and skill, what reasonable man doubts that, could she have

achieved her independence, she might subsequently have maintained it? Yet the South was far behind us in her appreciation of freedom and the true elements of a nation's greatness. It is only poor Canada which is to be sneered and jeered into clinging to a system of tutelage and inferiority for ever. It was not the fashion to disparage her resources and poh! poh! her aspirations when the Hon. John Brown, in his Confederation speech spread out the map and invited the House to an enthusiastic study of her magnificent geography. He traced the island of Newfoundland, and found it equal in extent to the kingdom of Portugal. Crossing the straits to the main land, the hospitable shores of Nova Scotia, stretched out to the dimensions of the kingdom of Greece. New Brunswick was equal in extent to Denmark and Switzerland combined. Lower Canada was a country as large as France, and Upper Canada, 20,000 miles larger than Great Britain and Ireland put together. Across the continent to the shores of the Pacific was British Columbia, the land of golden promise, and comparable in extent to the Austrian Empire; and then the Indian territories which lie between were greater in extent than the whole soil of Russia. There were, he said, in Europe forty-eight sovereign states, and only eleven with a population greater than ours. In 1871 we were to stand equal in population to the ninth sovereign State in Europe. The honorable gentleman further told the House that in 1793 the commerce of the sovereign and independent United States, their exports and imports, did not amount to one-third of what ours did at that moment, and there were few states in Europe, and those with vastly greater population than our own, that could boast of anything like, the foreign commerce passing through our hands. And France, though the third maritime power of the world, owned only 60,000 tons more of shipping than British America. Then the Dominion, whether for industry or defence, would muster a force of 70,000 seamen, and in round numbers 700,000 men capable of bearing arms. These are not the qualities of a country unfit for self-government and whose future need bear the taint of inferiority and dependence. I have said that independence is the natural sequence of the theories which promoted confederation. Lord Monck alluded to it as involving a "New Nationality," when he first referred to it in a speech from the throne. British statesmen have invariably discussed it as a step in the transition our institutions were undergoing. The events of the American war, and the attendant possibilities of a rupture with that country forced upon the attention of the British Government the question of the defence of their possessions on this continent. They promoted the scheme from an imperial point of view; and with reference to immediate relief from the embarrassments of their responsibili-

ties here. I cannot better express my view of the attitude they assumed than by quoting from the *True Witness* of March, 1867, one of the best written journals on this continent, and understood to be an organ of the Lower Canada Catholic clergy. The writer says: "We understand that the bill for the union of the B. N. A. Provinces has been rapidly carried through the three readings in the House of Lords. In all probability it will meet the same fate in the House of Commons; for in England public sentiment is very strong in favor of a measure which is looked upon as preliminary to the severance of a political connection not profitable and often very dangerous to the people of Great Britain. Some changes have been made in the Quebec scheme, apparently at the request of the delegates themselves, since we may well believe that in the Imperial Legislature the feeling towards these Provinces is a desire to get rid of them altogether as honorably and as speedily as possible. They profit Great Britain neither materially nor morally. * * * * All that remains for Great Britain is to get rid of her North American Provinces as speedily and with as little loss of moral prestige as possible. The so-called Confederation of these Provinces presents the means for accomplishing this, and it is therefore eagerly grasped at by men of all parties." There is no doubt that, more or less directly, such views were urged upon our delegates while the negotiations were proceeding in England. Indeed so determined were all parties there to hurry through the arrangement, that the most solemn remonstrances of its colonial opponents were treated with almost universal and contumacious neglect. And the views of the statesmen, as might be expected, are quietly reflected among the people of England. All the organs of opinion, the popular *Times*, the Radical *Star* and the Tory *Standard*, the stately *Saturday Review* and the snobbish *Pall Mall Gazette*, with their satellites all over the kingdom, adopt the same tone; either that Canada is an incumbrance to England or they are ready to promote her independence to-morrow; and every colonist with whom you speak and who has had the entre to British society will tell you that the same feeling pervades the British mind. Adam Smith wrote that no dominant country could ever voluntarily relinquish its power over a dependency. But he regarded the abandonment in the light of a sacrifice, and in our case England has already abandoned all the patronage which, in his view, was a temptation to retain dominant power. But Mr. Cornwall Lewis, who wrote later, and after modern colonial views began to permeate England, regarded as probable that a parent state, deriving no advantage from a dependency, and believing that the dependency was able and willing to form an independent state, might abandon its authority for the want of a sufficient inducement to retain it. There

might even be positive reasons for a withdrawal, as if the dependency contributes nothing to the commercial facilities of the dominant country, it is a source of expense to the supreme government, and may involve the dominant country in war; and he further says that if the parent state understands its true relation to the dependency it will voluntarily recognize independence when there is fitness to maintain it; will prepare those for independence who are still unable to stand alone; and will seek rather to promote its trade, than its Empire. Englishmen believe that we are able to fulfil all these conditions and they are cautiously but persistently pressing the responsibility upon us. Need we hesitate to take the hint and prepare to assume it? Are our public men too timid to lead the people up to the great work which is before them? Are they blind to the signs of the times or are they seeking to encourage the people in blindness? It is time that every Canadian should comprehend the attitude which England is assuming; and that he should calmly and dispassionately admit there is method in the madness she is accused of. We have seen that in a commercial sense or in a sense of military or national *prestige*, she derives no advantage from the connection. We have seen, that there is mutual disadvantage—unmistakeable danger to the mother and the child, in the relations subsisting between them. How long can we afford to cultivate blindness to our true position, and go on simulating an importance which is deceitful and visionary. The change must come and it is only manful to prepare for it. It is childish to undervalue ourselves or the duties that await us. There are dangers in delay, and it is our duty to face the grave aspect of the position. As we have seen, the interest and the policy of the Imperial Government are unmistakeable. Tory and Radical seem for once in accord. No doubt the responsibility of ministers in England, the delicacies of party relations, the anxiety of one side to retain office and of the other side to obtain it, may temper imperial tactics and stimulate caution and reserve. It may be that even yet a skilful appeal to the dead past of the old colonial policy might rouse a spirit of resistance among the British masses. There may be some who still believe that the perpetual minority of the Colonies is essential to the glory of the Empire; as there are still some who cherish the traditionary faith that one Englishman can whip two Frenchmen. This state of things may delay, but it cannot avert the crisis. There remains still the Colonial Policy—the unmistakeable hand writing on the wall. Even Sir John Young our chief Imperial officer, an able, astute, and experienced statesman, has not found it consistent with his high duties to be reticent upon this great question of the hour. Cautiously of course, as became his high office, but signifi-

cantly as the representative of great imperial interests here, he hints at the transition State, through which our institutions are passing. He stated at Quebec and reiterated at Halifax, that Canadian statesmen and people are the best judges of their own interests; that their destinies were in their own hands, and that if they decided upon some change, the proposition would receive from the statesmen and people of England a generous and friendly consideration. His Excellency does not belong to that school of thinkers, who preach that pending the great consolidation here, further changes are not to be thought of. He does not tell us that, because Confederation is but half accomplished, we should shut our eyes to the future, and leave blind chance to accomplish the destinies of this Great Northern Dominion. He tells us indeed, in his Halifax speech, that he had been misrepresented at Quebec, and that he had been made to talk of change of allegiance, when he only meant change of alliance. Nobody but the wilfully blind could have understood His Excellency otherwise. Nobody could have dreamed that a British Governor would suggest to the people of half a continent under his rule the cession of their territory to a foreign power. But His Excellency is too good a philologist not to understand the full purport of the words he discusses. Allegiance signifies the obligation of a subject to his prince or government; alliance suggests original powers mutually exercised by the parties to a compact, and practically, therefore, allegiance ceases when alliance begins; and this view is quite consistent with Sir John Young's able speeches, as interpreted by himself. He simply did not intend to convey the idea that England would promote the annexation of this great country to the vast territories of our republican neighbors, while at the same time he felt that the future had something nobler in store for us than the mere colonial tutelage of our times. Hence he spoke of change from such a state, encouraged by us, by reciting the example of Holland, with smaller territory and fewer resources, and cheered us with the promise of the perpetual good will of his government and "alliance" with England, the "mother of nations." The country owes a debt of gratitude to His Excellency for this timely aid to the popular thought, for thus cautiously foreshadowing that brilliant future whose effulgence has dazzled his timid ministers. It is, moreover, stated, upon what seems to be undoubted authority, that when it was intimated to Sir A. T. Galt that Her Majesty had it in contemplation, in view of his distinguished public services, to confer upon him the honor of knighthood, that gentleman took occasion to lay before the Executive a statement expressing his high sense of this great honor, but that he felt he ought, before accepting it, to represent the strong views he entertained in

favor of the early independence of this country. But Her Majesty's representative found in this phase of opinion no disqualification for royal favor, and Her Majesty was graciously pleased to confer it. It would be fair to ask if Sir John Young did not mean to indicate independence, what did he mean? He could not have referred to our representation in the British Parliament, the only means by which we colonists could become the equals of our trans-Atlantic countrymen, and an impossible concession from the Imperial Government. If England were to admit the representatives of her millions of colonists to seats in the House of Commons, how long would she maintain her metropolitan and conservative dominance? How long before she must cease to consider colonial questions from an Imperial point of view, and find her children assuming the attitude of her masters? Such a solution of the colonial relationship is undesirable and impossible. Englishmen would never dream of it, and if they did, it would not meet our colonial wants. Perhaps it would be fair to interpret that speech in the light of Imperial opinion. It is not to be supposed that His Excellency intended to start new and original theories. Let us believe him to have been in accord with the statesmen of his country and his time. In that great debate, from which I have quoted on the defences of this country, Mr. Disraeli alluded to the hypothesis of a desire on the part of Canada and the other North American Colonies, for independence; and to the hour when England might thus lose a dependency, but gain a firm ally and friend. And again, he said Canada has its own future before it. We have a right to assume it. It has all the elements which make a great nation. It has at this moment a strong development of nationality, and the full conviction on the part of England that these Provinces may ultimately become an independent country is to her, not a source of mortification, but of pride. Mr. Bright in the same debate points out the reason why Canadians should feel, if they are like other Englishmen, that it would be better for their country to be disentangled from the politics of England, and to assume the position of an independent state. He believed, from what had been stated by official gentlemen in the present government, and in previous governments, that there was no objection to the independence of Canada whenever Canada might wish it. If Canada, by a friendly separation, became an independent state, said Mr. Bright, choosing its own form of government—monarchical, if it liked a monarchy, or republican, if it preferred a republic, it would not be less friendly to England. And in case of war, Canada would then be a neutral country, and her population enjoy greater security. In the same debate Lord Palmerston declared that when the Provinces felt strong enough to stand alone, and desired the

connection no longer, England would say "God speed you and give you the means to maintain yourselves as a nation." These general sentiments of the debate provoked no dissent in the House, where all shades of British opinion are represented. And though nobody declared the time had come, England was manifestly shaping her policy to meet it. I shall pass over the stronger expressions, the advanced opinions of subsequent debates, because time does not permit me to produce a *repertoire* of all the discussions on this subject. But in the light of what has gone before it is not easy to misunderstand the remarkable utterances of Mr. Gladstone, the Prime Minister of England, during the debate in the House of Commons the other day upon the subject of guaranteeing the Hudson Bay Loan. Objections had been taken to the principal of colonial guarantees, and Mr. Gladstone fully endorsed them. But he declared that this guarantee was given for a strictly imperial object, to dissociate England from the inconvenience of too extensive territorial possessions. In former times, said Mr. Gladstone, the American Colonies were entangled in a vicious system of dependence on England. The government wished to engender in them a spirit of independence. They wished to wind up the old system and see the colonies make a new start. That was not to be a beginning, but an end. Almost as I speak a confirmatory missive comes to us across the water—one of the strangest, as it is one of the most important events of our time. The *London Times* by the last steamer is handed me, containing a circular from a meeting of colonists in London, expressing alarm at the new imperial views of the colonial relations, and seeking to provide means of inducing the British Government to withdraw from its lately declared policy on the subject of colonial defence; or failing in that, to demand to be released from their allegiance, and to adopt such further means as the exigencies of the new situation may require. The circular suggests a conference in London during the next session of the imperial Parliament of delegates from all the colonial governments, and the *Times* vouches for the importance of the movement, which it regards as an epoch by the tone in which it discusses the whole question. That journal, the most delicate thermometer of influential opinion in England, argues that the remonstrances will be fruitless, and warns the colonies to rely on their own independence. From all this it appears that the attitude of England is sufficiently pronounced and comprehensible, and one of its effects will be powerfully to modify and ripen colonial opinion. At first, no doubt, among our own people, we may witness bewilderment and surprise. Some will make it a pretext to advance preconceived opinions, and others may at first turn from it in disgust; but in the end the sober

second thought of our countrymen, if the opportunity is afforded them, will grapple with the subject in a patriotic spirit and with a fair reference to its bearing upon the interests of both countries. In this spirit I propose to consider a little more fully the relations of this subject to our Canadian interests, and perhaps to extend in some further detail points to which I have already adverted. There is a class of politicians and publicists among us who pretend that until the great scheme of Confederation is perfected the talk of further change is a fatal disturbance to the public mind. And in a despotic country, where popular opinion can be dispensed with, where all power rests with the Government and the theories of free institutions are unknown, such a dictum might be tolerated. It would be consonant with such a view to discourage thought, to forbid discussion, and by all means to smother whatever should tend to promote an intelligent public sentiment among the people. They might learn to differ from the policy of their rulers, and this might lead to disturbance and alienation. But such a pretension implies insult to a free people and indicates the apprehension of those who proclaim it, that they may cease to overshadow and control them. The Irish difficulties are as intricate as any of the embarrassments of our own position; yet we did not hear that Mr. Bright was forbidden to discuss the Land question until after the disestablishment had been perfected. The truth lies entirely in the opposite sense. It is the duty of public men, whose lives are devoted to the study of public questions, to discuss them before the people, that they may be educated to comprehend the great issues which involve the destinies of their country. These writers would conceal, while I would proclaim from the house-tops, the stern facts of the situation. They would hush the popular interest—lull the spirit of inquiry—while I, reposing ample faith in their honesty and patriotism of my countrymen, would excite the one, that I might lead the other, through the paths of intelligent research, to the haven of wise and profitable conclusions. Doubtless there is too much of disquiet in the public mind; but to discuss the position is not to create it; and he must be a crazy thinker who can suppose that, in view of all the circumstances, the people are to look on without thought and without speech! But who is to control the impressions of the masses, to limit their thoughts, to curb their restless mental activities? The people are observant; in their own way they read the signs of the times, and among them the apprehension is almost universal that we are on the eve of radical political changes. You and I, no, doubt, share the same apprehension. Is it, not, then, the duty of our political teachers to cultivate our opinions, to enlighten us and to prepare us for our duties in whatever awaits us, rather than to silence our inqui-

ries and leave us to drift in the dangerous currents of uncultivated speculations! The great commercial want of this country is a profitable market for the surplus products of our industry. It was the theory of confederation to supply this want by opening up to us the markets of the sister provinces. I am afraid the results have not thus far greatly increased our scanty manufactures. Our natural market is the American, and we do, and shall suffer, till we gain access to it. Nor would a mere temporary treaty, subject to the caprices of politicians and entangled with the embarrassments of British foreign diplomacy, afford a full remedy. Manufactures and commerce prosper under permanent as well as liberal tariff arrangements, and it is in vain that you treat them with generosity to-day if there is apprehension that you may cramp them to-morrow. We require markets; but to confer their full benefits they must be permanent, so that capital may acquire confidence and seek permanent investments here. Without this state of things our trade must be limited and manufactures remain exotics among us; and, the exodus of our population remaining about equal to its normal increase, the promise of progress is not cheering. We ought to be manufacturers for this continent, with our cheap labor, cheap living and wonderful natural facilities. We cannot compete against the distance, the skill, the capital and teeming labor of the Old World, and there remains for us but the comparatively petty business of supplying our own sparse populations in unhealthy competition with the great manufacturing industries of England and America; and it often happens in time of depression, when our struggling manufactures most need encouragement and support, that we are made a sacrifice market for those great countries, to the ruin of our home trade. Our agriculture is confined to our own markets, or leeched and crippled by the exorbitant exactions of the American Customs collectors. The development of our mines, too, is prevented by like inhospitable exactions, and we are depleted and impoverished by a paper wall of legislative prohibitions, built along an imaginary line. In this strait it is cold comfort to assure us that the neighboring trade suffers equally with our own; a fact, nevertheless, modified by this difference—that the aggregate of their commerce is so much greater than ours. It would be idle to doubt that these influences have contributed to produce the present languishing trade and universal depression. The *Canada Gazette* affords the spectacle of forty insolvents in one week; and the unfortunate list stretches back for months past in alarming proportions. The emigration of common laborers to the States is something actually alarming; and it could not be otherwise, for our water powers are neglected, our mines are closed, and we have no means of furnishing employment to our people. Some wise statesman has been understood to exult over the fact that many of these

poor people go away with the hope of returning; but it is a sad commentary on our hopes for the future if there are to be no means to remove the stern necessity, the hopeless poverty and want of employment, which drives them, unwilling, away. We are told that depression prevails in the States, which is true; but the manufactures are established there, and even the limited production goes on, the markets are supplied, and the poor laborer is employed and paid. It is to him matter of little moment whether the dividend of the stockholder is small or great, so long as his services are continued and he is enabled to sustain and educate his family. No doubt if a like chance were open to him here he would return to his native country to-morrow. And for all this, is there no remedy? Tell me which of your statesmen has proposed one. We may drag on as we are, but it were folly to hope for any rapid or general prosperity. The politicians of Ontario, ignoring the outward signs, profess to stand in no need of relief; but there is a different feeling in Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is said there is hope of a new Trade treaty, which would be a great boon; but it must promise permanence, to create confidence. We must have free and assured commercial intercourse with the States, and they need it as well as ourselves. I shall be told these theories lead to annexation; and it is true that, so far as our embarrassments relate to commercial intercourse, annexation would supply a remedy. But would it be the best remedy? I think not; and even if it were otherwise, would it be desirable or possible of achievement? I shall speak of this later on. But mine is another scheme, and, I think, a better one, for a system of continental trade. I would banish the Custom Houses along the frontier; but I would preserve the imaginary line, as a broad division between two friendly nations, who desire, while maintaining free intercourse, to maintain their autonomy—to work out their own destiny and develop their own free institutions. Before the formation of the Zollverein by treaty stipulations, the commercial intercourse of the several German States was hampered by disabilities and restrictions similar to those which prevail between us and our neighbors at this moment. The introduction of merchandise from one State to another was not permitted without the payment of duties. In addition to this numerous prohibitions existed, and the trade relations between the contiguous sovereignties were fettered by oppressive and vexatious restrictions. But the inconvenience became manifest and intolerable, and the German States, while retaining their autonomy, introduced a wiser commercial policy. They removed those unnecessary burdens which only tended to clog enterprise and choke the channels of legitimate trade between contiguous States. They adopted one consolidated Government for commercial purposes, one line of customs on the Geographical bound-

daries was established—one tariff, export and transit, was enforced for all, and the revenue thus acquired was distributed among the members of the confederation in proportion to the population of each. This system for a long series of years has given satisfaction in Germany, and it is conceivable that Canada and the United States might adopt something akin to it with mutual and permanent advantage. This would be preferable to any Reciprocity Treaty, because it would be absolute and permanent free trade between the two countries. It is preferable again, because it could be more easily obtained, and would indeed be a favorite arrangement with the Americans. It would save both parties immense expense along their frontier, and would disband a vast army of smugglers. It might be effected in six months, and while it would be equally advantageous to our neighbors, it would make Canada a great agricultural, mining and manufacturing country. It would be popular in the United States because it would please the free trader, and Mr. Greely, the great protectionist, has promised us his support. It would settle the Fisheries and give them the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, and it would open half a Continent to their enterprise and capital. It would give us access to the markets of 40,000,000 of people. It would attract to us unlimited capital, and our country would be dotted with numerous mining and manufacturing villages. Our agricultural and commercial interests would multiply and expand in proportion. Our people would be employed at home, and multitudes of foreign laborers would be attracted from abroad. Happiness and contentment would walk hand in hand with the prosperity of our countrymen. You like the picture, but alas! it has awkward shades; and it is set in an ugly frame. We can't negotiate such a treaty. Canada has great interests, but she has no power. She can exercise no diplomatic functions, because she has no recognized foreign relations. She might attempt it and be snubbed, after the manner of Prince Edward Island. There were those who sneered at my ignorance when I made this statement in the House, because the British Minister had been instructed to consult us in his negotiations. Do they think Mr. Thornton would negotiate this Zollverein for us? No! Because it would conflict with the policy of the Empire. Canada, as a dependency, can never become a party to a Continental Commercial policy here, because it would involve a discrimination against British goods. This is reasonable, and we must not complain of it. It would, indeed, be a vicious system, which would ignore the interests of the mother country and discriminate in favor of a foreign power. And yet how egregiously ~~we~~ we are the sufferers! There is but one logical remedy, and that brings me again to the same conclusion—a separation from the parent State. Independent, we might accomplish this

commercial advantage. Independent, we might take the staff in our own hands. We should have foreign relations. We could negotiate treaties. In this sense we could not suffer from the change. We know our own interests, but British diplomacy on this continent has never been a success. It could not be otherwise. Imperial statesmen have little time to think of us. They are better employed on the restless sea of European complications. But they are wiser than us in the appreciation of our affairs, for they believe and wish that we should assume our independence and maintain it. We shall grow to it in time if we are patient and discreet. But the pioneers of the movement must bare their bosoms for temporary contumely and reproach. There is a class of people among us, I believe they are not numerous, though the uncertainties of the times are calculated to increase them, who are impatient of half measures, and who desire immediate annexation to the States. To such people I say, what advantages would you derive, that the Zollverein would not afford you? Surely you do not prefer the system of our neighbors to our own British responsible system of government. You are not unmindful of the elevation which national hopes and aspirations would impart to our people. Why not join us and work out that system under improved conditions on this continent? England would gladly consent to our independence and aid us with the perpetual alliance her statesmen have promised. But could she without loss of prestige and honor consent to the alienation of half a continent, and its cession to a foreign power? You only complicate the situation by your impracticable demands. You furnish weapons to the enemy, and you do not serve your own views. If Canada is ever separated from England, it will be at the cannon's mouth, if it be not to establish her sovereign independence. It is better for America, and better for ourselves, that the Dominion should remain autonomous. The United States territories are vast enough, and she can well afford to let us try the experiment of self government. We shall work out a system slightly different from her own, but within the bonds of friendly commercial relations. If her flag floated over the whole continent, where would be the right of asylum in case of civil disorder? And what benefit would she derive from a multitude of people who should enter her councils in a spirit of repining and discontent because they had not been left to develop and glorify their own nationality. And I must say a word to another class of objectors. There is a powerful party here who represent the United States as overbearing and aggressive. They believe that the inauguration of a commercial Zollverein would be followed by overt acts for our subjection. I believe this statement is unfounded. I have no doubt that judicious negotiations might speedily remove the danger of it, by the guarantee of our status,

through the means of a treaty of comity with us between the United States and England; and I have no doubt that early steps should be taken to secure it. But I don't believe it is fair to assert that the Americans are an aggressive people. They are, as a nation, wedded to the arts of peace. Sometimes filibusters have departed from their shores, but they have never succeeded, and they have never been encouraged by their government. As I have already said, Mexico, Cuba, and the Spanish American States have never suffered from an American spirit of conquest. True, there was a war with Mexico, but with that nation at her feet, the Americans refused her subjugation. With less cause France invaded that country, and attempted to monopolize her government. England, by a happy accident, escaped. But I shall be told that the Monroe doctrine contemplates the unqualified subjugation of the continent, and that the Americans preach that doctrine as Peter the Hermit preached the Crusades. So much has been said of the monstrosities of that doctrine—so many excellent old ladies have been alarmed by it—that perhaps we may profitably enquire what it was, and whether we should really regard it as a standing menace to us and our children? It will, perhaps, startle some people to be told that this doctrine was essentially of British origin, and that it was suggested by Mr. Canning. France had put down the constitutional principles which prevailed in Spain, and entertained the notion of defraying her expenses by acquiring Spanish colonies in South America, and England, indignant at conduct so detrimental to her interests, and with the aversion which Mr. Canning had ever shown to the Holy Alliance, induced President Monroe to enunciate the doctrine which has since become so famous. The following quotation, from the late edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, will explain what that doctrine really was: "James Monroe succeeded Madison in the Presidency, and retained it eight years (1817 to 1825.) Towards the close of his administration (1823), in compliance with the suggestion of his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, he introduced into his message to Congress—adverting into the purpose of the European allies of Spain to assist her in subjugating her revolted colonies in Central and South America—the assertion of a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent positions which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. * * * * *

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power," continues the message, "we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the

purpose of oppressing them, or of controlling by any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

Congress took no action upon this; but the spirit of that body, and of the nation was in favor of the Monroe doctrine. Lord Brougham, in referring to the President's declaration, stated that it had diffused joy over all free men in Europe; and Sir J. MacIntosh spoke of it in the following terms: "This wise government, in grave but determined language, and with that reasonable and deliberate tone which becomes true courage proclaims the principles of her policy, and makes known the cases in which the care of her own safety will compel her to take up arms for the defence of other States. I have already observed its coincidence with the declarations of England, which, indeed, is perfect, if allowance be made for the deeper, or at least more immediate interest in the independence of South America, which near neighborhood gives to the United States. This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths—for so I delight to call them, and I heartily pray that they may be for ever united in the cause of justice and liberty—cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth." Thus it will be seen that the real Monroe doctrine differs entirely from the popular version of it, that it was suggested and heartily endorsed by England, and that it conveys no warning or menace to us. I entertain no doubt that the American Government and people would promote, by all convenient means, the independence of this country, and the intimate commercial relations I have suggested, and as will have been seen, my doubts are as few, that England would encourage the arrangement and promote it to every reasonable extent. But even if improved trade relations with our neighbors were impossible, the safest way out of our commercial difficulties is to throw off the restraints of the colonial state. It is conceivable that the tide of European emigration might, to some extent, be diverted from the American States to our own rich and extensive valleys of the Northwest, but for the European prejudice against dependent States; and especially the Irish prejudice against British sovereignty. Disguise it as we may, these are serious drawbacks to our immigration policy, and account in some measure for its practical failure. With the Northwest peopled, and with facilities of access to it, an important market will be opened to us and a corresponding growth of our manufactures will follow. And as we have already seen, independence would contribute to the establishment of an assured and permanent commercial policy; without which capital will continue to distrust us, and refuse to play its legitimate part in the development of our resources. Independence moreover, would create among us that

spirit of self-confidence and enterprise which prevails so largely among our neighbors, which has contributed so much to their greatness and which grew out of the national independence they established. From such a point of view, I have no doubt that here similar results would flow from similar causes, and that our powers of expansion would be immensely increased, by the higher responsibilities of the position; and though, as I have shown, our natural market is with our neighbors; and our exclusion from them would make our progress towards greatness comparatively toilsome;—having exhausted all means to establish fair intercourse,—I should by no means despair of my country, if, as I am sure will not happen, that intercourse were refused. But even in that case as in the other, independence would multiply and accelerate our successes; so that in any way, the gain to us is in proportion to our growth in manhood and self-reliance. I have already considered the probable influence of independence upon the character of the people of this country. I have always lamented the want of a Canadian national spirit. I regard it as an elementary truth, that no people can respect themselves or command the respect of others, who have among them no common sentiment of national pride and devotion. It bears to national life a relation, similar to the filial attachment of the domestic circle; and is, at the same time, the glory and the safe-guard of a free people. It is painful to remark its absence in this country. You will find national pride here, but it is an exotic, an importation. It is English or Scotch, Irish French and American; and the disposition to magnify a real Canadian nationality is too often and unhappily confined to the official, the placeman, whose duty and whose interest it is to make a proper display before the people. In how many promiscuous gatherings you might sneer the nationality of the Dominion without exciting an apologist or provoking an avenger. [But the subject is vast, and grows upon us in the contemplation of it. A full discussion would fill a book instead of a lecture. Time hurries me to a conclusion. This is a great scheme and your destinies are interwoven with it. I have touched upon its general features; you can do the filling up at your leisure, if you do me the honor to reflect upon what I have told you. We have seen that the subject is ripe for discussion; and that our vital interests are involved. We have seen that England is embarrassed by her relations to her dependencies here, and that Canada is crippled by the restrictions of the connection. We have seen how our noblest sentiments of loyalty to the crown may be merged and intensified into loyalty to the Dominion; and how a spirit of national patriotism is indispensable to our growth in enterprise and self-reliance. We have seen how the removal of Imperial tutelage, paved the way for the growth and expansion of the older

North American Colonies; and how rapidly, while administering their own resources, they rose into greatness and power. And we have seen how England was immensely the gainer, by this providential change of her relationship to them. I have shown how we might profit by their example—not through revolt and bloodshed,—for we find England offering us the boon of independence, which she denied to them,—and thus the way is made easy, through peaceful paths, for the accomplishment of our nationality. I have shown that the proposed state is but a second and necessary step in the great drama of confederation,—and, that it indicates no revolution, no violent distortion of our institutions. I have shown that England desires the change, and that we need it; and that it would happily solve for us great commercial and political problems. I have shown how it might lead to the cultivation of amity between ourselves and our neighbors—how it must tolerate the separate independence of each, while it embraces the widest freedom of commercial relations. I have warned the impetuous reformers, who would prize beyond all this, political alliance—that annexation is impossible,—and the agitation for it an embarrassment; and I have predicted that the Americans will be content with this change, so important and so easy of achievement; and which unlike its alternative, annexation, involves no humiliation to England. I have shown how the vast territories, the important population, and immense resources of this Dominion entitle it to a respectable place among the leading nationalities of the earth; and I have rebuked the critics who sneer at such aspirations, decry our abilities, and prophecy our humiliation and defeat. It may be all a dream; but it is a vision of a great future of wealth and happiness, of power and glory for our country. And it is a vision which foretells a fact, and will ere long expand into the region of substantial reality. I have necessarily left untouched several important branches of this great question. The army and navy—the diplomatic arm of the public service—the whole subject of the public expenditure—whether the new nationality would increase or diminish it, how best it may be provided, I have left altogether out of this preliminary discussion. It is enough for my present purpose to know that the ninth sovereign power as to population; the fourth as to commerce, and perhaps the first as to territory and undeveloped resources, will be prepared for the fiscal exigencies of its time. I have left out of the discussion the form of the proposed government of the Dominion. It is enough for my purpose to say that it must be a free system, whether organized as monarchical or republican. Further on in the agitation, we ought to have abundant opportunity to contrast the two systems and discuss them. It might happen that, as with Confederation, our politicians will give us a system, ready made, without troubling the people for opinions, yet the subject has

engaged some preliminary attention. The significant fact is stated that during the negotiations about the Confederation act in England, Sir John A. McDonald advocated the adoption of the word Kingdom instead of Dominion of Canada. And it is well known that a Canadian Monarchy was one of the dreams of the late Mr. D'Arcy McGee, administered by an English prince and dignified by a local nobility. And the able organs of the hierarchy of Lower Canada, who have cautiously written in favor of independence, are understood to favor similar views. On the other hand, there will be found those who dread the expenses of royalty, and who doubt the feasibility of ingrafting feudal forms and pageantry upon the democratic institutions of the new world. Such people see no charms in the extravagance of a court and the re-enactment of the laws of primogeniture for the maintenance of a privileged class. They will tell you that a system which failed in Mexico with France at her back cannot prevail here among the levelling influences of free institutions. But you and I may await the current of events, and prepare for the discussion in due season. It is well for these who agree as to the end to be achieved, to agree also upon the postponement of disturbing collateral issues. We shall find for a time yet a fierce party to fight—composed of those numerous and powerful interests which depend upon the maintenance of things as they are; and, embracing as well, no doubt, a large element of disinterested loyalty and honest devotion to the country. I proposed at the outset to speak from no party point of view. My theme is exalted above and beyond the divisions of party; and barring personal bitterness, my position has been assailed as fiercely by my friends as by my enemies. But this is not the occasion for recrimination or reply. My dependence is upon the completeness of my argument. I have strong views as a party man, but they have no place in this discussion. I might cross the house to-morrow—if I found my enemies adopting these views, and if my friends should persist in opposing them. There is a grave responsibility resting upon our public men. The country is adrift and the public mind is disquieted. Everybody believes the finality is not reached and asks, *Whither are we drifting?* Some suspect that the administration hold peculiar views—but they neither venture to deny nor proclaim them. When I had the honor first to express these opinions on the floor of Parliament ministers treated me to some personal abuse, but upon the main question they were cautious and silent. There was a profound impression through the house—but they ventured upon no word of disavowal. Their opinions were shadowed in mystery and they had not the courage to proclaim them. Afterwards when this strange phase of the debate had provoked some comment from the press, Sir George Cartier did indulge in a gentle dissent from my conclusions. Nobody denies that a change must come,

and there remains only the question of time and fitness and preparation. I repeat that public opinion is adrift, and the policy of the administration of the day should be openly avowed and vindicated. If they are opposed to these views, they ought to set their faces boldly and publicly against them. If the time has not arrived, and if they want delay and opportunity to prepare for it, let them openly declare their views and shape their legislation to maintain them. The public could afford to wait, if this dangerous uncertainty were dispelled, and if there were a fixed idea in the popular mind of a definite and desirable future. But grave dangers lurk behind the delays, the doubts and the insecurities of the hour. The truth must be told that we are fast losing our hold upon the loyalty and confidence of our people. Discontent and non-confidence stalk openly among them; and the enemies of our future are encouraged to flaunt their evil prophecies before our very doors. A national policy, pronounced and progressive, would attract the ear and excite the confidence of the public. They would listen to your appeal, if you supplied them with motives and invoked their sympathies, inspired them with national hopes and aspirations—and their interest in a future they could be proud of, would be like a sheet anchor to hold them fast to the Dominion. And now gentlemen, I have fulfilled the duty which, I thought, was incumbent upon me, of addressing you some observations, on this absorbing topic of the hour. I have counted the cost and I know the penalty. You have not misunderstood,—but my enemies, as is their custom, will misrepresent and malign me. I shall be neither intimidated nor disheartened. If my views prevail, some of them will join me before the battle is over. If they are rejected, I have still performed my duty. Sometimes it requires boldness to speak the truth, but there is no power to stifle free discussion in this country. You and I have a right to our opinions, and the right to discuss them. The statesmen of England have set us the example, in the very citadel of the empire. There is no political disability here,—for the councils of the nation are presided over to day by men,—some of whom lately sought to subvert the government,—and others to promote its immediate annexation. They are loyal citizens now, and so are we. Time changes conditions and works marvels and time will accomplish the great destinies of this country,—and let us hope, in a manner most conducive to the happiness of its people. In such a case, though my theories should be exploded, my hopes would be fulfilled. Let us hope, too, whatever be-tides,—in this great crisis of our history,—for an advancing intelligence—of brotherhood and toleration among us. And let us prayerfully commend our country, its future, its people, to the gracious protection and guidance of the great Father of Nations.

THE GOLD CLIQUES.

There is one question which the public are anxiously asking about the gold cliques, namely : what are the names of its members. Other things the people have been told with the most ready frankness, but this is as much a mystery as ever. It is known, for example, that the capital actually owned was small, and the length of time in which the clique was at work was much less than was supposed. A competent authority says that ten or twelve days only elapsed between the first purchases of the clique at 135, and its closing transactions at 160 or over on Friday, the fatal 24th of September. We are also told that up to the very day previous, the clique did all its business through its brokers, Smith, Gould, Martin & Co., who employed other brokers, and carried on their scheme so skilfully and quietly that they bought 25 millions, at least without putting up the price beyond $137\frac{1}{2}$ until the 22d September, when they purposely advanced it to $141\frac{1}{2}$, and later to $143\frac{1}{2}$. The 25 millions of purchased gold is supposed to have cost an average price of 139, and was freely loaned to the bears, considerable sums of money being called up as margins with every successive advance of the quotations. In embracing this policy the clique appear to have adopted the maxim of Napoleon, which was that "the enemy should always bear the cost of the war." The clique, by lending not only received the money back which they had paid for it, but got their gold "carried" for nothing, compelled their opponents to pay them interest for the privilege of "carrying" it, and called up margins so as to obtain new funds wherewith to go into the market again to make fresh purchases.

Up to Thursday, the 23d of September, everything worked like a charm. But on that day something happened. The Tenth National Bank was visited by those polite gentlemanly men from Washington, who at once began to examine the books of the bank. A cheque for a million of dollars drawn by the clique was, it is affirmed, refused certification, as the bank examiner inspected every cheque which came in and was particularly careful to see that the law was not violated, which requires, on pain of forfeiture of franchise, that no bank shall certify cheques ahead, or shall lend to any one firm or individual more than one-tenth of its capital. The bank machinery of the clique was thus disorganized. It was useless to apply elsewhere. Fortune was deserting the gold gamblers. Such is the story which has been told in Wall street, published without contradiction in the newspapers and believed by well-informed persons to be true. The next movement was to save Gould, Martin & Co., if possible, from the risk of failure by a method which we will quote from a

morning paper that has evidently obtained access to authentic information and claims to speak by authority. The *Sun* of yesterday says:

"On that Thursday night the clique determined to bring their scheme to a head. They had gold enough to enable them, as they supposed, absolutely to control the market; and their game was to press the price to the utmost, and gather in the margins on their immense loans, or compel settlements at such figures as they might dictate. In order, however, to carry out this scheme, it would be necessary to keep on buying gold to make a market. They did not want any more gold, but rather desired to sell what they had, and garner up their winnings. Gold was intrinsically worth but about 185, to which price it must inevitably fall when the movement should be accomplished; and those to whom the clique should sell at the high prices to which they intended to force the market, must of necessity be ruined. The gold that the clique would have to buy in forcing up the price would also be a dead loss to them should they be compelled to carry it. In this dilemma they apparently determined on playing the stale game of letting some of their own party break, while the others were to bag the spoils, and hold them until the final division. This was the scheme, and one of its features was that Smith, Gould, Martin & Co. were to be kept afloat. Accordingly, on Friday morning the base of operations was changed from the office of that firm to that of Wm. Heath & Co., from which place all the orders of the clique now emanated, while Smith, Gould, Martin & Co., as a firm, were left to operate ostensibly on their own account."

How gold was on the following day forced suddenly and amid unparalleled excitement to 162½ from which point it fell to 130 in a few minutes on the announcement of Mr. Boutwell's intended sale of four millions—all this is fresh in the memory of our readers and will form one of the most notorious practices of this great gambling fiasco. The catastrophe had not taken place until the clique had bought, through Albert Speyers 38 millions, through Belden & Co. 30 millions, through Smith, Gould, Martin & Co. 25 millions, and through other parties 15 millions more. The whole amount was 108 millions and was bought in the space of two or three hours by a clique of desperate men whose united capital, all told, did not probably reach two millions of dollars. The example of such bold audacity was infectious. The 108 millions which the clique claim to have bought stimulated the crowd in the gold room and an aggregate of 500 millions of gold is supposed to have been bought and sold on that memorable Friday forenoon.

These are some of the facts which the gold clique have allowed to transpire. They have even been communicative enough to tell the world that on Thursday night they had gained four millions of dollars; that on Friday the operations of Smith, Gould, Martin & Co. resulted in a loss of over 3½ millions, reducing the profit of the clique from 4 millions to \$376,250 if they could successfully carry out their scheme of repudiating everybody else and carrying that firm safely through. If, however, the clique shall be compelled to stand by all their other brokers, including Speyers, Heath, Belden and others, then they stand to lose on the whole of the transaction the prodigious sum of \$13,545,000. The imagination almost refuses to credit the unparalleled boldness of the schemes which

have been here partially unfolded to our view. If the statements had not been published with a positive claim to authenticity we should not have ventured to put them on record. We do not vouch for the accuracy of the facts, but they are believed to be at least approximately true. In any case, there is abundant evidence that this clique movement, like almost every other "pool" that has at any time been organized in Wall street, has inflicted loss on its members, whatever gains outside parties may have made by it. The prodigious extent of the losses in this case will lend no small importance to the query with which we began, Who were the members of the gold clique?

GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF BONDS.

The amount of bonds purchased by the Secretary of the Treasury and held by him under the Sinking Fund act, or subject to the future direction of Congress, has now reached the large sum of \$57,773,000. As the first purchase was made on the 12th of May, the period in which this amount has been taken off the market is only about five months.

The table given below contains the details of each purchase of bonds thus far made; showing the date, the total amount offered each time, the amount of each class of bonds accepted, and the total amount of each class now held by the Secretary of the Treasury. It has been compiled with much difficulty, from the fact that the reports published in the newspapers are frequently erroneous in some particulars, and correct results could only be obtained by comparisons and further examination.

The facts obtained from the figures below in regard to the general movement of Government Securities, are of much interest. We find that the coupon bonds of 1867 have been purchased more largely than any other class, amounting to \$14,733,650. Next come the coupon bonds of 1865 new, amounting to \$11,418,850, and next the registered issue of 1862, amounting to \$6,355,050. The coupons of 1862 show the smallest figures, the total purchased being quite insignificant.

The amount of each class of bonds held by the Secretary becomes of importance in regard to the item of accrued interest, and the additional purchases made by him to represent matured coupons; the total amount of January and July bonds, and of May and November bonds, can here be seen at a glance. It is also desirable that dealers in government securities should have a record of the amount of each issue, registered and coupon, taken off the market.

[illegible]

THE LESSONS OF THE CRISIS.

The late disaster in Wall street is to be prized for its lessons if not for its losses. It was the result of a speculation wholly factitious and unnatural. A ring of speculators, with large capital and equal daring, undertook to control the entire supply of gold upon the market. Their operation was not based upon any natural tendency of the premium; on the contrary, the common conviction that the price of gold must decline had induced very general sales for future delivery; and it was upon these transactions, coincident with the bent of the market, that the clique undertook to force the premium in an opposite direction. Thus the speculation was an effort to coerce the gold market against its natural direction; and to this circumstance it owes its failure and its ruinous results. The more the clique advanced the price, the more unreasonably high did it appear, and the greater became the apparent inducement to sell. Through this sort of manœuvring, the time contracts to deliver gold were swelled to an amount immensely exceeding the stock of gold upon the market. The sales were made, as we have stated, upon correct views as to the real value of gold; but the deliveries had to be made by coin to be first borrowed and ultimately purchased from the very parties to whom it had been sold; hence the clique, having the sellers, as they supposed, entirely in their power, attempted to compel them to buy in the gold from them at 20 to 30 per cent above the figures at which they had originally bought up the market supply. Had the scheme succeeded, the street would have had to purchase from thirty millions to forty millions at 20 to 30 per cent above the price at which they sold it; with the result of a transfer of about ten million into the pockets of the combination.

Such a speculation can be regarded in no other light than as the most reckless and licentious gambling; and, as such, it may be taken as an illustration of the dangers of illegitimate speculation. The sellers, while relying upon the natural course of the premium, could not but be aware of the character and power of the scheme against which they were contending; and, so far, they were as reckless as the clique. And this fact further shows how easily the spirit of wild speculation may seduce a large proportion of the brokers, including firms of respectable standing, into operations risking an enormous amount of capital upon chances just as fickle and uncertain as those of the faro bank.

The culmination of this speculation was attended with circumstances by no means creditable to the business morals of Wall street. When it was discovered that the combination had drawn the street into engagements involving enormous losses, and that the game was a heavily losing one, there was in many cases an effort to evade or directly repudiate con-

tracts ; street honor, hitherto the chief protection of Wall street dealings, being regarded as secondary to the preservation of something from the common wreck of fortunes. We do not pretend to judge whether the gambling character of the operations does not in some measure palliate these evasions of contracts ; but we do hold that it is a matter of profound humiliation and regret that houses of fair standing in the financial community, and entrusted with important transactions by the public, should be found willing to engage in operations leading to such dishonorable expedients for self-protection.

It should be learned from the experience of those two weeks that the dangers connected with excesses in speculation do not end with the mere losses on contracts. In the present case, we have witnessed a derangement in the whole machinery of Wall street. The recklessness with which dealers, within one or two hours, rushed into contracts covering many millions of gold, at immense differences of price, of necessity produced a sudden convulsion in credit operations. It was seen that many must be injured or ruined ; and the uncertainty as to who might be the losers caused an indiscriminate caution among the banks and money lenders generally, so that for a time money could hardly be borrowed upon any terms. Many of the dealers in gold being at the same time engaged in the stock business and having outstanding engagements in the Stock Exchange, the panic instantly spread to the stock market. Stocks fell to such an extent as to exhaust the margins on which they were carried and were consequently thrown upon the market in immense blocks, precipitating a further decline, and involving the weaker class of holders in ruinous losses. The extent of injury thus resulting is but very partially indicated by the failure of several prominent stock houses. Large numbers of private holders of securities have been brought to the verge of ruin, and their stock has been transferred at panic prices to the hands of a wealthier class, who are about the only parties benefited by the disaster. Operations naturally tending to these results cannot be too severely condemned. They are demoralizing and mischievous to the last extreme ; and those who engage in them cannot be expected to receive the confidence awarded to prudent men of business.

If the Wall street community cannot feel itself secure against the recurrence of these dangerous excesses, it is clear that prudent firms must recognise the necessity of protecting themselves and their customers by broader " margins " upon speculative transactions than have been hitherto accepted. In times when speculation was less rampant and fluctuations less sudden and extreme, a margin of 10 per cent might be deemed an adequate protection ; but in these days, when cliques of immense wealth undertake to make money inaccessible by " locking up " millions of cur-

Specie in banks June 26.....		\$30,287,140
Treasure received from California by steamer	\$95,814	
overland	678,042	
Imports from foreign ports	201,888	
Coin interest paid out	17,384,485	
Treasury sales of gold	8,000,000—	21,854,209
Total reported supply.....		\$41,611,349
Withdrawn for export.....	\$5,474,624	
Withdrawn for customs	10,502,045—	16,976,669
Specie in bank July 31.....		27,871,938
Total withdrawn and in bank		\$44,848,603
Excess of withdrawals over reported supply.....		3,237,254

Specie in banks July 31	\$27,871,938
Treasure received from California by steamer.....	\$124,977
" " " overland.....	896,824
Imports from foreign ports.....	159,927
Coin interest paid out	1,067,968
Treasury sales of gold	2,000,000— 4,551,211
Total reported supply.....	\$32,423,144
Withdrawn for export ...	\$3,027,040
Withdrawn for customs	14,319,916—17,347,856
Specie in banks August 23.....	19,468,103
Total withdrawn and in banks	\$36,816,987
Excess of withdrawals over reported supply.....	4,393,812

Specie in banks August 28.....		\$19,469,102
Treasure received from California by steamer.....	\$41,974	
" " " overland.....	1,897,289	
Imports from foreign ports.... ..	1,511,487	
Coin interest paid out.....	4,358,398	
Treasury sales of gold.....	6,000,000—	12,619,088
Total reported supply..... ..		\$33,068,190
Withdrawn for export.....	\$1,838,170	
Withdrawn on customs.....	12,654,325—	14,389,495
Specie in banks October 2.....		15,902,819
Total withdrawn and in bank.....		\$30,342,814
Excess of reported supply not accounted for.....		2,845,876

It must be remembered, in comparing the months of September and October with the same months of 1868, that the earnings in those months last year were very large; the grain crop was hurried forward at the

West with great urgency, and some of the Western roads doubled their receipts during that period, but fell off again quite as suddenly in November. The prospect for permanent heavy traffic on the principal lines of railway at the West was never better than now; the crops are large and the country in good condition, with an immigration of settlers which is developing the lands adjacent to railroad lines with wonderful rapidity.

In the case of Milwaukee and St. Paul Road, which shows a considerable decrease in earnings for the month, the falling off is fully accounted for by the circumstance that spring wheat moved to market quite three weeks later this year than last; a million bushels more of wheat were shipped over the road in September, 1868, than in the same month this year. Wheat is now coming forward freely, and the earnings of the last week in September were very large.

The consolidated lines of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway from Buffalo to Chicago show a fair increase in earnings, and it will be noticed that this is now among the few lines whose figures for the month exceed a million dollars.

In the table below we give the earnings for the past ten months of the year, in which it will be observed that all the roads show an increase, with a single exception.

Two companies are omitted from this statement, no comparison for the year being possible.

EARNINGS FROM JANUARY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30.

	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago and Alton.....	\$3,463,236	\$2,233,626	\$329,880
Chicago & Northwestern.....	9,939,438	9,713,336	276,047
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	3,860,309	3,356,330	474,079
Illinois Central.....	6,134,772	5,539,111	595,611
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	1,017,805	922,471	94,884
Michigan Central.....	3,435,430	3,256,498	178,932
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	4,812,216	4,454,335	357,881
Ohio & Mississippi.....	2,084,576	2,163,313	128,637
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	1,450,989	1,381,510	69,459
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	3,107,060	2,860,589	246,461
Total.....	\$39,275,296	\$36,881,019	\$2,522,914	\$123,637

EARNINGS FOR SEPTEMBER.

	1869.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
Chicago & Alton.....	\$501,258	\$438,196	\$15,063	\$....
Chicago & Northwestern.....	1,321,139	1,518,458	197,844
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	579,000	553,888	20,614
Cleveland, Col., Cinn & Indianapolis.....	327,801	287,451	40,350
Illinois Central.....	918,020	889,906	25,064
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern.....	1,329,725	1,307,496	32,229
Marquette & Cincinnati.....	149,473	121,519	18,054
Michigan Central.....	478,546	458,974	16,572
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	724,514	1,024,045	299,531
Ohio & Mississippi.....	292,803	307,122	14,319
St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute.....	200,130	196,436	3,694
Toledo, Wabash & Western.....	470,730	450,308	20,517
Total.....	\$7,136,129	\$7,504,977	\$193,046	\$511,194

RAILROAD CASUALTIES.

The lately published report of the State Engineer and Surveyor for the year 1868, contains many interesting facts concerning the railroad system of New York and its practical management by the companies controlling the various lines throughout the State. Among these the statistics of accidents resulting in the killing and wounding of passengers and others, are worthy of especial attention. For the year ending Sept. 30th, 1868, the Erie Railway carried 2,194,348 passengers. The number of miles run by passenger trains was 2,471,594, and the average rate of speed per hour was 26 miles for ordinary trains and 30 for express trains. The length of the road, including branches, is 821 miles. During the year 29 passengers were killed and 86 injured on this road, the greater part of whom were the victims of the memorable disaster at Carr's Rock, on the 14th of April, 1868. The New York Central during the same period carried 3,679,150 passengers; its passenger trains running an aggregate of 1,990,150 miles, at an average speed of $30\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour. The length of the road is 297.75 miles. During the year no passengers were killed, and only six injured. On the Hudson River Road during the year the number of miles run by passenger trains was 805,628, and the average speed $31\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour. This road is 144 miles long, and has double tracks for the entire distance. Of the 2,129,288 passengers carried, none were killed and only five injured. The New York and New Haven Railroad carried during the same period 2,192,939 persons, running 657,897 passenger trains, at an average speed of $31\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour. This road is $62\frac{1}{2}$ miles long. During the year no passengers were killed, and but three injured. On the Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg and the New York and Harlem roads, carrying respectively 497,333 and 1,667,578 passengers, none were killed or injured during the year. These figures show that the main lines of the State are well and carefully managed. Leaving out the Erie Road, on which 26 were killed and 72 injured by the one unfortunate accident before mentioned, the returns show that on four other roads above named but one passenger was injured for every 316,000 miles run. Counting in the Erie, the ratio is one killed for every 194,871 miles, and one injured for every 58,252 miles traveled by passenger trains during the year.

Considering the extent of the business done on our principal roads, and the average speed at which trains are run on them, the number of killed and wounded is comparatively small. Unfortunately, however, this cannot be said of American roads in general. Scarcely a day passes without the telegraph bringing information of one or more accidents, more or less serious in their consequences, that have occurred during the preceding

twenty-four hours. Not long since we noticed seven of these announcements, reporting the violent death or severe injury of fifteen persons in all, in one issue of the daily journals of this city. So frequent, indeed, are these so-called "accidents" that, unless the attendant circumstances are peculiarly aggravated, or the list of killed and wounded exceptionally large, they seldom attract more than a passing notice outside of the neighborhood where they occur. The statistics of railway casualties show that, during a period of fifteen years from 1853 to 1868, inclusive, the number killed on the railroads of the United States was 2,953, and the number wounded 10,500. When to this aggregate we add the number of casualties occurring this year, it will be seen that railroad travel in this country is dangerous in the extreme.

Clearly, there is something wrong in the system of management adopted on most of the roads in the United States that should be promptly and effectually remedied. Such frightful tables of mortality are unheard of throughout Europe. It is stated that during a period of nearly four years but three accidents have occurred on European railways, resulting in injury to the persons or property of passengers; and in each of these instances the causes were practically beyond the control of those responsible for the management of the roads on which they happened. Supposing our railroads to be well built and properly equipped, as a due regard to the safety of passengers requires they should be, it is evident that the greater degree of danger attending railroad travel in the United States than in Europe is mainly attributable to the want of a proper system of management. Experience has shown that travel by rail can be made both safe and expeditious, as it is in Europe at the present time; and this is accomplished by very simple expedients.

First and foremost, perhaps, is the fact that the managers of all public works in Europe are held to a stricter accountability by the government, as well as by public opinion, than they ever have been in this country. This is seen in many ways. In the matter of punctuality alone, the contrast between the operations of European and American roads is marked and striking. Every trip is made with unfailing regularity according to the tables, in consequence of which no time is lost by delays to be made up, as too often happens in this country, by sudden dashes of extraordinary and dangerous speed. So great is the vigilance exercised that it is known, at any moment, precisely where a train is; and no train is allowed to start out on a venture, without its being certain whether the way is clear or not. As the tracks are always double, direct collisions are impossible, and as the position and movements of every train are known, obstructions are always removed in time to leave a clear track for passenger trains. No doubt the principles of this system

of management are nominally adopted on every American railroad; but the want of greater vigilance in the observance of rules and regulations, on the part of engineers and conductors, and the willingness to take risks which, even if unsuccessful and disastrous, will be allowed to pass unpunished, have led to most of the accidents occurring on our roads.

Another reason for the greater safety of railway travel is the careful police of every part of the roads. Experienced and trustworthy watchmen are stationed at frequent intervals along the road, whose duty it is to see that the section of track under their charge is safe and free from obstruction. In this important particular the management of most American roads is essentially defective. Not long since an accident occurred on the Pennsylvania Central, killing two men, seriously injuring a number of others, and destroying much valuable property. The cause of the disaster was a huge fragment of rock that had fallen on the track, and remained there undiscovered until the train was wrecked on it. In Europe such an accident never has and never could happen. Every foot of road is there inspected before and after the passage of each train, and the engineers are never out of sight of one of these vigilant watchmen for a longer time than two or three minutes. Consequently we never hear of stray cattle, fallen rocks or other obstructions in the way of passing trains, no one tampers with the rails or misplaces the switches, nor are draws left open, or culverts, bridges or embankments washed away, without the fact being known in time to prevent accident. In the United States there are thousands of miles of railroad that are not carefully policed oftener than once a week, if as often; and it is only a wonder that on these long stretches of neglected track accidents are not of more frequent occurrence. The cost of maintaining a large force of intelligent and experienced men as watchmen is unquestionably great; but we have no doubt that the amount thus saved in the prevention of needless and costly accidents on American roads would more than cover the expense thus incurred by the companies.

When an accident, however slight, occurs on any of the railways throughout Europe, a thorough and searching investigation is at once instituted by the public authorities, as well as by the officers of the company on whose line it happens, and when carelessness or negligence is proved, the guilty officials are punished. On one of the French railroads the misplacement of a switch, which turned the train from its proper course, was followed by the sentence of the switch-man to a heavy fine and term of imprisonment, although no one was seriously injured. In another case a division superintendent was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for the delay of a train, resulting in a collision by which one passenger was killed and others wounded. In this country the heaviest

penalty awarded for such offences would be dismissal from the employ of the company—although such a disgrace would not prevent the guilty person from engaging elsewhere in the same position. Or, perhaps, a coroner's jury will be empaneled to take evidence, and the result will be a vote of censure. An illustration is seen in the case of Griffin, the Erie engineer, whose carelessness caused the recent disaster at Mast Hope, and who was lately acquitted after a formal trial, in which his guilt was clearly proved by the evidence adduced. Pecuniary damages are sometimes awarded to a few of the principal sufferers, who can afford to sue the companies, but beyond this nothing is ever done and the matter is quickly forgotten.

We do not expect too much of the railroad companies. It is unreasonable to demand that railroad travel shall be attended with no risk; but it cannot be denied that it may be made far safer than it now or ever has been in the United States. The fact that, with but few exceptions, accidents are prevented in Europe, and that in these cases somebody can be held responsible and punished accordingly, shows that with a system of management equally perfect in all its details, the number of casualties occurring on American Railroads might at least be greatly reduced.

THE LOUISVILLE CONVENTION.

Before the war, Southern Commercial Conventions were common enough. There was, however, much of fretfulness and dissatisfaction in them, and they were most emphatically sectional. Since the war, this has all changed, several commercial conventions having been held at the South, but in each there has been manifest far more of a national spirit than had animated their predecessors. The last great gathering was at Louisville, Ky., on the 13th inst., to which delegates appeared from 29 States. Of the whole number, (more than 520 in all,) 277 were from Southern States, 107 from Western, and 32 from the Eastern and Middle States. The Convention had for its presiding officer Ex-President Fillmore, and on the roll of its delegates were many prominent merchants and representative men of business from the various States from which delegates appeared. There was manifest a generous patriotism, a comprehensive public spirit, a forbearing disposition and an intelligent view of the great cereals of the country in the development of its resources, so that all sections should be benefited. If local or sectional ideas obtruded themselves, or if politics appeared, these opinions were checked or modified and the action taken was for the good of all.

In arranging the business of the Convention, committees were appointed, and reports were made on the following subjects:

1. On Southern Pacific Railroad.
2. On Railroads in General.
3. On Direct Trade with Europe.
4. On Immigration.
5. On Finance and Banking.
6. On Manufactures and Mining.
7. On the Mississippi Levees and Improvements.
8. On the Tennessee river and its Improvements.
9. On River Navigation, Canals and other Improvements.
10. On Agriculture.
11. On continuous Water Communication between the Mississippi river and the Atlantic seaboard.
12. On the removal of obstructions to a cheap and easy outlet through the Mississippi into the Gulf.
13. On Miscellaneous Business.

With regard to the Southern Pacific Railroad there were three reports, one from a committee of the late convention at Memphis, and a majority and minority report from the committee appointed by the present convention. A vast array of statistics was given, and the whole subject was reviewed at great length. The conflicting views related chiefly to the termini of the road, and to the parallel of latitude in which it should be constructed; but the route finally determined upon was on the 32d parallel, leaving to the legislation of Congress the terminus on the Mississippi river. Closely allied to this question was a discussion of the influence of this railroad in inducing immigration, in opening new markets and in putting an end to the difficulties with the Indians. The resolution embodying the views of the convention upon this point was as follows:

Resolved. That this convention memorialize Congress to grant the right of way and such subsidies as may seem just to a Southern Pacific railroad from San Diego, Cal., via the junction of the rivers Colorado and Gila, along the valley of the Gila, and south of the same to El Paso, on the Rio Grande, and thence to a convenient point near the 32d parallel of north latitude east of the Brazos or near that river in the State of Texas; to which main trunk feeder-roads may be built from Leavenworth, St. Louis, Kansas City, Cairo, Vicksburg, Memphis, New Orleans and Galveston on the east, and Guaymas, Mazatlan and San Francisco on the west, and such other roads on the east or west as may be desired, with equal right of connection to all.

The second subject in the order of business was "Railroads in General." The committee wisely refrained from specifying local objects. They recommended co-operation in railroad management, the remedy of breaks and obstructions in railway lines, the connection of tracks and uniformity of gauge. In their resolutions they urge the building of railroads to the Gulf ports, in order to make an outlet for produce which seeks a market in the West Indies, in Mexico and South America, and they advocated

the system of low fares to persons intending a settlement. They also recommended the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad.

"Direct trade with Europe" was the third subject which engaged the time of the Convention, we have not the space to give any portion of the interesting discussion upon this point. The Committee recommend the organization of steamship lines between this country and Europe, and the subsidizing of the lines by Congress. They ask for a modification of the navigation laws so that Americans may purchase foreign ships; they demand the abolition of the tariff on shipbuilding material, and they ask Congress to declare ports of entry all cities in the West and South which have a population of 100,000 and upward.

The general subject of "Immigration" attracted much attention and elicited a spirited debate. The convention favored the introduction of a million Europeans, and a comprehensive plan of enlightening Europe upon the advantages of the region below 36° 30', and of making known the climatic conditions and industrial resources was reported. As the General Agent in this matter M. F. Maury was recommended. Chinese immigration provoked a marked dissonance of opinion. It was concluded to leave that matter to the States and to private interests. The debate on this question was mainly confined to Southern delegates, and considering the fact that the Convention at Memphis was so decidedly in favor of Asiatic labor, the result reached here shows perhaps not so much a change in Southern sentiment as it does the general discussion of the subject and the expression of hostile views by men who were not members of the Memphis Convention, but who have reviewed its action.

On the subject of "Banking and Finance" the Committee made the following report, the recommendations of which it will be seen, coincide in the main with the views and plans expressed and proposed by Senator Sumner:

1. The wealth of a country consists in the net value of its productions, and all financial measures must be determined in the light of this fact.

2. Currency is not a product of a country, and is not property, but only a medium to facilitate the exchange of property.

3. Currency values of property and an irredeemable currency regulate themselves by each other, so that except temporarily, the amount of irredeemable currency in circulation in no manner regulates the ease of the money market, or influences the rate of interest.

4. An irredeemable currency retards production by the fact that it measures the value of property so unsteadily as to destroy confidence. It prostrates industry, unsettles society, and should be and can be banished from the nation's exchanges; therefore

Resolved, That Congress be requested to enact at once:

1. A free banking law, with efficient and certain measures for prompt redemption of currency, with a proviso that currency is to be issued only as fast as legal tender notes are redeemed and destroyed until specie payments are resumed.

2. Direct the Secretary of the Treasury to cancel and destroy all legal tender notes that come in his possession as fast as the net income of the Government will

allow. In case national bank currency is applied for faster than it can be furnished under the conditions herestated, preference to be given first to the South and second to the West, until the whole currency in circulation be equalized upon the basis of population.

3. Direct the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate all his actions by the wants and necessities of the Government, and leave the people to manage their money markets and their business in their own way.

The proceedings of a meeting of Southern gentlemen held in Washington in July were submitted to the Convention. These gentlemen proposed to planters to sell their products for gold only, and asked for the establishment of banks under State laws on a gold-coin basis. In regard to taxation the Convention asked for a repeal of the law of 1801, providing for a Direct Land Tax. The tax, they allege, is not imperatively needed by the Government, and its collection would fall heavily upon the South. In the North and West the tax was collected at the time, but the condition of affairs at the South required it to stand over until after the war. On the subject of revenue the Committee recommend the modification of the tariff. They also said that "the present system of Internal Revenue taxation should be simplified so that the revenue shall be derived from a few sources, and those such as tax the follies, extravagancies, and vices of the people, rather than the honest industry of the country. They recommend that the Internal Revenue should be collected from taxes upon the following articles: Licenses, stamps, tobacco, liquors distilled spirits, and from land sales, fines, and forfeitures."

From these sources they anticipate a revenue of \$327,000,000, a sum deemed more than sufficient to meet the expenses of the Government to pay the interest on the debt and to provide a sinking fund of one per cent, which, in thirty years, would liquidate the debt.

The Committee on the "Mississippi Levees" favored the construction of these works on a general plan to be inaugurated by the Federal Government. It was remarked that under the former system of labor the planter had often scores or even hundreds of hands whom he at once could set to work if occasion occurred, but that now no such force was at his disposal.

A report was also made in favor of the improvement of the Tennessee river, the removal of obstructions from the Mississippi, and such a regulation of bridges as will secure navigation from needless obstruction, and at the same time afford reasonable facility for railroad and other traffic across these streams.

The report on continuous Water Communication between the Mississippi River and the seaboard was in the interest of what is called the "Central Water line," through Virginia. But that part of the report was modified and altered and no State interest was especially commend-

ed. The Convention, however, was decidedly and with good reason in favor of cheap transportation so as to bring the products of the West into safe competition with production elsewhere in the governing markets of the world.

The twelfth subject in the order of business above given, was treated of by a Committee "on Harbors, Channels and Bars of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts." They offered the following preamble and resolutions which were adopted:

WHEREAS, All the harbors and bars and navigable waters of the Gulf and Atlantic coast belong properly to the United States, by purchase of Louisiana and Florida from Spain, and by the articles of annexation of Texas; and by treaty with the mother country; and whereas, the development of the industry and creation of trade over the countries, States, and Territories are dependent upon these harbors and bars; therefore be it resolved,

1. That it is the duty of the Government of the United States to protect and improve these bars and harbors to an extent indicated by the present and prospective trade of the same.

2. That in consideration of the foregoing premises, and the reasons assigned for the same in the accompanying report, this Convention does recommend to the Government's fostering care and improvement, the bars and harbors at the ports of Wilmington and Savannah; Mobile Bay, at Atchafalaya Bay, at the Sabine Pass, at Galveston Bay, at the mouth of the Brazos River, at Pass Cavallo and at Pass Aransas.

This concludes a general review of the action of this Convention, which adjourned to meet next year at Cincinnati. It was as we have said, harmonious, and though it is without power, yet its recommendations, as the mature thought of men of business, are worthy of careful study and consideration. They have at least the merit of directness and they are designed to develop the resources and advance the prosperity of the country. The Convention brought men of all parts of the Union together and so far effected an exchange of ideas which cannot fail to be beneficial. On some of the subjects discussed we shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

REDUCTION OF TAXATION.

A strong effort is to be made in the next session of Congress to obtain a remission of a part of the Internal Revenue taxation. There is no doubt that a part of the depression and languor which afflicts the material interests of the country and impairs its productive power, is due to the pressure of ill-advised and unwisely laid taxes. In consequence of the vigor and fidelity with which the Internal Revenue Law has been administered we have a surplus of fifty millions or more in the Federal Treasury. It is the pressure of this excess of income on expenditure that has given new impetus to the question of remitting the taxes, and has made it possible to give a favorable answer to the demand. In a few weeks Congress will assemble, and

it is well to look over the whole case and to lay down some general principles by which we can guide ourselves to a right decision of some, at least, of the important points involved.

And in the first place, taxes cannot be allowed to remain as they are. The people will not submit to the pressure of heavier taxation than is needful to pay the interest of the debt and the expenses of an economical administration of the government. Were the material interests of the country vigorous and unimpaired, and had not their prosperity been deranged by the unprecedented monetary spasms of the last six months, it might be practicable to keep up the present scale of taxation, so as to secure a handsome annual surplus to be devoted to the reduction of the principal of the debt. Desirable as that policy might be, however, it has to be made subordinate for the present to the paramount obligation of preserving the material prosperity of the country and of preventing an impoverishment of the national wealth and productive efficiency. Whenever we turn it is evident that legitimate commerce and trade are less profitable than formerly. Complaints are general that small capitalists feel it almost impossible to carry on their business and to stand up against the fierce competition which they have to sustain with the more ample capital of others around them. There is evidently a great change in progress in this respect. Formerly the small capitalists in this country seemed to have almost equal facilities in every department of business with men of larger means; but the tide of events now is settling rapidly in the opposite direction, and there is more and more tendency to accumulate capital in large masses. We have several times pointed out in the *MAGAZINE* the inevitable result, as one of the effects of paper currency and of the inflated and unstable value which never fail to be developed where the specie standard monetary equilibrium is lost. The same law which we have shown to rule in Wall street is growing every year more pervasive in its force, and more general in its sway, until it embraces almost all departments of our industrial life. These tendencies are well worthy of more attention than they have received from our financial statesmen. It would be easy to show that our internal revenue taxation has contributed not a little to increase the disadvantages of small capitalists, and to facilitate their absorption by their more opulent rivals. This discussion is, however, foreign to our present purpose, which is simply to point out one of the directions in which our tax-reform machinery should operate. Whatever taxes tend to clog our internal industry, to fetter the productive powers of the country, to give large capitalists undue advantages over small capitalists, to check the operation of our producers, and to hinder the free circulation of our industrial wealth—all such taxes should be forthwith repealed as pernicious. This principle applies of course, in the first place and most directly, to our

internal taxation, both that levied on manufacturing industry, and especially on the product of skilled labor. One of the chief points of the fiscal policy of any nation should be to unfetter industry, and as far as possible to guard against all interference on the part of revenue officials with the processes by which the labor of its population imparts new values to the rude materials of wealth.

These fundamental principles of taxation are universally admitted in theory. But the difficulty is, that in practice nothing is so difficult as their wise application. Still the attempt has to be made. Congress will have the agreeable task of taking off some fifty millions of taxes, and what we have to do is to decide which are the most galling, the most mischievous, the most obnoxious to just objection, the most opposed to the true principles of fiscal science, the most detrimental to the best interests of the country.

We do not design in this place to give an exhaustive statement of what Congress ought to do in revising the internal revenue tax list. We content ourselves with simply laying down the paramount principles which must be obeyed and pointing out the general direction of the path which Congress will do well to take. The details of the tax reform will come up for frequent discussion hereafter. For if we mistake not, fiscal questions are destined to assume a prominence before Congress greater than has ever been accorded to them before in this country.

Whatever difference of opinion may be provoked with regard to the taxes to be taken off and repealed about those to be left standing, there is we presume little doubt. There are the taxes on spirits, on tobacco, on stamps, and for a time we fear the income tax. With these honestly assessed and faithfully collected, we should probably be able to repeal almost all the rest of our internal taxation and thus relieve our domestic producers from a weight which is felt to be oppressive and may soon become almost intolerable.

LIABILITY OF RAILROADS FOR TAKING EXTRA FARE.

A decision has been recently made by the Hon. Charles P. Kirkland as referee in the case of Philo Johnson *vs.* The Hudson River Railroad Company, a correct understanding of which is of great importance to the different railroad companies of the State. The case will, of course, be carried up from the referee's decision and passed upon finally by the Court of Appeals, and may be reversed; but yet it seems to us hardly probable, after studying the opinion, that any change will be made in the judgment by the higher courts. In fact, the referee stated that

he had given the subject the most careful consideration, and earnestly endeavored to find a way of escape for the company from the payment of a sum so large in amount and apparently so disproportioned to their offence, but adds that he was unable to discover that way.

It appears that by the 17th section of the charter of the Hudson River Railroad the company is restricted in its charges for way travel to two and one-half cents per mile in the winter, and two cents during the residue of the year. By an act passed February 5, 1850, the word "winter" was stricken out of this section, and the words "December, January, February and March" were substituted. By chapter 185 of the Laws of 1857 the defendants and all railroad companies were authorized, for any distance less than one mile, to take the legal fare for one mile. The distance from Spuyten Duyvil to the railroad station at West Twenty-ninth street was over ten miles, but less than eleven. Thus, by the above acts, the railroad company was authorized to charge and receive of the plaintiff for his fare between those two points $27\frac{1}{2}$ cents in December, January, February and March, and 22 cents in the other months of the year. They actually charged and received 30 cents during the four months above mentioned, and 25 cents during other months. In 1857 the Legislature passed an act (chapter 185) entitled "An Act to Prevent Extortion by Railroad Companies," which provides that "any railroad company which shall ask and receive a greater rate of fare than is allowed by law shall forfeit \$50, which sum may be recovered, together with such excess, by the party paying the same." Between the 10th day of May, 1865, and the 9th of May, 1866, both inclusive, the plaintiff was a passenger on the Hudson River Railroad between Spuyten Duyvil and New York 526 times, in going in the morning from his residence and returning in the evening; and the railroad asked and received of the plaintiff each of said times excessive fare, as above stated. On these facts the referee found that the entire amount overcharged to plaintiff on the winter trips amounted to \$3 54, and on the summer trips \$11 47, making in all the sum of \$15 01 overcharged him during the year; that for each of these overcharges the defendant was liable in a fine of \$50, to be paid the plaintiff according to the statute; and therefore rendered a judgment against the railroad company for \$26,315.

To this conclusion of the referee the railroad company took exception, first, on the ground that under the General Railroad Act of 1850 they were entitled to charge the plaintiff the fare they did charge, section 49 of that act authorizing, as they claimed, all railroad corporations, as well those existing on the 2d day of April, 1850, as those afterward formed, to charge three cents per mile, and no more; in other words, that it fixed a uniform rate of three cents for all. Necessarily, if this position is cor-

rect, all existing railroads whose fares were less than three cents could raise them to that sum, and all whose fares were more must reduce them accordingly.

There were then more than fifty railroad corporations in this State ; many of the roads completed and in operation, and others in process of construction and near completion ; many millions of capital had been invested in them, and they extended over many hundreds, if not thousands, of miles in the State. Provision as to fare was made in all their charters ; in some the rate was not limited, but in others, the rate was fixed, as in the Lockport and Niagara Road, at 4 cents ; Oswego and Syracuse, at 5 cents ; Utica and Schenectady at 4 cents ; Buffalo and Niagara Falls at 4 cents ; Auburn and Syracuse at 4 cents ; Syracuse and Utica at 4 cents ; Troy and Schenectady, 6 cents ; (Northern Ogdensburg to Rouse's Point) at 4 cents, etc. In fact, the time of the passage of that Act, the Hudson River Railroad Company was the only Company in the State whose fare was limited to less than 3 cents. It follows, therefore, that if, by the Act of 1850, the defendants' rate of fare was raised to three cents, then the fare of all railroads, at that time entitled to 4, 5, and 6 cents, was, by the same Act, reduced to 3 cents. While the power of the Legislature thus to raise and to reduce cannot be disputed, it will not be denied that their intention to do the latter, at least in the case of those railroads (and there were many of them) which were at that-moment, in a financial sense, almost in their death struggles, must be manifested in a most clear, decisive, and unmistakable manner, and not left to ingenious verbal construction.

Such being the contemporary existing facts, let us, in the light they afford, examine the provisions of the Act itself.

The title of the Act is, as stated above, "An Act to authorize the formation of Railroad Corporations, and to regulate the same." Its object and intent was to create new railroad companies and adopt a general system for them. Whatever parts relate to existing railroads formed no part of the primary object of the Act, and such parts being comparatively incidental, must, on general principles of construction, be carefully scrutinized, and not extended beyond their plain and manifest purport. The section relied on to show that the Act, so far as it relates to fare, applies to all existing companies, and fixes a uniform rate of 3 cents, which cannot be exceeded, is the 49th ; the only part of the Act relating to fare is the 9th subdivision of § 28, which provides that "the compensation for any passenger shall not exceed three cents per mile." The first sentence of § 49 declares that all existing railroad corporations "shall possess all the powers and privileges contained in the Act, and be subject to all the duties, liabilities, and provisions, not inconsistent

with the provisions of their charter, contained in sections 9, 13, 14, etc., 28 (except sub. 9), 30, etc., etc." Here we see that subdivision 9 of section 28, the only part of the Act in any manner affecting the rate of fare, is expressly excepted from the operation of § 49. How, then, can it even plausibly be contended that that subdivision invests the Hudson River Road with power to raise their fare, in some cases 20 per cent, in others 50 per cent, and in others 45 per cent?

The Company's defense is not aided by the U. S. Rev. Acts, authorizing railroad companies to add the tax to the fare. The amount of tax authorized being two and one-half per cent on the gross receipts, if added to the defendants' charter fare, would not have amounted to the fare charged plaintiff. It would have added less than one cent to each sum paid by plaintiff. It has been held by the New York Common Pleas that this Act was inoperative on the ground that it was incapable of enforcement, there being no currency in which the tax, if it did not amount to one cent, could be paid. This difficulty was remedied by an Act of Congress of July, 1866; this act was subsequent to this transaction.

Other points were discussed on the argument and in the opinion of the referee, but it is unnecessary for us to refer to them here. The above presents the main question raised and the mode of its disposal. The decision is of great interest to all roads in the State, showing, as it does, the liability to which they subject themselves by each excessive charge for fare. It is proper to add, that so far as the Hudson River Road is concerned, its excessive charge for fare was corrected about the time this suit was brought, and that all other claims for the penalty on account of the illegal rates of that period demanded and taken are now barred by the Statute of Limitations.

BUSINESS CHANGES AT THE SOUTH—THE PAST AND FUTURE.

As one result of the political, social and commercial revolution which has passed over the Southern States, there is a marked change in the method of doing business. Formerly the proprietors of large estates made purchases for the multitudes of hands whom they employed. The planter was a sort of small jobber, or large retail dealer who provided for those dependent upon him everything they needed in the way of clothing, food, shoes, medicines, &c., &c. He purchased his supplies in large quantities, both of domestic and imported goods, buying either of the dealer in the large cities or of the merchant of his neighborhood, who kept in store a large stock. With the changes effected by the war came

a change here. The planter no longer had hundreds dependent on him. He had to make purchases only for himself and family. His former slaves became grouped in families, and family self-dependence began. Each was the purchaser of what he needed or desired. He supplied his own wants. Forthwith there sprang up a host of small shops in the South, managed by ignorant and incompetent men, who soon failed and went out of business. The old dealers grew stronger from month to month and enlarged their business. They drew around them a new class of customers. The negroes on their small holdings produced such crops as they could, and with the proceeds purchased goods. It was no longer dealing by wholesale. The small tools of the farm and garden, the iron and tin ware and crockery for houses, harness for animals, shoes, clothing, groceries; in fine all the varied wants and needs of an agricultural community became matters of individual and separate interest to the whole people, and a new phase came over Southern trade.

The minor villages, the corners and cross roads, buyers from which were heretofore unknown in Northern markets, familiar as they were in Southern centres like Mobile, Savannah, Macon, Charleston, &c., &c., now deal directly with the North; and there has also grown up a wider and more general system of commercial traveling than has ever before prevailed at the South. These travelers go from New York and Philadelphia, and from the manufacturing towns, and solicit direct trade with those with whom business was formerly done by the intervention of the Southern jobber or merchant.

So too the general business of the South, which was small at the end of the war, has steadily increased, and is assuming large dimensions, while it is in a more healthy condition than ever before. The merchants come North this season with cash or requiring very short credits, while the vastly increased number of independent "customers" in the Southern States enhances the demand for goods both in quantity and variety. At the same time the demand for the finest class of goods is increasing. The new wants and methods of trade are the direct outgrowth of the new system of labor.

This changed business at the South requires for its transaction an increased volume of currency. Business transactions are more numerous, and the interchange of commodities being more active, a large quantity of circulation is requisite to keep pace with the accelerated rate of the community. There is a change also in the method of moving the crops. Formerly, the factor who took the product of a great plantation working one or two hundred hands, made advances on this crop. The merchant also made advances. Now the same quantity of cotton is raised by a score or more of men, with each of whom a proportionate credit

is created at the factor's or the merchant's. The negro comes in also as a proprietor, and he has his four bales or his twenty bales to sell. The community is raising its own food far more than formerly, hence there is a renewed activity in domestic exchanges, and the cotton which formerly went for the purchase of grain and wheat now is a surplus, to be sold for cash. In this way too is the condition of the South improved and its prosperity placed on broader and firmer foundations.

The large cities of the West are making an effort to extend their trade with the South, and every fresh railroad built is a new means of securing a foothold there. There is a value and a certainty to the Southern crop which makes the promise of a sure and stable business, and none are keener to discover new relations than the business men who are to take advantage of them. There is an evident disposition, and one strongly developed in the South, to institute a system of manufactures. They have water power, and they propose to utilize it. They have iron and coal, and they can utilize them. They have cotton, why should they not spin it? There is a climate and a soil favorable to a most diversified industry, and there is no reason, not easily overcome, why they should not have the busy centres which are so frequently met with in other portions of the Union. If population is needed, that will come when enterprise is rewarded and labor is well paid. If capital is needed, that will flow in where it may confidently hope for profitable investment. Whatever may happen, the future can be but prosperous and bright. The cotton crop of 2,493,000 bales has a valuation of \$280,000,000. To this may be added the value of rice and tobacco, and sugar and corn, and the very large sum that is realized in the production of the minor crops which now form an important element in Southern agriculture.

A recent writer in a Mobile paper suggests that the cotton crop should be kept at its present dimensions in order that the present high price may rule. He therefore discourages emigration and any means by which the volume of labor would be increased. The fallacy herein suggested finds no favor among the thinking classes at the South, which shows a disposition to produce to its utmost possible limit. Scarcity cannot be organized, nor should it be, so long as any man is without clothing or food or a roof to shelter him. Increased and cheapened production must be the rule in every enlightened community. It is the only path to general comfort, happiness and wealth.

The conclusion briefly stated of these remarks is, that the South is growing stronger and richer every year; that it offers such a market as it has never done before; that manufactures are to be instituted there; that the changed course of business demands an increase of currency and a new method of dealing on the part of the great commercial centres,

and that in the new development of so large and populous and important a portion of the Union, the whole country will find its prosperity expanded, quickened and assured.

A FOREIGN LOAN.

Mr. C. S. P. Bowles, a prominent American banker, of Paris, has written to the Secretary of the Treasury, with the object of reviving, in a somewhat new form, the defunct scheme of a foreign loan. He proposes to us to issue a new series of 4 per cent non-taxable bonds, the interest on which shall be payable in London, Paris, or New York, at the option of the holder. These bonds, he thinks, can be negotiated at par, if, before we negotiate them, we pay off our matured Five-Twenties in gold. The National banks, he says, would at once accept the new bonds, and receive four per cent instead of six per cent as at present. In this Mr. Bowles is right. The banks are creations of the Government, and may be compelled to accede to this proposition by a law passed for that purpose. Indeed, there are a large number of the friends of the National banks who are of opinion that the banks ought to receive no more than four per cent on such bonds as they deposit as security for their currency. One-half of the profits of the currency-issuing privilege ought, they claim, to be the property of the Government. Our National banking system is a great benefit to the country, and offers advantages to the country far superior to any ever enjoyed under the old system of State banking, under which many millions were lost every year by uncurrent money, broken banks, and other incidents of the exploded system. Still the benefits of the National banks may be purchased at too high a price, and the banks, it is urged, should be content to receive four per cent interest, instead of six per cent on their bonds. This project has often been proposed, and there is nothing new in Mr. Bowles' version of it. Nor, indeed, has it anything to do with his proposed foreign loan.

The principles on which Mr. Bowles rests his scheme are two; first, that Europe is the reservoir of capital and secondly, that we can draw from that reservoir, presenting our own terms and fixing our own rate of interest. He points to the great French loans to show how abundant money is in Europe, and he asks us why, with the credit of this great country, we should not get in Paris and London as much money as we want, at a low rate of interest. We could do this, he says, and save immensely in annual interest by the doing of it. The new Tri-currency Consols, which he proposes to issue at 4 per cent, would take the place of the existing 6 per cent Five-Twenties, and he supposes that the holders of

the latter would be glad to make the exchange. These are the essential features of his plan, which does not much differ, as will be seen, from other schemes for foreign loans, of which a number are always proposed at every session of Congress. What Mr. Bowles fails to show is by what magic he will induce persons, who can buy our 6 per cent bonds at 90 or lower, to give 100 for bonds having only four per cent interest. It is true, he says that our credit will receive an impulse if we pay off the principal of our bonds immediately in gold. But suppose this were so. how are we to get the means to pay off these old Five-Twenties? Must we not get these means by the sale of the new bonds? And must not the new bonds be sold before the old ones can be redeemed? How, then, can the new bonds be sold at the enhanced price? The advance which would be produced by their payment might benefit a clique of speculators, but it would be at an advance loss to our National Treasury, if any such scheme should be tried and the scheme itself must inevitably be abortive. But this is not all. Can Mr. Bowles really think, on reflection for a moment, that our credit would be permanently raised abroad if we could, by some manoeuvring, adopt his scheme? What are the facts? We find our annual interest too heavy a burden to be easily borne. To reduce the burden by one-third we pay off our whole debt in gold, and pay it off with borrowed money. By this payment with borrowed money we are to be enabled so to improve our credit that we can borrow at four per cent when we previously had to pay six per cent. Mr. Bowles proposes to raise 1,200 millions for us at four per cent, that, with its proceeds, we may pay off 1,200 millions of debt now at six per cent. Supposing, we say, that the substitution were to be attempted, who does not see that the effect of it would be to lower our credit rather than to raise it? For whatever deranges and disturbs large masses of bonds, always tends to depress them in the market, and to unsettle their value as investments. If Mr. Bowles had been more conversant with Wall street, and with the ingenious schemes for funding our national debt which have been discussed there during the last seven or eight years, he would not be so surprised as he seems to be that his own schemes has found so little favor. As to this writer's statements that Europe is the centre and source of capital, we are not sure that we understand his meaning. We remember, in the early years of the war, the *London Times* used frequently to repeat this axiom, and argued from it that as John Bull would not lend us a penny we must stop fighting. This financial argument, if Mr. Bowles wishes to repeat it, we must confute now, as we did then, by pointing to our immense popular loans, especially the earliest Five-Twenty loan of 1862, and the last Seven-Thirty loan of 1866. The former of these was made when the resources of this country were undeveloped, and

in confusion at the outbreak of the war; and the latter when, after we had passed through the struggle, and was exhausted with the stupendous struggle through which we had passed we still contrived, in one single year, to raise among ourselves, and without foreign help, no less than 1,800 millions of dollars. We point to either or to both of these great loan efforts of this country, and we challenge Mr. Bowles to produce in the financial history of France, England, or of any other nation, aught that will compare with them. They are, and were, the wonder of foreign nations, and the glory and triumph of our own. How, with these vast resources, we are still compelled to pay so high a rate of interest is a question to which many answers have been given. As to the methods by which we are to put matters on a more satisfactory footing, there is also great diversity of opinion. But assuredly the goal is not to be reached in the way pointed out by Mr. Bowles.

COUPON AND REGISTERED BONDS.

[From the Commercial & Financial Chronicle.]

We have heretofore had occasion to call attention to the liberal policy pursued by the Secretary of the Treasury in making public all information in regard to the Government finances, which can be published without detriment to the service. The monthly statements of the public debt are given much more in detail than formerly, and, in regard to all the financial operations of the Government, the utmost publicity is observed, giving to all parties an equal advantage in forecasting the result of such operations, and in shaping their business transactions accordingly. Although this course seems to be the only true and honorable one for a public officer to pursue, when occupying the position of fiduciary agent for the whole people, it has not always been followed, and, at various periods in former years, the complaints against the secrecy of Government operations have been loud and strong.

The subject also seems to warrant these remarks, the more, from the fact that concealment in regard to the affairs of great corporations by their officers and directors, is one of the greatest financial evils of the time, and it would be an unfavorable sign, should the example for such concealment be found in the action of the Government itself. The following statement of the respective amounts of coupon and registered bonds of each issue of United States loans, outstanding on the 30th of September last, has been furnished by the Treasury Department. No similar statement has ever been made before, to our knowledge, not even in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and as the pro-

cess of conversion from coupon to registered bonds has been going on for a long time, the respective amounts of each kind have changed materially since they were originally issued. All the coupon bonds purchased by the Treasury are immediately converted into registered, and \$34,100,950 of coupon bonds had been thus converted up to the 30th of September last :

STATEMENT SHOWING THE AMOUNT OF COUPON AND REGISTERED BONDS OUTSTANDING SEPTEMBER 30TH, 1869.

Act.	When payable.	Coupon.	Registered.	Total.
June 14th, 1859.....	Jan. 1st, 1874	14,755,000	5,245,000	20,000,000
June 22d, 1860.....	Jan. 1st, 1871	973,000	6,049,600	7,022,600
Feb. 8th, 1861.....	Dec. 31st, 1880	5,380,000	13,035,000	18,415,000
March 2d, 1861.....	July 1st, 1881	945,000	945,000
July 17th, 1861.....	June 30th, 1881	74,065,300	115,252,300	189,317,600
Feb. 25th, 1862.....	May 1st, 1882	385,750,000	129,016,550	514,771,600
March 3d, 1863.....	June 30th, 1881	24,328,150	50,671,350	75,000,000
March 3d, 1864.....	March 1st, 1904	66,617,750	127,949,500	194,567,300
March 3d, 1864.....	Nov. 1st, 1884	3,682,500	3,682,500
June 30th, 1864.....	Nov. 1st, 1884	60,833,050	64,728,250	125,561,300
March 3d, 1865.....	Nov. 1st, 1885	139,095,200	64,242,050	203,337,250
March 3d, 1865.....	July 1st, 1885	242,598,300	90,400,650	332,998,950
March 3d, 1865.....	July 1st, 1887	284,404,950	95,184,000	379,588,950
March 3d, 1865.....	July 1st, 1888	32,689,350	9,850,000	42,539,350
		1,332,440,600	775,496,200	2,107,936,800

THE ASSISTANT TREASURERSHIP.]

The choice of a successor in office of General Butterfield becomes a matter of considerable public interest, from the difficulty experienced in finding a suitable person to take the position. There is no actual scarcity of parties possessing the requisite qualifications; but there are few who while competent for the duties are willing to accept the responsibilities for the compensation allowed. The office is one of great importance. The responsibility attached to it exceeds that of any other under the Government. The Assistant Treasurer is custodian of from \$70,000,000 to \$100,000,000 of money—a larger amount, probably, than is held by any fiscal officer in any country. He is responsible not only for the safe keeping of these funds, but also for the faithful and accurate execution of financial transactions aggregating over \$1,000,000,000 per annum. His responsibility extends not only to his own acts, but to the errors of his clerks, their defalcation, acceptance of spurious evidences of debt, their over payments, and in short everything at variance with a correct administration of his immense trusts, whether done directly by himself or through his agents. For the performance of such duties the highest business qualifications are required. The officer must have proved himself, through a long experience, to be a man of unquestionable integrity. He ought to be familiar with the banking system of New York and with all the details of practical finance. As the financial representative of the government at the money centre of the country, he is naturally called

upon, in monetary exigencies to tender opinions and counsel to the Secretary of the Treasury, who being at a distance from the centre of business often finds it impossible to form an independent opinion of the situation of affairs. At times the Secretary of the Treasury must confide to the Assistant Treasurer an absolute discretion in matters of great magnitude and importance affecting the market for money, gold, and securities.

Not only does the performance of these duties call for mature experience in the highest branches of practical finance and for excellent judgement and great prudence, but the public interest demands that who ever occupies this position should possess these qualifications in an eminent degree.

Is it to be expected, however, that one thus qualified would accept the risks, the labor, the responsibility, the worrying criticisms of *ad captandum* writers, and the liability to removal upon changes of administration, for a consideration of \$6,000 per annum? A person competent for such an office can readily command, in other positions, a salary of \$15,000 to \$20,000; and what reason has the Government, or we should rather say our law-makers, to expect that it can secure the requisite ability and character for one-third of that amount? If the officer accepts a compensation below what his abilities would command elsewhere, there is reason for expecting that his official position may be used, in outside operations, for making up the deficiency. In fact, the inadequacy of the salary acts directly as an incentive to speculation, on the part of the holder of the office, based upon the knowledge and facilities growing out of Government transactions. While, therefore, it may not be impossible to find a pure officer for the present salary, yet the lowness of the pay tends to make the incumbents impure; and before we can reasonably expect the Assistant Treasurer to maintain a spotless reputation, we should compensate him in proportion to the value of his services and the reasonable demands of his social position.

But while justice and prudence would demand that Congress should grant a more liberal remuneration for this office, it may be well for Congress, at the same time, to consider whether the period has not arrived for making some change in the manner of receiving, paying out, and holding the government funds. The accumulation of \$100,000,000 of money in the vaults of the Sub-Treasury, held aloof from the business of the country, and alternately distributed and again absorbed in large amounts is productive of serious derangements to the money market and to the general business of the country. While it may be necessary for the Government, in the present condition of its finances, to have large balances at its disposal, yet it is equally important that its funds should be so held

as to be available for facilitating the exchanges of the country and for encouraging its enterprise, now repressed by numerous unnatural agencies, the legacy of war finance. The working of the public finances instead of being conducted outside of the general financial operations of the country, and acting arbitrarily, and often injuriously, upon exchanges, should be so regulated as to form a part of the great whole, the one running into and naturally co-operating with the other. We do not, at present, propose to consider the details for such an arrangement; but the principle is so obviously natural and sound, that it appears to us but to need suggestion in order to command approval. No firm, or corporation, or city, or State, however extensive its capital and operations, finds it necessary or expedient to isolate itself from the banking arrangements of the community, and to erect an agency wholly independent for the transaction of its business; nor is it easy to conceive of adequate reasons for the Government taking an exceptional course. This was a matter of little moment when our disbursements amounted to only a few millions of dollars in a year; but now, when the aggregate receipts and disbursements have increased so largely, the system becomes a source of embarrassment and of actual injury to every interest, involving, as it does, the alternate letting out and locking up of such large sums, and the perpetual idleness of the immense balance it holds, of capital adapted for circulation through the channels of commerce and industry. We think, therefore, that the whole system demands the early attention of Congress.

A GOLD PRICE FOR COTTON.

The desirableness of a return to a stable basis of values is admitted by every one and many are the methods proposed by which that point may be reached. There is at present a want of fixedness and an absence of certainty in business transactions, which all deplore and which must continue while the price of gold or more correctly speaking the value of the greenback is daily and almost hourly changing. For with this large and irredeemable paper currency, thus changing in its purchasing power day by day, prices vary, the spirit of speculation is kept active, and an unhealthy and unsteady tone prevails in all financial and commercial circles.

In no branch of business is this continued fluctuation more unfavorably felt than in the cotton trade. There is now no large margin as formerly in prices between different countries. The telegraph has brought this market and Liverpool and all other cotton markets so closely together that a commission is about all the merchant can secure in any transaction, and

a slight turn in gold can more than wipe out this, leaving a loss as the net result of the operation. In fact so great has the risk become that the careful shipper must buy his gold first and then his cotton. Purchases also, for future delivery (a legitimate business), are rendered, from this same cause, almost as uncertain as a ticket in a lottery.

These facts have long led the Northern cotton merchant, especially those engaged in a foreign business, to desire freedom from our present unstable currency. To await till we return to a specie basis, may require the continuance for years of the existing difficulties; whereas a very simple and immediate remedy, so far as this branch of business is concerned, may be found in selling cotton hereafter for gold; that is, having no currency quotation, but simply a quotation in gold. As is well known, this has always been done in Galveston, and the South generally is in a condition to make the change. At the recent Commercial Convention in Louisville there was presented a communication from Mr. R. W. Latham, of Washington, in which were embodied the views of a meeting of Southern gentlemen, who, in July, passed resolutions in favor of the organization of banks at the South, under State loans and on a coin basis. The meeting resolved that our present paper currency was an undesirable medium of exchange; that the South had less than its proportion of national bank currency; that planters sell their cotton, hemp, tobacco and sugar for coin only; and that they make their labor contracts payable only in specie. The subject referred to in the concluding portions of this resolution has been widely discussed at the South, and is looked upon with favor by leading and influential men, as well as by the journals of that section, as a means of reconstructing our internal commerce upon a sound and safe basis, and avoiding the fluctuations that peril and render uncertain so much of the business of the country.

The cotton crop, at present prices, is worth say \$300,000,000, and of this value nearly two-thirds is taken for export, and goes abroad as the medium of settling our exchanges. Entering thus with controlling influence into our foreign commerce, how essential this change becomes. With it there would be uniformity in price at New Orleans, at Mobile, at Charleston, at New York, and at Liverpool. Purchasers would know what they were buying, and producers would know what they were selling. On the other hand, the present selling currency price, as stated above, must always be first adjusted to the gold value at the moment of purchase, and even then, before the transaction is closed, it is clouded, and its results are, perhaps, materially changed by the varying humors of the Gold Room. With every hour the figure fluctuates; a rise or fall of several per cent may occur in a day, or a week. Gold rings are organized, whose operations utterly paralyze foreign commerce, and a wide-

spread uncertainty and doubt become the rule where order, harmony, stability and fixedness should govern.

The South, also, is now out of debt, and for this reason in an excellent condition to inaugurate this scheme and put it into effective practice. The old debts of the South have either been paid, or where they could not be thus liquidated, they have been wiped out by the Bankruptcy Act. There is not, therefore, any debtor class to suffer by a return to specie payments. At present the merchants from that section are the favorite buyers in our market. They usually come with cash, and have had behind them the immense value of the cotton crop. Formerly the South depended largely, indeed almost entirely, on this great staple, and the money for it was spent before the crop was raised. The changed condition, resulting from the war, has introduced a changed method of agriculture. Industry is more diversified, and attention is paid to the raising of a variety of crops. The food for which they once looked so largely to the northwest is now produced at home in greater quantities than before. They buy fewer products for consumption. They have a large surplus of cotton from the proceeds of which they are accumulating wealth.

But it may be said that the step we have indicated is a step towards the resumption of specie payments. It is certainly a movement in that direction, and for that reason a special benefit to the north. Its influence would be felt in the north and west, and would tend to modify and render more certain business transactions in all parts of the country. Besides, this step is rendered the more necessary in view of the possible action of the Supreme Court of the United States in declaring the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional. There have been intimations that the opinion of this court would be adverse to the legality of the act, and there are very many who believe that the delay in rendering a decision is due to the apprehension of the Court of the effect of a sudden announcement of the conclusion reached by them. Be this as it may, however, much of this apprehension would soon be found to be groundless if a good start was already made in doing an important branch of business upon a specie basis. There would be at least one solid rock of real credit and value upon which commerce could be re-erected, and which would defy whatever tempest and disaster might from any cause result. But the apprehension and dread of those who predict immediate disaster upon a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Legal Tender Act, is according to our view, by no means certain of being realized. No decision of this Court could have a more damaging effect upon the general trade of the country than the late speculations in gold which prostrated the business of the nation as effectually as if it had been stricken by a tornado or upheaved by an earthquake. Prices declined, the import

trade ceased, the export business was checked, confidence departed, and the healthful commercial transactions of the whole country were suddenly and unexpectedly arrested. Such results as these we have seen recently. The "flurry" of a week culminated in a shock which was at once composed by stupefying all the interests that had been perturbed by it. If there had been a price in currency before for cotton, it ceased to have a value then, and no mathematical calculation could solve the intricate mysteries of the market, and bring order out of the confusion that prevailed. Under our present currency system, we are continually liable, and each succeeding year more liable to a recurrence of these gold corners, and it would appear that no decision, however sweeping in its effects, could have a more damaging influence upon the business interests of the country. But more than this, we are led to believe that the government will take such steps that its issues of currency will be redeemable in gold on the announcement of such a decision, and the immediate effect may thus be of far less moment than any imagine. We shall discuss this point more fully on a future occasion.

In view of what has been said would it not be possible and also the part of wisdom for this city to take the lead in this extremely important matter. The cotton is at the South to be sure, but the great body of the capital which makes the exchanges and transacts the business are here. Let cotton factors explode these currency rates at once, quoting cotton in a language intelligible to all the world and not requiring an elaborate arithmetical investigation to render it comprehensible. This staple offers the best point of departure because, as we have already stated, of its great value, and because so much of it enters into export, and is employed in adjusting the balances of the foreign trade. There is a significance about gold dealings in cotton which do not belong to grain or tobacco. They are comparatively modern elements in our commerce with the rest of the world, but they would not long resist the impulse of the new tide on which business would be borne along. They would be lifted from their currency moorings and wafted into an open sea where there was depth, a safe anchorage and ample sea room. If there ever was a time when stability in business should be sought for it is at the present moment. We have learned many lessons by experience, and we grow more assured every day that the real prosperity of the country depends upon a return to specie payments, and upon the subordination of our vast commercial interests to the established principles of financial action.

TRANSPORTATION OF BREADSTUFFS.

In the course of an article in September, on the subject of Breadstuffs, the probable supply, and the demand from Europe, we briefly alluded

to the fact that the matter of transportation might become of unusual importance in its relation to the course of prices. Year by year the centre of the great wheat-growing districts of the United States has been moving westward, until, from being in the Genesee Valley, as it was thirty-five years ago, or in Ohio or Michigan, as it was twenty years ago, it is now on the banks of the Mississippi, or to the westward of that great river. And as the centre of the wheat growing region has moved westward, the quantity which it is necessary to bring to the seaboard every year has increased. The same remark applies, in a less degree, to other cereals—corn, oats, rye, barley, &c.; and the subject of the means provided and the rates paid for the transportation of the vast quantities of breadstuffs now seeking the seaboard from far western fields, is one whose importance is constantly asserting itself.

The serious breaks in the Erie Canal, which were produced by the severe floods of October, and against which no foresight could have guarded, suspended navigation about two weeks, and was attended by various circumstances which gave it unusual importance, and finally forces the whole subject of the transportation of breadstuffs eastward upon public attention. The crop of spring wheat was fully twenty days late this season, and this break occurred just at the time when it began to move, —delaying the first considerable arrivals of spring wheat at this market to about the first of November, instead of the first of October, as usual; giving us, in fact but about one month's free deliveries by canal, instead of two, as usual. Should the weather prove exceptionably favorable, we may have yet five weeks of canal navigation, during which we have to accumulate such a stock of grain in store as will, with the aid of the receipts by rail, enable a steady export movement to be maintained, in addition to the local demand, without giving room for any important advance in prices. But if the canal should be suddenly closed by frost in the last week in November, it would be a serious circumstance.

The period during which the Erie Canal remains closed is usually about twenty weeks—sometimes as many as twenty-two, and often not more than eighteen. The largest accumulation of grain in store at this market, at the close of navigation, has been about fourteen million bushels. The actual wants of this market for consumption are about 85,000 bushels per day; namely, 15,000 bushels wheat, 35,000 bushels corn, 25,000 bushels oats—the balance rye, barley, &c. Thus fourteen million bushels in store will nearly meet the wants of consumption during the winter months. But it often happens that the quantity in store at the close of navigation is unequally divided, there being a surplus of one sort and a deficiency in another. The railroads or speculation must restore the equilibrium.

It is but two years since the railroads began to deliver any considerable quantities of grain at this market. In the fall of 1867, we think, we found at the close of navigation but about 1,500,000 bushels of corn in store—a quantity so notoriously inadequate to our wants, even when supplies from the South were added to it, that a great speculation and a large advance in prices resulted therefrom. These high prices induced the Erie railroad to make the needful preparations to bring forward corn in cars, and very soon we had a supply of from twenty to thirty thousand bushels per day. The speculation broke down, and every legitimate interest was vastly benefited. This marked a new era in the transportation of grain from the West. We have since received large quantities of wheat and oats by the same means. For the eight weeks ending last Friday, the deliveries of grain at this market by rail amounted to the handsome aggregate of 3,412,600 bushels, over 70,000 bushels per business day and nearly equal to the home wants of the market. The Erie road has now many competitors in the business. The New York Central, in connection with the Hudson River, Railroad, and the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Roads, are all engaged in bringing grain to this market.

During the winter season, these roads cannot bring to us so much grain as now. They will then be encumbered with large quantities of perishable products, which usually seek the market in cold weather. Dressed hogs, game, and dressed poultry—these justly claim and receive the preference. But if the deliveries of grain by rail at this market be reduced to 50,000 bushels per day, there would not, even then, be danger of any deficiency in supplies. It is very probable that an accumulation of stocks in December will approximate eight million bushels. The export demand is confined entirely to wheat; and of this, unless the shipments shall be much larger than for the past few weeks, a stock of four million bushels will be ample.

Besides, there are routes to the seaboard from the West other than those leading to New York. Portland is an important point, and nearly monopolizes the export of oats; Philadelphia and Baltimore can get forward liberal quantities of grain by rail. We noticed the other day the charter of a vessel to load wheat at Philadelphia for a British port. This is an unusual circumstance. In former years, that city, as well as Baltimore, drew on us largely for wheat. There remains to be considered the Mississippi route, via New Orleans. It is a long and expensive one, it is true; but during the active export of cotton, ships at New Orleans are glad to get some grain for ballast, and will accept low rates. This may in a measure overcome other obstacles to a movement of grain in that direction.

We conclude, therefore, that although rates for carrying grain from the growing districts to the seaboard are likely to be high for some months to come, there is no danger of such a scarcity of supplies at this market as to promote successful speculation, or seriously interfere with the regular course of shipments to Europe, unless something unforeseen should occur; and we infer that the lateness of the crop of spring wheat, and the break in the Erie Canal, are not likely to be attended with the important effect upon prices which many seem to expect. Still, if they shall attract attention to the growing importance of increased facilities for transporting the products of the West to the seaboard at all seasons of the year, an important service will have been performed.

CONSUMPTION OF COTTON IN EUROPE.

M. Ott-Trumpler, of Zurich, issued about the first of October his interesting annual Circular respecting the cotton consumption of Europe the past season, of which we have received a copy by the last steamer. We can make room this week only for the following tables showing the consumption. The figures represent thousands of bales.

	Ameri- can.	Indi- an.	Bra- zil.	Egypt. dry.	Sun- dry.	Total
Stock in the ports October 1, 1868.....	113	260	102	19	19	513
Imports during the season.....	974	1,025	521	187	140	3,447
Total.....	1,087	1,885	623	206	159	3,960
Exports to the Continent.....	153	626	78	10	17	884
Total in the ports Sept. 30, 1869.....	934	1,259	545	196	142	3,076
Consumption.....	57	346	52	21	13	489
Consumption.....	877	913	493	175	129	2,587

CONTINENT.

Stock, Oct. 1, 1868, at Havre, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, Trieste, and Genoa.....	21	43	13	2	22	101
Imports direct from countries of production at above named ports.....	388	233	121	51	245	1,038
Export from England to the Continent, deduction being made for 11,000 bales, exported from Continent to England.....	153	624	71	9	14	871
Total.....	562	900	205	62	281	2,010
Stock, Sept. 30, 1869, at above ports.....	17	50	14	1	12	94
Consumption.....	545	850	191	61	269	1,916

CONSUMPTION OF EUROPE.

	Ameri- can.	Indi- an.	Brazil.	Egypt. dry.	Sun- dry.	Total.
1868-69.....	1,422	1,763	684	26	388	4,503
1867-68.....	1,735	1,523	708	251	388	4,604
1866-67.....	1,548	1,592	450	215	342	4,147
1865-66.....	1,237	1,613	423	215	387	3,935
1864-65.....	236	1,487	324	374	634	3,055
1863-64.....	242	1,161	208	325	660	2,598
1862-63.....	133	1,454	160	227	163	2,146
1861-62.....	562	1,090	122	164	55	1,993
1860-61.....	3,443	674		271		4,388
1859-60.....	3,407	592		273		4,172

	ENGLISH CONSUMPTION.						CONSUMPTION OF CONTINENT.					
	Ameri- can.	In- dian.	Bra- zil.	Sun- dry.	Egypt.	Total.	Ameri- can.	In- dian.	Bra- zil.	Sun- dry.	Egypt.	Total.
1868-69.....	877	913	493	175	129	2,587	545	850	191	61	269	1,916
1867-68.....	1,197	799	533	189	111	2,829	539	723	175	69	277	1,783
1866-67.....	1,016	815	298	160	125	2,414	532	777	152	55	217	1,733
1865-66.....	846	878	259	186	150	2,319	391	753	164	69	237	1,652
1864-65.....	187	850	203	285	348	1,873	49	637	121	89	286	1,183
1863-64.....	178	620	124	219	414	1,565	64	543	74	106	246	1,033
1862-63.....	99	905	111	163	54	1,332	34	559	49	64	108	814
1861-62.....	304	675	101	122	15	1,217	258	415	21	42	40	776
1860-61.....	2,170	249		193		2,612	1,273	425		78		1,776
1859-60.....	2,135	207		218		2,560	1,272	385		55		1,712

STOCK IN ENGLAND SEPTEMBER 30.

1869.....	489	1867.....	911	1865.....	304	1863.....	217	1861.....	779
1868.....	513	1866.....	945	1864.....	490	1862.....	329	1860.....	954

The following figures show the imports and consumption in Europe in each of the last eight seasons:

	Stocks in Europe Oct. 1.	Imports			Stocks at close of season.	Consumption		
		Ameri- can.	Other countries.	Total.		Total.	Engl'd.	Cont't
1861-62.....	1,019	54	1,364	2,427	368	1,993	1,217	776
1862-63.....	368	121	1,917	2,438	250	2,146	1,348	814
1863-64.....	250	215	2,716	3,181	563	2,568	1,565	1,033
1864-65.....	563	270	2,602	3,415	347	3,055	1,873	1,182
1865-66.....	347	1,565	3,166	5,078	1,143	3,935	2,319	1,616
1866-67.....	1,143	1,495	2,601	5,239	1,099	4,147	2,414	1,733
1867-68.....	1,092	1,572	2,554	5,218	614	4,604	3,622	1,789
1868-69.....	614	1,362	3,110	5,086	583	4,503	2,827	1,916

The receipts at the ports of Spain, Sweden and Russia, from America and other countries, and the consumption in Italy of native cotton, are not included in these tables of consumption.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COTTON MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION, PRESENTED OCTOBER 12, 1869.

At the annual meeting, held in New York, June 30, 1869, the Statistical Report embraced returns from 794 cotton mills, having over 99 per cent of all the spinning machinery in the country. The details and results of the statistics thus obtained appear in the published proceedings of that meeting. We here repeat the statement then made of the home consumption of cotton, North and South, for the year 1867-8, and have, for the greater facility of comparison, changed the quantities from pounds to bales of 466 pounds each, that being the actual average, as is shown by the table of weights appended to this report.

Consumption of cotton, year ending 31st August, 1868:

Consumption of cotton, year ending 31st August, 1868:		Bales of cotton used for spinning.	
Northern Mills.		Spindles.	
Mills returned	608	6,429,974	865,007
Mills estimated	43	50,000	6,833
	736	6,502,974	861,840
Southern Mills.			
Mills returned	161	247,588	76,935
Mills estimated	7	13,000	4,430
	168	260,588	81,365
Used in mills, otherwise than for spinning,			
Quantity returned			24,165
Quantity estimated			80,018 —54,908
Totals	844	6,763,557	987,433
Deduct for exceptional cases in which the quantity reported was the consuming capacity, and not the actual consumption.....			
			81,787
Actual home consumption, North and South, 1867-8.....			
			905,646 bales

This consumption represents the quantity taken by the home mills from the crop of 1867-8, except the small difference in the stocks held by the mills at the beginning and end of the year.

The Committee desiring to obtain the mill statistics for 1868-9, for comparison with those of the previous year, and to facilitate the correct preparation of the annual crop statements,

destroyed, after being baled, has not this year exceeded 4,500 bales. Statistics are worse than useless if not accurate. The question at issue is not merely whether the Southern consumption of cotton in the past year was 2,000 bales or 173,000 bales, though that is an important one; but the question is, whether the public is not misled by receiving as a standard authority a commission radically defective. In the form used by the *Shipping List*, the subtraction of 173,303 bales from the production of the country, instead of 20,000 or 25,000 bales left the "crop" smaller by the excess subtracted.

Thus, if the true Southern consumption only had been deducted, the crop of 1868-9 would have been about 2,350,000 bales assuming that the other data and the method of the *Shipping List* were correct. By similar process the crop of 1867-8 would have been shown to be over 2,500,000 bales; of 1866-7 over 2,100,000 bales; of 1865-6 over 2,300,000 bales, that is, if the several amounts appropriated in excess for Southern use were transferred to the several appropriations for Northern use, and thence counted in the "crop" (as the *Shipping List* always reckoned the Northern consumption in the crop), then the several crops would have been increased, as stated. For instance, the *Shipping List's* annual statement for 1866-7, stated the crop thus:

Total crop of the United States	1,951,988
Stock on hand, 1st September, 1866	283,699
Makes a supply of	2,235,680
Deduct—Exports to foreign ports	1,553,315
Stock on hand, September 1, 1867	80,336
Burnt and manufactured in Virginia	28,673
	<hr/> 1,662,313
Taken for home use north of Virginia	573,367
" " " in Virginia and elsewhere throughout the U. S.	280,673
Total consumed in the United States, including burnt, &c.	854,039

The statement of the Southern consumption at 280,673 bales was so obviously wrong that it was severely assailed at the time, and in its next year's annual statement the *Shipping List* changed the figures in its table, and brought forward the home consumption of 1866-7, thus: North of Virginia, 697,367; elsewhere, 156,673; having taken 184,000 bales from the South and added it to the North, but without any note or other reference to this remarkable change. This increase of the Northern consumption, it will be seen, necessitated a like increase in the crop receipts, because the exports and stocks were fixed facts, and the crop receipts and consumption enough to balance them were the only elastic or convertible quantities.

The statement amended by the *Shipping List's* own figures must have stood thus:

Total crop of the United States, 1866-7	bales. 2,075,988
Stock on hand Sept. 1, 1866.	283,699
Makes a supply of	2,359,680
Deduct—Exports to foreign ports	1,553,315
Stocks in ports Sept. 1, 1867	80,336
Burnt and manufactured in Virginia	28,673
	<hr/> 1,662,313
Taken for home use, north of Virginia	697,367
Taken for home use in Virginia and elsewhere	156,673
Total consumed in the United States (including burnt, &c.)	854,039

If the crop had been so stated, what would have become of the contracts, &c., that were settled in accordance with the *Shipping List's* statement, making the crop less than two million bales?

So much to illustrate the untrustworthy character of the system that has been followed. Returning to the details of the last crop, the committee present the following as a true statement of the entire production of cotton for 1868-9 in the United States:

Home uses—In mill's North, spun	bales. 767,512
In mill's South, spun	64,998
In mill's North and South, not spun	31,744
In mill's North and South, added to stock	50,000
In home spinning, &c., South	7,500
Burnt or otherwise destroyed after packing	4,590
	<hr/> 926,254
Exports foreign, as per New York tables	1,443,000
" " to and through Canada	18,000
	<hr/> 1,466,000
Disposed of through the year	2,392,254
Deduct—Difference in stock in ports:	
Stock 1st September, 1868	33,130
Stock 1st September, 1869	12,343
	<hr/> 20,787
Total production, 1868-9	2,366,467

The committee, after a careful examination of every point involved, feel entire confidence in the substantial correctness of the statement of the crop of 1868-9 which they have presented above. Yet they would not wholly rely upon any one method or form of statement or collation of facts, if another is practicable.

As in the statistics of cotton, quantities are usually stated in bales, the committee have deemed it quite important that the true average weights of bales of United States cotton, should be accurately ascertained, and they have instituted inquiries to this end.

In calling for returns from the mills of their actual consumption the past year, it was requested that the answers should be in both pounds and bales. The request was generally complied with; seventy per cent (in consuming capacity) of the Northern mills reported in the form desired, and, with a very few exceptions, in such detail as to indicate that their books had been carefully consulted.

From these returns it appeared that of 838 mills, consuming 244,509,147 pounds, which was 80 per cent of the whole consumption, or 525,441 bales, each bale averaged 465.34 pounds.

The following averages for the several localities stated have been deduced from a great number of invoices from each. Applying these averages to the quantities produced in the same localities, we have the following result for 1868-9:

	Bales.	Average.	Pounds.
New Orleans and Texas	943,022	465	436,619,189
Mobile	280,726	477	114,670,822
Savannah	307,259	478	169,895,175
Charleston	189,948	440	87,594,929
Memphis and vicinity	314,645	474	162,025,340
Nashville, &c. (inland)	131,000	460	60,260,000
Virginia and North Carolina	65,420	425	27,803,500
	2,270,909	466.45	1,059,208,948

The average net weight of all the American (United States) cotton received at Liverpool the last three years was 444 pounds per bale. As gross weights are always given in our statistics, the tare (equal to 4½ per cent of the gross weight) must be added to this average, and the result will be an average of 465 pounds. A further test has been made by the committee. By the courtesy of manufacturers and merchants of Boston dealing in cotton, they collected from them the actual invoice weights of nearly 180,000 bales, taken without selection, of the crop of 1868-9, as follows:

	Bales.	Pounds.	Average weight.
From merchants	86,561	87,256,591	474.81
From manufacturers	93,564	44,167,287	473.06
Total	179,125	81,423,878	473.13

Of this the greater part was from Memphis, Mobile, Savannah and New Orleans, and its average is above the average of the whole crop.

As the result of these several inquiries, we have the following:

Average weight of bales—As per returns of Northern mills	465 3-10
Invoices from Southern markets	466½
Liverpool weights, with tare restored	465
Boston weights	473½

And these result in the common average used by the committee, at 465 pounds per bale for the whole crop.

Respectfully submitted.

THE STATE DEBT OF ARKANSAS.

The State of Arkansas in 1827 and 1838 issued bonds to the amount of one million seven hundred and seventy-two thousand dollars, to establish a banking institution in that State.

The failure of the banks to which the bonds were issued, and which were expected to pay the interest upon them semi-annually, left these obligations unprovided for, and since 1841 the State has been in default in regard to them.

The Legislature of Arkansas at its last session passed an act authorizing the issue of new bonds in payment of the principal and interest upon the whole debt. The new bonds amount, with back interest, to the sum of four million four hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars; they have been issued, and are now ready to be exchanged at the American Exchange National Bank in this city; and provision has been made by law for raising a sufficient amount by taxation to pay the interest upon these new bonds as it becomes due.

This act of the State of Arkansas is honorable to its people, and they will find it advantageous to themselves in the growing prosperity and improved credit of the State.

THE DEBT STATEMENT FOR OCTOBER.

The following is the official statement of the public debt, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns at the close of business on the last day of October, 1869:

Debt bearing interest in Coin.

Character of Issue.	When Payable.	Amount Outstanding.	Accrued Interest.
5's, Bonds.....	After 15 years from January 1, 1859.....	\$20,000 00	\$333,333 33
5's, Bonds.....	After 10 years from January 1, 1861.....	7,022,000 00	117,083 33
5's of 1881.....	After December 31, 1880.....	18,415,000 00	368,300 00
6's, Oreg. War, 81. Redeemable.....	20 years from July 1, 1861.....	945,000 00	18,900 00
6's of 1881.....	At pleas. after 20 years from June 30, '61.....	189,317,300 00	3,736,332 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from May 1, 1862*.....	514,771,000 00	15,443,148 00
6's of 1881.....	After June 30, 1881.....	75,000,000 00	1,500,000 00
5's, 10-40's.....	40 years from March 1, 1864†.....	194,567,300 00	1,621,394 17
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from November 1, 1864*.....	3,882,500 00	116,475 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from November 1, 1864*.....	125,561,300 00	3,766,839 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from November 1, 1865*.....	208,327,250 00	6,099,817 50
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from July 1, 1865*.....	332,986,950 00	6,659,979 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from July 1, 1865*.....	379,586,950 00	2,591,709 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from July 1, 1865*.....	42,539,350 00	850,787 00

Aggregate of debt bearing interest in coin.....\$2,107,936,800 00 \$48,274,187 33
Coupons due, not presented for payment.....3,750,706 25

Total interest.....\$52,024,843 58

Debt bearing interest in Lawful Money.

3's, Certificates. On demand (Interest estimated).....	\$47,640,000 00	\$1,071,900 00
3's, Navy pen. f'd. Interest only applic. to pay. of pensions.....	14,000,000 00	140,000 00

Aggregate of debt bearing interest in lawful money.....\$61,640,000 00 \$1,211,900 00

Debt on which interest has ceased since maturity.

6's, Bonds.....	Matured December 31, 1862.....	\$6,000 00	\$360 00
6's, Bonds.....	Matured December 31, 1867.....	14,150 00	849 0 0
6's, Bonds.....	Matured July 1, 1868 (9 months' inter.).....	58,700 00	2,441 50
5's, Texas indem. Maturity.....	December 31, 1864.....	242,000 00	12,100 00
Var. Tr'y notes, Matured at various dates.....		108,614 64	8,072 85
5 & 6's, Tr'y n'es, Matured.....	March 1, 1859.....	2,400 00	120 0 0
6's, Treas. notes, Matured.....	April and May, 1863.....	3,250 00	195 0 1
7 & 10's, 3 years.....	Matured August 19 and October 1, 1864.....	31,000 00	1,131 50
5's, 1 & 2 years.....	Matured from Jan. 7 to April 1, 1866.....	800,852 00	15,042 6 0
6's, Certif. of ind. Matured.....	at various dates in 1866.....	620 00	720 0 0
6's, Comp. Int. n. Matured.....	June 10, 1867, and May 15, 1868.....	2,576 210 00	406,901 4 6
4 & 6's, Temp. l. Matured.....	October 15, 1866.....	162,410 00	7,564 65
7 & 10's, 3 years.....	Matured August 15, 1867, and June 15, 1868.....	857,400 00	31,295 10

Aggr'te of debt on which int. has ceased since matur.....\$4,389,986 64 \$570,993 16

Debt bearing no interest.

Authorizing acts.	Character of issue.	Amt. outstand.
July 17, 1861 and Feb. 12, 1862.....	Demand notes.....	\$118,253 50
Feb. 25 & July 11, '62, & Mar. 3, '63.....	U. S. legal-tender notes.....	356,000,000 00
July 17, 1862.....	Postal currency.....	87,085,443 39
March 3, 1863 and June 30, 1864.....	Fractional currency.....	28,731,520 00
March 3, 1863.....	Certificates for gold deposited.....	

Aggregate of debt bearing no interest.....\$421,880,226 88

Recapitulation.

	Amount Outstanding.	Interest
DEBT BEARING INTEREST IN COIN—Bonds at 5 p. cent.....	\$221,584,300 00	
Bonds at 6 p. cent.....	1,865,317,500 00	
Total debt bearing interest in coin.....	\$2,107,936,800 00	\$52,024,84 58
DEBT BEARING INTEREST IN LAWFUL MONEY—		
Certificates at 3 per cent.....	\$47,640,000 00	
Navy pension fund, at 3 per cent.....	14,000,000 00	
Total debt bearing interest in lawful money.....	\$61,640,000 00	\$1,211,900 00
DEBT ON WHICH INT. HAS CEASED SINCE MATURITY.....	\$4,389,986 64	\$71,993 16
DEBT BEARING NO INTEREST—		
Demand and legal tender notes.....	\$356,113,253 50	
Postal and fractional currency.....	87,085,442 88	
Certificates of gold deposited.....	28,731,520 00	
Total debt bearing no interest.....	\$421,880,226 38	
Total.....	\$2,595,847,164 00	\$53,807,738 74
Total debt, prin. & int., to date, including coupons due not presented for payment.....		\$2,649,654,94 26

* These bonds are redeemable at any time after 5 years from the date here given and payable after 20 years.

† These bonds are redeemable at any time after 10 years from the date here given and payable 40 years.

AMOUNT IN THE TREASURY—

Coin.....	\$115,994,211 69
Cur.ncy.....	7,248,266 14
Sinking fund in United States coin in 1st bonds, and acc. red interest thereon	18,360,401 47
Other United States coin interest bonds purchased, and accrued interest thereon.....	46,020,546 58
Total.....	\$188,523,425 90
Debt, less amount in the Treasury.....	\$2,461,181,189 26
Debt, less amount in the Treasury on the 1st ultimo.....	2,468,498,072 11
Decrease of debt during the past month.....	7,313,892 15
Decrease of debt since March 1, 1869.....	\$64,32,070 65

Bonds issued to the Pacific Railroad Companies, Interest payable in Lawful Money.

Character of Issue.	Amount outstanding.	Interest accrued and not yet paid.	Interest paid by United States.	Interest repaid by United States, of m. & c. States.	Balance of interest paid by United States.
Union Pacific Co.....	\$26,638,000 00	\$5,318 97	\$2,081,809 83	\$1,105,941 51	\$975,128 30
Kansas Pacific, late U.P.....					
E. D.....	6,303,000 00	126,070 00	834,813 09	631,224 99	203,588 10
Sioux City and Pacific.....	1,628,320 00	12,564 40	96,508 69	16 27	96,492 42
Central Pacific.....	2,362,000 00	41,54 24	588,816 81		
Central Branch Union Pacific, assignees of Atchison & Pike's Pk.....	22,009,000 00	439,594 86	1,139,399 75	94,216 48	1,624,980 10
Western Pacific.....	1,600,000 00	32,000 00	205,806 26	5,260 79	200,517 47
Western Pacific.....	1,640,000 00	10,31 64	46,906 03		46,906 03
Total issued.....	62,188,320 00	1,15,350 09	4,984,222 51	1,836,730 04	3,143,092 50

DEBT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

A pamphlet upon the debt of North Carolina has recently been issued by H. Bowlby Wilson, Esq., No. 7 Nassau street, which contains a very complete statement of the present situation of the financial affairs of that State. We have only space to give a summary of the valuable contents of this pamphlet, and those of our readers who are interested in the subject will do well to procure a copy for careful perusal.

OF THE DEBT OF NORTH CAROLINA AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, OCTOBER 1st, 1868, AND APPROPRIATIONS SINCE MADE, IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 5 AND 8 OF ARTICLE V. OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, IN AID OF UNFINISHED PUBLIC WORKS. THOSE MARKED WITH AN ASTERISK, THUS (*), ARE SPECIAL TAX BONDS.

Name of Corporation.	Date of New Issues.	Jan. & July Amount.
Reported October 1, 1868.....		\$10,373,245
Western (Coalfield) R. R. Co.....	July 1, 1868,	540,000
*Atlantic, Tennessee & Ohio R. R. Co.....	July 1, 1869,	2,000,000
*Wilmington, Charleston & Ruth. R. R. Co.....	July 1, 1869,	4,000,000
		\$16,773,245
Reported October 1, 1868.....		\$16,773,245
Bonds for funding interest.....		\$4,536,700
*Williamston & Tabor R. R. Co.....	Oct 1, 1868,	2,000,000
*Western N. C. R. R. (Eastern Division).....	" "	800,000
" " " " (Western ").....	" "	840,000
" " " " (Eastern ").....	April 1, 1869,	4,000,000
*Northwestern N. C. R. R. Co.....	" "	2,668,600
*Western (Coalfield) R. R. Co.....	" "	833,400
		1,440,000
		1,500,000
		\$17,516,700
January and July Bonds.....		\$16,773,245
April and October Bonds.....		17,516,700
		\$34,289,945
Chargeable on general revenue.....		\$18,049,945
Special tax or preferred debt.....		16,240,000
Total debt.....		\$34,289,945

The old and new debts appear to hold the same rank as charges on the revenue.

Mr. Wilson remarks on the debt as follows: "It will be seen that the total debt of North Carolina amounts to a little over thirty-four and one quarter millions of

dollars (\$34,389,945), all of which bears an interest of six per cent, payable half yearly.

"Of this amount eighteen millions and forty-nine thousand nine hundred and forty-five dollars (\$18,049,945) is chargeable, principal and interest, on the general revenues of the State, and sixteen millions two hundred and forty thousand dollars (\$16,400,000) are provided for by special taxes at rates specified in Statement No. 2, which is in conformity with the requirements of Sections 5 and 8 of Article V of the new Constitution. The effect of this legislation is to make the new issue of bonds, since first October, 1868, a preference charge on the entire assessable property of the State. Whatever may be said respecting the policy of creating what, in effect is a preferred debt, the fact nevertheless exists. In other words, the holders of the first class of bonds must rely on the future development of the industrial resources of the State for the means to meet the interest thereon, whilst those who hold the second class will receive prompt payment, if the valuation of the assessable property amounts to enough to cover the whole issue.

The special tax authorized to be levied by the several acts, is equal in the aggregate to 47.08 of one per cent on the whole assessable property of the State, which, as will hereafter be seen, amounts, on a close estimate founded on the last census, to over \$25,000,000. The sum that will accrue and be applicable to the interest on the gross amount of special tax bonds will amount to \$1,177,000, while the interest is only \$974,400, leaving an annual surplus of \$202,600, as a sinking fund.

TENNESSEE DEBT.

The biennial report of the Comptroller of the State of Tennessee, as submitted to the General Assembly, shows the following relative to the State finances:

To balance in the Treasury Oct. 1, 1867, \$689,950 54.

Less the following credits: Over checks in banks, \$ 0,016 30; paid members of the Legislature by Dr. Stanford, Treasurer, \$1,932 84; Bank of Tennessee money, \$311 64; Tennessee National Bank, Memphis, \$58,142 71, making a total of \$90,403 49, which left an actual balance in the Treasury of \$499,547.

Amounts paid into the Treasury on warrants issued for the two years ending Nov. 30, 1869, and on previous issues, \$5,387,29 56. Grand total received and in the Treasury, \$5,887,176 90.

Within the same time there has been paid out of the Treasury \$5,857,967 06; leaving in the Treasury Oct. 1, 1869, \$29,209 54.

The following gives the receipts and expenditures for the first year ending Oct. 1, 1878:

To balance in the Treasury, Oct. 1, 1867, \$499,547 05.

Payments into the Treasury on warrants issued this year, and on former issues, \$2,545,747 49.

Payments out of the Treasury on warrants issued this year, and on former issues, \$3,028,945 52, leaving a balance in the Treasury on the 1st of October, 1868, of \$23,319 02.

The following gives the receipts and expenditures for the second year, ending Oct. 1, 1869:

To balance in the Treasury, Oct. 1, 1868, \$21,349 02.

Payments into the Treasury on warrants issued this year, and on previous issues, \$2,842,209 06.

Payments out of the Treasury on warrants issued this year, and on former issues, \$2,834,348 54.

Balance in the Treasury 1st October, 1869, \$29,209 54.

The following is a statement of the State debt proper:

Turnpike.....	\$1,228,256 66
Bank of Tennessee.....	1,000,000 00
Railroads.....	410,250 00
Hermite's Purchase.....	48,000 00
State Capitol.....	653,000 00
Total.....	\$3,341,606 66
Funded Interest.....	735,563 00
Total.....	\$4,080,169 66

The State has loaned to turnpike roads \$545,000 in bonds.
The following is a statement of the Railroad debt:

State bonds loaned.....	\$26,412,000
Bonds indorsed by the State	2,196,000
Funded interest	3,213,046
Interest to July 1, 1866.....	2,308,477

Total..... \$34,127,523

Claim of the United States *vs.* Edgefield and Kentucky Railroad assumed: \$180,804.

Claim of the United States *vs.* Memphis and Clarksville Railroad, assumed, \$180,756 24.

This added to the former total, makes \$34,639,084 89.

The total debt, including State debt proper, bonds loaned to turnpikes, bonds loaned to railroads, is, by the above figures, \$39,264,244 55.

Since the war there have been loaned to the railroad companies, in bonds, \$13,292,000, and to turnpike companies, in bonds, \$55,000—making a total of \$18,347,000.

The following despatch is of interest in this connection:

NASHVILLE, Oct. 18.—In the Senate, to-day, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

Resolved, That the people of Tennessee will never signalize their restoration to the control of public affairs by countenancing, in any manner, a disregard of their public obligations.

Resolved, That under strict retrenchment and rigid economy in all other respects, all the available revenues and resources of the State should be faithfully appropriated to the payment of the interest on our bonded debt, and the security of the principal at maturity, for which they are in honor bound.

Mr. A. J. Fletcher, Secretary of State of Tennessee, in a letter to the *New York Times* remarks that statements to the effect that the business of cancelling old bonds and issuing new ones has been conducted in a careless manner, without full and accurate record of transactions, are all untrue, and that all the proper books have been kept and the business conducted with the usual care practiced in such operations. He says further:

"Any able business man, if he could be untrammelled, can take charge of the finances of Tennessee, and by a judicious management of the State's lien on her railroads, reduce the debt of the State in twelve months to nine million dollars—a sum that the people of the State would not be conscious of. Half of the entire debt rests upon the railroad companies who pay their interest without difficulty, and who are already considering the project of buying in the bonds of the State to an extent sufficient to extinguish their entire liability to the State. This would certainly be sound financial policy on their part, and as the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company has done so, strong hopes are entertained that other companies will follow.

"Your correspondent gives the new bondholders the comforting assurance that their interest will not be paid for ten years. The duration of the suspension of the payment of the interest on the State debt will depend upon the action of the Legislature, now about to commence. Some of the ablest men in the State are members of that body, including learned lawyers and experienced business men and large property holders. Of course no prediction can be safely made as to the duration of the suspension, but there is no reason why payment should not be resumed in two years.

TESTS OF STEEL RAILS.

The circular of Messrs. John A. Griswold & Co., of Troy, New York, thus describe their method of testing steel rails:

"1st. A testing ingot from each five-ton ladleful of liquid steel is hammered into a bar and tested for malleability and hardness, and especially for toughness, by bending it double cold. In case any test bar falls below the standard established as suitable for rails, all the ingots cast from that ladleful of steel are laid aside for other uses.

"2d. All the ingots, and each rail rolled from them, are stamped with the number

of the charge or ladleful. A piece is cut from one rail in each charge, and tested by placing it on iron supports a foot apart, and dropping a weight of five tons upon the middle of it from a height proportioned to the pattern of rail. A blow equivalent to a ton weight falling 10 to 15 feet is considered a severe test. We use a five-ton weight falling from a less height, believing that it more nearly represents in kind (although it of course exaggerates in severity) the test of actual service in the track.

"In case a test rail does not stand the blow deemed proper and agreed upon, the whole of the rails made from that charge or ladleful of steel are marked No. 2, and sold for use in sidings, where their possible breaking would do no great harm, and where their greater hardness and resistance to wear would be especially valuable.

"In addition to this double test, the rails are rigidly inspected for surface imperfections.

"We believe that these tests render it practically impossible for us to send out rails of inferior quality.

"We further invite railway companies to send inspectors to our works to witness the tests mentioned, and other tests and inspections agreed upon."

RAILROAD ITEMS.

NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD.—The report of this company for the year ending May 31, 1869, shows that the earnings and expenditures are as follows:

EARNINGS.

From passengers	\$196,187 95
" freight	334,140 90
" mails	16,735 00
" rent of cars	4,843 64
Total	\$581,897 49

EXPENDITURES.

Conducting transportation	\$108,174 63
Loss and damage	2,556 61
Maintenance of motive power	25,879 63
Maintenance of cars	37,543 27
Maintenance of road	92,703 27
Buildings and bridges	10,901 33
New railroad iron, chairs and spikes	72,655 34
Subsistence for hands	17,479 66
Total	\$401,110 87
Net operating expenses	\$361,233 00
Leaving as net income over operating expenses	330,664 40

Of the above amount \$139,877 is regarded as extraordinary expenditures.

The earnings and expenses for four years past have been as follows:

	Passengers.	Freight.	Total.
For year ending May 31, 1866	\$198,662	\$599,730	\$798,392
" " May 31, 1867	201,763	816,797	619,559
" " May 31, 1868	172,775	865,165	587,940
" " May 31, 1869	196,188	835,710	581,898

Expenses for the fiscal year ending—

	Old.	New.	Total.
May 31, 1866	\$71,045 33	\$913,330 46	\$984,375 79
" 31, 1867	244,823 49	444,132 74	630,456 23
" 31, 1868	97,190 79	411,395 64	508,526 43
" 31, 1869	138,973 99	401,110 87	470,033 86

The debt of the company, as shown in the financial statement, is \$677,859 04. Considering the assets on hand of \$110,522 93 applied to this debt, we have the sum of \$567,336 11, and from this take the probable deduction of \$33,656 39, which will be on the Negro bonds given in 1864 and 1865, and it will leave a debt of \$533,679 72. The President remarks:

"It is the desire of the administration to have all the debt in the mortgage bonds of the company running twenty years. Of this debt there is \$146,000 in the twenty year bonds, to which add \$15,230, the balance on Dividend No. 9, and the scrip

which is convertible into such bonds, and it makes \$161,230, which sum will reduce the debt to be changed into the twenty year bonds to \$372,449 72, which change can be easily effected by the assistance of our stockholders.

"To manage the road with success and pay dividends, to give it credit in the financial circles, and even along its line, it is necessary that its present liabilities be so arranged that its current expenses can be paid promptly, and the dividends and other debts cashed by the Treasurer as they are made or become due. The financial statement shows why no dividend is declared. I consider it just to the stockholders that not less than six per cent be paid, and that in cash. It is very unwise to pay dividends in the bonds of the corporation when it subjects the bonds to such heavy discounts as have been the past year, which, if continued, would soon lead to bankruptcy, thereby depriving you of your all—your stock.

AMOUNT OF BONDS ISSUED UNDER THE MORTGAGE.

"At your annual meeting in 1867 it was ordered that \$800,000 first mortgage bonds be issued, and at your last annual meeting a resolution was passed authorizing the President and Directors to issue \$700,000 more—making in all \$1,500,000, the total amount of mortgage on the road.

"It has not been necessary to issue any Bonds under the last resolution of your Company. We have on hand at present \$193,500 of the \$800,000 ordered to be issued at your annual meeting in 1867.

SINKING FUND.

"The company has paid during the year to the Trustee \$35,000 in the five year bonds, \$30,000 in the ten year bonds, and \$75,500 in the twenty year bonds.

"On the 1st of January next the payments will be \$45,000 in the five year bonds and \$30,000 in ten year bonds. Nothing will be required on the twenty year bonds, as the payment made this year on the amount signed is more than will be required in six years.

AID GIVEN TO THE COLUMBIA AND AUGUSTA RAILROAD COMPANY

"Under authority given in a resolution at your last meeting, the company purchased from the Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company \$100,000 of its bonds at par, for which notes were given to said company in monthly instalments of \$12,500 each, the first being due October 1st, 1868, and the last May 1st, 1869. These obligations have all been paid by our Treasurer as they became due.

"The bonds bought from the Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company have been disposed of at an average discount of 15½ per cent; \$97,000 during this fiscal year and \$3,000 since the close of the year. This \$15,000 discount will no doubt soon be replaced by increased travel and freight over our line, caused by the completion of the Columbia and Augusta Railroad to Augusta."

HARTFORD AND NEW HAVEN RAILROAD.—The earnings of this road for the years ending August 31, 1868 and 1869, were as follows:

	1868.	1869.
From passengers.....	\$891,091 20	\$973,630 50
" freight.....	632,454 06	774,786 80
" expresses.....	111,709 50	56,009 41
" mail.....	55,627 28	28,754 43
" rents, etc.....	3,432 35	8,001 01
	\$1,697,384 39	\$1,811,682 30
Expenses, viz.:		
Repairs of road and bridges.....	\$328,427 99	\$312,887 50
Wood, coal and oil.....	96,318 14	111,102 03
Material and labor on engines and cars, and new cars and engines.....	224,588 38	243,646 91
Transportation account and general expenses.....	325,867 93	347,886 94
Station repairs and improvements.....	48,009 83	55,377 53
Lost and damaged goods, gratuities, etc.....	3,472 79	7,677 36
	\$1,024,935 08	\$1,078,378 55
Net earnings.....	672,399 31	733,303 65
Interest and taxes.....	180,908 50	185,084 34
Balance.....	\$481,510 89	\$548,219 41

Compared with the previous year, the gross earnings of 1868-9 show an increase of \$114,347 81, with an increase in expenses of \$58,443 47—making the increase in net earnings, \$60,904 34. The balance remaining after the payment of interest and taxes is \$66,628 60 more than that of the preceding year.

BALANCE SHEET, AUGUST 31.

Capital stock.....	\$3,800,000 00	Railway building, grounds.....	\$3,407,284 76
Bonds.....	937,000 00	Real estate, land and dwellings..	132,317 43
Contingent fund.....	427,875 65	Bonds purchased.....	83,000 00
Reserve fund.....	15,000 00	T. M. Inson Bridge stock.....	8,881 67
Profit and loss.....	252,111 41	Equipment engines and cars.....	254,000 00
Dividends un. a'd.....	7,097 00	Wood, s o c k, and tools o n hand..	253,440 07
Debts due by the Co.....	63,805 64	Debits due the company, includ ing a ccounts due from the N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. adjusted, and funds i n hands of agents...	474,697 48
	\$5,126,789 70	Connecticut River Bridge.....	170,677 31
		Debt about Orient.....	196,083 81
		New Wharf, New Haven.....	45,823 57
		Wind- o Locks and Suffield R. R. Co.....	1,344 18
		Cash.....	158,377 87
			\$5,126,789 70

At the meeting of stockholders it was resolved to accept the legislative permission to issue \$3,000,000 new stock.

EAST TENNESSEE AND GEORGIA RAILROAD.—The report for the year ending June 30, 1869, shows the gross earnings and expenses as follows:

EARNINGS.

From freight.....	\$271,587 97
" Ex. res.....	10 725 04
" Passengers.....	224,949 16
" Transportation, United States.....	5 1 89
" Mail.....	13,670 02
" Other sources.....	10,560 48
Total.....	\$515,994 56

EXPENSES.

For transportation.....	\$59,513 74
" Motive power.....	82,730 13
" Maintenance of way.....	90,693 83
" Maintenance of cars.....	53,816 55
" General expenses.....	13,979 02
" Extraordinary expenses.....	30,250 00
" Taxes.....	5,534 51
" Depot buildings.....	3,279 77
Total.....	\$347,013 18

Which, deducted from the gross earnings, as above, would leave \$166,981 43 net to pay interest to the State of Tennessee and on second mortgage bonds, the interest on which amounts to \$141,460 64. This, taken from the net earnings as above would leave a balance of \$ 7,520 89; of this sum \$14,181 91 has been retained during the year by the Government and credited upon the bond, which leaves on hand for the year's operations \$13,338 98. By comparing these figures with those of the annual report of the year ending June 30, 1868, it will be seen that while the earnings of the present year exceed that of the previous year \$8,080 05, that the expenses have been reduced very greatly. Including extraordinary expenses and all, it has taken 67½ per cent of the gross earnings to operate the road.

The President remarks: "Since the last annual meeting of this company we have succeeded in effecting a settlement with the State of Tennessee, of our interest and sinking fund account, which has been the cause of so much annoyance and trouble since the war; because, from the annual reports of the Comptroller of the State of Tennessee, made to the Legislature, it was made to appear that we were largely in arrears in our semi-annual payments of interest, which the effect to damage our credit, from the fact that outside parties did not know but a receiver might be appointed to take charge of the road, for non-payment of interest due to the State. This apparent difference of the accounts of the Comptroller and the company existed, not from a want on the part of the officers of the State to do us damage, but from honest convictions on their part that they had no right to credit the company with certain payments that had been made after the 1st of January, 1861. But, under

a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the State, all payments made to legally authorized parties upon all contracts were, legal and valid, when they were received without protest. And under this decision of the court a full and complete settlement was made; this company having made there payments to the Bank of Tennessee, the fiscal agent of the State, before the removal of the bank from the State: which settlement, as made, is in accordance with our books and is satisfactory to the State and to the officers of this company.

"The interest due to the State of Tennessee, as well as on our second mortgage bonds, was paid in full on the 1st day of July last."

ABSTRACT OF THE GENERAL CONDITION OF THE EAST TENNESSEE AND GEORGIA RAILROAD COMPANY, ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE, 1869.

Capital Stock.....	\$1,290,067 25	One State Bond.....	\$1,000 00
State Scrip.....	29,929 00	One Endorsed Bond.....	1,000 00
State Loan—Old.....	1,037,000 00	For State Compons.....	120 00
" New.....	480,277 50	Telegraph Stock.....	750 00
Company Bonds—Old.....	646,010 00	Express Company Stock.....	5,000 00
" New.....	136,400 00	Post Office Department.....	8,032 97
Endorsed Bonds.....	115,010 00	U S Transportation Account.....	90,134 00
Coupon Company Bonds.....	7,030 00	Southern Express Co.....	704 06
" End recd.....	5,700 00	Holston Salt & Plaster Co.....	1,164 00
Bills Payable.....	1,812 49	Due from Agent.....	2,953 09
United States Income Tax.....	1,434 40	" Other Roads.....	31,543 87
Pay Rolls.....	16,236 40	Funds on hand to pay Interest,	
Due to Agents.....	324 46	Purchase Iron, Rails, &c.....	94,223 63
" Other Roads.....	19,773 18	Funds in Augusta, Georgia, to	
" Individuals.....	1,420 84	pay interest.....	3,145 96
Interest due 1st July on Com-		Cash.....	23,261 63
pany and Endorsed Bonds.....	26,712 00	Road and fixtures.....	1,495,764 34
	\$3,759,137 52		\$3,759,137 52

Messrs. Henry Clews & Co. advertise to pay both the April and October coupons on the Special Tax Bonds of the State of North Carolina, at their banking house 32 Wall street.

JEFFERSONVILLE, MADISON, AND INDIANAPOLIS RAILROAD.—The report for the year ending December 31, 1868, has just been issued, and contains the following:—

The gross receipts of the road, during the year 1868, were \$1,068,523 78. As compared with the previous year, when the receipts amounted to \$1,164,799 92, this indicates a decrease of nearly nine per cent. This falling off was caused, in a great measure, by the sharp competition for business that was waged, during a large portion of the year, between the four principal roads known as "trunk lines"—a contest which affected not only the revenues of those particular roads, but of all others, including our own, doing business in connection with them.

By the terms of a written contract between the City of Louisville and the Jeffersonville Railroad Company, dated November 10, 1863, the debt due by the railroad company to the city, then amounting to \$200,000, was to be discharged by the delivery, within five years, of a like amount of any of the outstanding bonds of said city. Pursuant to this agreement, the Jeffersonville Railroad Company delivered \$50,000 of such bonds in December, 1863, thereby reducing the debt to \$150,000. Some time before the expiration of the five years mentioned in the contract, this company made a purchase of Louisville city bonds to the extent of \$75,000, and tendered them to the proper authorities of that city in further liquidation of the debt. This tender was unconditionally declined, under advice of the City Attorney, who held the opinion that the contract between the city and the Jeffersonville Railroad Company was illegal and void in so far as it permitted any bonds to be received except the particular issue upon which the debt was based. After this refusal, of course no further steps in the case were taken by the company.

If the decision of the City Attorney is to be regarded as conclusive, it is not believed that our position has been affected unfavorably, since it will only remain for this company to discharge her liability in the premises by redeeming \$150,000 of the bonds originally issued by the city of Louisville to the Jeffersonville Railroad Company, when the same mature, viz.: May 1, 1883, or earlier, should it be deemed desirable and found practicable to do so—meanwhile anticipating events by exchanging for those bonds the securities we now hold, whenever the opportunity can be made on favorable terms.

The late period at which this report goes to press permits a close estimate to be made of the company's business for the first six months of 1869. The receipts indicate a steady and handsome increase over those for the corresponding months of 1868—sufficient to warrant the lief that the earnings of the present year will considerably exceed those of 1868, if indeed they do not equal those of 1867.

RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES.

RECEIPTS.	EXPENSES.
Freight..... \$252,596 18	Fuel..... \$74,958
Passengers..... 494,546 68	Passenger Expenses..... 84,790
Expenses..... 50,280 90	Freight Expenses..... 116,989
Mail..... 26,106 10	Repairs of Road..... 185,844
	Other Expenses..... 228,956
Total Receipts..... \$1,063,523 73	Total Expenses..... \$698,568
	Net earnings..... 364,955

The passenger business shows a decrease of \$23,587 69. Eliminating from the passenger accounts for 1867 and 1868, the military transportation performed during the war, but only reported to us and entered on our books during those years, the earnings will appear as follows:

Passenger Receipts for 1867.....	\$458,134 34	
Deduct Old Military Reports.....	11,189 96	\$446,944 38
Passenger Receipts for 1868.....	\$434,546 65	
Deduct Old Military Reports.....	1,271 10	433,275 55
Decrease.....		\$12,668 83

The falling off in the regular travel is, therefore, only \$12,668 83.

CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET.

Cost of Road and Equipment.....	\$6,037,343	Capital Stock.....	\$3,000,000
<i>Investments</i> —		<i>Funded Debt</i> —	
Jeffersonville R. R. Bonds.....	40,000	Jeffersonville R. R. Bonds.....	297,000
Indianapolis & Madison RR. Bonds.....	197,500	Indianapolis & Madison RR. Bonds.....	612,000
City of Louisville Bonds.....	76,000	Jeffersonville, Madison & Indianapolis R. R. Bonds.....	1,961,000
Stock in Louisville Bridge Company.....	3,000 00	Bonds of the City of Louisville.....	150,000
Lake Erie & Louisville Railroad Company.....	194,992	Temporary Bond Account.....	50,000
Outside Real Estate.....	80,863	Surplus fund of the Jeffersonville RR. Company.....	770,443
Bills Receivable.....	13,848	Profit & Loss.....	682,193
Cash.....	37,412	Capital Stock Sinking Fund.....	40,442
Due by the United States.....	9,165	Bills Payable.....	259,833
Due by Railroad Companies.....	68,402	Due to Railroad Companies.....	108,868
Due by other Associations and by Individuals.....	100,680	Due to other Associations and to Individuals.....	176,146
Due by Agents.....	64,481		
Fuel and other Supplies on hand.....	86,243		
	\$7,934,931		\$7,934,934

KANSAS PACIFIC RAILWAY.—A correspondent of the *New York Times*, under date of Sept. 26, writes in regard to this road as follows: While acknowledged to be at least as deserving as the Union and the Central Pacific, the Kansas Pacific was not as lucky as its competitors; for when the line had been built to a distance of 393 miles, Congress suddenly shut down on any further subsidy. However, the road was last year, by private enterprise, pushed out some miles further, and it now abuts at Sheridan, 406 miles west of the Missouri River. From Sheridan preparations are under way to extend the line 225 miles to its natural terminus at Denver, whence it will connect with the Union Pacific, by the "Denver Pacific Railroad," now actively under construction and to be finished this year.

THE GOVERNMENT LAND GRANTS.

Government was liberal in its grants of public land to the builders of the Kansas Pacific Road; and it is mainly to this circumstance that the already-mentioned astonishing progress of the State of Kansas is attributable. The concession, as is well known, was of the alternate section within twenty miles of the road on each side. This gave the Company above six million acres of land lying between Kansas City and Denver. It is worthy of remark, in passing, that this provision on the part of the Government (by which the railroad receives only the alternate or "odd-numbered" section) is regarded by the people here as an exceedingly wise one, for it completely balks the speculators who would, otherwise, absorb large tracts of land to hold for

a rise. At the same time, parties buying lands in bulk from the railroad company and settling them with actual settlers, are enabled to obtain, under the Homestead law, the adjoining ("even-numbered") sections from Government.

ACTION OF THE RAILWAY CORPORATION—LAND SALES.

To people the wilderness through which the road runs was, of course, the first care of the corporation, and to this end judicious measures were taken. The Company has been selling and is going to sell, at very low prices, farms to actual settlers.

In a general way, then, I may state that the Kansas Pacific Road has this year sold upwards of 275,000 acres. With unimportant exceptions these sales have been made to actual settlers, as, indeed, is sufficiently evinced by the fact that the purchases have been from 80 to 320 acres each, and that the sales have been made to over 2,000 different individuals. The price has varied from \$2 to \$6 per acre. The gross receipts of the Kansas Pacific Company from these land sales have reached the large aggregate of above \$600,000, which would make the price per acre something less than \$3. These sales are increasing in a wonderful ratio, while the perfect satisfaction which emigrants have found in the climate, soil and rich agricultural rewards of Kansas forms a powerful attraction with those who hear from their old neighbors such good account. Nor is this movement confined to our own countrymen; for, owing to the systematic organization of the National Land Company, which works in concert with the Kansas Pacific Road, very large sales of land have of late been made to English, German and Swedish colonists. Here, for instance, are two or three illustrations. They are samples from among many.

ENGLISH AND GERMAN COLONIES.

1. A single English colony a few weeks ago, bought 30,000 acres of land here. The tract is to be divided among no less than twelve hundred different families, the families of well-to-do English farmers and artisans. I saw a score of these families, who have already arrived. They bring with them the means to stock their farms, and build themselves houses, and they have already bought mowing machines, feed for their cattle, &c. 2. A German colony has recently bought some 24,000 acres north of Junction City, (180 miles west of the Missouri,) upon which one hundred and twenty families are to be established. 3. A Swedish colony, a year ago, bought 15,000 acres south of Salina. This colony has already sent out over two hundred families."

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW

Monetary Affairs—Rates of Loans and Discounts—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Price of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at New York—Opening, Highest, Lowest and Closing Prices at the New York Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

October has passed with an easier condition of the money market than was expected. Notwithstanding the abundance of the crops, the amount of currency sent from this centre for moving them has been much less than usual. This fact arises partly, perhaps, from the reduced prices of produce, but principally from the circumstance of the banks not having had sufficient small notes to meet the wants of the agricultural sections, where the lower denominations of currency are required for the purchase of grain from the producers. This circumstance, while it has helped to keep money comparatively abundant here, so that the rate on call loans has ranged, in the midst of the crop season, at 4@7 per cent, must be expected to be followed by an unusually light return of currency after the completion of the crop movement. Some considerable amounts of money were sent, early in the month, to New Orleans and Savannah; but, later, the demand from that quarter ceased almost entirely. The South would, undoubtedly, have drawn upon New York more freely, had the banks been able to supply small

currency; to send notes in denominations of over \$50 was of no avail, when the money was required largely by interior dealers for the purchase of small lots of cotton. The cotton traders have, consequently, been compelled to effect their operations as best they could, though, of course, with some inconvenience. Throughout the month the deliveries of new currency of the lower denominations from the Treasury have been quite nominal. The expectation of an ample supply of small notes in November, and the supposition that money might then be sent out more freely to the South and West, have induced the banks to keep their funds as much as possible on call, in preference to employing them on time. Merchants have, consequently found it difficult to get their paper discounted outside their own banks, and the difficulty in selling notes has again increased the pressure from sellers, which, in turn, has produced distrust among buyers, and at the close of the month, the best paper was negotiated with difficulty at 10@12 per cent. This stringency in the discount market has, perhaps, been the most unsatisfactory feature of the business of the month.

Wall street speculation still shows the effect of the severe blow dealt in the culmination of the September gold operations. That denouement gave an exposure of the hollowness of a certain class of speculative operations which appears likely to hold the gambling propensities of the "street" hereafter in severe check. Operators appear disposed to conduct their speculations within a lower range of prices; and in every branch of business there is a very marked caution. There is a certain undefined hesitancy about engaging in operations for high prices, which appears to be inspired by a conviction, grounded upon the general aspect of affairs, that we are on the eve of a generally lower range of values. The markets have been more or less affected by a disposition to discount the probability that Secretary Boutwell, in his report on the assembling of Congress, will make decidedly conservative recommendations, designed to facilitate the resumption of specie payments; and this feeling is encouraged by intimations, coming from quarters which give them some weight, that the Supreme Court will pronounce the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional. Notwithstanding these conservative tendencies, there has been a steady recovery in Wall street interests from the effects of the November panic, confidence being more settled and prices steadier. As an illustration of the contraction of speculative operations, it may be stated that the total recorded transactions in stocks for the month have been only 447,911 shares, against 2,362,27 shares in the same month of 1868; while the sales of Government bonds at the Exchange have been only \$10,606,500, as against \$23,479,150 in October of last year.

United States bonds have been decidedly weak, prices being, at the close of the month, about 2 per cent below the opening figures; which, taking into account the accumulation of one month's interest, is equal to a decline of fully 2½ per cent. Considerable sales have been made by investors and financial institutions with a view to buying other securities, which, since the late panic, have ruled exceptionally low, while Government's had yielded comparatively little. The price of gold also has steadily declined; and, the quotations for bonds abroad having but partly responded to the reduced premium, a fall in securities here was required to equalize the home and foreign markets.

The purchases of bonds by the Government, during the month aggregated \$10,000,000.

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds.....	\$28,479,150	\$10,600,500	\$	\$12,370,650
State & city bonds.....	11,145,100	4,996,500	6,148,000
Company bonds.....	2,031,400	1,214,500	816,900
Total—October.....	\$36,655,650	\$16,819,500		\$19,335,150
Since January 1.....	195,521,090	273,231,609	\$77,718,519

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of October, as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement :

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of month.	6's, 1881.	Coupon.	Reg.	1863.	1864.	6's, (5-20 yrs.)	Coupon.	new.	'67.	'68.	C'n.
1.....	119½	119	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
2.....	119	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
3.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
4.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
5.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
6.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
7.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
8.....	120½	120	120½	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
9.....	120½	120	120½	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
10.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
11.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
12.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
13.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
14.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
15.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
16.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
17.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
18.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
19.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
20.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
21.....	117½	117½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
22.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
23.....	120	120	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
24.....	120	120	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
25.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
26.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
27.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
28.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
29.....	119	119	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
30.....	119½	119½	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
First.....	119½	119	120	119½	119½	117½	118½	117½	118½	119½	109½
Highest.....	120½	120	121	119½	120	118½	119½	118½	119½	119½	109½
Lowest.....	119	118½	119½	117	117	116½	117½	116½	117½	117½	107½
Last.....	119½	119½	119½	117½	119½	116½	117½	116½	117½	117½	107½

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. 5-20s	Ill. C. sh's.	Erie sh's.	Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. 5-20s	Ill. C. sh's.	Erie sh's.
Friday.....	1 93	84½	94½	24½	Friday.....	23 93½	81½	96	21½
Saturday.....	2 93	84½	94½	24½	Saturday.....	24 93½	81½	96	21½
Monday.....	4 93½	81½	94½	24	Monday.....	25 93½	81½	97	21½
Tuesday.....	5 93½	84½	94½	24	Tuesday.....	26 93½	81½	97½	21½
Wednesday.....	6 93½	84½	94½	24½	Wednesday.....	27 93½	82	98	21½
Thursday.....	7 93½	81½	94	23½	Thursday.....	28 93½	82½	98	21½
Friday.....	8 93½	81½	94	23	Friday.....	29 9½	82½	98½	21½
Saturday.....	9 92½	84½	94	23½	Saturday.....	20 93½	82½	97½	21½
Monday.....	11 92½	84½	94	23½					
Tuesday.....	12 93½	84½	94	23½	Lowest.....	93	81½	93½	20½
Wednesday.....	13 91½	84½	93½	23½	Highest.....	93½	84½	98	24½
Thursday.....	14 93½	84½	94	23½	Range.....	93	84½	97½	24½
Friday.....	15 93½	84	94½	23	Last.....	93½	82½	97½	21½
Saturday.....	16 93½	83½	93½	21½					
Monday.....	18 93½	83½	94½	20½	Low.....	92½	74½	92½	17½
Tuesday.....	19 93½	83	95	20½	Hig.....	94	84½	98½	23½
Wednesday.....	20 93½	81½	95	22½	Rng.....	1½	9½	6½	11½
Thursday.....	21 93½	81½	95	21½	Last.....	93½	82½	97½	21½

The stock market has been characterized by a dull, cautious movement though with a gradual improvement in prices, and a steady recovery of confidence. The earnings of the roads which report publicly their receipts have

not been such as to encourage a sanguine speculation; which may partly account for the fact, that prices are far from having recovered the figures from which they declined in September, and are still much below the average. The exceptionally low range of prices appears to have encouraged a certain amount of buying for investment, and, as a rule, stocks are now held in strong hands. Speculation has been confined to encouraging temporary fluctuations of 2@3 per cent, rather than promoting a direct movement for either a rise or a fall.

STOCKS SOLD AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Dec.
Bank shares ..	2,883	767	1,616
Railroad ..	2,017,944	290,708	1,633,241
Coal ..	6,309	8,157	8,053
Mining ..	109,129	11,450	97,789
Improv't ..	19,775	900	18,875
Telegraph ..	44,333	10,107	84,226
Steamship ..	109,833	12,914	99,919
Exprs&c ..	66,861	17,918	88,448
Total—October.....	3,362,077	447,911	1,914,116
Since January 1.....	16,906,045	9,877,766	7,028,229

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities sold at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of September and October, 1869:

	September—			October—		
	Open.	High.	Low.	Open.	High.	Clos.
Railroad Stocks—						
Alton & Terre Hant.....	59	59	54	54	56	60
do " " pref.....	59	59	54	54	56	60
Boston, Hartford & Erie.....	154½	154½	135	145	146	135½
Chicago & Alton.....	156	156	135	135	144	147
do do pref.....	170	170	160	165	165	159½
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	84½	86½	63	70½	71½	69½
do do Northw't'n.....	94½	95	79	85	84½	85½
do do & Rock Island.....	118	115½	109	106½	109½	110
Columb. Chic. & Ind. C.....	83½	84	74½	82	83½	84
Cleve. & Pittsburgh.....	109	112	82	95	104	106½
do Col. Cin. & Ind.....	78	79	73	74½	78	73½
Del., Lack. & Western.....	112½	113	103½	115½	110	109
Debuque & Sioux city.....	111	111	104	105	108	108
Erie.....	87	42	27	32	33½	34½
do preferred.....	70	71	57½	57½	58	59½
Harlem.....	160	160	121	127	133	149½
Hannibal & St. Joseph.....	125	125	92	107	110	114
do do pref.....	123	123	97	97	111	109
Hudson River.....	186½	186½	134	164½	161½	174½
Illinois Central.....	139	139½	134	134	137	139
Joliet & Chicago.....	101	106½	70½	82½	85	94½
Lake Sho. & Mich. South.....	20	20	20	20	20	18
Mar. & Cincin., 1st.....	8½	8½	8	8	8	18
do " 2d.....	129	131	116	118	122	124
Michigan Central.....	79½	80½	61	68	70	65½
Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	87½	89½	75	60	81½	83½
do do pref.....	84	88½	67½	60	87	88½
Morris & Essex.....	123½	131	120	120	117½	120
New Jersey.....	10	107½	97	10	102	102
do Central.....	232	232	232	232	232	232
New Haven & Hartford.....	203½	206½	163	163½	173	185
New York Central.....	140	140	135	130	128	140
do & N. Haven.....	130	130	130	130	130	130
do do scrip.....	112	112	112	112	112	112
Norwich & Worcester.....	82½	82½	24	26½	27½	28½
Ohio & Mississippi.....	240	251	240	250	240	240
do do pref.....	240	251	240	250	240	240
Panama.....	240	251	240	250	240	240
Pitts., F. W. & Chi. guar.....	97½	97½	91	91	93½	93
Reading.....	105	110	105	109	107	107
Rome, W. & Ogdens'g.....	185	185	185	185	197½	197½
Third Avenue.....	83½	83½	60	55½	59½	67
Toledo, Wab. & Western.....	83	83	80	90	78	80
do do do pref.....	83	83	80	90	78	80
Miscellaneous—						
American Coal.....	40	40	40	40	40	40
Central Coal.....	60	60	60	60	60	60
Cumberland Coal.....	81½	81½	28	28	27	29
Pennsylvania Coal.....	126½	126	122	122	120	124
Del. & Hud. Canal.....	29½	29½	29½	29½	29½	29½
Atlantic Mail.....	29½	29½	29½	29½	29½	29½

Pacific Mail	80	80½	80½	83½	83½	89½	86½	89½
Boston Water Power	15½	16	13	13	13	14½	13	14
Brunswick City Land	9½	9½	9½	9½
Canton	56	56	60	64	53	54	60	59½
Mariposa	8	10½	8	9	9	9½	8	8
do pref.	1½	19	19½	14	16½	18	16	16½
Quickilver	15½	15½	19	19	19	15	19	14½
West Union Telegraph	81½	87½	85	86	86½	87	86	86½
Citizens Gas	150	150	160	160
Bankers & Brokers Ass.	104	105	104	105
Express—								
American M. Union	35	38	30	30½	31	36	50	35
Adams	58½	57½	49½	51½	53½	58½	52½	57
United States	65	63	50	50	50½	60	40½	56½
Merchant's Union	11½	11½	11	11	11
Wells, Fargo & Co.	18	19	16	17	18	26½	17	20½

The gold market has presented a remarkable freedom from speculative movements. The wholesome lessons of the panic of September 24th appears to have made a deep impression on the gold operators; so much so, that it has been found impossible thus far, to establish, in connection with the Gold Exchange, any arrangements for clearing the transactions of dealers, those facilities having in the past very materially contributed to the activity of speculation and to irresponsible parties taking large risks. The general tendency of the market has been downward; the decline having been due to the anticipation of the supply coming from the November interest payments, to the sale of \$11,000,000 of gold by the Treasury, and to a growing feeling that the improving condition of the public finances and the abundance of the exportable crops warrant the expectation of a lower premium. The exports of specie for the month have been quite nominal.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing	Date.	Open'g	Lowest	Highest	Closing
Friday	1 130	130	130½	130½	Saturday	131½	130½	131½	131
Saturday	2 130½	129½	130½	129½	Monday	25 131½	130½	131½	130½
Monday	4 130	128½	130	128½	Tuesday	26 130½	130½	130½	130½
Tuesday	6 125½	128½	130½	130	Wednesday	27 130½	129½	130½	129½
Wednesday	6 130	130	131	131	Thursday	27 129½	128½	129½	128½
Thursday	7 131½	131½	132	131½	Friday	29 12½	128½	128½	128½
Friday	8 131½	131½	131½	130½	Saturday	30 128½	128½	129½	129
Saturday	9 130½	130½	130½	131½					
Monday	11 13½	130½	130½	130½	Oct., 1869	130	128½	129	129
Tuesday	12 13½	13½	130½	13½	" 1869	140½	133½	140½	133½
Wednesday	13 130½	130½	130½	130½	" 1867	143½	140½	145½	140½
Thursday	14 13½	130	130½	130	" 1866	116	145½	154½	146½
Friday	15 130	130	130½	130	" 1865	144½	144½	149	146½
Saturday	16 130	130	130½	130½	" 1864	192	189	22½	123½
Monday	18 130½	130	130½	130	" 1863	119½	140½	156½	145½
Tuesday	19 130	130	130½	130½	" 1862	121½	122	133½	129½
Wednesday	20 130	130	130½	130					
Thursday	21 130½	130½	131½	130½	S'ce Jan 1, 1869	134½	128½	162½	129
Friday	22 131	130½	131½	131½					

Foreign exchange has been comparatively steady. Importers have been free buyers of bills, but the supply has been well sustained by the liberal exports of cotton and grain.

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

Days.	London. cents for 64 pence.	Paris. centimes for dollar.	Amsterdam. cents for florin.	Bremen. cents for rix daler.	Hamburg. cents for M. banco.	Berlin cents for thaler
1	107½ @ 93	522½ @ 520	40 @ 40½	78 @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
2	108 @ 108½	524½ @ 520	40 @ 40½	78 @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
3
4	109 @ 109½	518½ @ 517½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
5	109 @ 109½	518½ @ 517½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
6	109 @ 109½	518½ @ 517½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
7	109 @ 109½	518½ @ 517½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
8	109 @ 109½	518½ @ 517½	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
9	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
10	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
11	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
12	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
13	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
14	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
15	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
16	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
17	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½
18	108½ @ 109½	522½ @ 520	40½ @ 40½	78½ @ 78½	85½ @ 85½	70½ @ 70½

14....	109	109%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	77%	85%	85%	70%	70%
15.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
16.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
18.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
19.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
20.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
21.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
22.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
23.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
25.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
26.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
27.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
28.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
29.....	109	10%	518%	517%	40%	40%	78%	78%	85%	85%	70%	70%
Oct.,	1869, 107%	109%	522%	515	40	40%	77	79	85%	86%	70%	71%
Oct., 1868	108%	110%	520	518%	40%	41%	79	79%	85%	85%	71%	72%

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1 :

NEW YORK CITY BANK RETURNS.												
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Cir. ul t on.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. c'ear'gs.						
February 6.	266,541,733	27,939,404	14,246,436	196,601,899	53,424,183	670,899,470						
February 13.	264,380,407	8,354,831	31,263,451	192,977,860	52,534,953	690,754,499						
February 21.	263,422,064	28,411,91	34,247,321	187,612,546	50,997,197	70,991,041						
February 27.	261,371,597	21,832,603	34,247,981	185,216,175	50,585,054	629,116,029						
March 6.	262,039,883	19,416,634	34,273,885	182,601,437	49,145,769	737,118,131						
March 13.	261,699,695	17,453,671	34,690,445	182,392,458	49,639,621	629,116,029						
March 20.	263,093,302	15,213,806	34,741,310	183,501,949	50,774,874	730,710,002						
March 27.	264,009,549	12,013,722	34,777,314	180,113,910	50,555,103	797,974,483						
April 3.	261,933,675	10,777,889	31,816,916	175,325,769	48,490,359	837,23,698						
April 10.	257140,237	8,791,43	31,690,360	171,495,540	48,644,732	810,05,455						
April 17.	255,184,882	7,811,779	31,436,761	172,203,494	51,001,88	772,345,294						
April 24.	257,453,074	8,891,60	31,040,51	177,310,080	50,677,598	75,905,766						
May 1.	260,436,190	9,207,65	30,972,033	183,948,565	56,400,722	73,768,349						
May 8.	269,439,873	16,081,49	33,906,190	19,83,87	56,109,573	91,174,577						
May 15.	269,499,897	15,374,769	33,977,793	199,392,449	56,501,356	80,730,880						
May 22.	270,375,952	16,429,404	33,927,866	199,411,869	57,83,298	728,747,852						
May 29.	274,983,461	17,871,280	33,940,845	214,036,600	57,810,373	781,446,491						
June 5.	275,919,609	19,051,138	33,929,945	199,124,042	51,289,329	766,28,026						
June 12.	277,993,785	19,063,680	34,141,740	193,886,005	50,559,253	860,006,646						
June 19.	265,841,906	19,025,444	31,198,829	199,214,10	49,612,488	831,224,021						
June 26.	260,431,783	20,27,140	34,214,785	481,774,645	48,163,920	76,170,742						
July 3.	267,398,471	23,590,267	34,217,978	179,949,467	46,737,263	46,763,800						
July 10.	257,494,942	20,268,912	31,277,945	163,177,239	48,172,723	676,540,291						
July 17.	257,008,299	31,055,450	31,173,437	184,431,71	51,859,706	711,325,141						
July 24.	259,611,880	30,073,424	31,110,748	193,622,261	54,271,862	58,455,097						
July 31.	260,533,223	27,41,933	31,68,677	196,416,443	56,101,627	614,455,477						
August 7.	251,819,337	26,003,925	31,917,985	200,229,003	56,056,834	614,875,637						
August 14.	266,505,65	24,154,499	33,992,257	198,952,711	54,730,089	52,841,637						
August 21.	252,711,183	21,594,510	34,024,104	192,024,546	53,070,531	561,550,531						
August 28.	267,017,109	19,169,102	31,999,742	188,751,539	52,792,831	601,801,345						
September 4.	263,549,839	17,41,722	33,960,435	191,10,06	5,89,784	546,809,378						
September 11.	263,861,333	14,942,046	33,961,196	188,823,344	51,487,867	701,753,341						
September 18.	266,496,024	14,581,19	33,972,739	185,380,131	51,259,197	662,419,784						
September 25.	263,441,823	13,963,431	33,995,081	190,230,793	50,045,461	599,274,472						
October 2.	256,239,619	15,902,349	31,169,49	183,124,508	54,009,083	722,893,772						
October 9.	260,749,974	21,513,526	34,173,925	179,214,673	52,017,588	628,382,859						
October 16.	248,537,931	20,399,070	34,217,114	173,642,936	52,227,504	581,300,262						
Oct ber 23.	249,845,073	21,393,701	34,201,435	175,793,919	52,037,904	581,10,267						
October 30.	250,946,831	21,9,616	34,136,240	180,828,832	52,177,831	540,450,649						

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
February 1.....	52,412,913	82,784	14,296,570	29,677,943	10,549,351
February 8.....	53,053,716	87,031	13,735,595	40,080,399	10,586,552
February 15.....	52,929,391	804,681	13,673,043	33,711,575	10,32,226
February 22.....	52,416,146	21,307	13,208,607	37,990,996	10,18,546
March 1.....	52,251,351	256,933	19,010,548	37,785,203	10,438,546
March 8.....	52,232,000	297,897	13,253,801	38,293,966	10,458,853
March 15.....	51,911,522	277,517	13,028,807	37,571,582	10,459,081
March 22.....	51,328,419	225,037	12,765,759	36,960,009	10,461,406
March 29.....	50,597,100	210,444	13,021,315	34,863,344	10,472,420
April 5.....	50,499,866	199,038	12,169,321	35,375,854	10,622,396
April 12.....	50,770,188	181,346	12,643,367	36,029,133	10,623,166
April 19.....	51,478,371	167,848	12,941,783	37,081,747	10,629,426

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	L. Tend's.	Deposits.	Circulation.
April 26.....	51,394,372	164,361	13,640,063	37,487,285	10,624,467
May 3.....	51,510,983	201,758	14,230,371	38,971,241	10,617,315
May 10.....	51,938,530	270,625	14,623,808	39,478,868	10,617,934
May 17.....	52,168,526	276,167	14,696,365	40,602,742	10,614,612
May 24.....	52,367,764	174,115	15,087,008	41,631,410	10,618,216
May 31.....	52,210,874	185,267	15,484,947	42,747,819	10,618,591
June 7.....	52,326,257	169,816	15,378,868	42,890,330	10,610,390
June 14.....	53,134,800	153,451	15,178,332	42,005,077	10,621,933
June 21.....	53,010,095	148,795	14,973,123	42,066,901	10,617,894
June 28.....	53,661,172	180,684	14,567,327	41,517,717	10,622,704
July 5.....	53,937,521	303,621	14,031,449	41,321,536	10,613,845
July 12.....	53,140,755	485,293	13,415,498	40,140,497	10,613,279
July 19.....	53,128,595	456,759	12,944,886	39,834,862	10,618,766
July 26.....	52,463,100	393,377	13,076,180	38,160,644	10,614,973
August 2.....	51,953,818	381,869	13,613,911	39,717,126	10,610,323
August 9.....	53,032,930	322,216	13,530,061	39,506,425	10,608,381
August 16.....	51,932,991	266,089	13,047,635	39,141,196	10,610,861
August 23.....	52,309,626	244,256	12,977,027	39,010,665	10,608,352
August 30.....	52,013,663	245,515	13,012,218	38,334,414	10,608,834
September 6.....	51,991,372	247,368	13,073,705	39,213,588	10,611,674
September 13.....	51,697,258	149,169	12,900,074	38,915,913	10,612,041
September 20.....	51,703,372	174,855	13,848,598	39,169,526	10,610,035
September 27.....	52,130,402	139,068	13,418,889	39,244,378	10,609,182
October 4.....	52,105,010	177,303	13,335,858	38,436,234	10,598,931
October 11.....	51,597,914	265,111	12,810,857	37,102,275	10,607,345
October 18.....	51,657,361	284,568	12,880,187	37,021,083	10,599,390

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
April 5.....	96,969,714	662,276	11,348,884	33,604,099	24,671,716
April 12.....	99,625,473	750,160	11,391,519	34,392,377	23,338,789
April 19.....	99,115,550	639,460	11,419,996	34,257,071	23,351,844
April 26.....	98,971,711	617,435	12,361,827	35,302,203	23,819,751
May 3.....	100,127,413	708,963	12,352,113	36,726,742	25,330,060
May 10.....	100,554,542	1,557,749	12,513,472	37,457,837	25,321,533
May 17.....	101,474,527	1,134,486	12,688,527	38,708,304	25,709,603
May 24.....	102,042,193	934,566	12,191,542	39,347,891	25,390,399
May 31.....	102,573,278	772,397	12,696,857	38,403,624	25,175,223
June 7.....	102,613,649	640,522	12,454,661	38,491,446	25,292,167
June 14.....	104,362,548	601,743	12,643,615	37,405,719	25,347,667
June 21.....	103,691,658	959,706	12,087,305	38,243,995	25,313,661
June 28.....	102,575,825	1,105,693	11,784,602	34,831,417	25,304,859
July 5.....	102,633,948	3,140,676	9,593,618	34,861,745	25,235,701
July 12.....	101,405,241	3,255,121	9,511,879	31,620,417	25,325,056
July 19.....	102,702,540	2,024,585	9,708,461	35,811,103	25,251,264
August 2.....	103,604,554	2,965,920	10,719,569	37,308,687	25,514,706
August 9.....	101,811,271	2,154,616	10,488,545	34,117,973	25,279,223
August 16.....	102,918,791	2,117,372	11,210,614	34,931,531	25,244,034
August 23.....	103,053,007	1,571,713	11,906,736	35,229,149	25,200,083
September 6.....	103,945,516	1,715,543	11,792,519	37,041,045	25,322,271
September 13.....	104,437,227	1,218,474	12,571,211	37,362,711	25,227,279
September 20.....	104,478,949	915,681	12,747,357	37,068,497	25,377,754
September 27.....	104,375,531	518,579	12,950,087	36,917,664	25,307,121
October 4.....	105,329,208	652,197	12,167,041	36,810,891	25,321,464
October 11.....	101,946,179	1,091,712	11,913,898	34,691,731	25,283,066
October 18.....	104,551,831	1,151,254	11,776,041	34,448,503	25,313,494
October 25.....	103,662,620	1,690,130	11,819,736	34,877,071	25,212,031

WEBSTER'S SYSTEM OF SPELLING AND DEFINING.

The standard authority in all schools in the United States in spelling and pronunciation is the latest revised edition of Webster's Dictionary. At a very early day in the establishment of our common schools Webster's Spellers became the almost universal first lesson book of the young mind, and this still holds its place in the schools of the country, thus inevitably paving the way for the continuation of the system of spelling and defining as given by Webster's series of Dictionaries, and we are therefore not astonished to be told that the sale of these is nearly ten times as great as that of all other dictionaries combined. In order to render the unabridged edition of this work a trustworthy companion of the scholar and student the Messrs. Merriam, the publishers, have spared no expense in procuring the services of the most able linguists and philologists of the present time, to completely revise the edition now offered to the public. It contains some two millions more words of printed matter than any other dictionary published in this country, and we believe it the most complete work of reference ever produced.

THE
MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE
AND
COMMERCIAL REVIEW!

DECEMBER, 1869.

THE SUEZ CANAL.

The passage of the grand naval procession from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, which sailed from Port Said on the 19th of November, and reached Suez on the 21st, ended the imposing ceremonies that celebrated the formal opening of the Suez Canal to the commerce of the world. The completion of this great work, accomplished in the comparatively short period of ten years, is another of the many important events characterizing the high and progressive civilization of the present century. Although it is probable that the difficulties overcome in the construction of the canal, as well as its value when finished as a direct channel for the great and increasing trade between Europe and the East, have been exaggerated in the one instance and overestimated in the other; it cannot be denied that, to the enterprise of M. de Lesseps and the French capitalists who contributed the greater part of the \$55,000,000 expended, the civilized world is indebted for one of the grandest achievements of modern engineering science. It will be

remembered that, during the progress of the work, the general tone of the European and American press was one of incredulity as to the success of the enterprise. Among the many objections advanced, it was confidently asserted that, even if it were possible to cut a canal across the Isthmus, the shifting sand of the desert would fill it up more rapidly than the dredging machines could clear the channel. No sooner was the canal actually finished, however, than the former disbelievers rushed to the opposite extreme of unlimited credulity. Not only did they accept the fact of its successful completion, but they at once decided that the commerce of the East, which had formerly followed the less direct routes by way of one or the other of the Southern Continental Capes, must henceforth flow exclusively through the new channel opened for it by way of the Isthmus of Suez. It is evident that this estimate of the results which are to follow the opening of the canal is extravagant, even though the sanguine predictions of M. de Lesseps and his friends may not wholly fail of ultimate realization.

The isthmus of Suez is, as our readers are aware, seventy-five miles broad, and separates the Red and Mediterranean Seas, barring the road to the goal of Columbus, and, in consequence, opening in past centuries a New World and a new passage to the enterprise of the Old. It is almost level with the adjoining seas, having a general depression to the Mediterranean. Its average elevation is from five to eight feet above the sea level, although, in the case of two hillocks, it rises to heights of thirty and forty feet. Indeed, it is more than probable that the seas once flowed across this bar. At the present day there are several salt lakes and swamps which have been used in the construction of the canal. The land of the isthmus is natural sterile, and wanting in fresh water. It has long been an object to the rulers of the adjacent territory to cut a canal from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. It has been frequently attempted, and more than once with success. Some historians attribute the earliest attempt to Sesostris. The ancient Egyptian canal did not pass in a line across the isthmus as in the present case. The waters of the Nile were divided into two branches, one flowing northward to Lake Timsah, and the other southward, through the Bitter Lakes, to the Red Sea, near Suez. They sailed on the Nile so far as it was navigable, and when it ceased to be so they cut a canal, filling it with water from the river, which debouched into the Red Sea, near the present Suez. This line thus had four sections, 92½ miles in length—13½ miles from Suez to the Bitter Lakes, 27 miles through these lakes, 40 from the lakes to El Ouady (of Tomat), and 12 miles from El Ouady to Bubastis, then one of the principal branches of the Nile. The vestiges of the old canal show a breadth of from 100 to 200 feet.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE SUZ CANAL.

The pamphlet of M. de Lesseps, recently published in Paris, and entitled *Egypte et Turquie*, contains valuable information in reference to the historical antecedents of the Suez Canal. In discussing this point we shall principally rely on his authorities. It is known that, in the most ancient times, in default of a canal directly connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, of which the imperfect state of engineering science in those days prevented the execution, there existed a vast canal which united the Red Sea with the Nile. This canal, undertaken, in the first place, by Nechos, the son of I'sameticus, 630, B. C., or perhaps by his predecessors, was finished by Darius, the son of Hystaspe. Half a century after Darius, Herodotus stated that this canal was four days' journey in length, and of a width sufficient to admit the passage of two triremes abreast. It commenced at Bubaste on the Nile, following at first an easterly direction, then diverging to the south, and finally entering the Red Sea at Patymos. The Ptolemys kept the canal in constant repair, and added considerable improvements to the great work. Strabo, who travelled in Egypt fifty years before the Christian era, beheld this canal covered with ships. The Roman Emperors, Trajan and Adrian especially, greatly enlarged and extended the canal. When the Musselmans effected the conquest of Egypt, the canal had been abandoned, but the Caliphs, comprehending how necessary it was to renew the work, in the interest of the holy cities Mecca and Medina, soon caused the reconstruction of the canal, and it was subsequently styled "Canal of the Prince of the Faithful."

The Arab historians in detailing the work of reconstruction, give a curious mythical account of the inception of the work. The following is an extract from the Arabic chronicle of El Makrizy: "This canal was hollowed out by an ancient king of Egypt for Agar, the mother of Ishmael while she dwelt in Mecca. In the continuation of days it was hollowed a second time by one of the Greek kings who reigned in Egypt after the death of Alexander. When the Most High bestowed Islamism upon mankind, and Amrou-ben-el-A'ss made the conquest of Egypt, this General, following the instructions of Omar-ben-el-Khathathab, provided for the reconstruction of the canal in the year of the pestilence. He conducted it to the Sea of Kolzoum, from whence vessels sailed to Hedjaz, Yemen and India. In the year when Mohammed-ben Hagan revolted in the City of the Prophet (Medina) against Abou-Djafar, then Caliph of Irak, the latter sent orders to his lieutenant in Egypt directing him to fill up the canal that it might not be used for the transportation of provisions to the insurgents in Medina. His order was accordingly carried

out; and communication stopped with the Sea of Ko'zoum. In this condition the canal has remained to this day."

In reference to the reconstruction of the canal by Amrou-ben el-A'ss the following account is given by the Arab geographer Alfergan: "The river Trajan, which passes from Egypt to Babylon, as was stated by Ptolemy, is the same that subsequently named the "Canal of the Commander of the Faithful," and which flows by Cairo. For Omar, as is stated in the history of the Egyptian war, ordered that the canal should be reopened to effect the transportation of food to Medina and Mecca, which were then desolated by famine. The Caliph's letter to Amrou was as follows: 'To the rebel son of a rebel—Whilst thou and thy companions are fattening yourselves, you care nothing that I and mine are daily getting leaner. At once give succour to us,' Amrou replied: 'I am thine. I will send thee a train of beasts of which the first shall be with thee ere the last has set out. *Besides I hope to find another mode of transportation by sea.*' But immediately Amrou repented that he had given this hint; because somebody made the observation to him that it would be possible to devastate Egypt and speedily transfer the spoils to Medina. Accordingly he wrote directly afterwards to the Caliph, to state that he had reflected upon *the transportation by sea*, and had found insurmountable difficulties in the way of the work. Omar replied; "I have received the letter in which thou seekest to elude the execution of the project conceived in the preceding. I swear by the Almighty either that thou shalt execute it, or that I will drive thee out by the ears, and send one in thy place who will accomplish it." Amrou saw at once that he had blundered, so he began work directly upon the canal. Omar enjoined him not to neglect sending comestibles, clothing, lentils, onions, and cattle—in a word, all that Egypt produced. Eikendi states that the canal was hollowed out in the year 23 of the Hegira, which corresponds with the year 643 of the Christian era. It was finished in six months, so that vessels could pass through it and proceed to Hedjaz."

In M. de Tott's *Memoires sur les Turcs* occurs the following: "The late Sultan Mustapha felt uncommon interest in the project for connecting the two seas by means of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez. In addition to the information that I had upon the subject, he wished to know all that had been ascertained by the different commissions that had been in Egypt. If Mustapha had lived long enough to undertake this work he would have found upon the spot facilities enabling him to carry out the greatest revolution of which the political situation was susceptible. This Sultan, whose mind was becoming much enlightened, caused me to undertake a work explanatory of this important object, which he proposed to execute as soon as peace was established. Of all the different public

works which have made Egypt illustrious, the canal of communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean would merit the first place in point of rank, if, indeed, the efforts of genius on behalf of public utility were duly seconded by the generations destined to enjoy them; and if the foundations of social weal could acquire the same solidity as the prejudices which tend to destroy it. There lies the abridgement of all history; it affords constantly the same tableau; it is that of all nations, of all ages. Without these continual destructions, the happiest position would have dictated immutable laws; and the Canal of the Red Sea had been constantly the basis of the public right of nations."

Napoleon appeared upon the soil which had been trod by Sesostris, Alexander and Cæsar. Hardly had he arrived in Egypt when he hastened to Suez to determine whether he could recommence the work of the Pharaohs—the work continued by the Greeks and the Romans. On the 24th of December, 1798, he reached Cairo, and, on the 30th, accompanied by his illustrious comrades, Berthier, Caffarelli, Gantheaume, Monge, Berthollet, and Costaz, he rediscovered the vestiges of the ancient canal. Napoleon tracked them upwards of five leagues; then, after visiting the fountains of Moses, he returned to Cairo by the Wady-Toumilat, and inspected near Baalbec, on January 8, 1799, the other extremity of the canal of the Pharaohs. He ordered a clever engineer, M. Lepere, to prepare a memoir upon communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The canal which M. Lepere proposed was no other than the ancient canal; and according to his calculations the work would not cost above twenty-five or thirty millions of francs. The commencement of the canal was, as formerly, to be at Bubaste, on the Nile; its direction was by Wady-Toumilat towards Lake Timsah, thence turning to the South it descended towards Suez. Always the thought predominated that it must be a canal destined solely to unite the Nile with the Red Sea. Yet, by the side of this principal thought were seen traces of another—the true one—which, however, remained *inferonde*. After an examination of the localities, the clever engineer could not hinder himself from perceiving the facilities which nature afforded for the construction of a canal which would place Suez and Peluze in direct communication. That would indeed have been the canal dividing the isthmus, and which also would open the grand maritime route reclaimed by commerce and civilization. But two considerations prevented Napoleon from welcoming the idea. He believed, in the absence of profound political and strategical studies which had not yet been made, that it would be impossible to maintain the ports in the extremity of the line of navigation. The recent labors of the International Scientific Commission have peremptorily demonstrated that, thanks to the perfect apparatus now at the disposal of

the engineer, the difficulties of which were formerly dreaded exist no longer. Upon this point, however, it is well to quote M. Lepere's own words. His opinion in regard to the direct cutting of the isthmus is expressed as follows:—"In this project of the Suez Canal we have expressly recommended the choice of the ancient route by the interior of the Delta towards Alexandria, upon commercial considerations particularly referring to Egypt, and because on the side towards Peluze it does not appear feasible to maintain a permanent maritime establishment. Nevertheless, abstracting these considerations, it would be easy to open a direct communication between Suez, the Bitter Lake, the Ras-el-Mojeh, prolonged upon the eastern border of Lake Menzalieh to the sea towards Peluze. We think that a canal opened in this direction would present advantages which the interior canal does not afford. The navigation would be constantly open, and not subject to the alternate rising and falling of the Nile. In such a canal, too, it would be easy to attain a much greater depth. I would add that, if I did not see several difficulties in regard to digging out and keeping clear the channel to a sufficient depth between Suez and the roadstead [the force of steam machinery was not then understood], I should propose a direct communication, for the use of large ships, between the two seas through the isthmus." Napoleon, on his return to France, received from M. Lepere, in presence of the members of the Institute of Egypt, the *Memoir on the Canal of the Two Seas*, from which the above extracts are taken. And the Emperor then pronounced the following prophetic words: "It is a big thing. However, I am not able to accomplish it. But the Turkish government will one day find its conservation and its glory in the execution of this project." So far about the predecessors of M. de Lesseps as told by himself. Let us see now what he has done as it is told by others.

From the days of Napoleon to the present the project which he so much favored has not been lost sight of. Its present success—whatever time will prove that to be—is mainly due to Vicomte Ferdinand de Lesseps, the eminent French engineer. M. de Lesseps was born at Versailles in 1805, and at the age of 23 was employed in the consular service of France at Lisbon. His father was for a long time attached to the French consulate at Alexandria. Here de Lesseps *per se* attained great influence over Mehemet Ali and the Turkish authorities; indeed, the recognition of Mehemet Ali as Viceroy of Egypt is often attributed to the personal interference of M. de Lesseps with the Sultan. The intimacy of the fathers lead also to an intimacy between the sons. Young de Lesseps, after his promotion from Lisbon, held various consular positions in the East, and was afterwards transferred to Barcelona, where, during a political disturbance, he displayed great energy, tact, and ability. In 1854

he visited Mehemet Said, who had succeeded to the viceroyalty. At this time he broached formally his idea of the Suez Ship Canal. At the request of Said Pacha he drew up a memoir, entitled "Perceement de l'Isthme de Suez Expose, et Documents Officiel." M. de Lesseps, in consequence, received in 1834 a firman sanctioning the enterprise, and a letter of concession in 1839. The Viceroy offered very liberal terms, taking a large share in the company, making valuable concessions of land, and permitting the employment of the native workmen.

M. de Lesseps proposed to dig a canal 90 miles long, 330 feet wide at water line, sloping at the sides to the bottom, which was to be 20 feet below the low water level of the Mediterranean. There were to be at each end sluice locks 330 feet long by 70 feet wide. By using the tides, it was hoped that an additional depth of three to four feet might be gained. As no ship could enter it from the sea, unless the mouths were protected from the sands and shoals, the greatest difficulty of the work was anticipated in the artificial harbors necessary at each end. At Suez, the piers had to be brought out three miles through shifting sands; the stone, however, could be found near at hand. The harbor on the Mediterranean side, near Tyneh, or Pelusium, was more costly and difficult. The Nile annually pours into the Mediterranean 13,000,000 cubic yards of sand and mud, which are borne by a strong ocean current to the neighborhood of Tyneh, making that coast shallower and more dangerous each year. In M. Lepere's report, the opinion was expressed that the Red Sea was thirty feet higher than the Mediterranean, but the surveys of M. Boardaloue in 1806 from Suez to Tyneh, and from Tyneh to Suez demonstrated that hardly any difference of level existed. Nevertheless, men like George Stephenson, who should have known that with time, money, and labor no engineering work is impossible, threw cold water on the scheme. Indeed the English capitalists and diplomats endeavored by every agency to hinder the work, as they saw in it a political movement. M. de Lesseps's company was organized in 1834. In 1855 the Viceroy had a new survey made.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS.

In that year, the representatives of France, England, Prussia, Austria, and Holland assembled in Paris to discuss the question in its international relations. After hearing the explanations and reports of M. de Lesseps, it was determined to send five of their number to Suez to examine the work. Their report went to show the entire feasibility of the scheme. This report made in November and December, 1855, was published in June, 1856. The work of organizing the company proceeded until 1858, when *La Compagnie de Grand Canal Maritime de Suez* became a fact.

It raised a capital of 200,000,000 of francs, about \$38,000,000 of our money, or £7,760,000 sterling. Subsequently, two other loans of 400,000,000 of francs in the aggregate were raised.

The following are substantially the terms of the Egyptian concession: The Egyptian government to have the right of selecting the managing director from the largest stockholders, if possible; the concession to last ninety-nine years from the opening of navigation; the works to be at the expense of the company; the Egyptian government conceding public lands to defray the expenses, and undertaking, if desirable, to build fortifications at its own expense; the government to receive annually 15 per cent of the earnings, without reference to dividend or interest to be derived from their shares; the remainder of the profits are to be divided, 75 per cent for the general shareholders, and 10 per cent for the original founders; the tariff (to be regulated by the Egyptian government and the company) to be the same for all nations. Should the company deem it advisable to join the Nile and the maritime canal by a navigable channel, the land now uncultivated may be irrigated and cultivated at their own expense and charge, the company to have these lands free of any charge for ten years, dating from the opening of the canal; during the remaining eighty-nine years they will pay one-tenth of the usual land tax; after which, the whole of the usual tax on irrigated land in Egypt; a plan of all the lands conceded is to be made; the company is to have the right of quarrying stone on government lands, and of importing tools and machinery and supplies for the workmen, free of duty; at the termination of the concession the Egyptian government is to be substituted in lieu for the company.

In January, 1856, it was provided that "four-fifths at least of the workmen should, in all cases, be Egyptians." These native workmen, or *fellahs*, numbered 20,000. Their wages were one-third less than that of the European laborers, but still a third more than what was usually paid to the *fellahs* in their own country. It was also agreed that they should be provided with habitations, food, and medical assistance, and that while in hospital they should receive half their usual salary.

On the death of Said Pacha, the Sultan visited Egypt, and personally examined the works. On his return to Constantinople he published an order forbidding the forced employment of the *fellahs* in the work, as fever and exhaustion had decimated them, and further disagreeing to the land concessions made by Said Pacha. M. de Lesseps protested against this interference, whereupon Ismail Pacha, the present Khedive, sent to Paris Nubar Pacha to lay the matter before the Direction. They refused to agree to his demands. Nubar Pacha then referred the matter to the eminent French jurists, Odillon Barrot, Jules Favre, and Dufaure.

These recommended the company to abandon their extraordinary demands, and to be satisfied with the terms offered by the Sublime Porte.

The works were delayed in their progress in consequence of this dispute, although large numbers of the fellahs engaged voluntarily in the work, attracted by the good wages and comfortable quarters of the workmen. The dispute having been referred to the Emperor of the French, he decided as follows: 1. That the concessions of November, 1854, and January, 1856, had the form of contracts mutually binding on each party. 2. That as by the withdrawal of the fellah labor the cost of the work would be increased, the Viceroy should pay an indemnity of £1,200,000 sterling on that account. 3. That the company should cede to the Viceroy their fresh water canals, reserving only the right; that the Viceroy should pay £400,000, representing the cost of construction of the canals and £240,000 for the tolls, which the company thereby relinquished. 4. That the company should only retain such lands along the line of the maritime canal as might be necessary for the care and maintenance of the said canal. 5. That the company should cede to the Viceroy their title to all lands capable of cultivation by means of irrigation from the fresh water canals, and for which the Viceroy should pay £1,200,000. This last grant made the total indemnification, £3,360,000 sterling.

The canal passes through four large natural lakes. The largest of these is called *Lac Amer*, or the Bitter Lake, and is situated some ten miles from Suez. The other lakes are Lake Timsah, Lake Ballah, and Lake Menzalleh. Lake Timsah is the smallest of these, and has been drying up for a long time. These lakes are but ten or fifteen miles distant from each other. The work of the company consisted in deepening the channel through these lakes, cutting a passage through the intervening sections, and building the harbors at Port Said and Suez. The land was principally sandy, with occasional strata of calcareous blue slate. The difference of level, even at the highest calculation is only four inches in the mile, so that the current will not be great. Whatever current there will be, will be broken by the lakes. The rate at which the work on the canal was performed was remarkable. The average monthly work was 1,200,000 cubic metres. The divisions of the Canal are four in number, that of Port Said or Lake Menzalleh, El Guisr (pronounced El Gearsh) Ismailia and Suez. Ismailia, at the junction of the freshwater canal and the maritime canal, divides the entire work into nearly two equal parts, which are subdivided into four parts, each having a resident engineer and corps of assistants.

Port Said is the Mediterranean entrance of the canal. It is 124 miles north of Alexandria and 30 miles north of Damietta. It is a mushroom city, such as we have had on the path of our Pacific railroad. It owes its

origin to the canal, and its name to the first patron of the work, Said Pacha. It is now a large city, and promises to rival in importance and trade both Marseilles and Alexandria. The harbor of Port Said is artificial, and, as has been intimated, is of massive proportions to resist the terrible influx of sand and mud from the Nile. There are two jetties, the eastern and the western. The length of the western jetty is 2,200 metres, or nearly $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles; and of the eastern, 950 metres. The width of the mouth will be 400 metres (1,300 feet) and the area of the harbor will be 51 hectares. These immense sea-walls are constructed from artificial stone, made on the spot. Two hundred and sixty-three thousand eight hundred and thirty-six centimetres of this artificial stone have been sunk or used in the construction of this breakwater.

DIVISION OF LAKE MENZALLEH.

The work on this extending from Port Said to kilometre 23, a distance of 14 miles, has been very important, it passes through a large lake very much subject to the action of the wind and sea, from which it is separated but by a narrow strip of land. The amount of matter excavated here would be represented by 11,141,622 cubic metres. The division of El Guisr is the longest division of the canal, extending over thirty-five miles. As far as Kantara it is very straight, but after that locality is passed the work is heavy especially at El Guisr. The cuttings in this neighborhood are the deepest. Kantara is the principal town of this division. It is twenty-eight miles from Port Said. Lake Ballah is eight miles south of Kantara. In this neighborhood is the village of El Guisr, which is the highest elevation on the peninsula. The work here was very severe. Ismailia, on Lake Timsah, is so called after the Khedive Ismail Pacha. It owes its origin to the canal. The original canal from the Damietta branch of the Nile extended to the town of Zagazig, fifty miles west of Ismailia. One of the first acts of the present company was to bring it within a few miles of the site of Ismailia. The division of Ismailia is the third. It extends through Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes to Kilometre one hundred and fifteen. Thence to Suez is the fourth division. Suez was an unimportant town heretofore, but it has been galvanized into vigorous life by the operations of the canal company. On August 15, 1865, the fete day of Napoleon, the first vessel passed through from sea to sea. It was a coal barge, which made the passage a portion of the way by the fresh water canal. In January, 1867, as our special telegrams at that period announced, large steamers passed through by means of the same auxiliary canal. The completion of the maritime canal is of recent date.

BALANCE SHEET.

The following is the general balance sheet of the Suez Canal Company, exhibiting the whole indebtedness incurred in the construction of the work, and the funds which have accrued from various sources; dated June 30, 1869:

Dr.	Francs.
Expenses of organization from 1854 to 1859.....	2,991,435.27
Construction of general offices.....	920,310.43
Furniture and material of offices in Alexandria and the administration in Paris.....	141,296.34
Interest on shares 1859-'69.....	64,654,393.80
Interest on bonds 1868-'69.....	7,818,493.75
Extinction of obligation 1868-9.....	1,700,000.01
Expenses incurred in contracting loan of one hundred million of francs.....	1,486,745.40
General expenses of the administration of the affairs of the company, commission on agents, and negotiations in France and Egypt, from January 1, 1859, to date.....	16,951,941.73
Expenses of health department, 1868-9.....	67,056.16
Expenses of telegraphs, 1868-9.....	145,087.40
Expenses of maintenance, 1869.....	17,503.95
Expenses of transportation 1866-9, including floating and rolling stock, buildings, sheds, and also of tolls.....	8,101,631.23
General expenses of construction advances to contractors on material and victualing.....	17,213,943.89
Other stores, buildings, &c.....	33,341,980.89
Works in the construction of the canals and ports.....	217,471,670.72
Various running accounts with contractors.....	6,962,499.46
Running accounts of various services—	
Superior agency in Egypt.....	14,117,553.88
General direction of works.....	1,472,350.69
Transport service.....	2,034,987.15
Telegraph service.....	492.76
Health department.....	59,833.72
Capital account—	
Egyptian government on account of grants.....	30,000,000.00
Balance to be recovered on bonds, for calls fallen due.....	91,335.01
Various debts.....	239,131.85
Cash balance and portfolio of the superior agency in Egypt.....	4,024,000.00
Cash.....	68,231.08
Bank of France.....	119,736.71
Agricultural credit.....	15,035.25
Commercial and industrial credit.....	4,250,070.00
Society generale.....	5,680.22
Banc des depots et comptes courants.....	85,724.45
Securities.....	521,783.93
Property (various).....	7,809,464.53
Total.....	451,656,661.16

Cr.	Francs.
Capital (50 fr. on the 400,000 shares subscribed).....	200,000,000.00
Indemnities fixed by arbitration of the Emperor.....	84,000,000.00
Loan of 100,000,000 fr. on the 333,333 bonds subscribed).....	99,999,900.00
Value of grants settled by the convention of 23d August, 1869, between the Egyptian government and the company, 30,000,000 fr.; from which, deducting value of property previously purchased, there remains.....	29,744,520.80
Received from various sources.....	
Receipts anterior to formation of the company.....	6,504.88
Products of temporary investments, 1859-1868.....	18,410,988.64
Products of temporary investments, 1869.....	5,263,744
From various sources.....	159,397.85
Accessory proceeds.....	7,617,745.50
Receipts connected with the works.....	401.70
Receipts—Transportation department, 1866-69.....	3,421,391.95
Receipts—Sanitary department, 1868.....	84,371.21
Receipts—Postal and telegraph department, 1868-69.....	65,635.37
Receipts from domain.....	574,625.72
Current account of domain.....	198,370.94
Creditors (various).....	6,471,310.68
Total.....	\$451,656,661.10

ENGLISH INTERESTS IN THE SUEZ CANAL.

While Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was ambassador at Constantinople, M. de Lesseps addressed to him a letter in reference to English interests in the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez by means of a canal. The following is a translation of this interesting document :

"There are questions (says M. de Lesseps) which require to be frankly approached in order that they may be fairly resolved—as wounds or maladies have to be discovered before they can be cured. The kindness with which you have received my first observations in regard to a subject, the gravity of which cannot be disguised, encourages me to submit to you the question of the Suez Canal, from a point of view in which, I think, the matter may be very usefully discussed. The influence which your high character and long experience naturally give you in the decisions of your government relative to all Oriental questions makes me anxious to neglect nothing that might aid you in forming an opinion with full knowledge of the facts.

The results already attained through the intimate alliance of France and England, sufficiently prove how advantageous is this union of the two nations in the interests of the equilibrium of Europe and of civilization. The future happiness of all the nations of the world is involved in this state of things, which, to the everlasting honor of the governments that have thus far maintained it, can alone guarantee to mankind the benefits of peace and progress. Hence the necessity of removing in advance every cause of rupture, and even of coolness, between the two nations; hence the imperious duty of examining among possible contingencies what circumstances are of a nature to awaken antagonistic feelings and provoke among either people those emotions against which the wisdom of governments is powerless to strive. The motives of a hostile rivalry tend successively to give place to that generous emulation which produces grand achievements.

In considering the situation in a general way, however, one fails to perceive on what ground or what occasion those struggles which deluged the world with blood could begin again. Can financial or commercial interests divide the two nations? But the capital of Great Britain thrown into so many French enterprises, and the immense development which international commerce has made, establish bonds between them which become closer every day. Are political interests or the questions of principle likely to awaken strife? But the two nations have now but one single object, one single ambition—the triumph of right over might, of civilization over barbarism. Finally, will paltry jealousies in regard to territorial extension divide them? But to-day they understand that the

globe is vast enough to present to their respective populations domains to be reclaimed, and human creatures to be reclaimed from barbarism ; and that whenever their flags were together the conquests of the one enhance the profits of the other.

At the first glance, therefore, it is difficult to detect anything in the general situation that could alter our beneficial relations with England.

Nevertheless, upon a more careful scrutiny, an eventuality presents itself, which, by making the two most enlightened and moderate Cabinets of Europe partake of popular prejudices and passions, is capable of reviving old antipathies, and compromising, with the alliance, all the old bonds of amity which united the peoples. There is, in fact, a certain point upon the globe the freedom and neutrality of which is intimately connected with the political and commercial power of Great Britain—a point which, in times gone by, France, on her part, has desired to become possessed of. That point is Egypt, the direct path from Egypt to the Indies—Egypt, sprinkled so many times with the blood of Frenchmen.

It would be superfluous to review the motives which would actuate England in preventing Egypt from falling into the hands of a rival nation. But we must also carefully note that, with interests less positive, France—under the empire of her glorious traditions, under the impulse of other sentiments, instructive rather than critical, and for that reason all-powerful in the minds of her sensitive people—would never leave England in the peaceable possession of Egypt. It is, therefore, clear that so long as the route to the Indies is open and secure, and that the condition of the country guarantees facility and promptitude of communication, England will never attempt to create grave difficulties by appropriating a territory which has really no other value to her than as a place of transit. It is equally evident that France, whose policy for the last fifty years has consisted in contributing to the prosperity of Egypt as much by her counsels as by the co-operation of a large number of distinguished Frenchmen in Egyptian affairs, in science, in administration, and in all the arts of peace or war, will never attempt to realize the project of an epoch now passed away, so long as England keeps her foot from the country.

But supposing that one of those crises which so frequently disturb the East should happen, or that England should think herself obliged by circumstances to take possession of Egypt in order to prevent another from seizing it, let us inquire whether it is possible that the alliance would resist the complication which such an event would produce ? What reasons would England have for believing herself forced to become mistress of Egypt at the risk of breaking her friendly relations with France ? Solely on this account : That Egypt is the shortest and most direct route from England to her Oriental possessions ; that this road must

be constantly open; and that she can make no terms with anything that touches this transcendent interest. Therefore, by her natural position, Egypt may be the cause of a conflict between France and Great Britain; and yet the chances of rupture would disappear if, by a providential event, the geographical conditions of the old world were changed, and the route to India, instead of traversing the heart of Egypt, was carried back to the boundaries, and, being open to all the world, was no more in danger of becoming the privileged possession of any.

Well, this event, which must be in the designs of Providence, is to-day within the reach of mankind. It can be accomplished by human industry; it can be realized by piercing the Isthmus of Suez. That is one to which nature offers no obstacles; it is one which would attract the free capital of England as well as other countries.

Let the Isthmus be cut across; let the waves of the Mediterranean mingle with those of the Indian Ocean; let railroads be directed thither—and Egypt, becoming immensely valuable as a productive country, as having good internal commerce, as warehouse and place of transit, would lose its perilous importance as a line of communication always uncertain and frequently contested. The possession of Egyptian territory being no longer a matter of interest to England, the country would cease to be the object of a possible struggle between that power and France. The union of the two people would be henceforth unalterable, and the world be preserved from the calamities which would follow their rupture. This result affords such guarantees for the future that it is sufficient to indicate it to attract to the enterprise destined to accomplish it the sympathy and encouragement of statesmen whose efforts have the sole aim of placing the Anglo French alliance upon indestructible bases. You are one of these men, my lord, and you have so great a part in the debates of *la haute politique*, that I am extremely anxious to make you acquainted with my aims."

M. de Lesseps has published an interesting pamphlet discussing the various international advantages of the Suez Canal, from which we summarize some important matter. In touching upon this important question, so far as it regards Turkey, he adopts an ingenious device, which would have the effect of specially commending the subject to the attention of all good Moslems, whether Turkish, Egyptian, or Hindoo. He prefaces his chapter on the Turkish interest in the undertaking with three verses from the 31st chapter of the Koran, which bears the title, "Against the Spirit of Immovableness." These verses read as follows: "Do you not see that God has subjected to your use all that is upon the earth? He has poured out upon you his benefits, both evident and hidden. But men say: We will follow rather that which we found among our fathers. But what if

Satan should invite them to the torment of fire! Do you not behold the ship wafted upon the sea, bearing the gifts of God, to make you perceive his teachings? There is in this many signs for the steadfast man to be grateful."

M. de Lesseps declares that interests of the highest order bind Turkey to the success of the enterprise. And those interests he classifies under politics, religion, and commerce.

THE POLITICAL INTEREST

is clearly defined, since the enterprise adds to the stability of the empire, in giving it a new maritime passage, of which Europe will be as much interested in maintaining the independence as it has been in preserving the neutrality of the ancient route of the Dardanelles. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire (inscribed in treaties which actually have often had no other force than accord founded on the interests of the contracting parties) acquires a consecration much more complete in the necessities of the case, in the indispensable conditions of the equilibrium of the world. The powers of Europe have had *one* motive for defending this integrity; henceforth they will have *two*. The Sultan becomes the guardian of two political positions of the greatest importance—the passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and the passage from the Mediterranean to the Asiatic and Austral oceans. In the same hand these two passages lend each other a natural strength, a mutual guarantee. Under the same sceptre, they sanction and consolidate the neutrality of the empire, which this double position will at length incorporate in the equilibrium of Europe. As the European powers can never consent to see the Suez Canal possessed or dominated by one of themselves, Egypt can never in any case be a gift or compensation; and thus vanish the dream of certain statesmen, who, desirous of obtaining a portion of the spoils, fancy that they can still render acceptable to Europe the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The policy of exclusive conquests appears to have had its day. But, supposing that the world must fall again into the old ruts, what dangers would the Ottoman Empire have to foresee and provide against? On one side it must defend Constantinople—on the other to watch Egypt. These are the two weights upon the balances—for it cannot be forgotten that since the commencement of the present century, on two memorable occasions, the partition of the Ottoman Empire has been seriously proposed by placing Egypt and Constantinople in the two scales as the condition of the sale. Well, recent events have proved that Turkey would not be left to stand alone in resisting attacks upon the Constantinople side.

As for the West, we know England and France could never agree to the possession of Egypt by one of themselves. But what difference in regard to security, if, instead of being a merely natural question between these two powers, the question became European; if, by the possession of a neutral route between the two most opulent oceans on the globe, Egypt, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, rendered Austria jointly responsible for her position by the prosperity of the Adriatic and the developments of maritime trade; Italy and France by their Mediterranean ports; England by her communications with India and Australia; Russia by her ports on the Black Sea, and by the maritime communication of the great rivers which debouch near her settlements upon the Amoor; Spain by her colonial possessions and her Mediterranean littoral; Holland by her interests in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo; the United States of America by an abbreviation of nearly 3,000 leagues for their Atlantic ports in navigating towards the Indian Ocean?

Let us add that, through all the interests attaching to the maintenance of the *statu quo*, the Suez Canal is destined to bind Egypt still more closely to the rest of the Ottoman Empire. All antagonism between the vassal and the suzerain will forever disappear, not only on account of the exterior considerations which have been indicated, but also on account of a powerful motive of internal policy. For as the Suez Canal becomes the material demonstration of the principle sometimes misunderstood, that the prosperity and strength of Egypt are elements essential to the vitality of Turkey; the vassal will be so much more assured that partizans for the enfeeblement of Egypt will have lost all influence in the councils of the Sublime Porte. Enlightened men in Turkey, so far from entertaining alarm at the situation, perceive, on the contrary, in the consequences following the opening of the Suez Canal, a pledge of security for the future; for they have always dreaded exposures to dangerous eventualities on the part of some European power; they always preferred to see Egypt governed, in an exceptional manner, by Mussulman princes of Turkish origin, and who were attached to the metropolis by many common ties of policy and religion.

The Viceroy, Mohammed Said, in his communications with the statesmen of Turkey in reference to susceptibilities which it was sought to awaken against him, remarked:

"In the actual situation a governing Prince of Egypt, who had mental reservations, would never permit the execution of a Suez Canal. All the coast from Damietta to the principal ports of Syria, is to-day exempt from all foreign surveillance as well as from European navigation. Nothing would prevent the Viceroy of Egypt under given circumstances to prepare armaments, to concentrate troops without attracting external

attention, and to precipitate his forces into Syria before measures of prevention could be arranged. But with a canal to Suez the position is completely changed."

"Besides, the important Arabian possessions of Turkey, which Egypt is now charged with provisioning in grain, could be easily starved; or, as the heaven of revolt is there always at hand, it could be laid hold of and augmented by Egypt, which, under the present system of communication, would be in a position to dominate. Experience has already proved that the distance and the difficulties of transportation would never permit Turkey to send into Arabia the forces necessary to assure the preponderance of her power. The canal has been spoken of as a barrier between Egypt and Turkey. It is sufficient to know the country to become convinced that physically the separation between Turkey and Egypt is much more complete by the desert than it would be or will be by the canal, around which populations of Syrian and Egyptian cultivators will assuredly congregate."

This language is not less remarkable for its loyalty than for its striking truth.

Let us now show that in this question political interests are strengthened by religious interests; that sometimes the one is founded in the other. The power of the Sultan's successors of the Caliphs is at once a political power and a supreme pontificate. The Grand Signor is chief and protector of the Mussulman religion, and at the same time sovereign of the territories which compose his States. Nobody can be ignorant of the importance the Moslems attach to the possession of the Holy cities, which is regarded by them as an essential condition of the spiritual authority of the Sultan. But the difficulties and the slowness of communication between Turkey and Arabia, the consuming distance to be traversed, the deserts to be passed in order to convey thither the forces sufficient to maintain supremacy—the opening of the Suez Canal will cause all these obstacles to disappear. Constantinople can communicate in a few days with Arabia; and a maritime route always practicable and easy will permit of arrangements being made against all eventualities, and really bring the sanctuaries of faith again under the direction of the Sovereign Pontiff. The execution of the enterprise resolved upon by the Viceroy of Egypt will facilitate and multiply, to the aggrandisement of the Sultan's authority, one of the acts of faith most dear to the piety of Moslems, and free the subjects of the empire from those perils of the holy pilgrimage. To day the route of the caravans is marked by the bones with which it is annually whitened.

In an indirect manner, but not less certainly, the Suez Canal will render the same service to the Moslem populations of Asia and Africa. By

uniting the two seas, it introduces into the Red Sea, and places at the disposal of the hadjis of those countries the innumerable means of communication which are found in such perfection in the Mediterranean; thus rendering still more direct the influence of the Sultan over the tribes which already recognize and respect his religious supremacy.

In regard to commercial relations, Turkey will reap advantages from the union of the two seas, not less evident than have appeared in treaty of political and religious affairs. Without recurring to souvenirs of ancient Byzantium, it is not to be disputed that at certain epochs of the middle ages Constantinople was one of the great marts of commerce between the East and the West. By the Euphrates, by way of the high plateau of Asia, she received the products of India; the silks of China and the commodities of all eastern lands embarked at the ports of the Black Sea were bounded on the shores of the Bosphorus. The Venetian and the Genoese were the factors in these important transactions. But, by perfected methods, by combinations differently arranged, the piercing of the isthmus should offer to the commerce and navigation of Constantinople a far wealthier career. A single material fact will be sufficient to indicate the advantages which the city has a right to expect from the new route. Of all the great European ports, Constantinople is the one which the maritime canal brings nearest to India and China. To day it is the most distant. It is at present 6,000 leagues from Bombay; it will in future be but 1,800 leagues. Necessarily it will become the emporium of a large portion of the commerce which will establish itself between the oriental oceans and the Black Sea; and an idea may be gained of this movement by remarking that the Trebizonde and Odessa are less remote from Suez than Trieste and Marseilles. And the commercial advantages which have just been inferred apply to all the other ports of the Empire in Asia Minor, in Syria, and in the Archipelago. By the mouth of the Danube, Constantinople extends its commercial relations to the very centre of Hungary and Germany. Naturally these relations will be augmented by the opening of the isthmus to navigation, and the Moldo-Wallachian provinces, in obtaining new outlets for their products, above all for cereals, will not fail to acquire new elements of prosperity. Finally, Turkey, which is to-day a stranger to the opulent exchanges which are commanded by the great route around Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope, can take an active part therein when the path of exchange shall be the Red Sea rendered accessible to the coasters of the Mediterranean by the passage of Suez.

Such are the immediate results to Turkey of the opening of the maritime canal; independently of the scope which will be given to them in the future by the interest of traders and the enlightened solicitude of the government for the well being and progress of its population.

It is claimed that the best and most trustworthy data from which to estimate the probable traffic of the Suez Canal, is found in the movements of the various European steamship companies. In France, the *Mesageries Imperiales* are adapting some of their fine steamers for the canal traffic. A number of light draught steamers are now building in England for a similar use, and docks and warehouses have been secured by the Russian Authorities at Port Said, for the use of the Great Commercial Company of Odessa, whose vessels will ply between that port and the East. The powerful and wealthy company known as the Australian Lloyd, has offered to carry free samples of the national products, with a view to improving and extending the trade of Austria in the Indian seas; and the Italian government has urged the ship owners of that country to prepare to profit by the opening of the canal. A steamship line is organizing in Spain to ply between Barcelona and the Philippine Islands; and in this country, the Oriental Steam Navigation Company will soon establish direct communication with China, India and the Mediterranean ports. As a general summary of the commercial movement, M. De Lesseps estimates the tonnage of Liverpool at 6,000,000, Marseilles, 6,000,000, and the trade through the Dardanelles 6,000,000; and claims that the traffic of the canal will be 6,000,000 at least, affording from the tonnage alone an annual return of \$12,000,000.

It is also claimed that the opening of the canal will favorably affect the commerce of the United States with the East. For the fiscal year ended June 30, 1867, our direct trade with the principal countries of the East was as follows:

	Exports.	Imports.
Dutch East Indies.....	\$304,895	\$.....
British East Indies.....	831,141	3,932,486
Australia.....	5,102,865	262,401
Philippine Islands.....	45,636	3,473,371
Other South Pacific Islands.....	83,137
China.....	8,788,145	12,112,440
Total.....	\$14,600,809	\$24,780,197

During the same period the total of exports to Southern Europe, the Mediterranean and the East Indies, was \$71,780,203, and of imports \$65,894,796, in all \$137,147,999; from which it will appear that one sixth of the foreign commerce of the United States was transacted with the countries named in the above table. How much of this trade will flow through the new channel remains to be seen. The canal undoubtedly shortens the average distance between our Atlantic ports and the East, as will appear from the following table of comparative distances from New York and Port Royal to the principal ports of Australia and Asia, via Gibraltar and Suez, on the one hand, and San Francisco and the Pacific on

the other—measured in nautical miles, with the exception of the distance overland to the Pacific coast :

	From New York via Gibraltar and Suez.	From Port Royal via Gibraltar and Suez.	From N.Y. via San Francisco & Pacific RR.
Melbourne.....	13,300	13,700	10,300
Shanghai.....	12,500	13,000	8,850
Hong Kong.....	11,700	12,300	9,300
Manila.....	11,000	12,100	9,600
Singapore.....	10,300	10,800	10,600
Batavia.....	10,500	11,000	11,000
Penang.....	9,950	10,450	11,100
Calcutta.....	9,700	10,200	12,150
Ceylon.....	8,750	9,250	12,200

As some portion of our trade will at once follow the new routes, it is claimed that the United States will share largely in the increased prosperity of the Mediterranean ports, Egypt, Arabia and the Indies. As a movement is already on foot to transfer a large proportion of the cotton manufactures of Northern France to points nearer the Mediterranean, it is believed that a direct trade in the staple will be established immediately with this country.

It may be doubted whether, in this favorable showing, the friends of the enterprise have fairly estimated the probable traffic of the canal and its influence on the commerce of the world. A formidable array of figures and statistics are advanced in support of these predictions, but certain important facts appear to have been left out of the calculation which are likely to affect the financial success of the enterprise in no small degree. As far as the commerce of the United States with the Indies is concerned, we do not attach much present importance to the opening of the Suez Canal. Probably our East India trade will follow the route of the Pacific Ocean, via San Francisco and the trans-continental railway lines. The commerce of Europe with the East will alone be influenced by the opening of the new route; and whether the vessels engaged in this traffic will pass through the canal or cling to the old path by way of the Cape of Good Hope, will depend wholly upon which route shall prove to be the quickest and cheapest.

It is the opinion of many of our practical and experienced shipmasters, that westward bound sailing vessels will still follow the route by way of the Cape. It is true the latter route is nearly four thousand miles longer than that by way of the Suez Canal, but the time required by a sailing vessel for the voyage from Calcutta to Liverpool by the new route will be longer by several weeks than the average time now required to make the homeward voyage by the old path round the Cape. The reason for this apparent anomaly is found in the trade winds and monsoons, which favor the vessels taking the Cape route, and the northerly winds of the Red Sea, and westerly winds of the Mediterranean, which prevail through the greater part of the year, and are favorable only to vessels bound east.

ward. It is probable, therefore, that but few westward bound vessels, if any, will make the voyage from India to the Northern European ports by way of Suez. The utility of the Canal will be restricted mainly to westward bound Indiamen. To them the principal advantage of the new route consists in a considerable saving of time; but, on the other hand, there are several considerations which render it still uncertain whether even outward bound Indiamen will avail themselves of it. According to the tariff of charges already published, the tolls which must be paid to the Canal Company by the owners of vessels of a thousand tons burden for the privilege of passing through it, will amount to nearly twenty-five hundred dollars. As the tolls are graduated according to the measurement of vessels, they would in most cases exceed the amount above stated, as the majority of Indiamen exceed one thousand tons burden. It is doubtful whether the saving of time will compensate ship-owners for the largely increased expenses incurred by following the new route. Besides this, the navigation of the Mediterranean is proverbially dangerous, while that of the Red Sea is intricate and difficult; nearly as much so, indeed, as that of the Malayan Archipelago. The Red Sea is almost wholly destitute of lighthouses, its coast has been but imperfectly surveyed, and no trustworthy chart, indicating location of its many reefs and isolated rocks, has ever been prepared. It is but natural, therefore, that special rates should be charged for insuring vessels following the new route, as no company could afford to take the increased risks for the same rates now charged on vessels keeping in open sea. The saving of time, which, under favorable circumstances, could be made by eastward bound vessels following the canal, is to some extent offset by the great expense necessarily incurred; and it is still uncertain whether the old routes are not the safest and cheapest, even for vessels whose cargoes lose in value in proportion to the time required to bring them to market.

Under these circumstances, the assertion made with so much confidence, that the opening of the Suez Canal would revolutionize the commerce of the world, is manifestly premature. It is by no means certain that the canal will be extensively patronized even by passenger steamers, as the passage will be found far from comfortable at any time, while at certain seasons of the year it would prove dangerous, if not fatal, to those not thoroughly acclimated. It may be conceded, however, that the trade between India and the Black Sea and Mediterranean ports will follow the canal, and that this traffic will be greatly increased by the facilities offered by it; but it yet remains to be proved that the vast trade of Great Britain with her magnificent Indian empire will be directed through the new channel, or even that the opening of the canal will affect it to any considerable extent.

THE FINANCIAL QUESTION.

BY C. H. CARROLL.

What is repudiation? What is a dollar? What is money?

These specific inquiries embrace all that is essential in the great unsettled question of our national finance. Let me endeavor to reply to them scientifically, uninfluenced by political prejudice, or by the dogmatism of writers of any party, or of any shade of opinion.

Repudiation is the denial of the validity of a contract, disavowal of an obligation, and refusal to comply with its terms. On this point I think there can be no two opinions. Now, what is the obligation of debt in this country? Read it on the back of the greenback in your pocket: "This note is a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt." This is equally plain on the back of the note, and in the law authorizing its issue. Nor is there any question that a legal tender involves the compulsory acceptance as *a dollar*, of anything which Congress decrees to be a dollar, in discharge of a debt, even if it be, as in the case of the greenback, but the evidence of another. The substitution of debt for debt is not indeed payment; and the law, in saying that the note of the government is *payment*, says an untruth; but it is a "legal tender," and hence a forced loan.

It takes two to make a bargain; which of these is the repudiator in this case? Obviously the creditor, when he refuses to accept the greenback according to the terms of the contract; and the talk about repudiation, of which we hear so much in reference to the 5-20 bonds, is all on the wrong side.

I do not see that the opinion of S. P. Chase, or of Jay Cooke, as to the character of these bonds, is of any more consequence, or is any more binding on the conscience or the capital of the nation, than the opinion of any other citizen who may or may not have been concerned in their sale immediately.

Facts of experience show that, under the notions of political economy prevailing everywhere, the sovereign can make a unit of price out of a bushel of beans, or a red herring, or a paper token, or anything else, and both debtor and creditor must be bound by it. To my mind it is false economy, as well as great folly and injustice; but no opinion which favors a sound political economy is popular or considered practical at present, because privileged classes of commanding influence are opposed to it who gain by the wrong.

But an *ex post facto* law is a nullity. The constitution of the United States expressly declares that no such law shall be passed. Hence the greenback is not a legal tender for any debt contracted prior to Feb

ruary 25, 1862, the date of the act which authorized the issue of the legal tender notes.

What, then, is a dollar? It is a thing of law, and not of fact, independent of law. Every government, I believe, makes the mistake of establishing arbitrarily a money unit different from the unit of weight, claiming the right to alter it in weight and quality at will. Formerly this was done notoriously to cheat the public creditors. So that, everywhere, at least in Europe and America, law, and not commerce, determines what the unit of price shall be, and even whether it shall be a ponderable substance, and money, or not money. If government can change its substance, or alloy the coin at will, 10 per cent, or 20 per cent, or 40 per cent, and still give it the same name, and compel its acceptance at the same nominal value, why not alloy it 100 per cent, that is to say, eliminate the money, and establish a currency which is not money? And this is precisely what our government has done in making a legal tender of the greenback dollar.

I think government has a constitutional right to do this by the power to borrow money, which implies the choice to issue evidences of debt in any form that may serve its purpose; also, by the power to regulate commerce and the currency, the last being implied in the power to regulate the value of money: the moral right, as well as its expediency, is quite another thing.

It is true the inference may be drawn from the inhibition of power to the States to emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, that the framers of the constitution intended to establish a hard money government; but this is only an inference. And, unfortunately for this view of the case, the principle had lapsed already on the adoption of the constitution; for the Bank of North America had emitted bills of credit, as well as loaned its credit in deposits, as money, without money, which had expelled so much money from the country. So that a specie currency, with this principle in operation, was impossible from the first.

The original dollar was coined in Bohemia of a troy ounce of silver, the fineness of which I do not remember to have seen stated. This was superseded by the Spanish dollar, weighing 416 grains of standard silver, about nine-tenths fine, and the latter was adopted as the money unit here prior to the establishment of the mint. The first American dollars were struck in 1792 to conform in weight and fineness to this Spanish coin. The mint dollar afterwards underwent several alterations, until 1853, when the coinage of the silver dollar ceased and the gold dollar became the unit. This coin contains 25.8 troy grains of standard gold, nine-tenths fine. The real gold dollar, therefore, is 23.22 troy grains of fine metal which is our present money unit, by and upon which all our foreign

exchanges are reckoned. But our currency unit, for all purposes but the payment of duties on imports and interest on the public debt, is the dollar greenback, which is essentially a paper token. Thus we have two separate legal dollars, one of money and one of debt.

Since 1853 our silver dollar has been coined only in halves of 192 grains each, making a reduction of about 8 per cent from the weight and value of the mint dollar of 1792. But in Europe the variations of the dollar have been much greater than in the United States, except that it is there always made of silver. In Germany, its birth place, where its original weight was an ounce, its contents in pure silver vary in different localities from 252.6 to 271.8 grains, the standard metal being alloyed variously, so that by our gold standard it is valued at 70 to 75 cents. In Prussia the *thaler*, or dollar, of full weight contains 342½ grains of standard silver, alloyed 25 per cent. In Italy the *tallero*, the Italian dollar, weighed 454 grains, and was alloyed 40 per cent. I believe this coin, like the old Spanish dollar, is out of circulation. Enough is here presented to show that the dollar is a creature of government and not of commerce; that it is subject to the most arbitrary alterations by Princes and legislators who are wholly ignorant of the effect of their measures, ignorant of the nature of money, of financial science and of political economy altogether.

More obscurity in political economy, and more confusion to commerce, result from the ignorance and folly of governments all over the world in separating the unit of money from the unit of weight, and tampering with the money unit, under the notion that they regulate commerce and the value of money thereby, than from all other causes. Instead of regulation, every such act is disturbance; the only regulation in the power of government being that of prevention, which shall prevent individuals and corporations from disturbing the normal value of money with a false currency in making credit in notes and deposits without value received and in counterfeiting.

Now let us consider what is money? Money is a matter of commerce independent of government. It existed before government, and records of its use appear in the dawn of history. It is a commodity which, before it was tampered with by Princes to cheat their creditors, circulated and was exchanged by the same unit of weight as other ponderable substances. 1860 years before Christ "Abraham weighed to Ephron four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant," in exchange for the cave of Machpelah. The shekel was an ordinary Jewish weight equal to about half an ounce avoirdupois, having no more relation to money than to any other commodity that circulated by weight. Every one knows that the British pound sterling contained originally a pound weight of silver, and so did the French *livre*.

From the Conquest, A.D. 1066, to the 28th of Edward I, A.D. 1300, the pound weight of silver was coined into the pound sterling, rather more than 11 12ths fine. That is, the pound sterling contained 11 ounces and 2 dwts of fine silver, and 22 dwts of alloy. Under this King, in the latter year, the first depreciation appears when the pound of silver was coined into £1 0s 3d; but in the reign of Edward III, A.D. 1344 to 1356, the depreciation was extended to 20 per cent, the pound of silver still of the same fineness, being coined into £1 5s, so that 25 shillings were degraded to the original value of 20 shillings. Gradually, until the fifth of Edward VI, a further depreciation took place when (A.D. 1551) it reached its climax, the fineness of the silver being reduced to 3 ounces in the pound weight, and the debased metal was coined into £3 12s. Both these measures of depreciation reduced the value of the pound sterling eleven twelfths from that of the original pound sterling or pound of silver, leaving to the new coin of one pound but the original value of 1s 8d.

It seems that the sum of £120,000 only was so coined, and in the same year the standard was raised to 11 ounces of fine silver to the Troy pound. This pound of standard metal 11-12ths fine was then coined into £3. It is remarked in James' essays that "the coinage of debased silver money in the fifth year of Edward VI of 3 oz. fine ought more properly to be considered as tokens," which is very true, but it should be understood that all coins are tokens and not money, so far as they consist of base metal. The alloy is always reckoned of no value, and as that which is of no value will purchase nothing, and make no payment, the alloy in coin is not money since money is a universal purchasing and paying power.

During all these years, from the Conquest, or at least from the reign of Edward I, the notion prevailed that the will of the Sovereign determined what should be money, and what should be the value of money, by the name of the unit. Calling a thing a pound sterling by authority was supposed to secure a uniform value under all its variations of weight and quality.

The world has pretty thoroughly outgrown this foolish notion, but not quite. There are yet people in this country, of pretensions to scientific knowledge, who believe that Congress can by enactment determine that any thing which it chooses to call "a dollar," to be paid and received as a dollar, shall have the value of a dollar of gold coin containing 23.22 grains of fine metal, in which all the value of the dollar lies. This nonsense comes of the absurd custom of making and continuing a unit of money that is not a common and familiar unit of weight, like, for example the Troy or avoirdupois ounce or pound.

Here let me remark, episodically, that, if we in this country are to

adopt the French metrical system of weights and measures, as I trust and believe we shall at no distant day, it is to be hoped that we shall have nothing to do with the franc as the unit of money, but come at once to the gramme coined in gold, since the gramme is the French unit of weight. The gramme equals $15\frac{1}{8}\frac{3}{4}$ English Troy grains; hence, if alloyed one-tenth, like the present Federal and French money, it would make a coin equal to 59, $\frac{1}{8}\frac{3}{4}$ of our present gold dollar or nearly sixty cents. To avoid the inconvenience of having so small a coin solid, it should be made and expanded in a ring. As in any absolute change of the unit, a fraction for reckoning, in the translation from the old to the new currency, is unavoidable, we may as well have one fraction as another; and the sooner we get rid of the corrupted, blinding, preposterous, and unmeaning *dollar* the better, if we can have the plain unit of weight in gold in its place.

To return now to our immediate inquiry: What is money? it is necessary to say that in every alteration of the coinage of England, before the establishment of the Bank, general prices rose and fell to a corresponding degree; rising with the depreciation, and falling with the appreciation in quality of the unit, only excepting variations arising from the difference in the quantity of other circulating capital, such as the fullness or scarcity of crops and production generally. The alterations of the coin in England have been great enough, as I have already shown, to mark this feature distinctly: and the proof is plain that money is pure unwrought gold and silver, and nothing else, differing from bullion only in the alloy or impurity of the metal, which must be eliminated to determine the quantity of money it contains.

As has been remarked already, the world has pretty thoroughly outgrown the notion that the fiat of the Sovereign can determine the value of money by operating upon the unit and debasing the coin; but it has only begun to see that the value of money can be immediately and disastrously disturbed by abnormal banking, which operates directly upon the currency, as well as by the paper issues of government. This is an evil infinitely worse than debasing the coin directly, because it amounts to a debasement of the coin in effect, and a loss of capital into the bargain.

By debasing the coin directly, government gets the advantage, as a debtor, for the difference between the new and the old unit, by paying a less quantity of money than its debt was contracted in, and it gives to every other debtor the same unjust advantage over his creditor. But here the mischief ends; no loss of national capital results therefrom because the foreigner, who sells goods to us, must accept the debased coin which he can exchange only for its true equivalent in the less quantity of

gold or merchandise for export. Whereas, when debt is converted into currency, either of notes or deposits, the sum thus added to the previous currency is as complete a debasement of its value as would be the addition of a like proportion of base metal to the coin. The foreigner accepts the debased currency for his goods, and immediately exchanges it for gold at par for its full amount, through the convertibility of the bank notes and deposits, and the loss by the debasement is thrown wholly upon ourselves.

I am indebted to no authority for this doctrine; it is self-evident in my opinion. Through some leading mind it will some day enlighten Congress and make an end of "paper money" in this country. Long after I had presented it in this magazine I discovered that it was maintained by Adam Smith, although in direct contradiction of the "paper money" theory which he seems to have contrived as an apologist of the system of the Bank of England. In the *Wealth of Nations*, Book 4, Chapter 5, on Bounties, he says:—

"That degradation in the value of silver, which is the effect of the fertility of the mines, and which operates equally, or very nearly equally, through the greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little consequence to any particular country. * * * * *"

"But that degradation in the value of silver, which, being the effect either of the peculiar situation, or of the political institutions of a particular country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of very great consequence, which, far from tending to make any body really richer tends to make everybody really poorer. The rise in the money price of all commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that country, tends to discourage more or less every sort of industry which is carried on within it, and to enable foreign nations, by furnishing almost all sorts of goods for a smaller quantity of silver than its own workmen can afford to do, to undersell them, not only in the foreign, but even in the home market."

This is directly in conflict with the teaching in other parts of his book, that "paper money" can be made to economize the precious metals through the operations of banking, since the paper or bank credit, on its introduction or its increase, must be an addition to, and consequent local degradation of the value of the pre-existing currency, including silver, of course. The *Wealth of Nations* is made up of disconnected lectures; the author seems to have altered his opinion at times, and to have forgotten at one time what he said at another in relation to money.

But an older and a better authority on this point than Adam Smith has recently been brought to my notice by a controversy in the *London Times*. In 1757 Joseph Harris, then master of the mint, wrote an *Essay on Money and Coins*, in which my doctrine is set forth better, perhaps, than I

can do it myself. McCulloch, the economist, who procured the republication of this book by the Political Economy Club in 1856, describes it "as one of the best and most valuable treatises that has ever seen the light." Mr. Harris says:

"Supposing the sum total of money, real and fictitious, now annually circulating in this country, to be 100 millions; 20 millions of which is in cash, and the rest in paper credit both public and private. If this paper credit be increased, by the creating of more bills, suppose to the amount of ten millions; one of the following will necessarily be the consequence: Either all our commodities will rise ten per cent in their nominal value, which will render them too dear for foreign markets; or this addition will drain away ten millions of our cash, and so impoverish us in reality to that whole amount; or the effect most likely will be partly the one, and partly the other; but whichever it is, the nation will be equally damaged. May this be ever a caution to statesmen, how they listen to projects that must clog our trade, banish our coin, and in the end bring on general bankruptcy."

Nothing can be plainer than this; but it is only a better utterance of the same doctrine that I have held, and expressed in these pages, for many years.

Our true financial policy then, is to abolish the fictitious money, or credit in currency, altogether, and thus maintain the highest possible value of money, so that we may produce and buy cheap and sell dear. Higher than the value of gold in the markets of the world we cannot keep it if we would, because gold will accumulate, both by production and import, the moment its purchasing and paying power is appreciably greater here than elsewhere. Let us so regulate the value of money as to restore it to its natural position as a commodity, and thereby so regulate commerce that we may produce commodities more abundantly, as well as cheaper, build ships and sail them cheaper, than the nations of Europe who use a paper or bank currency, and thus we can easily take the lead of the commerce of the world.

As to the pretence that a bank currency payable in coin on demand, without coin in reserve dollar for dollar to cover and pay it, can be limited to the natural sum of money that would circulate without it, which is the theory of Adam Smith, in which he contradicts himself, it is a proved impossibility. And, if it were not an impossibility, it must always be an absence and a loss of capital, as the foregoing illustration of Mr. Harris' demonstrates, and as I think I have demonstrated over and over again in this magazine.

Of the 5-20 bonds I have already spoken. It is, I think, a quibble to deny that they can be legally and justly discharged in greenbacks, but it

would be madness to do this by a new and further issue of greenbacks, since it would involve such a degradation of their purchasing power, and consequent rise of prices, as would eventually disgrace and sick them, and the national debt with them, in the hands of their holders, after the manner of the French assignats. No such extreme depreciation of currency will be long endured by an intelligent people. And the loss of the national debt would thus fall almost entirely upon the working classes, who cannot afford to be idle and reject the current circulation.

But if new gold bonds bearing a lower rate of interest, say 4 or $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, can be sold at par for the existing currency, as many persons suppose, then surely government ought to accept the opportunity and retire the five-twenties. I confess to great doubt on this point, because it is not a question of national credit, but of the rent of capital in this country.

In England, where the proportion of capital to the demand for its use is greater than here, and the currency is always better, because containing more of the element of capital, and less of debt, 4 per cent per annum, offers a desirable investment, the average rate there being 3 per cent. But here, where a vast extent of new, rich, and cheap, land in market, and vigorous young enterprise, with a currency of debt built upon debt, are pressing upon a comparatively limited supply of capital, 6 or 7 per cent per annum is its needful rent on good securities. It is not easy, therefore, to understand why anybody should lend us capital at 4 or $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, even on government bonds. Should Congress try the experiment, and succeed, I shall be very glad to admit that my political economy is so far at fault.

Loanable capital is chiefly home-staying, consisting of goods sold on short credit, the value of which the owners cannot well part with for long periods, and of money which does not run abroad to a higher rent of capital, because its rent is high only where it is scarce, and where capital in general is scarce it is of course dear in exchange value, which is the same thing as saying that money is cheap; that is, goods command high prices. Money does not go or stay where it is cheap any more than other capital. Hence capital in goods runs to California, but money runs the other way, although the rent of capital, or rate of interest, in California is from 18 to 24 per cent per annum on good securities.

We are always sure of having all the foreign capital in goods that we can consume in this country, because our financial system which makes money cheap makes goods dear. The capitalists who take and hold foreign loans in Europe pay the shippers of goods that are sold to us; but in every country such men are but a small minority of the people, and they hold or own, comparatively, but a small proportion of the capital, most of it being actively employed at home.

However, Congress will tax out of existence the fictitious bank currency of notes and deposits, fund the greenbacks, and thus give to industry and commerce the opportunity to add to the capital of the country a currency of money, which the people and the banks can use in place of the present incubus of debt, the rent of capital, or rate of interest, will fall materially, if not as low as it is in England. We can then not only manage the national debt with ease, but as I have already said command the commerce of the world.

These are my candid and carefully considered views of the financial question.

THE RECIPROCITY MOVEMENT IN CANADA.

As far as any practical benefit to the people of British North America is concerned, the confederation of the several Provinces under one government has proved a failure. Even Canada has derived but little advantage, if any, from her union with the Maritime Provinces; and the desire for independence which has always characterized the thrifty and industrious people of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, has assumed the form of a popular movement, numbering among its most earnest advocates many of those in whose interest the Act of Confederation was framed. Everything is tending towards a political revolution that is to mark the beginning of a new era of prosperity and progress for the States north of us. During the past twelve months public sentiment in Canada on the subject of allegiance to the British Crown has undergone a marked change. Until quite recently it required no small degree of courage to express an opinion as to the desirability of a final and complete separation of the colonies from the mother country, and the bold utterances of those who represented public sentiment in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were denounced as treasonable. The people are now impressed, however, with the fact that the question of independence is not a question of loyalty or disloyalty to the Crown, but a problem in practical statesmanship, of an economical rather than political nature.

The comparison between the material wealth and prosperity of their country and the United States, so unfavorable to themselves, has led them to consider, seriously, whether any advantage may be hoped for from a perpetuation of British institutions and British rule. They have seen that, in proportion to population and resources, their canals and railroads, agriculture, commerce and manufactures have not kept pace with those of this country, and the people are beginning to desire a change that shall result in independence of England and free trade with the United States. It

was partly to meet these requirements, essential to the prosperity of the Provinces, that the present Confederation was formed. The promoters of this scheme believed that it would lead to the establishment of a flourishing trade between the Maritime Provinces and Canada, as well as with other countries. These promises, however, never have been and never can be realized. Both are agricultural, and their products must seek the same market. The exchange of commodities between Canada and the lower Provinces in 1865 did not amount to 4 per cent of the trade of the former, while in 1866 the proportion did not reach 5 per cent. This trade has increased very little under the Confederation, and the returns for 1868 show that the exports during that year from the Canadas to Newfoundland and Prince Edward's Island were scarcely 2 per cent of their trade. At the same time, the exports from Canada to the United States, notwithstanding the high tariff of duties established by our government, amounted in value to twenty-two million dollars—more than half of her entire export trade, which is estimated at forty-two millions. The same disparity is also notable in the statistics of the trade of the maritime Provinces for 1868. The small and unimportant trade of Nova Scotia with Canada, for example, shows the folly of seeking to protect it at the expense of her trade with the United States and Europe. In 1866 the value of the exports of Nova Scotia to the United States was \$3,228,559; to Great Britain and other countries, \$287,884. It is, of course, evident from this statement that, as compared with the United States, England affords no market for Nova Scotia; and, with the exception of lumber, the same may be said of New Brunswick and Prince Edward's Island. These facts, showing as they do that the United States are the largest customers of the Provinces and, for much that they have to sell, their only customers, are the basis of the present movement in the Dominion for the establishment of reciprocal free trade relations with this country.

In the discussion of the questions growing out of the proposed changes in the government of the provinces, considerations of a purely political nature, are properly regarded as of secondary importance. That which will most conduce to the development of the country and the prosperity of the people is the object sought. Whatever may have been the advantages derived from the allegiance of the people of Canada to the British crown in former years, the time is past when any further benefits may be expected to result from it. The civilization of the British North American Provinces is no longer primitive, in any sense. With a territory covering an area of 3,097,174 square miles, rich in undeveloped natural resources, and a population of nearly four millions. The Provinces not only claim the ability to govern themselves, but insist that self government is essential to the prosperity of the country. The rapid growth and

progress of the American Republic, during less than a century of independence, furnishes the strongest argument in support of this assertion. The confederation of the Provinces under one government was a step in this direction, but the measure has proved insufficient. It is true that all restrictions upon trade between the Provinces are removed, but the advantages derived from this are only proportionate to the limited increase in the population of the country. To give an impetus to the development of their industrial and commercial resources, two things are needed—independence of England and free trade with the United States for agricultural and other products, and for certain manufactured articles which here find a market. Until the former is established it is not probable, in the opinion of the people of the Provinces, that our government will agree to the latter; and absolute independence of Great Britain is therefore demanded as a commercial rather than a political necessity.

For many reasons this movement should meet with encouragement and, as far as practicable, co-operation on the part of the people of the United States. Under the existing tariff, the revenues accruing to the government from our trade with British America do not exceed \$4,000,000 and the sum is of small importance compared with the advantages to be derived from reciprocal trade between the two countries. Since the expiration of the reciprocity treaty our trade with British North America has diminished year by year, until but little remains of our former exchange of produce and merchandise which, in 1863, amounted in value to nearly fifty millions. Under that treaty the great bulk of the breadstuffs product of the lower provinces found its way to the seaports of the Eastern and Middle States, affording a profitable business to our railroads and shipping. Since its expiration this trade has died out. What has been lost to New York and other American ports has been gained by Montreal. The receipts of wheat at that city during the present season exceeded those of last year by 331 per cent.; while the exports to Europe by, way of the St. Lawrence, will exceed that of last year by 521 per cent. From sharing any of the profits or advantages of this trade, the forwarders and shippers of the United States are now excluded. In addition to this, large amounts of lumber and other valuable products are now directed from their natural and proper course to the seaboard. The benefits of a reciprocity that shall reopen the former channels of trade, and revive the business once mutually advantageous and profitable, are fully appreciated by the practical men of both countries. We need the coal, gypsum, fish and lumber of the Maritime Provinces, and the live stock, breadstuffs and general produce of Canada, both for consumption and export. They, in return, will take our manufactures, besides receiving a considerable share, at least, of these importations from other countries

through our ports. More than this, it is of the utmost importance that the transportation routes of both countries should be mutually free. One great obstacle in the way of our more rapid commercial development is the enormous cost of transportation from the West to the seaboard. The fullest competition between the railroads and canals of both countries, is the best possible means by which to obtain control of the European markets as an outlet for our surplus products. The inadequacy of the railroads and canals of the Eastern and middle States, dependent as they are on the Michigan Central and Michigan Southern railroads, as the only connecting link with the railroad system of the northwest, and the consequent delays and expenses attending the Eastward movement of produce and the distribution of merchandise throughout the interior, make the question of reciprocity one of vital practical importance; the true solution of which can only be found in the establishment of free commercial intercourse between the two countries.

It is probable that, in some form, the question of reciprocity with Canada will be brought up during the next session of Congress. If so, we hope the movement now organized in Provinces will be met with a disposition on our part to accede to renew the relations formerly existing between the two countries. Whatever may be the ultimate political destiny of British North America, it is certain that the discussion of any scheme of annexation is ill advised and premature. The people of the Provinces do not desire it, nor would it be the policy of our government to accede to such a proposition at the present time, even if it were made in good faith, and with the unanimous consent of the people. Indefinite territorial expansion is not the aim of true statesmanship, but reciprocal trade relations are highly important to both countries.

FLOATING CAPITAL AND NEW LOANS.

Nothing more clearly indicates the change which has been slowly taking place in the minds of the people as to their capabilities, financially, than the large amount of loans put upon our market during the past four years. Previous to the war if money was to be raised by a railroad or by a city or town, in most cases an agent was at once dispatched to Europe to negotiate the bonds. The idea that our own market could absorb any considerable quantity of such securities was not entertained. Other conclusions, however, were forced out of us during the early days of the war by the refusal of Europe to take our bonds. We were thus compelled

to look to ourselves. As a result our Five-Twenty loan was offered, and it proved such a success the same policy was continued during the war, and even when the war ended, instead of going back to the old plan, we pursued the one of supplying our wants from our own markets.

Among those who do not appreciate the changed condition of the country in this respect, the many new loans which have been offered, and are being offered, have caused serious apprehension with regard to the ultimate effect of this movement upon the business of the country. Experience has certainly shown that the too rapid transformation of floating capital into fixed and permanent forms is likely to produce trouble in the money market and consequent disaster in the whole financial machinery. The violent panic of 1847, which was so severely felt in the United States and in England, was attributed chiefly to this cause. Prof. Perry, in remarking upon it, states the subject very clearly as follows: "While credits continued about as they were, or were slightly increased by railroad speculations, the capital in the loan markets, which had supported these credits from time to time and on which they depended, was largely and somewhat suddenly drawn off to be put into the form of fixed capital. All great public works, such as railroads, canals, and so on, take more or less money out of the loan market and convert it into fixed capital and thus make it unavailable for future lending. This happened in 1847. Railroad building was then at its height. The continued demand on the loan market by these railroad calls diminished the loanable fund to such an extent that they who had been accustomed to rely on it in carrying forward their business, and whose own capital had become temporarily or permanently unavailable, found it impossible to command that perpetual renewal of credit which had previously enabled them to struggle on." The present period is said by some to resemble in many respects that described above as preceding the crisis of 1847. The amount of capital invested in securities of one kind and another during the past five years has been very large and apparently much in excess of our legitimate savings or accumulation of capital.

From the month of May, 1865, to July 1869, a period of about four years, we may safely say that \$500,000,000 of railroads and canal securities have been issued in the United States in one form or another. A part of these have been issued to individuals who subscribed for certain proportions of capital from motives of interest as owners of property adjacent to the proposed lines, and a large proportion of company obligations have also been issued to cities, towns, and counties in exchange for the corporate bonds of the latter, which were more negotiable in the market. For the purpose of showing the real extent of this movement during the four years named, we have prepared the following table, which gives, as

accurately as the nature of the case allows, the increase in the *funded debt* of railroad companies in the period above named :

SECURITIES NEGOTIATED FROM JULY 1863, TO JULY, 1869.

Increase in U. S. bonds from		Memphis & Charleston.....	1,000,000
May, 1863 to June 1, 1869.....	76,640,801	Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	5,000,000
Albany & Saratoga.....	2,000,000	Mobile & Montgomery.....	1,300,000
Allegheny Valley.....	4,000,000	Montgomery & Alabama.....	133,000
Bay de Noque & Marquette.....	250,000	Morile & Essex.....	8,000,000
Atlantic & St. L.....	2,000,000	Nashville & Chattanooga.....	500,000
Boston H. & K.....	12,000,000	Newark & New York.....	60,000
Buffalo, Bradford & Pittab.....	580,000	Newbury & New York.....	250,000
Buffalo, Corry & Pittab.....	700,000	N. Y. & O. & W. Midland.....	2,000,000
Buffalo & Erie.....	800,000	New London Northern.....	230,000
Bur., Cedar Riv. & Minnesota.....	60,000	North Mississippi.....	6,000,000
Bur. & Mississippi River.....	6,250,000	North Penna.....	275,000
California Pacific.....	2,200,000	North Shore, L. I.....	125,000
Cameron & A.....	4,000,000	Northern Central.....	1,000,000
Camden & Mt. Co.....	305,000	Oil Creek & Alleghy River.....	3,170,000
Cedar Falls & Minnesota.....	1,700,000	Orange Valley.....	200,000
Central Branch U. Pacific.....	3,200,000	Oswego & Rome.....	500,000
Central Pacific of Cal.....	26,000,000	Patero & Newark.....	500,000
Charlotte & Savannah.....	505,000	Pemberton & Hightstown.....	160,000
Charlotte & S. Carolina.....	250,000	Pennsylvania.....	2,500,000
Chicago, Cin. & Louisville.....	400,000	Pittsburg & Connelville.....	2,000,000
Chicago, Iowa & Nebraska.....	1,100,000	Port Huron & Lake Mich.....	1,000,000
Chicago & Northwest.....	4,800,000	Pitts. Ft. Wayne & Chic.....	500,000
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.....	7,375,000	Rockford, R. I. & St. Louis.....	9,000,000
Cin., Dayton & Eastern.....	475,000	Rome, Watert. & Ogdensburg.....	571,000
Cin. Ham. & Dayton.....	250,900	St. Joseph & Council Bluffs.....	2,000,000
Cleveland & Pittsburg.....	400,000	St. Louis & Iron Mountain.....	2,000,000
Cleveland, P. line & Ashab.....	1,000,000	St. Louis, Jackson & Chic.....	2,600,000
Columbia & Augusta.....	400,000	St. Louis & S. Joseph.....	1,000,000
Columbia, Ark. & Ind. Cen.....	2,000,000	St. Louis, Vaud. & T. Haute.....	4,500,000
Columbus & Hocking Val.....	260,000	St. Paul & Pacific.....	2,000,000
Connecting Phila.....	1,000,000	St. Paul, N. & Fond du Lac.....	275,000
Cumberland & Penna.....	1,000,000	St. Paul City & Pacific.....	1,700,000
Danville, U. S. & Pekin.....	2,000,000	Southside, L. I.....	750,000
Detroit & Milwaukee.....	1,500,000	Southwest Pacific, Mo.....	2,000,000
Dubuque & Sioux City.....	1,600,000	Southern Minnesota.....	2,400,000
Dubuque & Southwestern.....	550,000	Toledo, Peoria & Warsaw.....	3,500,000
East Tenn. & Co.....	185,000	Toledo, Wab. & Western.....	3,300,000
Eastern Va.....	500,000	Union Pacific.....	26,000,000
European & N. American.....	1,000,000	Union Pacific, Central Br.....	1,600,000
Erie.....	4,814,444	Union Pacific, E. Div., low	
Erie & Pittsburg.....	900,000	Kansas Pacific.....	11,478,000
Flint & Pere Marquet.....	1,520,500	West Wisconsin.....	1,000,000
Grand Rapids & Indiana.....	500,000	West Jersey.....	1,000,000
Grand River Valley.....	1,000,000	Western Maryland.....	1,000,000
Ind. Cin. & Lafayette.....	1,000,000	Western Union.....	4,000,000
Ind., Crawford & Louisville.....	1,000,000	Del. & Hudson Canal.....	1,500,000
Jackson, Lansing & Sag.....	1,500,000	Lehigh Coal & Nav.....	6,000,000
Jefferson Phila.....	800,000	Morris Canal.....	230,000
Keokuk & St. Paul.....	400,000	Western Union Telegraph.....	2,000,000
Lawrence, Pa.....	260,000		
Lehigh & Lackawanna.....	200,000	Total Company Bonds.....	\$240,303,411
Lehigh Valley.....	1,900,000	Add U. S. Bonds.....	76,640,801
Louisv., Inn. & Lexington.....	2,100,000		
Louisville & Nashville.....	2,500,000	Total.....	\$325,944,212
Marietta & Cinn.....	2,800,000		

In the above statement, only that debt is included which was issued *de novo*, and not such as was issued in exchange for other obligations previously outstanding. It is possible that in particular cases the amount of obligations negotiated may be overstated, but, as a whole, the figures are below rather than above the actual amount issued.

We have made no account here of the increase in capital stock, either of old corporations or of those more recently organized, as a detailed statement of stock outstanding could hardly be given with accuracy. It may be assumed, however, that about one-half only of the funds for rail-

road construction are raised from the negotiation of company bonds, the balance being obtained from stock subscriptions or from the aid given by States, cities, counties, &c., involving the issue of their own obligations; and thus placing the same amount of securities upon the market, differing merely as to the parties ultimately responsible. As we find, then, that the bonded debt of railroad and other companies negotiated in the period named is \$250,000,000, the total amount of obligations of these descriptions issued, and taken by the people in one form or another, must have been at least \$500,000,000. During the same time, also, the funded debt of the United States, including the issues of Pacific Railroad Bonds, and without regard to the cash in the Treasury, was increased \$76,640,801 between the first of June 1865 and first of June 1869, making the total amount of new securities negotiated in the country during that time about \$576,000,000.

If these totals, showing such large absorption of floating capital, constituted the only fact affecting the question, the situation would indeed justify much of the apprehension felt among certain classes. But there are very many evident and important considerations requiring a modification of the conclusion thus drawn. Of course, so far as the absorption of these bonds and other evidences of debt represent a mere change of securities, no harm need be anticipated; the same may be said also if much of this money has been borrowed from Europe indirectly through New York, rather than directly through London; and on examination such will be found to be the true facts of the case. The amounts of city, county and town obligations issued for war purposes, and which have been paid off during the four years, is very considerable. In this State alone these securities have decreased many millions. So, too, several hundred millions of United States and railroad bonds have, during the same period, been taken by Europe, and in return European capital has been poured in here. This has, to be sure, come to us in the shape of goods and raw material, but is none the less capital, much of which, we have turned into money, and thus increased our ability to absorb bonds. We borrow of Europe; but as we do it through New York, the commissions are saved to the country. Again, the Government has lately been a heavy purchaser of its own securities, reaching up to the first of December, about 75 millions, and this has given the people the means for other investments to an equal amount. These facts, together with the further one that probably not over 80 per cent. of the par value of the securities named above has been realized upon them, shows that this bond movement furnishes no ground for apprehension or mistrust. For the purpose of indicating the price at which new loans are negotiated, we

give below a statement of the several loans now or recently offered in New York.

NEW LOANS OFFERED IN NEW YORK.

Name.	Rate.	Price.	Amount.	Agent.
N. Y. & Oswego M. d., &c.	7 g'd	p-r	20,000 p.m	G. O. Dyke & Co.
Louisville & N. Y. RR.	7	70	5 000,000	A. D. Seleck.
Louisville & Nashv. R.R.	7	83	8,000,000	J. A. Alexander & Co.
Kansas Pacific R.R.	7 g'd	95	6,500,000	M. K. Jessup & Co.
Central R.R. of Iowa.	7 g'd	95	16,000 p.m.	W. B. Shattuck.
Macomb Co., Ill.	10	p-r		Howe & Macy.
Danville Union & N. R.R.	7 g'd	93	2,000,000	Turner Bro.
Bur. C. d., Cap. & Min. R.R.	7 g'd	93	16,000 p.m.	Henry Claws & Co. ;
South Cen. R.R. of N.Y.	7	87½	1,500,000	Vermilve & Co.
St. Joseph City.	7	75	400,000	Utley & Dougherty.
Louisville City.	7	93	20,000	Wm. Alex. Smith & Co.
Mercer & Granger Co. Mo.	8	78	400,000	Johnson & Day.
Chic. Dan. & Vinc. R.R.	7 g'd	93	2,500,000	W. Bailey, Lusk & Co.
St. Louis City, p. claitax.	6	82½	225,000	James n. Smith & C.
bonds.	7 g'd	94	4,500,000	Jay Cooke & Co.
Lake Super. & Miss. R.R.	7	81	75,000	Carpenter & Richards.
Hackensack & N. Y. R.R.	7	80	250,000	M. Morgan's Sons.
Louisian. State.	7	83	500,000	Connelley, Jennings & Co.
Savannah & Charleston.	6 g'd	81	800,000	Utley & Dougherty.
Rochester City water works.	6 g'd	90	2,800,000	Fisk & Hatfield.
Western P. & C.	7	90 to 95	2,000,000	American Exch. Bank.
Chicago City Park Loan.	7	75	1,500,000	J. & W. Sullivan & Co.
N. O. City.	8 g'd	91½	1,500,000	Tanner & Co.
St. Joseph & Denver City.	8 g'd		320,000	Henry Claws & Co.
Seima, Marion & M.	8 g'd			

CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD.

During the past week a dividend has been agreed upon by the directors of the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company of fifty per cent. of the present par value of the stock on the payment by the shareholder to the Company of about fifty per cent. on the dollar of the new stock issued: that is to say, to any holder of one hundred shares of the old stock, fifty shares additional will be issued on the payment of two thousand five hundred dollars. The exact terms of the dividend have not as yet been announced, but we believe they will be substantially as above, and the money thus obtained will be used for building a branch road of 112 miles in length which will be built by the Company for cash and the directors think will be a very valuable addition to the enterprise. Of course with this dividend of stock there is to be the usual cash dividend of 5 per cent. payable in March. Since the meeting of the directors agreeing upon this dividend we have received numerous inquiries respecting the present condition of the road, and have, therefore, prepared the following for the information of our readers.

According to the last Annual Report, the Capital, Stock, and Funded Debt of the Corporation are represented as follows:

Common Stock.	\$3,141,800	
Preferred Stock.	2,425,400	\$7,567,200
Preferred Sinking Fund Bonds.	402,000	
First Mortgage Bonds.	1,100,000	
Income Bonds.	2,100,000	2,902,000
		<hr/>
		\$11,169,200

The Chicago & Alton Company, on 1st January, 1864, assumed the liability to pay interest and dividends on the bonds and stock of the Joliet & Chicago R. R., as below :

Mortgage Bonds at 4 1/2 per cent. on.....	\$500,000
Stock seven per cent on.....	1,500,000

and acquired by lease in 1868, possession in perpetuity of the St. Louis, Jacksonville & Chicago Railroad, at a minimum rental of \$240,000.

The charges on the property may therefore be stated as follows :

Preferred Sinking Bonds.....	\$72,000
First Mortgage, say.....	168,000
Income Bonds.....	77,000
Joliet and Chicago lease.....	160,440
St. Louis, Joliet and Chicago lease.....	
(Minimum rental).....	240,000
	<u>\$117,440</u>

Including Sinking Fund payments and Government tax the financial condition for 1868 may be stated as follows :

Balance to the credit of Income account.....	\$924,352 23
Net receipts.....	2,045,460 33
	<u>2,969,812 56</u>
Disbursement as per the Annual Report.....	\$1,905,145 24
	<u>\$951,667 37</u>

Included in the above disbursements was an amount of \$635,763 07, being "Cost of Improvements charged this account," so that in addition to

Balance at credit Income account.....	\$924,352 23
Can be added.....	635,768 07
Total net profits.....	<u>\$1,560,118 35</u>

The earnings for 1869, as reported have been

January 1 to November 30, passengers.....	\$1,373,835 75
" " " " freights.....	2,866,999 78
" " " " mails.....	202, 53 08
	<u>\$4,343,334 61</u>
December earnings estimated.....	31,700 00
Total earnings 1869.....	<u>\$4,375,034 61</u>

Showing an increase in earnings for 1869, of about \$200,000.

Assuming the fixed charges and operating expenses to be the same, we have the following result :

Gross receipts.....	\$4,702,588 11
Expense—same as last year.....	2,163,182 64
	<u>\$2,539,405 47</u>
Less fixed charges.....	717,440 00
	<u>\$1,821,965 47</u>
Common stock.....	2,425,400
Preferred stock.....	\$5,141 800
	<u>\$7,567,900</u>
10 per cent \$756,730 00 and 5 per cent tax \$37,936.....	<u>794,666 00</u>
Surplus.....	<u>\$733,409 00</u>

Now let us see how the case will stand after this 50 per cent addition to the stock:

The present stock amounts to.....	\$7,567,890 00
Add 50 per cent in common stock.....	3,783,900 00
Total stock is now.....	\$11,350,890 00
Assuming amortization and after payment of fixed charges to be as stated above.....	\$1,527,965 00
It will be seen that after payment of 10 per cent on the increased capital, which would be.....	\$1,135,000
Tax 5 per cent.....	56,754
Total dividend.....	\$1,191,894 00
Balance remaining on hand.....	336,131 00

We will see that after paying 10 per cent. dividend on the present increased capital and all the fixed charges against the Company, there will still be a balance of \$336,131 to the credit of income account.

It should also be stated that these figures are based upon the business of the *present line*. They show that if we take the road as it now stands, it can pay more than 10 per cent dividends upon the increased stock. Of course there will be a contribution to the earnings of the road, from the business of the new line of 112 miles, which is to be built with the money paid in for the new issue of stock. The directors claim that the new line will earn its own 10 percent. dividend on cost, and increase the traffic on the main line. The road and branches will be 544 miles in length.

THE DISCOUNT MARKET.

For a few weeks past there has been a growing pressure in the discount market, which at last has developed into an unusual stringency. The city banks report a greater urgency from their mercantile customers for accommodation than has been experienced for many years past; and that the applications have exceeded the means of the banks has been unfortunately obvious, from the fact that several failures have occurred within the week. When the best double name paper is negotiated with difficulty at 12@15 per cent, and choice single names at 12@24 per cent, the market is obviously far from being in a healthy condition; and this state of affairs appears the more anomalous, in view of the fact that money is comparatively abundant on call, Wall street borrowers being readily supplied upon collaterals at 5@7 per cent.

It has been common with the press to attribute this condition of the market to a radical distrust in mercantile credits. It is of course to be expected that, when rates rise to such extraordinary figures, there should be more than ordinary caution among discounters; but we find no

reason for supposing that the process which has culminated in the prevailing pressure was influenced by any special lack of confidence. The banks generally state that they now hold more paper than for many years past, and it is hardly presumable that they would have discounted so heavily under a feeling of distrust. It has been again said that distrust has been especially directed against the dry goods interest; this idea, however, is irreconcilable with the fact that there has been no more difficulty in negotiating that class of credits than any other, nor have rates upon such paper been relatively higher. Of course, with a deranged monetary system, with a steady decline in prices and consequently in the value of stocks of goods, and with extravagant private and business expenditures, there is naturally a chronic feeling of caution respecting credits generally; but there has been of late nothing to stimulate or intensify this feeling, or to augment the risks arising from these causes. On the contrary, within late months there have been indications of an improving condition of the material interest of the country at large. There has been a check upon our late excessive importations, and our exports have very materially increased—the best possible indication that stocks of commodities are recovering their normal condition, and that the product of the country is gaining upon its consumption, the symptom for which intelligent observers have eagerly watched as the truest evidence of a natural return to a healthier condition of affairs. So far, the signs of the times have been encouraging to a growth of confidence in commercial credits; and the banks have not been slow to appreciate these indications.

This unusual condition of the discount market appears to be very closely connected with recent irregularities in currency movements. A few months since the Treasury began to cancel the lower denominations of United States notes, and the process was continued until several millions of the more active form of legal tender circulation were temporarily retired from use, the Treasury having but this month commenced to replace the retired notes. From this cause, the New York banks could only very partially supply the demand for currency from the West for moving the grain crops. The West had consequently to sustain the pressure of an important currency contraction at a season when currency is required for the transfer of commodities from the producer to the merchant. In the absence of the usual medium of exchange, the crops had of necessity to be moved to a large extent upon credit. The farmer, having failed to receive money for his products, was unable to make purchases or settlements with the storekeepers, who, in turn, were unable to settle with their creditors; and thus the Western merchants were, on the one hand, compelled to buy in this city more largely on credit than usual,

and, on the other, to ask a temporary extension of maturing obligations. The direct result of this process has been to cause a sudden and large increase in the credits granted by New York merchants; and hence the unusual magnitude of their present applications for discounts. So far as this cause may have contributed to the prevailing stringency, the pressure is to be viewed as the result of a temporary postponement of settlements, from reasons of an extraneous and exceptional character.

At the same time other minor influences may have helped to impede credit operations. Rumors have prevailed foreshadowing a decision of the Supreme Court adverse to the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act; and its importance having been magnified for sensational effect, it is possible that some may have felt timid about taking long date paper. The growing conviction that the increasing crops and the decline in gold will inaugurate a permanently lower range of values, may also have produced in some quarters a feeling of caution. But our observation does not lead us to suppose that these influences have had any very material effect upon the negotiation of credits. Something, however, is undoubtedly due to the fact that the means of the Western population has been diminished by the recent fall in the value of grain and other produce. The aggregate value of the grain crop of 1869 is very materially below that of late years; and as the reduction of expenditures does not immediately accompany the loss of income, is quite conceivable that the West is temporarily short of funds for paying its debts to the East. Then, again, the effect of the irregularity in currency regulations, above alluded to, has been aggravated by the lack of elasticity in our monetary system. In the absence of any arrangements providing for the redemption of bank circulation during periods of ease in money, the surplus funds of the banks are at the quiet seasons of the year drawn into speculative movements and there held, at periods when the crop movements call for a freer circulation, and when the merchants require enlarged discounts. This, however, cannot perhaps be regarded as having contributed more than usual to the prevailing pressure.

Upon the whole, then, we incline to the conclusion that the present state of the market is mainly the result of an over supply of mercantile paper, induced by temporary and exceptional causes, extraneous to purely commercial movements or to considerations fundamentally affecting the soundness of commercial credits.

RELIEF FROM FISCAL BURDENS.

The December statement of the debt shows us that we have in the Treasury almost 77 million dollars of bonds, of which 20 millions belong to the sinking fund, while the remainder are held to await the action of Congress. The fact that so large a surplus has been raised by taxation during the past ten months is very gratifying and suggestive. It shows that this country is in earnest in the work of paying off its public debt, and it indicates the extent of the fiscal resources and industrial strength which can bear so heavy a drain upon its means, and can still carry forward with more energy and activity than ever, innumerable railway and other projects, which are absorbing capital to a degree seldom equalled in this country heretofore. Now, however, a general desire appears to be springing up on almost every hand for a diminution of the pressure of taxation. Great as has been the amount of the taxes repealed during the last two years, it is notorious that much remains to be done before our internal revenue system can be pronounced adapted to the fiscal wants of the country, or free from mischievous imperfections. It has been truly said that a bad tax is more mischievous, and inflicts greater evils on a people, in time of peace, than a disastrous campaign in time of war. Spain, by a foolish and monstrous tax system, confiscated the property of its industrial population, devastated and laid waste its fairest industries, and put back the progress of the country for a whole century. Now, although there is little danger that under our popular government, such stupendous disasters should be let loose upon the country by bad fiscal legislation, still minor evils, to a considerable extent, have been produced by some of our taxes. And where these fiscal evils remain on the statute book, public opinion demands that the pruning knife of fiscal reform must, with a firm hand, be applied.

But there are other reasons why a diminution of the pressure on internal revenue is demanded. The aggregate amount yielded by these taxes is regarded as more than the country can really afford. The custom duties yielded last year nearly 182 millions, and the internal revenue 159 millions. There is a large class of persons who are in favor of reducing the internal revenue to about 120 millions, or even lower, keeping up by a revenue tariff the aggregate of the customs duties, so as to secure the prompt payment of the interest on the public debt, and the redeeming a considerable sum of the principal of the debt every year. By rigid economy in every department of the administration, by turning a deaf ear to all projects for making grants to new railroads, or subsidizing steamship companies, or buying up useless real

estate from foreign governments, we shall be able, it is supposed, to get along very well with 180 millions from customs and 120 millions from internal revenue.

But there is a third reason urged by those who are in favor of a repeal or remission of some of the internal revenue taxes. It consist in the fact that to lower taxes does not always lessen their productiveness. This was seen last year in the working of the spirit tax, which yielded 30 millions at the reduced rate of 50 cents a gallon, against 13 millions the previous year, when the tax was \$2 a gallon. The full report of the internal revenue collections for last year is well worthy of examination in this point of view. It is semi-officially published as follows :

Articles.	1869.	1868.
On spirits.....	\$45,026,401 74	\$14,290,790 98
On tobacco.....	23,430,307 67	14,944,07 68
Fermented liquors.....	6,090,79 51	5,685,63 79
Banks and bankers.....	3,235,50 62	1,861,43 53
Gross receipts.....	6,301,998 84	6,280,60 34
Sales.....	6,201,839 03	4,371,00 34
Other special taxes.....	8,801,451 67	16,344,547 23
Income.....	34,701,855 84	4,455,58 56
Legacies.....	1,244,30 01	1,718,17 64
Articles in schedule.....	6,280,0 73	1,134,339 08
Passports.....	29,500 00	28,280 00
Gas.....	2,116,05 83	1,902,01 52
Penalties.....	877,08 79	1,256,881 19
Not otherwise mentioned.....	1,244,078 98	6,040 37
Stamps.....	16,407,00 01	11,864,222 02
Totals collected.....	160,039,841 29	
Total tax refunded.....	360,235 12	
Net collections.....	159,679,60 17	

This report fully bears out what has been said about the increased productiveness which sometimes follows reduced rates of taxation. It is needless to cite the details. Fiscal history is full of illustrations of the same truth. What is more useful is to point out a fourth reason for reversing our internal tax system. We refer to the necessity for repealing petty, inquisitorial, unproductive taxes, which make a government unpopular and cause needless annoyance to private citizens. One of the taxes most resented and objected to, because of its inquisitorial character, is the income-tax. The *MAGAZINE* has not ventured to go so far as to recommend that it should be given up when it expires next year. It produced thirty-four millions last year against forty-one millions the year before. If this large sum could be dispensed with, we should be glad. But other inquisitorial and offensive taxes there are which have no indispensable character of productiveness about them. The articles in schedule A, and several of the special taxes, might be dispensed with, and we should scarcely lose any appreciable amount of revenue; for they cost oftentimes to the people far more than they bring in to the Treasury. The abuses of the tax on gas and on the fares

upon the street railroads have been frequently pointed out, and the time certainly has come for a reform.

We have space to notice but one more of the numerous reasons for revising our Internal Revenue system. Some of its arrangements demoralize the tax-payer. We put too much temptation to false oaths before the minds of our citizens. Except, we believe, in Holland, a generation or two ago, no modern government has ever taken so bold a step as to put almost every man of its more intelligent adult population under an oath in order that it may raise from them a fragmentary part of its taxation and prevent them from defrauding it of its legal revenue. By all means let us do away with the multiplicity of oaths. No supposed advantages of any revenue arrangement will compensate for the fearful perils which in a Republic like ours must inevitably spring from causes which demoralize the citizen, degrade the public opinion of right and wrong, and outrage the reverence of the human mind for the solemn asseveration of an oath. The English Government for almost a quarter of a century has derived considerable revenue from an income tax, but it has never resorted to the expedient of putting the taxpayers under oath, much less has it resorted to the clumsy contrivance of attempting to prevent false swearing by publishing, or conniving at the publishing, of the income returns in the newspapers. Congress, of course, will take no rash steps in regard to our fiscal system, but we have said enough to show that a well-considered judicious reform in regard to our internal revenue is not only expedient but desirable, and imperatively demanded by public opinion and by an enlightened regard to the best interests of the nation.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE LEGAL TENDER ACT.

Prophets of evil are always abundant. In fact it requires so little skill or acumen to follow their profession that it is no wonder many spend their time in dressing up their imaginary dangers to frighten the timid with. At present the country is full of these self-satisfied individuals who are filling the air with their dismal forebodings. But they lived during the entire period of the war, and in spite of them the country prospered.

The rock upon which every man's fortune is now to be wrecked is, according to the wise heads, the expected decision of the Supreme Court with regard to the Legal Tender Act. That decision will at once,

we are told, take off thirty per cent from all values, leave the country without a currency, and all commercial matters in inextricable confusion. This certainly is a dark picture, and if there were any real resemblance between it and the probable events of the immediate future, capital would be very timid and business paralyzed.

But in the first place may we not challenge the assertion, that the Supreme Court is to render any decision upon these questions? If the results are to be as disastrous to the country as these forebodings indicate, certainly that Court can see it, and constituted as it at present is, would delay action until a quieter and easier mode could be found for lifting us out of our present condition and putting us upon a more stable currency basis. Our entire revenue system depends for its productiveness upon freedom from any such convulsion; in fact the whole machinery of the government, its ability to maintain itself under the heavy payments it must make, are so intimately connected with the commercial prosperity of the country that we may rest with perfect confidence in the knowledge that nothing will be done by that Court which can result in any sudden tumble in values.

We should therefore be entirely sure, if the results of this decision were to be thus disastrous, that the country's needs would influence and guide the Court in its deliberations. Yet a delay of justice is to the litigants a denial of justice, and nothing but national disaster, as the result of their action, would be an excuse for delay. Such, we think, is the opinion of the Court, and that they do not anticipate any injury to the country from this decision, and do not intend to hold the question open much longer, would be inferred from the decisions already made affecting this subject. In two cases, they have held contracts valid and have enforced them, which by their terms were to be discharged alone by the payment of gold. Another contract under the Confederate Government the Court decided must be paid in confederate notes or their equivalent at the maturity of the obligation. In a word, the idea appears to be that the contract must be executed according to the intent of the parties making it, and that these vexed questions shall be so settled and the statute so interpreted as to work the least possible injury to individuals.

With these ideas in view, then, what is likely to be the decision of the Court on this legal tender question, and what when made, will be its results? The Court can come to either one of the two conclusions. First, that the provision in the act making the greenback a legal tender for all debts was void *ab initio*. Such a decision would not, however affect obligations payable in dollars made since greenbacks came into use as currency; for the Court has already held as noticed above, that the intent of the parties would in all cases govern, and that they would

therefore be payable in currency. Any other construction would impair the contract, and is therefore wholly unauthorized. Hence, after the decision, contracts could be made and business could be transacted in either gold or currency, precisely as it can be now. In this particular then, such a determination of the question would work no change in the condition of the country or in the modes of doing business. The words legal tender would be erased from the United States currency, but they would none the less be legal tender for the payment of all outstanding contracts made since their issue, and for every contract subsequently made, in which such was the intent of the parties to it. How, then, could any disaster or check to business transactions result?

But it may be said that the inferior currency (the greenback) would be quickly forced out of use by the better (gold) currency, and that hence we would have the severest kind of contraction. This very argument was used when it was proposed to pass the Gold Contract Bill, and yet how little influence the decisions establishing the principle contained in that bill have had; in fact not the least, in the direction suggested. And in the nature of things why should United States notes be any the less in use than at present? They would, according to the above mentioned decisions, discharge contracts precisely the same as now; the business of the country would continue as now to be done with them; and only by very slow degrees would that law assert itself, and then, in a natural, quiet way, as the country became prepared for the change, bring us back to a currency redeemable in specie.

Nor need we fear that the Banks would suffer by the action of the Court, and through the Banks the people. Ordinary banking business would be conducted as now, money being loaned and notes paid, deposits received and checks cashed all in kind. The gold decisions and the confederate decision above referred to would protect the parties to any contract. With regard to Bank currency it might be necessary for Congress to grant some relief, so that no one could demand specie of them for their bills until both they and the country were in position to resume gold payments. We do not indicate what precise action would be necessary, or what should be done. But the Banks are the creatures of Congress, and have become the financial machinery of the country; the crippling of these institutions would be quickly felt throughout the whole commercial body. Hence the power and necessity would exist for meeting any exigency which the new state of things might make apparent in their business relations with the country.

Again, there can be no force in the idea that as a result of such a decision gold would rise in value, or more properly speaking greenbacks would depreciate. We have already seen that United States notes would

perform all the functions of currency they now perform, so long as the business of the country was conducted on that basis. Besides they would now continue to be the notes of the government, and it would as now be liable for their ultimate payment. Without doubt some provision also would be quickly made for their final withdrawal; not violent withdrawal so as to disturb the business of the country; but gradually and almost imperceptibly lifting them up to the value of gold. This might be done by converting them in fixed amounts at fixed times into compound notes, as we have often heretofore suggested.

In what has been said we have taken it for granted that the decision of the court would declare the legal tender clause void. This is the most radical form which the decision could take. There is another conclusion which we think the court is more likely to reach, and which would involve no possible change in the status of things, and yet effectually dispose of the question. The Legal Tender act was passed at a time when the nation was struggling for its life, and it was declared by the then President, by a large majority of Congress and of the people, that it was requisite as a war measure, as a means of national preservation. Of course many will insist that it was not necessary; that the war might have been successfully prosecuted without it. We shall not argue the point. As we have stated above, Congress affirmed that it was necessary, and a large majority of the people were of a like opinion. The United States Court can now very reasonably be of the same mind, and declare that though the letter of the constitution does not authorize such an act under any ordinary circumstances or condition of the country, yet there is a war power necessarily inherent in any governmental constitution authorizing any and every act which is requisite for the preservation of the nation's life. Should the Court come to this conclusion the result would simply be that the present issue of legal tenders would be upheld, but any new issue would be impossible. Such a decision could not in any manner interfere with, or in the least disturb the business of the country.

We thus see that in any event the difficulties and dangers suggested by these prophets of evil are merely imaginary, and that the changes effected in our daily transactions by this decision would be very slight. But there is one important particular in which the whole business interests of the country would be benefited. We are now living under continual uncertainty as to whether Congress will or will not issue more currency. Every interest is held in suspense by this doubt. There can be no real vitality given to legitimate enterprise so long as this state of affairs continues. But let this decision be announced in either way suggested, so that it is known that no new issue of greenbacks can be made, and at once a

degree of certainty is thrown around the future; confidence will increase; capital will become less timid; and the movement towards a more active, legitimate business be fairly inaugurated. May we not, therefore, conclude in view of what has been said that a decision of the Supreme Court such as we have indicated above would be a source not of evil but of the highest good to the country.

CONDITION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSURANCE COMPANIES.

The following interesting statement, showing the condition of the Insurance Companies of Massachusetts, was prepared by the Secretary of the Howard Insurance Company of Boston, and presented to the stockholders of that company at their annual meeting on the 15th of October:

Name.	Capital, 1863.	Surplus in 1863.	Surplus in 1869.	Gain or loss of surplus in four years.	Dividends paid in 4 years.	Average annual per cent of dividend since company was formed.	Avg's annual fl. on each mill. of fire risks dur'g 4 years.
American.....	300,000	312,470	250,063	132,407	60	18%	3.375
Bay State.....	134,000	1,370	16,137	115,257	28	5 1-16	7.407
Boston.....	200,000	208,505	146,681	161,854	46	11 1-5	3.347
Boylston.....	300,000	391,788	381,904	1,184	115	12 3-100	2.312
City.....	300,000	54,869	136,999	152,130	40	8 5-17	2.669
Eliot.....	*20,000	188,481	275,207	137,226	43	11 4-9	3.664
Firemen's.....	300,000	205,196	479,430	1184,324	106	15 7-10	3.152
Franklin.....	300,000	8,309	57,934	132,675	22	9	2.294
Howard.....	200,000	16,621	81,757	115,137	39	7 8 5	4.440
Manufacturers.....	400,000	739,000	592,468	1146,612	76	16 5-100	10.516
Merchants.....	500,000	271,958	236,169	123,231	83	19 8-100	3.173
National.....	300,000	295,119	229,009	107,200	53	15 41-100	7.935
Neptune.....	300,000	555,155	204,353	1,633,830	62	15 7-100	4.188
North American.....	100,000	20,660	238,100	179,470	76	11 1-18	2.755
Peoples.....	200,000	102,533	164,301	162,369	80	9	5.305
Prescott.....	*150,000	46,014	125,011	179,027	30	7%	5.091
Shoe & Leather.....	200,000	65,167	136,906	131,789	42	10	3.397
Suffolk.....	150,000	46,677	74,817	128,140	31	4	8.178
Springfield.....	300,000	71,728	89,617	111,181	43	18	7.311
Traders & Mechan's.....	50,000	86,753	53,941	119,183	38	8%	8.667
Washington.....	300,000	242,133	219,347	17,212	65	1 3%	6.441
yrlly avg. yearly avg. avg.							
13 9-10, 11 17 21							5.70

* Av. age.

is gain.

is loss.

THE HOG CROP AND ITS PRODUCT.

The commencement of a new season in "pork packing," and the curing of other products of the hog, brings with it the usual amount of speculation respecting the probable supply and demand. These matters are susceptible of being estimated with tolerable accuracy. Packers, through their correspondents at the different points, obtain such information as enables them to state the number of swine which are to come to market with fully as much accuracy as the cotton crop may be estimated; indeed of late years the estimates of the packers have very nearly approximated actual results, they seldom making such a mistake as was made last year in cotton.

There has not been, either, any important obstacle to an accurate estimate of the probable demand. It is, to be sure, subject to some contingencies. The foreign demand depends a great deal upon the state of trade in Great Britain. If manufactures are active in that kingdom, and her working people well employed, our exports of bacon will be larger than usual; if otherwise, smaller. The activity of the shipping interest also produces an increased demand, while the state of industry in the Southern States has a considerable influence in the same direction. This was well illustrated in the early part of 1868. An extraordinary advance then occurred in the price of cotton. It was about the season for planting cotton, and the advance in the price was a great stimulant to the work of planting. The increased work of planting cotton was immediately felt in the market for hog products, which were wanted to provide food for hands engaged in that work, and an advance in prices of bacon and lard immediately took place, amounting to about thirty per cent on the prices previously ruling.

There is a disposition to estimate the number of swine for the coming season at about the same figure as last season; while at the moment nothing is apparent indicating that the demand will be more than an average from any direction. The dull state of trade in England, and the large number of hands in the manufacturing districts unemployed, do not favor a large export demand. The decline in cotton that has taken place does not favor special activity in cotton planting, nor any increased demand for hog products from the South. The shipping interest is so much interfered with by regular lines of steamers, whose consumption of cured meats is relatively much smaller than that of sail vessels, that but little promise is evident in that direction.

But a comparatively new feature in the trade, and one affecting the course of it very materially, is the practical abolition of what was formerly known as the "packing season," which commenced about the first of November and ended about the first of March. The curing of hog products

has for a year or two past been kept up all the year through with the aid of ice. Ice-cured meats have nearly supplied our local trade for two summers past, and considerable quantities have been shipped abroad. The farmer has discovered that there is a market for his hogs at any time. He is therefore under no necessity of hurrying them to market at a particular season, or in default losing the sale of them. They can be sold in July as well as in December at their full market value. This is a favorable circumstance in many respects. It promotes better curing, by avoiding the haste and carelessness incident to "the season." It facilitates economy in feeding, and preserves the health of the swine. Its commercial effect is to cause the swine to be held back if prices are low and corn is low. If corn be high, as now, the farmer is disposed to send it to market, and his swine with it half fattened. There is every prospect of corn ruling at a pretty full figure for the coming year, even in the absence of an export demand, the cold and drought east of the Alleghanies having materially reduced the yield this year. This favors an early marketing of the swine which may now be ready, or nearly ready, to come forward. And yet there is reason to believe that the hogs will be well fattened. If corn is scarce and dear, other grains are cheap, which, mixed with potatoes (of which the crop is excessive), make excellent food for swine. There is, besides, the "mast" in Tennessee and Kentucky, said to be never more abundant, and which fattens hogs well.

From this review of the subject, there is little encouragement to expect the high prices which have ruled in the past six years, and it is probable that for this important crop, as in breadstuffs and cotton, it will be found difficult to infuse a speculative spirit into the market, in the absence of which prices are quite likely to rule lower than many anticipate.

TENNESSEE FINANCES.

The following from the Comptroller's report is of much interest :

STATE DEBT AND FINANCES OF TENNESSEE.

Bonds loaned to railroads, ante-war.....	\$12,115,000
Bonds to fund interest thereon—1866.....	3,213,000
New bonds to railroads, since war, 1866-69.....	11,297,000
Railroad bonds indorsed by State.....	3,196,000

Total railroad debt.....	\$21,521,000
Bank, capital and other old debt.....	3,473,000

Total debt, October 1, 1869.....	\$25,294,000
Add July, 1869, interest unpaid.....	1,000,000

Together.....	\$26,294,000
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Represented as follows :

Railroads for bonds and indorsements, as above.....	\$21,521,000	
Due from railroads for arrearages of interest due State.....	2,303,000	\$23,127,000
State Capitol, Bank of Tennessee, &c.....		\$2,267,000
Taxables of the State.....		223,262,243
Revenues of 1869-70.....	\$1,878,949	
Less for schools.....	450,000	—\$1,228,949

The Comptroller remarks :

From October 1, 1869, to October 1, 1870, this amount of money will be paid into the Treasury as State tax if the revenue laws are not so changed as to lessen it. To this is to be added the revenue derived from the privilege tax on insurance companies, bonds from banks, turnpike dividends, telegraph and express companies, the redemption of lands and town lots that have been sold for taxes and bid in for the use of common schools, and whatever may be received from the railroads.

As to the amount likely to be paid into the Treasury from these different sources, the Legislature will judge from the amount received during the present fiscal year. The amount paid into the Treasury during the fiscal year ending September 30, 1868, by the railroads, was \$998,251 14. During the year ending September 30, 1869, it was only \$780,264 57. This shows a falling off of \$217,985 57. The cause of this deficit on the part of the railroads, was the inability of some of the roads (that are unfinished), longer to pay, and the refusal of others to pay (able to do so), unless the State would receive from them in payment of their indebtedness, past due coupons which they had purchased at a reduced price for that special purpose — as I have been credibly informed, and verily believe. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company (due the State on interest account), \$55,931 62, proposed to pay its dues to the State—as above—to the fiscal agency of the State in New York, on the 30th of June last, provided a portion of it, nearly half the sum, would be received in coupons.

Learning in June last that certain railroad companies had agreed among themselves not to pay their July interest, thus making it impossible for the State to meet its liabilities, and afterward, when our securities had depreciated, to buy up the coupons, and present them in payment of their July interest. I instructed our agency in New York not to receive coupons from any road. The proposition of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company therefore was rejected, and the \$55,931 62 remains unpaid.

The Mississippi Central and Tennessee Railroad Company has also failed to pay, notwithstanding the fact that its President was fully advised of the necessities of the State Treasury, and notwithstanding the ability of the Company to pay.

The case of these two roads is specially spoken of here in my report, for the purpose of calling the attention of the Legislature to the necessity of instituting measures to effectually checkmate the designs of railroad companies, which—dead to every principle of gratitude to the State that has warmed them into life—use every means within their reach to sink her into temporary bankruptcy for purposes of selfish speculation. These roads certainly ought at once to be put into the hands of receivers, and run in the interests of the State till the last farthing is paid.

My reasons for not accepting coupons from the roads in payment of their July interest last, may be stated as follows: The State lends its bonds to the railroad companies. The companies sell the bonds, and use the proceeds in building their roads. The holders of the bonds do not look to the railroad companies for the interest maturing on the bonds. That is the business of the State. So far as the payment to the State of the interest due by the companies on the bonds loaned is concerned, the law provides that it shall be paid by the companies to the State semi-annually, by the 15th day of June and December of each and every year, not only the amount due, in many, but enough besides to pay for exchange, commissions, &c.

This being the law on the subject, it is evident that no railroad company has even believed that it could force the State to take coupons in payment of the interest due by said Company to the State. The object of these companies, therefore, must have been to depress the price of the bonds of the State for purposes of speculation, by taking advantage of the peculiarly critical condition of the State Treasury at that time, which was well understood by them.

The report shows what roads have fully paid their interest. I am not of opinion that any of the roads have intentionally failed to pay except the two already named, and the Evansville, Henderson and Nashville. It owes the State \$18,000 in interest, and I believe its purpose is to swindle the State. The Nashville and Decatur has paid \$131,955 29 on its January and July interest, 1869. It still owes \$15,955 26; but this will soon be paid. I have assurances, also, that the Knoxville and Charleston Railroad will soon pay the amount of interest due by it.

It seems evident that the State has increased her liabilities (by loaning her

RAILROAD ITEMS.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROADS.—The agreement of consolidation, made the 15th day of September, in the year 1869, between "The New York Central Railroad Company," party of the first part, and "The Hudson River Railroad Company," party of the second part, provides that "The said companies do hereby agree to merge and consolidate, and do hereby constitute and form one corporation, by the name of The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. Said corporation shall continue for the term of 500 years.

That the capital stock of the new corporation to be now issued shall be \$45,000,000, and the authorized number of shares of said capital stock shall be 450,000. 287,950 shares shall be issued to the holders of the capital stock of the New York Central, and 160,280 of said shares shall be also issued to the holders of the capital stock of the Hudson River Railroad Company. The said capital stock may at any time, at the option of the Board of Directors of the consolidated Company, be increased to an amount sufficient to capitalize at par the interest certificates heretofore issued by the New York Central Railroad Company, under the resolution of the Board of Directors of said Company, passed December 19, 1868; and also the consolidation certificates authorized to be issued in pursuance of this agreement.

No further or other issue of shares of capital stock, beyond the amount necessary for the capitalization of the said interest and consolidation certificates, shall be made, unless such increase shall be first authorized and approved by two-thirds in amount of all the stockholders of such consolidated company.

All the bonded or other indebtedness of either of said corporations, including the debt certificates of the New York Central Railroad Company are hereby declared to be valid and binding on the new corporation.

ARTICLE VII.

For the purpose of equalizing the values of the property of said consolidating companies, and making compensation to the stockholders of said companies, respectively, for all differences in such values, the parties thereto do further agree that there shall be issued to the stockholders of the said companies certificates, to be called consolidation certificates, and which shall provide that the same shall be payable ratably, at the pleasure of the company, out of its future earnings, and that until the same be wholly paid off and redeemed, dividends upon the amount thereof shall be paid at the same rates and times as dividends shall be paid upon the capital stock.

Such consolidation certificates shall be issued for such purpose of equalization as follows, viz:—

First—To the stockholders of the New York Central Railroad Company, there shall be issued consolidation certificates for 27 per cent., or \$27 on each \$100 of the capital stock of said company.

Second—To the stockholders of the Hudson River Railroad Company, there shall be issued consolidation certificates for 85 per cent., or \$85 on each \$100 of the capital stock of said Company.

For the further purpose of such equalization, there shall be retained out of the assets of the New York Central Railroad Company, the sum of \$518,310, which sum shall be distributed ratably among the holders of the stock certificates and the holders of the interest certificates of the New York Central Railroad Company, at the time of the exchange of stock certificates, after the perfection of the consolidation, as herein provided. The 27 per cent. in consolidation certificates herein provided, being the compensation to the stockholders of the New York Central Railroad Company, both in respect to their stock and their interest certificates for 80 per cent. of the par of such stock heretofore issued to the stockholders of said Company, in respect to such stock—it is understood and agreed that each stockholder of the New York Central Railroad Company, shall, at the time he shall receive his consolidation certificate of 27 per cent., produce the interest certificate of 80 per cent. upon the par thereof corresponding thereto, to the end that the delivery of the consolidation certificate may be noted and receipted for, both on the stock certificate and the interest certificate; and in the event that any interest certificate shall have been separated from the corresponding stock certificate, the holder of the stock certificate shall not be entitled to receive the consolidation certificate for 27 per cent until he shall produce for the purpose of notation and receipt hereinbefore provided interest

certificates to the amount of 80 per cent. upon the par amount of the stock, but in case such stockholder shall be unable to produce such corresponding interest certificate he shall only be entitled to receive consolidation certificates for 15 per cent. on the par of the stock so produced, and the holder of the corresponding interest certificate shall, when producing the same and receipting therefor be entitled to a consolidation certificate for the residue, being 15 per cent. on the amount of such interest certificates.

ARTICLE VIII.

It is further agreed that the consolidated Company may at its option, at any time, convert the amount of the consolidation certificates issued in pursuance of the preceding article, into capital stock, at par; and that such consolidation certificates may be transferred in any sums on the books of the Company by the holders thereof, either in person or by attorney, on the surrender of the certificate.

And it is further agreed that the consolidated Company may from time to time invest its surplus moneys in the said consolidation certificates, by purchase thereof in the market.

ARTICLE IX.

It is further agreed that the outstanding interest certificates, issued by the New York Central Railroad Company, in pursuance of the resolution of said Company, passed December 19, 1868, may at the option of the holders thereof, be converted into or exchanged for certificates of the same tenor and effect as the consolidation certificates, the issue whereof is herein provided for—and that the consolidation certificates which may be thus issued for exchange in said interest certificates, may at any time at the option of said consolidated Company, be converted into capital stock at par, as provided for by the article hereinbefore contained, fixing the amount of the capital stock of the consolidated Company.

ERIE RAILWAY.—The *personel* of the Board of Directors of this Company has come to be a matter of such immense importance to the stockholders, that we give the directors and officers, as elected on Tuesday, Oct. 12th.

The new board elected Jay Gould President, and James Fisk, Jr., Vice-President. H. N. Otis holds over as Secretary, and the appointment of Mortimer Smith as Assistant Secretary, was confirmed. Jay Gould continues to act as Treasurer. Alexander S. Diven, the former Vice-President, declined being a candidate for reelection, and Mr. Fisk was put in his place.

The new board also proceeded to classify themselves in accordance with the law passed last winter. The following classification was agreed upon:

Homer Ramsell, Charles G. Sisson and J. D. White, to go out of office October, 1870.

John Hilton, M. R. Simons and George C. Hall, to go out in 1871.

John Ganson, O. W. Chapman and Henry Thompson, to go out in 1872.

Alexander S. Diven, H. N. Smith, Abram Gould and H. N. Otis, to go out in 1873.

Jay Gould, James Fisk, Jr., William M. Tweed and Frederick A. Lane, to go out in 1874.

At the meeting of the new board the following resolution was also adopted:

Resolved, That the President be instructed to carry out the policy which the Executive have inaugurated; that he be directed to proceed at once to carry into effect the contract with the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad for a narrow gauge through line for passengers and freight to Chicago and the West; and that he be authorized and directed, for the completion, finishing and operating the road, to issue and the Secretary be authorized to attach the corporate seal to \$5,000,000 bonds, to be called the "Narrow gauge sinking fund bonds," secured by the proceeds of the traffic of such narrow gauge as is provided for in such contract.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD.—A report from St. Louis, dated 15th inst., says:

"The sensation of to-day in St. Louis is the action of our County Court in selling \$500,000 Pacific Railroad stock, belonging to the county, for \$250,000 cash to Hudson E. Bridge, of this city, who has been two years trying to get control of the Pacific directory. A "ring" of capitalists in the interest of the present directory had been

formed to get all the city and county stock, amounting to over \$1,000,000. Since June last the proposition has been pending to transfer this stock for bonds of a new track, which the Pacific Company wants, running centrally through St. Louis county, shortening the route a number of miles. The whole thing has been regarded as a grand speculation, out of which certain parties would realize some \$2,000,000 profits one way or another. The bid of Mr. Bridge has broken up the present dictory's "ring," but great indignation still exists among the people at the sale of the county's stock for 60 cents on the dollar when 60 has been offered. The City Council last week, with only one dissenting voice, voted to transfer the city's stock to the January, Gibson or Pacific party, but it is said that Mayor Cole has written a veto of the bill, which will be sent in to-morrow."

Thomas Allen, President of the Iron Mountain Railroad, offered for the 5,000 shares of the Missouri Pacific stock, which was sold to Hudson E. Bridge, \$280,000 in 7 per cent. bonds of the St. Louis & Memphis Railroad Company. D. R. Garrison, the leader of the party opposed to Mr. Bridge, says that he offered \$300,000 in cash for it.

CINCINNATI, HAMILTON AND DARTON RAILROAD.—The earnings of this road for the years ending March 31, 1868 and 1869, were as follows:

	1868.	1869.
From passengers	\$476,797	\$437,624
" freight	737,276	696,691
" mails and express	63,410	32,449
" rent of track, &c.	36,203	40,815
" rent of machinery, &c.	39,102	1,521
	<u>\$1,332,591</u>	<u>\$1,209,164</u>
Expenses.....	- 748,719	- 704,074
Earnings, less expenses.....	\$583,872	\$505,090
From which deduct:		
Interest on bonds.....	\$144,030	
General interest account.....	21,334	
Taxes, State	41,368	
" national	24,091	
Insurance.....	7,067	
Profit and loss—sundries.....	407	
		<u>\$33,199</u>
Leaving a balance of.....		\$326,890
Add surplus March 31, 1868.....		498,847
Total.....		<u>\$75,678</u>
Applied as follows:		
Subscription to complete Junction R. R.		\$5,000
Damage on account of collision at Oakland, Nov. 21, 1867.....		17,075
Dividends No. 26 and 27, a slip		350,000
Balance—surplus account, March 31, 1869.....		303,602
Total, as above.....		<u>\$675,678</u>

Compared with the previous year, the gross earnings show a decrease of \$123,790 17 with a decrease in operating expenses of \$44,615 31.

The entire expenditures, including interest, taxes, &c., was \$942,274 16, against \$974,435 60 in 1868—a decrease of \$32,161 44. The net earnings show a decrease of \$91,638 73. The earnings per mile have been \$20,151 84. Number of passengers carried, 642,583. Tons of freight moved, 608,692. Number of miles run by trains, 476,805. The operating expenses were 53.23 per cent of gross earnings.

CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET, MARCH 31, 1869.

Construction	\$3,967,094	Capital stock.....	\$3,500,000
Equipment	995,750	First mortgage bonds	1,250,000
Real estate.....	330,608	Second mortgage bonds	500,000
Materials.....	198,060	Third mortgage bond	282,000
Woodlands	12,540	Surplus earnings.....	303,602
Items receivable	8,405	Interest on bonds	5,794
Stocks and bonds.....	80,745	Dividends unpaid.....	13,680
Due from rail road companies	30,360	Dividend No 27.....	175,000
Due from individuals	26,063	Due rail road companies.....	77,259
Due from post office dept.....	6,712	" individuals	70,879
Cash and cash as etc.....	78,653	" United States.....	11,648
Dayton and Michigan Rail- road, lessors' account	107,113	Pay rolls	61,917
		Bills payable.....	319,962
	<u>\$6,572,115</u>		<u>\$6,572,115</u>

DAYTON AND MICHIGAN RAILROAD—The income of this company for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1869, was as follows:

From freight.....	\$74,604	Equipment.....	112,568
" passengers.....	341,688	Sinking fund.....	
" mails.....	18,762	Widening Bayou Bridge, Toledo.....	2,500
" express.....	34,211	Construction.....	90,991
" rents and interest.....	1,042	Loss on redemption 1st mort. bonds..	38,717
	<u>\$1,040,289</u>		<u>\$609,190</u>
Expenditures.....	672,472	Excess of expenditures over receipts.....	\$250,700
Earnings less operating expenses.....	147,816	Add balance due C., H. & D. M. R. Co.,	
Received from sale of steamboat stock.....	10,000	lesses, March 31, 1868.....	897,164
Received from sale of real estate.....	672	Add balance of account D. & W. R. R.	19,279
Total.....	<u>\$338,489</u>		<u>\$97,148</u>
Interest paid on bonds.....	\$245,988	Deduct for 700 3d mort. bonds.....	560,000
General interest account.....	11,937		
Insurance.....	6,120	Balance due Lessees, March 31, 1869..	\$107,148
Taxes, State and National.....	40,088		

The balance of the First Mortgage Bonds (recently the Second), of which there was \$229,000 held by the lessees, as per last report, to pay the indebtedness to them for redemption of First Mortgage Bonds due July 1, 1867, have been disposed of, and the amount realized therefor (\$194,818 38) has been applied for that purpose, leaving a balance of \$38,717 52, which has been carried to this year's account. Two of the bonds, Nos. 22 and 23, have not been presented for payment, and as there has been no interest paid on them since 1859, the probabilities are they have been lost. During the year 35 First Mortgage bonds have cancelled by the sinking fund, making an increase as shown on the balance sheet of \$194,000.

A mortgage of \$700,000 has been recently placed on the property of the company to Stanley Matthews, trustee, and bonds issued for that amount in sums of \$1,000 each, bearing interest at 7 per cent. per annum, and payable October 1, 1888. These bonds have been paid to the lessees at 80 cents on the dollar, in part payment of amount due them, leaving a balance still due of \$107,148 49, and the discount on these bonds charged to profit and loss account.

CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET, MARCH 31, 1869.

Construction account.....	\$4,789,675 61	Capital, old.....	\$2,305,315 08
Stock interest account.....	472,743 85	" new.....	74,897 01
Fencing.....	23,786 31	" not issued.....	16,474 43
Tolero improvement.....	833,623 75	1st mortgage bonds.....	2,829,000 00
Right of way.....	146,401 45	2d.....	642,000 00
Litua shop equipment.....	12,145 21	3d.....	710,000 00
Real estate.....	917,817 17	Mortgage bonds.....	7,000 00
Rolling stock.....	620,774 13	Toledo depot bonds.....	169,500 00
Bills receivable.....	1,624 00	Inc me bonds.....	1,300 00
Town of Perryburg.....	11,000 00	Bills payable.....	4,300 00
Indiv dual account.....	7,187 72	Interest on bonds.....	8,147 87
Profit and loss.....	336,072 91	Indiv dual R. R. acc unt.....	840 78
	<u>\$6,827,723 29</u>	C. H. & D. R. R. lessors' ac't.....	107,148 49
			<u>\$6,827,723 29</u>

CINCINNATI, RICHMOND AND CHICAGO RAILROAD.—The income of this company for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1869, was as follows:

From passengers.....	\$70,895 49
" freight.....	43,789 13
" mails.....	3,000 00
" express.....	3,123 89
" rents.....	229 56
" mileage of cars.....	8,290 35
	<u>\$104,938 42</u>
Expenditures.....	<u>\$10,082 50</u>
Excess of operating expenses.....	\$1,151 09
Interest paid on bonds.....	30,142 25
General interest and exchange.....	152 94
Insurance.....	32 12
Taxes, State and National.....	572 43
Excess of expenditures over receipts.....	<u>\$46,084 24</u>
Add balance due C., H. & D. R. R. Co., Lessees, March 31, 1863.....	<u>13,726 29</u>
Total due lessees.....	<u>\$59,730 1</u>

To pay off this indebtedness a mortgage of \$65,000 has been made to Stanley Matthews, trustee, and bonds issued in sums of \$1,000 each for that amount, payable Jan. 1, 1899, and bearing interest at 7 per cent. These bonds have been received by the lessees, in full account to March 31, 1889.

BALANCE SHEET, MARCH 31, 1899.

Construction.....	\$326,793 29	Capital stock.....	\$352,600 00
Equipment.....	130,451 98	First mortgage bonds.....	180,000 00
Real estate.....	700 00	Second ".....	65,000 00
Profit and loss.....	61,804 23	Interest on bonds unpaid.....	2,081 50
	\$1,099,089 50		\$1,099,689 50

NEW YORK, PROVIDENCE AND BOSTON RAILROAD.—The receipts of this company for the year ending August 31, 1889, were as follows:

From passengers.....	\$368,633 78	Salaries.....	9,966 71
freight.....	244,493 00	Wages.....	\$97,901 40
mail service.....	12,261 61	Fuel.....	62,261 48
rents, balance account.....	10,473 74	New cars.....	32,874 90
gas, balance account.....	993 04	Taxes.....	83,970 70
dividends, Stonington Steam- boat Co.....	62,233 00	Dredging.....	100 87
	\$639,168 06	Water works.....	576 90
Expenditures, viz:			\$163,729 84
Repairs of roads.....	\$83,508 73	Net earnings.....	\$335,458 21
engines.....	26,723 88	From which deduct—	
cars.....	32 157 06	Dividends, interest, &c.....	\$114,447 42
bridges, &c.....	23,729 67		
Ferry.....	17,624 67	Surplus.....	\$21,010 79
General expenses, oil, &c.....	37,945 37		

Compared with the previous year, the gross receipts show an increase of \$235,723 18, with an increase in expenses of \$102,712 88—making an increase of net earnings, \$133,010 75. The report says:

Acting under proper authority, the directors, in November last, directed the issue of \$1,000,000 in 7 per cent. bonds, payable in 1899. Of this amount \$400,000 was offered for sale, and \$383,000 disposed of, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the floating debt. In addition, \$56,000 of the old 6 per cent. bonds have been exchanged for the new issue, and the balance remains in the hands of the Treasurer.

LIABILITY OF CITIES FOR THEIR BONDS TO RAILROADS.—Upon this subject the *New York Times* gives the following: The United States Courts when appealed to, have invariably enforced the obligations of the Western cities and counties to pay their bonds issued for railway purposes, without reference to the responsibility of the railways negotiating or indorsing the bonds. In the State of Iowa it was supposed that a State constitutional defence might be interposed to the collection of these bonds, but the Federal Courts have decided otherwise, and after a prolonged and vexatious litigation, involving a conflict of jurisdiction, the following conclusion has been arrived at. We quote from the *Des Moines State Register*:

"The conflict in the decisions and orders of the State and Federal Courts on the question of the payment of certain bonds issued by various cities and counties in this State for the purpose of aiding in the construction of railroads, we are glad to know, is substantially at an end. The late decision of the State Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph Holman et al. vs. Harry Fulton, settles the question so far as any interference by the State Courts with the processes of the Federal Courts is concerned; and the Federal Courts having already determined that all the power of the Government under the control of the Court should be used to enforce its mandates for the collection of these bonds, there seems to be no other alternative than for the cities and counties who have issued their bonds to go to work in good faith and honestly to compromise or pay them.

THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILROAD.—RICHMOND, VA., Nov. 25.—The stockholders of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad met to-day. The receipts for the fiscal year were \$661,227, and the expenses \$477,551. An offer was received from some parties in England to take \$800,000 of the Company's stock, but no action was taken upon it.

SUITS AGAINST SOUTHERN RAILROADS.—The Washington correspondent of the *New York Times* gives the following statement on this subject: "The United States Government has filed bills in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee against the East Tennessee and Virginia and East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Companies, the object of which is to collect from the first named road the sum of \$250,000, and from the last named the sum of \$356,000. The evidence of this indebtedness is bonds executed by the President of the roads, and they were given as security for the purchase of engines, rolling stock and material turned over to the roads by the Government in August, 1863. The payment of the bonds has been delayed by the companies in the hope that they might secure from the Government some recompense for the great amount of railroad material and supplies turned over by these companies to general Burnside on his advent to East Tennessee, in 1863, as well as for the use and occupation of the roads by the Union armies from 1863 to 1865. These claims against the Government amount to about \$700,000. The United States has taken the initiative to force the collection of its claims in the Courts. Both parties are willing to submit to the decision of the Courts. The prayer of the bills in equity filed by the United States is for the appointment of receivers for both roads."

THE CENTRAL AND UNION PACIFIC JUNCTION CONTROVERSY SETTLED.—Washington, Nov. 23.—The controversy between the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad Companies, concerning the possession of the road between Ogden and Promontory Point, the settlement of which was initiated by the act of Congress of last spring, which fixed the point of junction at Ogden, has been finally arranged by an agreement between the two companies as to the price to be paid to the Union Company for that portion of the road constructed by it between Ogden and Promontory, 80 miles. By this arrangement the Central pays to the Union a sum understood to be somewhat in excess of \$3,000,000, and comes into the proprietary possession of that portion of the road in dispute. These essentials being now settled, both companies will proceed to erect permanent and commodious buildings at Ogden, and the Treasury Department will issue to the companies the remainder of the subsidy bonds due to them, except such sum as may be retained to guarantee the final completion and equipment of the roads, in accordance with the recommendation of the Government Commissioners. Henceforth the two companies will be as one line.

FREIGHTS TO THE WEST.—The representations of the different railroads competing for the Western trade have met and agreed upon a new freight tariff. The war in which they have been engaged during the past few months has been beneficial, perhaps, to the shippers, but has certainly done the roads no sort of good. Rates to Chicago at one time had fallen so low as 25 cents per 100 pounds. The present schedule is considerably in advance of former ones, as will be seen by the following list of prices for first class freight to the places named:

Cleveland, Ohio	per 100 lbs.	\$0 84
Cincinnati, Ohio		1 18
Chicago, Ill.		1 25
St. Louis, Mo.		1 60

The rates for the other classes of freight are proportionately increased.—*Commercial Advertiser*.

LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILROAD.—The *New York Tribune* gives the following as the terms of consolidation accepted by the Boards of Directors of the Lake Shore Road and the Toledo, Wabash and Western Road: "The Michigan Southern is to be taken at 100, and the Toledo and Wabash 75. The consolidation goes into effect January 1, 1870. The nominal capital of the new Company will be \$50,000,000. Previous to the issue of the new stock, a dividend of 4 per cent will be made on the present stock of the Michigan Southern Road, payable February 1, 1870. The transfer books of the Michigan Southern Road will close on the 15th of November, after which a meeting of the stockholders will be called to ratify the act of consolidation. The transfer books of the Toledo and Wabash Company are now closed, and will remain so until the stockholders have voted upon the proposal. The new Company will be called the Buffalo, Lake Shore, Chicago and Wabash Railroad Company."

THE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS have made their report in full, in which they estimate that the sum of \$1,586,100 will supply all the deficiencies of the Union Pacific road from Omaha to Promontory, so that it may meet its description of "first-class." Of this amount, \$208,044 is needed for the section between Ogden and Promontory, which is claimed by the Central Pacific. The surplus rolling stock, material and supplies, now in possession of the road, are worth, it is thought, about \$1,800,000. Estimates are made for the amount necessary for every separate improvement, and the whole amount required for the Central Pacific Railroad is given as \$578,840, and this is counterbalanced, so the commissioners think, by a surplus rolling stock, material and supplies on hand, worth more than a million dollars.

THE RAILROADS OF VIRGINIA.—It is reported that the Richmond and Danville Railroad Company of Virginia has paid into the State Treasury one half of the interest due the State on its loans, and the remainder is to be paid on December 16th, under instruction from General Canby. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad is yet behind. The annual interest due from the corporation is about \$18,000, while the Southside Railroad owes the sum of \$252,000, the time for payment of which, the Legislature, satisfied of the pecuniary position of the Company, has extended on their own accord. The Virginia and Tennessee Railroad owes about \$420,000 interest to the State, and the last-mentioned road appears not to be in a condition to meet its liabilities at present. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad is negotiating a loan with which it expects to liquidate its entire indebtedness to the State, principal and interest, in all about \$850,000.

VIRGINIA AND TENNESSEE RAILROAD BONDS.—The following notice is published in regard to these:

'Bondholders of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad Company.

'Every preparation has now been made for the funding of the past due interest, in the manner and upon the terms of which notice has been previously given.

"On and after the 1st day of November, I shall be glad to receive the past due coupons of the Company, and to have such communication upon the subject otherwise, which bondholders may desire to make in furtherance of this subject.

"I shall occupy a room in the Company's main building at Lynchburg.

"CHARLES W. STATHAM, Funding Agent, Lynchburg, Va."

THE SUSQUEHANNA RAILROAD—JUDGE JOHNSON'S DECISION AT ROCHESTER.—ROCHESTER, November 3.—The decision of Judge Johnson, of the Supreme Court, was filed to-day in the matter of the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad Company. It requires the receiver to pay, first, the current expenses of running the road; second, the interest due on the Company's bonds, as well as the Albany City bonds loaned the Company; third, it authorizes the payment to the receiver of the balance due the Company from the Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank of Albany, or from any other bank or person. The receiver is not authorized to borrow money on the credit of the Company without special authority from the Court.

ARKANSAS BONDS.—The new Arkansas bonds exchanged for old obligations at the American Exchange Bank in this city amount to \$4,425,000. They are six per cent, put of them dated July 1, 1869, with coupons payable semi-annually in New York January 1 and July 1; and part of them dated January 1, 1870; the first coupon being annual, payable January 1, 1871, and after that semi-annual coupons January and July. The bonds run thirty years, and therefore mature July, 1899, and January, 1900.

IOWA CENTRAL RAILROAD.—Forty-five miles from Ackley to Marshalltown are now completed. Sixty more are graded, and work is being urged along the entire line. This road, as our readers are aware, is to run from the southern to the northern boundary of Iowa, near the 16th meridian, a distance of 240 miles. When finished, it will supply to St. Louis a connecting link to St. Paul, 147 miles shorter than any existing route. The line in Iowa will traverse the rich central basin between the Cedar and Des Moines rivers, prolific in coal and the finest agricultural and cereal products.

RICHMOND, VA., Nov. 28.—Arrangements were closed yesterday in New York with several prominent capitalists, by which the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad will be completed at once. Among the capitalists are W. H. Aspinwall, A. A. Low, C. P. Huntington, Fisk & Hatch and others.

THE WELLS-FARGO EXPRESS.—According to special call, a meeting of the stockholders of the Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express was held November 25th. The object of the meeting was to decide whether the capital stock of the company should be increased from \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000, and whether the additional \$5,000,000 of stock should be delivered to the Pacific Express Company, who demand that amount in order to insure to Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express the cessation of their rivalry.

Mr. Eugene Kelly opposed both propositions. The great point claimed in favor of the delivery of five millions of the Wells-Fargo stock was that the Pacific Express Company had an exclusive contract over the Central Pacific Railway for ten years. This line covered 800 miles, for the privileges of which the Wells Fargo Express is expected to pay \$5,000,000. The Union Pacific Railroad was 1,000 miles long. Now did the stockholders know that some enterprising gentlemen, such as comprised the Pacific Express Company, would not obtain an "exclusive" contract over the Union Pacific Railroad, and then obtain a concession of stock from the Wells-Fargo Company? He did not deny that the rights to be conceded by the Pacific Express Company were valuable, but he did deny that they were worth \$5,000,000.

Mr. Barney said that the Pacific Express had been organized as an opposition to Wells Fargo. The officers had been notified of the fact by friends in California, who had asked them to come on and make some arrangements to fuse with the opposition. For eighteen months the Pacific Express had damaged the business of the Wells Fargo, having offices at all the main stations, and reducing the tariff almost to a non-paying point. They had a ten years' exclusive contract over the Central Pacific Railroad, which owned three-fifths of their stock. He considered that the Pacific Express Company had the best of the situation. Had he been in their place he would not have taken less than one-half of the total stock of the Wells-Fargo Express, since the latter could not compete with them. Unless the stockholders decided to carry out the arrangements proposed, it would necessitate a closing of the concern.

Eventually a vote was taken, resulting as follows: In favor of increasing the capital stock to \$15,000,000, 50,558; in favor of delivering the extra stock to the Pacific Express Company, 50,558; against the first proposition, 344, and against the second, 730.

Mr. Kelly and others of the opponents of the expansion of the capital stock refused to vote; thus the vote drawn out was not more than half of the actual capital stock of the Company. While these gentlemen did not vote, they did not endeavor by injunction to prevent the voting; but Mr. Eugene Kelly appealed to and procured from Judge Cardozo, of the Supreme Court, an injunction forbidding the issuing of the extra stock. This was served upon the President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Company, and will prevent any further action in the matter except by permission of the Courts.

COLUMBUS, CHICAGO, AND INDIANA CENTRAL RAILROAD.—The following explains itself: 57 Broadway, New York, Sept. 22d, 1869.—For the purpose of contradicting rumors in reference to the successful operation of the Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central Railway, under the lease to the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, which lease is dated on the 22d day of January, 1869, the undersigned beg leave to say to those interested in the securities, that the road is successfully operated under the lease to the satisfaction of the parties, and shows a continued increase of earnings, with every prospect of a successful future traffic.

The lessees have made great improvements in the condition of the road and its depots, shops, and other buildings, and are adding largely to its rolling stock and facilities for doing business, and will continue to make whatever expenditures may be necessary to meet the increasing traffic of the future.

THOMAS L. JEWETT,

President Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis Railway Company.

E. E. SMITH,

President Columbus, Chicago, and Indiana Central Railway Company.

THE CREDIT MOBILIER CASE.—HARRISBURG, Nov. 25.—The jury in the Credit Mobilier case came in at one o'clock with a verdict for the Commonwealth of \$497,483 34. The amount claimed by the Commonwealth was \$520,546 87. The jury deducted \$2,390,500 from the nominal value of their dividends, which was over \$9,000,000.

NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD.—The Raleigh *Sentinel* says that "the North Carolina Railroad Company have let and farmed out their road, for the term of twenty years, to the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad Company and others, for an annual rent of \$240,000, to be paid on the first day of January in each year. The rent is secured by a deposit in bank of cash or its equivalent in United States bonds; or good and acceptable railroad or other bonds; this deposit is to be permanent, and if there is occasion to apply it, then it is to be renewed, and as often as necessary."

—The annual report of the Evansville and Crawfordsville Railroad for the year ending August 31, 1869, contains the following:

"In accordance with the proposition made to our bondholders for a twenty years' extension of their bonds, we have begun the redemption of the two several issues, by redeeming upon advertisement from the lowest bidders, in January and May last, twenty-seven bonds of \$1,000 each, for the sum of \$22,766. This redemption will be continued on the first days of January and May of each year, till all the bonds of these issues are paid.

The Evansville, Henderson and Nashville Railroad, to whose completion we anxiously look forward for Southern connections, has, for financial reasons, progressed slowly for the past year, and its completion will probably be delayed another year.

A direct Northern connection of this road, under the name of the Evansville, Terre Haute and Chicago Railway Company, has been organized, to construct a road from Terre Haute to the State Line, in the direction of Danville, there to unite with the Chicago, Danville and Vincennes Railroad, and has so far progressed with its surveys and stock subscriptions as to justify the hope of its completion within about a year from this date. Its Northern connection, the C. D. & V. Railroad, is being rapidly completed. About thirty-three miles of the track is laid, and its builders contemplate its completion to the Indiana State Line during the coming year at farthest.

EARNINGS AND EXPENSES FOR THE YEAR

ENDING AUGUST 31, 1869.		OPERATING EXPENSES.	
From Passengers.....	\$185,983	Running Road.....	\$75,474
Freight.....	245,775	Maintenance of Way.....	74,635
Express.....	12,438	Repairing Bridges and Structures.....	11,710
Mail Service.....	9,400	Repairs of Machinery.....	59,061
Roads.....	295	General Expenses.....	64,535
Use of Engines and Cars.....	3,735		
Total Earnings.....	\$456,978	Total Expenses.....	\$285,451

Net Earnings.....\$171,526

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND EXPENSES FOR THE THREE LAST YEARS.

	1866-7.	1867-8.	1868-9.
Total Earnings for Year.....	\$507,703	\$458,186	\$456,978
Total Operating Expenses.....	\$341,444	\$285,366	\$285,451
Net Earnings.....	\$168,247	\$117,920	\$171,526
Deduct Interest and Taxes.....	108,336	108,946	106,633
To Credit Income Account.....	\$51,911	\$8,973	\$64,893

GENERAL BALANCE SHEET, AUGUST 31, 1869.

ASSETS.	LIABILITIES.
Construction of Road.....	Capital Stock paid in.....
Equipment.....	Fractional Scrip.....
Real Estate not necessary for use.....	Unclaimed Stock Dividend, 1856.....
District Fair Ground Stock.....	Preferred Stock.....
Fuel on hand.....	Seven Per Cent Bonds, Main Line.....
Shop Supplies.....	Less Redeemed by Sinking Fund.....
Cash.....	Seven Per Cent Bond, Rockville Extension.....
Due from Agents.....	Due other Lines.....
Open Accounts.....	Other Liabilities.....
Total.....	

Total.....\$2,875,078

INCOME ACCOUNT.

Earnings Expended for Construction.....	\$414,687
Balance of Account.....	54,663

\$2,875,037

—The Treasurer's report of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad Company shows the following for the year ending June 30, 1869. The capital stock issued is \$2,494,900, divided as follows:

438 shares in Federal currency, of \$100 each.....	\$43,800
2,043 shares in sterling currency, of £100, or \$484 each.....	2,420,492
28 fractional share rights, of \$16 each.....	008
	<hr/> \$2,494,900

During the past year an arrangement has been made with the city of Portland in reference to their \$1,500,000 loan, by which the 15,000 shares, previously reported as held by the city as collateral, and upon which no assessments have been paid, have been surrendered to the company and the certificates cancelled, and are now unused capital. Upon the Federal shares two dividends of \$2 per share have been paid at this office, and the dividends upon the sterling shares have been paid in London. The debt of the company has been reduced the past year \$159,200, by payments to that amount upon the company's obligations to the city of Portland. The total debt now is \$3,324,800, consisting of:

Obligations to the city of Portland for the first and second loans of their bonds....	\$1,340,800
Company's mortgage bonds of 1861.....	614,500
Company's sterling bonds of Nov. 1, 1863, on 25 years, £100,000 at \$484 to the £100..	444,500
Company's mortgage sterling bonds, 5-20, at \$4 84 to the £1, £:82,900, equal to..	883,236
Amount due on exchange of bonds.....	264
	<hr/> \$3,324,800

The lessees have promptly provided for the payment of the dividends, the interest on the debt and the contributions to the sinking funds. They have also assumed and paid the excise tax of five per cent. on the company's mortgage bonds, thus giving the holders their full six per cent interest.

—The rates of freight from New York westward are now as follows:

	First class.	Second class.	Third class.	Fourth class.	Fifth class.
St. Louis.....	\$1 60	\$1 30	93	88	65
Louisville.....	1 45	1 18	90	80	65
Milwaukee.....	1 25	1 00	75	65	50
Chicago.....	1 55	1 00	75	65	50
Cincinnati.....	1 18	95	70	63	48
Indianapolis.....	1 21	98	74	64	50
Columbus.....	1 03	82	61	51	42
Toledo.....	1 00	80	60	52	40
Cleveland.....	80	67	51	43	34
Buffalo.....	60	50	40	30	25
Detroit.....	50	42	34	27	27

—*Western R. R. Gazette.*

—The Tennessee Railroads, whose suit with the United States was terminated last week, were found during the war by our armies in a dilapidated condition, with little or no rolling stock. The government put them in repair and equipped them for its own use, operated them during the war, and at its close delivered them, with the improvements it had made, to the companies owning them. It charged the companies for these improvements, amounting altogether to about \$2,000 000.

Now, these companies had received aid from the State of Tennessee, for which they were required to pay interest. They failed to pay this interest during the war, and the government which had possession of their roads did not pay it for them. So when the government presented its claims to the Supreme Court against the companies, the companies presented counter claims, first for the use of the roads during the war, and next for the interest still due the State of Tennessee, which, the companies claim, should have been paid by the government for the time it had full possession of the roads.

According to the terms of the settlement, as they are reported, the roads are to remain in the control of the companies, and they are to pay first the interest due the State of Tennessee, but the whole amount of the net earnings, after paying this

debt, must go to pay the government demand; and they give their own bonds, or those of the State, to the amount of \$3,000,000, to insure the performance of the contract.

The roads concerned are the East Tennessee & Virginia, from Knoxville to Bristol, on the Virginia line; the East Tennessee & Georgia, from Knoxville to Dalton, Ga.; the Nashville & Chattanooga; and the Nashville & Northwestern, which extends from Nashville to Hickman, on the Mississippi, but during the war was operated only to Johnsonville, on the Tennessee, 78 miles from Nashville. The whole length of these roads is about 450 miles.

The *Western Railroad Gazette* gives the following:

—The city council of St. Louis last Tuesday passed an ordinance transferring the city's interest in the Missouri Pacific Railroad, of \$500,000 of stock, to Charles Gibson and T. J. January. The grantees give \$8,000,000 in bonds to build within two years a railroad through the center of St. Louis county, to Howell's Ferry, on the Missouri river, where it will connect with the projected road *via* Louisiana to Keokuk and to South Point, where it will connect with the Missouri Pacific, shortening the road to Kansas City, and offering a new connection to the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad to the present directors.

—It is reported that arrangements will be completed in a few days for the transfer of freight, without breaking bulk, between the Iron Mountain and Mobile & Ohio Railroads at Belmont, Missouri, and Columbus, Kentucky.

—The articles of consolidation and amalgamation of the Western Pacific Railroad and San Francisco Bay Railroad Companies, and the incorporation of both under the name of the Western Pacific Railroad Company have been filed in the Secretary of State's office. Directors—Leland Stanford, C. P. Huntington, Mark Hopkins, Charles Crocker, E. B. Crocker, E. H. Miller, Jr., and E. B. Stanford. Capital stock \$10,000,000.

—The *St. Joseph Gazette* says that Mayor Hall of that city has made arrangements for putting \$1,500,000 of the bonds of the St. Joseph & Denver Railroad on the New York market, and that he has purchased a new locomotive for the road and iron enough to complete it to Hiawatha.

—A temporary bridge has been built over the Kansas river at Lawrence for the use of the Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston Railroad.

—A committee of the Cincinnati Board of Trade which has been examining the condition and prospects of the Fort Wayne, Muncie & Cincinnati Railroad recommends the loan of \$500,000 seven per cent. gold bonds to aid in the completion of the 42 miles between Muncie and Bluffton.

—The Treasury Department has paid to the Union Pacific Railroad Company \$487,000 in bonds for that portion of the road between the 1,020th mile post and Ogden, at the 1,084th mile post. The Union Pacific Company now owns up to the latter point, but the remainder of the distance, between Ogden and Promontory Point, is still in dispute. It has not yet been settled whether the Union Pacific Company shall have that part of the road, or whether it shall be given to the Central Pacific.

—The Cincinnati and Zanesville Railroad, extending from Zanesville to Morrow, 132 miles in length, together with other property and franchises, including the franchise to be and act as a corporation of the Cincinnati and Zanesville Railroad Company in the State of Ohio, will be exposed for sale at public vendue, in the city of Cincinnati on the 1st of December. The minimum price fixed by the Court is \$1,008,968.

—The Bangor, Oldtown and Milford Railroad Company have sold their road, better known as the Venzie Railroad, running from Bangor to Milford, thirteen miles in length, to H. G. Jewett and Noah Woods, acting in behalf of the European and North American Company. The price is not made public. The sale takes effect on the 1st of December. This is one of the oldest railroads in the country, and will be discontinued as soon as tracks can be laid from the European and North American Railroad to points accommodated by the Venzie Road.

—Mayor Cole, of St. Louis, has vetoed the ordinance of the Common Council selling the city's Pacific Railroad stock to January & Gibson for \$250,000 in bonds of the new railroad through St. Louis county. This transaction is distinct from that of the County Court, which sold half a million of the county's—not the city's—stock for \$250,000 in cash to Hudson E. Bridge, who leads a party in the Pacific directory opposed to January and Gibson.

—The work of laying the track of the Mobile and New Orleans Railroad was commenced at Mobile on November 8th, and was witnessed by most of the prominent citizens. This road is being built by Northern capitalists. The grading is well advanced, the iron has nearly all arrived and an early completion of the road and connection with New Orleans is promised. The distance is 138 miles.

—The Denver Pacific Railroad is not yet completed to Evans, as has been reported. It is open for 40 miles south of Cheyenne, and it is 20 miles further to Evans. There is one stage line from the terminus to Evans, and another between Evans and Denver. The road will be completed to Evans before the winter, however, leaving but 50 miles of staging to Denver.

—The injunction lately obtained by the Rutland Railroad Company, staying further proceedings before the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Cheever & Hart, Trustees, vs. Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company and others, has been dissolved.

—Louisville, Ky., has voted by a majority of about 500 to subscribe \$500,000 to the projected Louisville, New Albany and St. Louis Air Line Railroad. General I. M. St. John, Chief Engineer, in the report of his survey, estimates the cost at \$3,700,583.

—The stockholders of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company, at a late meeting, passed a resolution rejecting the river line for the connecting line between the Louisville and Nashville and the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington roads.

—Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior the President has accepted a section of sixty-three miles of the Western Pacific Railroad, and ordered the bonds due on account of the construction thereof to be issued to the company.

—The St. Louis & Southeastern Railroad Company has executed a mortgage for \$250,000 to George Opdyke and Philo C. Calhoun, of New York. It is promised that work shall commence on this road at Shawneetown next spring.

—The city of Memphis on the 8th inst., sold its stock in the Mississippi & Tennessee Railroad, (Memphis to Grenada,) amounting to \$300,000 to A. T. Lacey, agent of the Mississippi River Railroad, for \$40,000.

—Under the reorganization the Little Miami road controls the Columbus & Xenia, Dayton & Xenia, and Dayton & Western roads. The entire capital stock paid up is \$3,358,600, and the traveled length 196½ miles.

—Evansville, Indiana, has voted to subscribe \$300,000 toward the building of the Evansville, Carmi and Paducah Railroad. This makes the construction of the road a certainty.

—The unfinished portion of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, from Covington to Catlettsburgh and Point Pleasant, has been placed under contract.

THE DEBT STATEMENT FOR DECEMBER.

The following is the official statement of the public debt, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns at the close of business on the last day of November, 1869 :

Debt bearing interest in Coin.

Character of Issue.	When Payable.	Amount Outstanding.	Accrued Interest.
5's, Bonds.....	After 15 years from January 1, 1859.....	\$20,000,000 00	\$116,665 77
5's, Bonds.....	After 10 years from January 1, 1861.....	7,022,000 00	116,291 67
6's of 1861.....	After December 31, 1860.....	18,415,000 00	469,375 00
6's, Oreg. War, '61.....	Redeemable 20 years from July 1, 1861.....	945,000 00	25,25 00
6's of 1861.....	At pleas. after 20 years from June 30, '61.....	189,317,900 00	4,782,940 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from May 1, 1862*.....	514,771,600 00	2,578,858 04
6's of 1861.....	After June 30, 1861.....	75,0 0,000 00	1,475,000 00
6's, 10-40's.....	40 years from March 1, 1864*.....	191,567,300 00	2,432,091 25
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from November 1, 1864*.....	3,832,500 00	19,411 00
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from November 1, 1864*.....	125,561,300 00	627,803 50
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from November 1, 1865*.....	203,327,250 00	1,16,636 25
7's, 5-20's.....	21 years from July 1, 1865*.....	832,998,950 00	8,321,93 75
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from July 1, 1867*.....	379,514,500 00	9,489,733 75
6's, 5-20's.....	20 years from July 1, 1868*.....	42,539,350 00	1,063,481 75
Aggregate of debt bearing interest in coin.....		\$2,107,988,000 00	\$33,202,914 97
Coupons due, not presented for payment.....			8,475,572 00
Total interest.....			\$41,27,8 09

Debt bearing interest in Lawful Money.

3's, Certificates.. On demand (interest estimated).....	\$47,105,000 00	\$913,900 00
3's, Navy pen. f'd. interest only applic. to pay. of pensions.....	14,000,000 00	1,000 00
Aggregate of debt bearing interest in lawful money.....	\$61,195,000 00	\$1,18,900 00

Debt on which interest has ceased since maturity.

6's, Bonds.....	Matured December 31, 1861.....	\$6,000 00	\$361 61
6's, Bonds.....	Matured December 31, 1867.....	14,150 00	819 00
6's, Bonds.....	Matured July 1, 1868 (9 months' inter.).....	58,700 00	2,641 50
6's, Texas Indem. Matured December 31, 1864.....		242,000 00	12,190 00
Var., Tr'y notes. Matured at various dates.....		108,614 64	3,072 35
5-20's, Tr'y notes. Matured March 1, 1859.....		2,400 00	120 00
6's, Treas. notes. Matured April and May, 1863.....		8,250 00	195 00
7-10's, 3 years.....	Matured August 19 and October 1, 1864.....	30,800 00	1,124 20
5's, 1 & 2 years.....	Matured from Jan. 7 to April 1, 1866.....	262,853 00	14,505 11
6's, Certif. of ind. Matured at various dates in 1866.....		12,000 00	720 00
6's, Comp. int. n. Matured June 10, 1867, and May 15, 1868.....		2,221,150 00	465,219 37
4-5 & 6's, Temp. l. Matured October 15, 1866.....		182,160 00	7,534 65
7-10's, 3 years.....	Matured August 15, 1867, and June 15, 1868.....	82,950 00	3,107 63
Aggregate of debt on which int. has ceased since matur.....		\$4,291,026 64	\$5,8,506 83

Debt bearing no interest.

Authorizing acts.	Character of issue.	Amt. outstand.
July 17, 1861 and Feb. 12, 1862.....	Demand notes.....	\$11,253 11
Feb. 25 & July 11, '62, & Mar. 8, '63.....	U. S. legal-tender notes.....	356,000,000 00
July 17, 1861.....	Postal currency.....	3,985,61 00
March 3, 1861 and June 30, 1861.....	Fractional currency.....	36,952,940 00
March 3, 1863.....	Certificates for gold deposited.....	
Aggregate of debt bearing no interest.....		\$431,31,763 18

Recapitulation.

	Amount Outstanding.	Interest
DEBT BEARING INTEREST IN COIN—Bonds at 5 p. cent.....	\$22,581,000 00	
Bonds at 6 p. cent.....	1,846,318,700 00	
Total debt bearing interest in coin.....	\$2,107,988,000 00	\$41,270,486 09
DEBT BEARING INTEREST IN LAWFUL MONEY —		
Certificates at 3 per cent.....	\$47,195,000 00	
Navy pension fund, at 3 per cent.....	14,000,000 00	
Total debt bearing interest in lawful money.....	\$61,195,000 00	\$1,18,900 00
DEBT ON WHICH INT. HAS CEASED SINCE MATURITY.....	4,291,026 64	58,506 83

* These bonds are redeemable at any time after 5 years from the date here given and payable after 20 years.
 † These bonds are redeemable at any time after 10 years from the date here given and payable after 40 years.

DEBT BEARING NO INTEREST—

Demand and legal tender notes.....	\$354,119,251 50
Postal and fractional currency.....	38,455,561 68
Certificates of gold deposited.....	86,862,940 00

Total debt bearing no interest..... \$431,861,763 18

Total..... \$2,605,786,789 52 \$12,947,829 97
Total debt, prin. & int., to date, including coupons due not presented for payment \$2,435,234,952 79

AMOUNT IN THE TREASURY—

Coin.....	\$104,969,949 77
Currency.....	11,811,753 79
Sinking fund on U. S. coin int. b'ds, and acc'd int. thereon.....	2,411,026 01
Other U. S. coin int. b'ds purchased, and acc'd int. thereon.....	544,610 06
Total.....	\$119,671,944 54
Debt, less amount in the Treasury.....	\$2,453,559,785 23
Debt, less amount in the Treasury on the 1st ultimo.....	2,461,131,181 36
Decrease of debt during the past month.....	7,571,451 13
Decrease of debt since March 1, 1869.....	\$71,933,524 73

Bonds issued to the Pacific Railroad Companies, Interest payable in Lawful Money.

Character of Issue.	Amount outstanding.	Interest acc'd and not yet paid.	Interest paid by States.	Interest repaid by int'l paid in U. S. currency by United States.	Balance of int'l paid
Union Pacific Co.....	\$27,475,000 00	\$776,542 32	\$2,081,839 89	\$1,103,941 51	\$755,238 33
Missouri Pacific, lat. U.P.					
E. D.....	6,303,000 00	157,771 00	831,813 09	611,224 99	263,788 10
St. Louis City and Pacific.....	1,428,320 00	40,700 00	16,508 09	16 21	96,491 42
Central Pacific.....	2,562,000 00	5,091 22	548,216 81	94,264 48	1,624,460 10
Central Branch Union Pacific, assignees of Atchafalpa & Pike's Pk.....	1,600,000 00	40,000 00	205,808 36	5,290 79	200,517 47
Western Pacific.....	1,640,000 00	18,375 64	46,506 01	46,905 03
Total issued.....	62,625,320 00	1,536,205 40	4,984,223 51	1,836,730 04	\$1,148,092 50

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW

Monetary Affairs—Rates of Loans and Discounts—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Price of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at New York—Opening, Highest, Lowest and Closing Prices at the New York Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

November has been characterized by a steady, quiet course of business in Wall street. The money market has been more settled than was expected.

Although the month is usually one of special activity in the pork trade of the West, no considerable amounts of currency were sent to that section until the third and fourth weeks, when the remittances to the West and South combined aggregated probably close upon \$5,000,000. This drain was met without much inconvenience to the banks, and produced little effect upon the general tone of the market. It is indeed somewhat remarkable that, with such a comparatively light supply of legal tenders in the banks, these withdrawals should have produced so little effect; the explanation being perhaps afforded, first, in the partial return of money from the East; next, in the liberal disbursements of the Sub Treasury; and further in the moderation of the advances upon stocks, the prices of which have ruled below the average. The rate of interest on call loans has ranged

between 5 and 7 per cent; but at the close of the month a hardening tendency was apparent, and 7 per cent quite general. In discounts there has been a gradual improvement of tone but with little alleviation of rates. In the absence of failures, the uneasiness engendered by the excessive pressure in October has gradually disappeared, and, with the exception of paper coming from those branches of trade which have suffered from a late fall in prices, there has been a fair degree of confidence in credits. As western collections have come in slowly, and merchants have had to give unusually liberal credits to traders in that section, there has been a very heavy supply of paper, and it is to this cause mainly that the high rates must be attributed. During the latter half of the month the demands for discounts from the pork sections came in competition with local paper, and stopped a declining tendency in rates which was becoming apparent. For the first half of the month prime double name paper ranged at 10 to 15 per cent, and subsequently at 9 to 12 per cent, while for single name of like grade the range has been 12 to 24 per cent.

The causes which we have previously noted as tending to restrict speculation still continue to operate, especially in the stock market. In United States bonds the transactions for November show a decline of nearly forty-five per cent compared with the same month last year. In that class of securities, however, there has been considerable investment business, but rather in the way of selling than buying. The government purchased \$11,000,000; and yet prices have declined $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 per cent. In gold value, however, bonds were worth more at the close than at the opening of the month; for the price of gold declined from 128 $\frac{1}{4}$ on the first, to 121 $\frac{1}{4}$ on the 30th, and at London Sixty-two's advanced $1\frac{1}{2}$. The decline in gold, by rendering the interest upon currency investments more valuable, has caused a large amount of stock to be exchanged for railroad and other bonds, and the expectation that Congress may adopt some measures for funding the six per cent debt, at a lower rate of interest, has also induced free sales by the same class of holders; the purchases of the government, however, have absorbed the supply of bonds coming from this source.

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1865.	1866.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds.....	\$13,657,000	\$13,155,850	\$	\$9,810,050
State & city bonds.....	5,466,000	4,829,500		587,000
Company bonds.....	1,181,700	1,298,700	115,000	
Total—N. Y. mkt.....	\$20,304,700	\$19,312,050		\$10,397,050
Since January 1.....	245,134,600	292,546,650	\$67,361,050	

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of November as reported by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of month.	6's, 1881.		6's, (5-20 yrs.)		5's, 10-40.	
	Comp.	Reg.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.
1.....	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	116	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	114	116
2.....	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	115	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
3.....	118	118	115	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
4.....	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
5.....	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
6.....	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
7.....	118	118	115	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
8.....	118	118	115	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
9.....	118	118	115	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$

10.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
11.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
12.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
13.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
14.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
15.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
16.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
17.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
18.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
19.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
20.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
21.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
22.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
23.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
24.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
25.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
26.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
27.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
28.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
29.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
30.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
First.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
Highest.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
Lowest.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4
Closing.....	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4	117 1/4

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. 5-20s sh's.	Ill. C. sh's.	Erie sh's.	Date.	Cons for mon.	Am. securities. U. S. 5-20s sh's.	Ill. C. sh's.	Erie sh's.
Monday.....	1	(Holl. day.)	Monday.....	22	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Tuesday.....	2	93 1/4	83 1/4	97 1/4	Tuesday.....	23	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Wednesday.....	3	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Wednesday.....	24	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Thursday.....	4	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Thursday.....	25	94 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Friday.....	5	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Friday.....	26	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Saturday.....	6	Saturday.....	27	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Monday.....	7	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Monday.....	28	94 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Tuesday.....	8	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Tuesday.....	29	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Wednesday.....	9	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Wednesday.....	30	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Thursday.....	10	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Thursday.....	31	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Friday.....	11	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Friday.....	1	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Saturday.....	12	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Saturday.....	2	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Monday.....	13	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Monday.....	3	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Tuesday.....	14	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Tuesday.....	4	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Wednesday.....	15	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Wednesday.....	5	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Thursday.....	16	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Thursday.....	6	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Friday.....	17	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Friday.....	7	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Saturday.....	18	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Saturday.....	8	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Monday.....	19	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Monday.....	9	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4
Tuesday.....	20	93 1/4	83 1/4	98 1/4	Tuesday.....	10	93 1/4	83 1/4	99 1/4

The dulness in the stock market is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the sales of all kinds of stocks at the Exchange have amounted to only 705,238 shares for the month, against 1,713,627 shares in November, 1868. This depression is the more singular from the fact that the earnings of the roads have been, in the main, satisfactory, and that the condition of the money market has favored the carrying of stocks—conditions which it might be supposed would have induced an active speculation for higher prices. It is very evident, however, that the cessation of the "watering" mania has taken away the special inducements to speculation which have influenced the market for the last two years; and as the capital of nearly all the roads represented on the Stock Exchange has been largely increased, and the fall in the prices of produce raises a probability that railway companies may find it necessary to reduce the rates of freight, there is a very general disposition to postpone speculations for a rise, until it becomes more apparent how the net earnings are likely to square with the increased capital; and yet, as the roads are at present earning good dividends, and prices of stocks are moderate, there is no immediate inducement to operate for lower prices; in this position of affairs there is very obvious cause for the extreme moderation of business. In prices there has been considerable irregularity, but,

on the average, quotations are lower at the close than at the opening. The Vanderbilt stocks have been especially weak, New York Central having declined from 192½ to 169½; Hudson River from 172½ to 154, and Harlem from 141½ to 129, from which it is to be inferred that the completion of Mr. Vanderbilt's consolidation scheme has been followed by an extensive realizing by the larger holders of stock.

STOCKS SOLD AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1868.	1869.	Increase.	Dec.
Bank shares ..	2,945	1,201	1,141
Railroad ..	1,579,212	639,456	901,776
Coal ..	11,699	8,435	8,814
Mining ..	22,759	16,785	12,535
Improv't ..	11,200	2,200	9,000
Telegraph ..	26,151	11,629	14,510
Steamship ..	48,926	22,893	24,030
Express &c ..	45,874	18,193	27,150
Total—November ..	1,713,617	705,229	1,008,398
Since January 1 ..	18,619,673	10,682,994	8,036,673

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities sold at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of October and November, 1869 :

	October.				November.			
	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos.	Open.	High.	L. w.	Clos.
Railroad Stocks—								
Alton & Terre Haute ..	80	88	80	83	29	29	25	28
do do pref ..	56	60	56	59	53	54	58	58
Boston, Hartford & Erie ..	13	13	17	17½	11	11	9½	10
Chicago & Alton ..	146	146	185½	176	146½	152	143	148½
do do pref ..	141	147	136½	147	146½	149½	146½	148½
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy ..	165	165	194½	189½	155	155	147	158
do do & Northwest'n ..	71½	73½	69½	69½	69	75½	65½	74½
do do do pref ..	84½	85½	83½	84	84	88	83½	87½
do do & Rock Island ..	109½	110	133½	108½	103	108½	102½	106½
Columb., Chic. & Ind. C. ..	26½	27½	22	26½	28	28	21½	21½
Clev. & Pittsburgh ..	95	104	86½	86½	86	86	79	80
do Col., Cin. & Ind. ..	74½	78	73½	78	78	78	74½	74½
Del., Lack. & Western ..	110	111	109	111	111	111	101½	110
Dubuque & Sioux city ..	108	110	108	108½	109	109	108	110
Erie ..	83½	84½	29½	30	29½	30	27	27½
do preferred ..	58	59½	54	54	51	53	42	46½
Harlem ..	135	149½	129½	143½	141½	141½	121	129
Hannibal & St. Joseph ..	110	112	106½	108½	107	108½	107	107½
do do pref ..	111	111	109	109½	107	109	106	106
Hudson River ..	161½	174½	156½	173	172½	172½	154	155
Illinois Central ..	137	139	133	139	137½	140	131	138
Joliet & Chicago ..	92½	93½	92½	92½
Lake Sho. & Mich. South ..	85	94½	81½	91½	91½	91½	86½	88½
Mar. & Cinclin., let ..	20	20	18	18	20	21	18½	20
Michigan Central ..	123	124	119	122	119½	121	119½	121
Milwaukee & St. Paul ..	68½	70	65½	67½	67½	71	65½	67½
do do pref ..	81	83½	79½	80	78½	84½	78½	82½
Morris & Essex ..	57	58½	56½	58	57½	58	47	57
New Jersey ..	117½	120	117½	120	120	120	120	120
do scrip	112	112	112	112
do Central ..	107	107½	57	100	95	98½	88	88
New York Central ..	173	195	171½	193½	192½	192½	169½	164½
do do & R. C. Catk.	96	96	87	87
do scrip	81	83½	74	74
do do & N. Haven ..	128	140	125	140	139	141	138½	140
do do scrip ..	130	131	130	130½	132	141	132	141
Norwich & Worcester	108	108	108	108
Ohio & Mississippi ..	27½	28½	26	26	26	27½	24½	24½
do do pref ..	70	70	70	70	69	69	69	69
Panama ..	240	240	200	210	207½	207½	203	203
Pitts., F. W. & Chi. guar. ..	83½	85½	83½	85½	85	88	85	87½
Reading ..	93½	97	93	96½	96½	99½	98½	98½
Rome, W. & Ogdensburg	105	105	105	105
Third Avenue ..	197½	197½	197½	197½
Toledo, Wab. & Western ..	59½	67	55	64	63½	63½	55	55
do do do pref ..	78	80	76½	78	75	75	75	75

Miscellaneous—

American Coal	40	40	40	40
Cumberland	27	29	26½	27½	27	23	26	26
Pennsylvania Coal	230	250	120	280
Del. & Hud. Canal	120	120	120	120	1-2	122	120	120
Pacific Mail	68½	68½	64½	59½	59½	63	61	51
Boston Water power	13	14½	13	14
Huntswick City Land	9½	9½	9½	9	9	9	9	9
Canton	53	54	50	52½	52	52½	50½	51
Mariposa	9	9½	8	8	8	8	8	8
do pref.	16½	18	16	16½	16½	16½	15½	15½
Quicksilver	12	15	12	14½	15	15½	13½	13½
West. Union Telegraph	36½	37	36	36½	36½	36½	34½	31½
Bankers & Brokers Ass.	104	105	104	105	103½	103½	103½	103½

Express—

American M. Union.....	81	36	70	33	81	36½	83	35½
Adams.....	82½	58½	53½	57	68	59	55	57
United States.....	80½	60	47	58½	58½	5¼	51½	58
Wells, Fargo & Co.....	18	26½	19	20½	19	20½	16½	16½

The course of the gold premium has been steadily downward, from 128½ on the 1st to 121½ on the 30th. The decline has been partially due to the large supply on the market, consequent upon the lightness of the exports of specie for the past 11 months. The chief cause, however, is in the large sales of coin by the Treasury, the effect of which, after having been stayed off by speculation and doubts as to the persistence of Secretary Boutwell in his policy, is at last having its force. The total amount of coin advertised by the Treasury for sale during the month was \$11,000,000, the last instalment of \$1,000,000, offered on the 30th, was not sold, Mr. Boutwell declining to sell below 122, while the bids ranged between 120.63 and 121.20. The exports of specie for the month were quite nominal. The receipts on customs duties amounted to \$9,190,801, against \$7,638,883 in November, 1868.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Open'g	Lowest	High'st	Closing	Date.	Open'g	Lowest	High'st	Closing
Monday.....	1 138 3/4	128 3/4	128 3/4	128 3/4	Tuesday.....28	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Tuesday.....	2 138 3/4	127 1/4	128 3/4	127 1/4	Wednesday...29	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Wednesday....	3 126 3/4	127 1/4	127 1/4	127 1/4	Thursday.....25	124 3/4	124 3/4	124 3/4	124 3/4
Thursday.....	4 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	Friday.....26	124 3/4	124 3/4	124 3/4	124 3/4
Friday.....	5 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	Saturday.....27	123 3/4	123 3/4	123 3/4	123 3/4
Saturday.....	6 127 1/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	127 1/4	Monday.....28	123 3/4	123 3/4	123 3/4	123 3/4
Monday.....	7 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	Tuesday.....30	123 3/4	123 3/4	123 3/4	123 3/4
Tuesday.....	8 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					
Wednesday....	9 127 1/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	127 1/4					
Thursday.....	10 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	Nov., 1868.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Friday.....	11 127 1/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	" 1868.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Saturday.....	12 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	" 1867.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Monday.....	13 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	" 1866.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Tuesday.....	14 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	" 1865.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Wednesday....	15 127 1/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	127 1/4	" 1864.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Thursday.....	16 127 1/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	127 1/4	" 1863.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Friday.....	17 127 1/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	127 1/4	" 1862.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Saturday.....	18 (Thurs.-Frid. Day.)				" 1861.....	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4	126 3/4
Monday.....	19 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					
Tuesday.....	20 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					
Wednesday....	21 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4	S'ce Jan 1, 1860.	124 3/4	124 3/4	124 3/4	124 3/4
Thursday.....	22 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					
Friday.....	23 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					
Saturday.....	24 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					
Monday.....	25 126 3/4	126 3/4	127 1/4	126 3/4					

Foreign exchange has ruled steady at $\frac{1}{2}$ below the specie shipping rate, the market having been well supplied with both southern and local bills, while a moderate amount of bond bills have been marketed.

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

Days.	London. cents for 64 pence.	Paris. centimes for dollar.	Amsterdam. cents for forlin.	Bremen. cents for rix daler.	Hamburg. M. banco.	Berlin. cents for thaler.
1...	102 1/2 @ 102 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
2...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
3...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
4...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
5...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
6...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
7...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
8...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
9...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
10...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
11...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
12...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
13...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
14...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
15...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
16...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
17...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
18...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
19...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
20...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
21...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
22...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
23...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
24...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
25...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
26...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
27...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
28...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
29...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
30...	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
Oct., 1868	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2
Oct., 1869	108 1/2 @ 108 1/2	51 1/2 @ 51 1/2	40 1/2 @ 40 1/2	78 1/2 @ 78 1/2	35 1/2 @ 35 1/2	71 1/2 @ 71 1/2

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1 :

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. Clear'gs.
February 6.	260,541,733	27,989,404	24,246,436	196,802,899	53,424,133	670,329,470
February 13.	264,380,407	31,554,531	24,263,451	192,977,860	52,384,953	690,754,499
February 21.	263,432,064	28,511,901	24,247,321	187,612,542	50,987,197	70,099,011
February 27.	261,371,897	30,632,603	24,217,981	186,216,175	50,855,054	529,116,929
March 6.	262,039,883	19,486,694	24,273,885	182,601,437	49,146,269	727,148,181
March 13.	261,699,693	17,363,671	24,690,445	172,392,458	49,699,621	629,177,566
March 20.	263,093,302	15,213,306	24,141,310	183,601,999	51,744,874	790,716,002
March 27.	254,909,549	12,018,721	24,777,814	180,113,910	50,553,103	797,957,433
April 3.	261,933,675	10,747,389	21,818,916	175,325,769	48,486,934	887,236,698
April 10.	257,130,227	8,791,443	21,604,360	171,436,580	43,644,732	810,16,453
April 17.	253,184,382	7,811,779	21,436,761	172,201,494	51,001,88	772,395,548
April 24.	257,153,014	8,899,689	21,060,511	177,310,080	5,677,888	757,908,766
May 1.	261,135,160	9,267,615	23,972,033	184,945,565	56,486,722	763,763,849
May 8.	264,439,372	10,081,449	23,938,160	19,838,37	55,109,573	71,174,577
May 15.	269,197,877	15,374,769	23,977,793	199,392,443	56,501,360	860,720,880
May 22.	270,275,363	16,429,404	23,927,366	199,414,869	57,98,898	788,747,252
May 29.	271,385,461	17,871,280	23,920,858	213,056,600	57,810,873	781,146,491
June 5.	277,919,609	19,061,193	23,929,495	199,124,042	51,289,429	799,28,026
June 12.	271,393,785	19,053,580	24,141,790	193,886,045	50,969,253	850,000,648
June 19.	261,341,966	19,025,444	24,198,829	189,214,10	49,612,483	836,224,021
June 26.	260,441,733	20,217,140	24,214,765	481,774,696	48,161,920	79,170,744
July 3.	268,398,471	23,580,267	24,217,778	179,929,685	47,787,263	46,763,340
July 10.	267,444,942	20,266,912	24,277,943	163,197,239	48,12,724	678,540,291
July 17.	267,068,292	21,065,450	24,173,437	183,431,711	51,359,716	711,328,111
July 24.	269,611,859	20,073,444	24,110,748	183,622,281	51,277,831	684,446,097
July 31.	260,580,473	27,911,333	24,163,677	196,416,413	56,101,627	814,453,47
August 7.	264,841,937	26,003,923	24,917,985	200,220,103	56,996,734	814,675,637
August 14.	266,906,05	24,164,399	23,992,357	198,962,711	51,790,069	82,321,069
August 21.	262,711,133	21,991,510	24,027,101	194,044,646	51,701,831	596,650,581
August 28.	26,012,109	19,161,108	21,999,743	188,753,539	52,792,831	603,80,345
September 4.	262,549,849	17,417,722	23,960,85	191,10,066	5,839,784	546,889,478
September 11.	261,864,83	14,912,096	23,961,196	189,829,344	51,427,867	791,763,311
September 18.	266,196,034	14,581,19	23,972,79	183,360,130	51,299,197	662,419,764
September 25.	263,141,823	13,963,431	23,999,181	180,230,793	50,028,01	689,277,472
October 2.	256,339,619	15,902,349	21,169,49	178,124,048	54,09,088	792,893,772
October 9.	260,749,974	21,518,536	24,176,925	179,214,673	52,017,508	628,387,553

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag Clear'gs
October 16...	218,537,941	20,399,070	34,317,114	174,444,936	53,224,504	531,390,283
Oct. ber 23...	219,350,073	19,311,701	31,204,435	153,793,919	53,037,454	581,510,267
October 30...	250,444,581	21,950,006	31,136,249	180,824,832	52,177,841	540,470,614
November 6...	252,709,459	2,219,006	34,188,663	182,968,840	49,977,544	689,888,676
November 13...	251,105,517	2,755,693	34,212,847	183,751,305	51,065,061	670,559,293
November 20...	253,968,103	27,920,071	34,231,921	183,731,190	47,455,121	461,750,758
November 27...	272,774,474	29,647,893	33,155,838	183,597,893	48,181,893	577,888,665
December 4...	453,335,993	30,633,539	34,140,469	182,990,140	45,959,274	676,011,384

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
April 5.....	10,499,946	139,003	12,169,221	35,375,854	10,622,496
April 12.....	50,770,193	181,346	12,643,367	36,029,133	10,621,164
April 19.....	51,178,371	167,818	12,941,783	37,031,747	10,624,425
April 26.....	51,394,224	164,361	12,640,069	37,477,285	10,624,407
May 3.....	51,510,934	201,758	14,320,371	38,971,241	10,627,515
May 10.....	51,933,530	270,525	14,623,803	39,178,803	10,617,934
May 17.....	51,168,626	276,167	14,696,363	40,692,742	10,622,496
May 24.....	52,391,764	174,115	15,087,008	41,614,410	10,618,246
May 31.....	52,210,874	183,257	16,484,947	42,477,819	10,628,561
June 7.....	52,620,257	169,816	15,378,388	42,340,230	10,619,590
June 14.....	51,134,640	152,451	15,178,312	42,005,077	10,619,590
June 21.....	52,810,095	148,795	14,972,129	42,064,901	10,617,844
June 28.....	53,661,171	180,684	14,567,327	41,517,716	10,622,704
July 5.....	53,937,641	302,621	14,011,449	41,921,637	10,618,246
July 12.....	53,110,735	485,293	13,415,493	40,140,497	10,619,590
July 19.....	51,128,898	456,751	12,944,890	39,834,862	10,618,246
July 26.....	52,461,100	390,377	13,076,180	36,160,614	10,619,590
Aug 2.....	51,953,813	384,869	12,618,911	39,717,126	10,619,590
Aug 9.....	51,079,930	327,216	13,580,061	39,506,405	10,619,590
Aug 16.....	51,933,941	266,059	13,047,635	39,141,198	10,619,590
Aug 23.....	52,309,626	244,256	12,977,037	39,000,665	10,619,590
Aug 30.....	52,038,652	245,515	13,013,213	38,338,414	10,619,590
Sept 6.....	51,971,372	247,358	13,073,705	39,213,568	10,619,590
Sept 13.....	51,597,318	199,169	12,900,044	38,916,913	10,619,590
Sept 20.....	51,708,372	174,855	13,248,598	39,169,626	10,619,590
Sept 27.....	54,170,402	189,068	13,418,859	39,347,378	10,619,590
October 4.....	51,033,010	177,303	13,335,858	38,436,294	10,619,590
Oct 11.....	51,597,944	206,111	12,830,357	37,102,575	10,619,590
Oct 18.....	51,637,361	284,598	12,980,187	37,002,063	10,619,590
Oct 25.....	51,701,039	216,915	12,438,501	36,738,298	10,619,590
Nov 1.....	51,532,214	354,815	13,104,341	37,965,411	10,619,590
Nov 8.....	51,969,031	647,685	13,278,567	38,781,734	10,619,590
Nov 15.....	51,781,448	673,475	13,175,402	38,438,991	10,619,590
Nov 22.....	51,579,807	665,899	12,913,135	38,351,230	10,619,590

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Deposits.	Circulation.
April 5.....	96,344,714	262,216	11,348,384	34,504,099	24,771,616
April 12.....	99,625,473	750,160	11,201,519	34,392,377	24,771,616
April 19.....	101,118,750	639,460	11,430,966	31,257,071	25,518,412
April 26.....	98,971,711	617,433	11,361,637	33,302,493	25,518,412
May 3.....	100,127,414	708,963	12,252,113	36,735,742	25,518,412
May 10.....	100,556,542	1,267,749	12,018,472	37,457,837	25,518,412
May 17.....	101,474,527	1,134,886	12,689,527	38,708,894	25,518,412
May 24.....	102,042,181	934,560	14,119,542	39,347,681	25,518,412
May 31.....	102,538,373	772,297	14,606,857	38,403,624	25,518,412
June 7.....	103,643,849	640,582	12,454,601	38,491,446	25,518,412
June 14.....	104,952,548	601,743	12,948,615	37,403,719	25,518,412
June 21.....	103,691,663	959,796	12,067,203	36,343,995	25,518,412
June 28.....	102,558,625	1,103,692	11,794,504	34,331,417	25,518,412
July 5.....	102,633,948	3,140,626	9,645,668	31,651,745	25,518,412
July 12.....	101,403,211	2,255,121	9,511,879	31,580,417	25,518,412
July 19.....	102,707,510	2,021,595	9,798,461	35,211,103	25,518,412
Aug 2.....	103,601,561	2,363,890	10,719,569	37,890,687	25,518,412
Aug 9.....	104,811,271	2,154,616	10,498,595	36,117,973	25,518,412
Aug 16.....	103,087,791	2,127,372	11,200,964	34,933,731	25,518,412
Aug 23.....	103,063,197	1,511,713	11,906,736	35,229,149	25,518,412
Sept 6.....	103,845,516	1,715,563	11,792,519	37,041,045	25,518,412
Sept 13.....	104,477,377	1,284,874	12,571,211	37,962,711	25,518,412
Sept 20.....	104,478,949	1,515,641	12,747,357	37,064,497	25,518,412
Sept 27.....	104,753,531	518,579	12,950,087	36,917,996	25,518,412
Oct 4.....	105,490,008	652,197	12,747,004	36,800,894	25,518,412
Oct 11.....	104,946,179	1,191,713	11,913,893	34,891,731	25,518,412
Oct 18.....	104,751,831	1,151,364	11,876,043	34,446,603	25,518,412
Oct 25.....	103,662,630	1,090,120	11,319,796	34,877,011	25,518,412
Nov 1.....	103,400,940	1,363,791	11,711,185	35,810,564	25,518,412
Nov 8.....	104,184,433	1,636,219	11,564,147	36,896,618	25,518,412
Nov 15.....	104,506,997	2,713,218	11,536,118	36,197,306	25,518,412
Nov 22.....	103,177,786	1,755,693	11,395,691	36,398,911	25,518,412
Nov 29.....	103,379,544	1,227,090	11,579,406	36,676,549	25,518,412
Dec 6.....	103,923,510	1,590,738	11,978,107	37,344,225	25,518,412

